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FOREWORD
The study of the history of naval warfare is an integral part of the Naval War College’s educational programs. The importance of the discipline was firmly established with the foundation of the College in 1884 with the initial contributions of
both the College’s founder, Stephen B. Luce, and his successor as its President, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Historical research and analysis have continued as recognized elements of the academic life of the institution for the past 125 years.
Nowhere has the history of warfare at sea been more thoroughly investigated and
analyzed for the professional purposes of the U.S. Navy than at the Naval War College. Nowhere is there a more logical requirement for a corpus of relevant source
materials and for an academic research department devoted to new research in naval history. On 1 January 2003, the College’s Maritime History Department was established as part of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies to carry out this function.
Predating this, a program for the publication of books and source materials on the
history of naval warfare was formally established by the College in 1975, with a series known as the Naval War College Historical Monographs.
In order to encourage and to make more widely known the College’s extensive
collections for historical research, including its archives, historical manuscripts,
and associated materials in the Naval War College Museum’s collection, the series
has been restricted to book-length works that deal with the history of naval warfare
and are based, wholly or in part, on the source materials in the Naval War College
Library’s Naval Historical Collection and the Naval War College Museum. As the
series has developed over the past thirty-five years, these works have taken a variety
of forms, including bibliographies and conference proceedings, many of them edited historical documents from the College’s rich historical collections. This series
is now managed by the Maritime History Department in collaboration with the Naval War College Press and the head of the Naval War College’s Naval Historical
Collection.
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TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Consistent with the earlier books that have appeared in this series since 1975,
Dr. Albert A. Nofi has made very effective use of the Naval War College’s archives,
among a very wide range of other archival and published materials that he has used
in completing this study, To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems,
1923–1940. Dr. Nofi’s work is a major contribution to our historical understanding
of the interwar period in American naval history. In this volume he examines and
describes in detail each of the “fleet problems,” discussing the issues raised and the
resulting conclusions in the individual fleet exercises. Then, in a triple set of very
valuable conclusions, Nofi elucidates the larger patterns that emerged over the period, finds a range of enduring lessons from this full set of experiences, and goes on
to suggest the applicability of some of his historical observations for future thinking
about naval warfare in the twenty-first century.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF, D.PHIL.
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History
Chairman, Maritime History Department
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PREFACE
It was certainly never my intention to write a book on the fleet problems.
In January of 2001 the Center for Naval Analyses, in Alexandria, Virginia, assigned me as its field representative to the CNO Strategic Studies Group, in Newport, Rhode Island. Chartered by the Chief of Naval Operations, the SSG annually
brings together in a collegial environment some naval officers, scientists, and analysts for ten months to consider, develop, and evaluate “revolutionary war-fighting
concepts.” At the beginning of 2002, SSG XXI began to discuss the problem of “metrics” and “measures of effectiveness” that might be of use in evaluating experimental war-fighting concepts generated by the SSG for the naval service over the years.
In conversation, it was suggested that these ideas were as innovative in their way as
naval aviation had been eighty years earlier, involving new, unproven, and unprecedented technologies that might radically alter the character of warfare. Having
spent a great many years studying military and naval history, I recalled reading that
the “annual fleet exercises” held between the world wars had played a role in shaping
naval aviation, but knew nothing more about them than that. It occurred to me that
the naval officers who had conducted the fleet problems all those years earlier had
themselves addressed this very problem, how to craft “metrics” and “measures of effectiveness” to help develop an understanding of the power and potential of aviation. So it seemed reasonable to have a look at how they had gone about it.
At the time, a colleague commented, “One would think the fleet problems have
been mined to death.”1 There is some truth to this.
There has been extensive research into the fleet problems. That research, however, has focused almost exclusively on their relevance to the development of naval
aviation, and particularly carrier aviation. The pioneering work in this regard is
James M. Grimes’ Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, 1911–1939, an unpublished volume
in the postwar series U.S. Naval Administrative Histories of World War II, which attempted to examine the role of the fleet problems in the rise of naval aviation. Unfortunately, Grimes focused very narrowly on carrier aviation, provided little
analysis, and does not seem to have had access to many of the pertinent documents.2
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TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

A number of more recent works dealing with naval aviation have involved some discussion of the fleet problems. Notable among these are American & British Aircraft
Carrier Development, 1919–1941, by Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and
Mark D. Mandeles,3 and Thomas Wildenberg’s two books Destined for Glory: Dive
Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower and All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Air Power.4
These are valuable works. But their concern with the development of naval aviation can lead to the mistaken impression that the fleet problems were primarily
about the role of aircraft in sea power. Although advances in naval aviation were
perhaps the most spectacular development to come out of the fleet problems, aviation was but one of many innovations, technologies, and doctrines developed,
tested, and refined during the fleet problems.
The only major published work devoted specifically to the fleet problems is
Craig C. Felker’s Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises,
1923–1940.5 Felker very correctly identifies the central fact that fleet problems were
successful because they were unscripted free maneuvers. His focus, however, is on
the fleet problems as they affected the ways in which specific technological developments (e.g., carrier aviation, submarines, and so on) were integrated into the Navy’s
tool box. This is valuable, of course. But it overlooks the role of the fleet problems in
developing the integrated “naval force” that successfully prosecuted the Pacific
War.6 In addition, the work does not look at the effects of the fleet problems on the
development of the Navy’s understanding of the complexities of war across the vast
Pacific, or the ways in which they helped hone the skills of the officers who would
command and staff the fleet in the war.
Even Edward S. Miller’s magisterial War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat
Japan, 1897–1945,7 an indispensable work for anyone seeking to understand the development of the Navy’s plans for war against Japan, pays but slight attention to the
fleet problems. Nevertheless, scenarios for the fleet problems often reflected contemporary thinking on how such a war should unfold, and the problems certainly
influenced the final triumph of those planners who believed that a long, cautious
approach to defeating Japan was more likely to yield success than a vigorous thrust
across the Pacific on the outbreak of war. Indeed, the difficulties of conducting
trans-oceanic operations that were revealed in the fleet problems would seem to
have had a significant influence on resolving the dispute between the “Thrusters”
and the “Cautionaries” in favor of the latter by the mid-1930s.8
There have also been a number of academic papers drawing upon the wealth of
documentation produced by the fleet problems. Mark Allen Campbell’s immensely
valuable “The Influence of Air Power Upon the Evolution of Battle Doctrine in the
U.S. Navy, 1922–1941” makes extensive use of evidence from the fleet problems as
he discusses the ways in which air power insinuated itself into the Navy’s thinking.
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PREFACE

Francis Lovell Keith’s thesis, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution: An Analysis
of United States Fleet Problems, 1931–1934,” provides a highly detailed, critical look
at the influence of Fleet Problems XII, XIII, XIV, and XV (1931–1934) on the evolution of the concept of the autonomous task force in the Navy, while Ryan David
Wadle’s “United States Navy Fleet Problems and the Development of Carrier Aviation, 1929–1933” looks more specifically at the problems of aviation.9
While these works provide valuable insights into the contributions of the fleet
problems to the development of the Navy in particular areas, they all seem to overlook one of their most essential features.
In a sense, the fleet problems provide a series of “snapshots” of what the Navy’s
senior leadership believed things would be like if they had to take the fleet to war
immediately. The only treatment of a fleet problem as if it were a real “war” is the
chapter “A Mirror to War: Fleet Problem XX” in Patrick Abbazia’s old, but still valuable, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939–1942.10
In short, despite the importance of the fleet problems to the U.S. Navy, in refining naval skills in all aspects of war at sea, in integrating innovative technologies
into the fleet, in shaping doctrine and tactics, and in training the commanders and
staffs who fought World War II, it is surprising how little they have been studied,
particularly given the extraordinary experimental process they represented. The
fleet problems were critical to the development of doctrine, tactics, and technology
in all naval warfare areas, including strategic offensive and defensive operations,
amphibious warfare, coast defense, battleline and surface tactics, convoy escort,
mining and counter-mining, and submarine and anti-submarine operations, as
well as communications, security, intelligence, cryptological operations, underway
refueling, and apparently even special operations, in addition to the fast carrier task
force. Perhaps even more importantly, the fleet problems provided extremely realistic training in the planning and conduct of operations on a trans-oceanic scale for
the generation of officers who went on to win World War II. So a look at the fleet
problems is of value not only for their importance in creating the fleet that won the
Pacific war, but also for the lessons they may yield for anyone who is today thinking
about transformation of the naval service. This was the origin of the present work.
My intention in writing this was twofold. First, I wanted to examine the fleet
problems as a process or tool that the Navy’s leadership used to develop and refine
its strategy, tactics, organization, and technology, not to mention its skills at commanding the fleet in wartime. In addition, the Fleet Problems can serve to throw
light on how the Navy’s senior commanders viewed the nature of war at sea “here
and now.” These two overlapping objectives resulted in the use of a chronological
approach, as the examination of each fleet problem as a problem made it possible to
study the process by which the fleet’s senior commanders attempted its resolution,
given the tools available at the time, and sought to integrate innovative ideas into
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TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

their war making, which thus more or less reflected what they expected to do if they
had to go to war at that time.
Many areas of interest are beyond the scope of the present work, and require further exploration. Some major questions with regard to the history of naval operations in the mid-20th century surely include:
How did the lessons of the fleet problems become embodied in planning, doctrine, and tactics?
What influence did the fleet problems—and the frequent closely associated joint
Army-Navy exercises—have on the development of joint doctrine?
What similarities and differences existed between the fleet problems and the annual maneuvers of the Royal Navy,11 the Imperial Navy,12 and other major fleets?13
Were the fleet problems studied by foreign navies—and particularly the Imperial Navy—to provide insights into the ways in which the U.S. Navy intended to
fight?14
What effect did performance in the fleet problems have on the career prospects
of the participating officers?
Did the relatively short tenure of CINCUS and other senior commanders hamper systematic analysis and application of lessons learned?
There is more, of course. One could also ask how the fleet problems influenced
the development of the Navy’s communications systems, logistical flexibility, staff
work, cryptographic skills, and more. Of special importance is the subject of the development of the rules, with a particular eye on determining how closely they conformed to reality as experienced during the Second World War. Students of
diplomatic history might find it useful to look into the relationship between the
Navy’s senior leadership and the State Department during the planning of the fleet
problems. Certainly, the planning for some of the problems required State Department participation, where visits to foreign ports were involved or when participating elements were to operate from foreign soil.15 In addition, the State Department
occasionally suggested changes in places to be visited by the fleet during a problem
due to local political conditions.16 Then too, the press, both foreign and domestic, as
well as some political leaders, notably in Japan, often charged that a particular fleet
problem seemed to be intended to influence recent international developments.17 In
at least one instance there may be some truth to this; Fleet Problem XX (1939) certainly was shaped largely by concerns about Fascist ambitions and penetration in
Latin America, and might deeper investigation reveal other such linkages?18 And
scholars of “Peace Studies” should certainly address the remarkable parallels between protests by individuals, organizations, or governments that the fleet problems were “provocative” or “threats to the peace” during the 1920s and 1930s with
similar protests over military exercises during the Cold War and down to the present, often made by the same organizations and even the same people.19
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PREFACE

The economic, social, and cultural impact of the fleet’s presence in various ports
as a result of the fleet problems seems worthy of inquiry. During a port call large
numbers of sailors—easily 30,000—were often given liberty, providing enormous
infusions of cash into local economies. And while beneficial to the economies of
places such as New York or San Francisco, where they were not seriously disruptive
of local social and cultural institutions, large numbers of free-spending sailors must
have been enormously important to the economies of places such as Panama or
Puerto Rico, yet at the same time imposing significant social, cultural, and racial
strains.20
One could even study the influence of the fleet problems on the social life of the
Navy. The concentration of the fleet provided an occasion for intraservice athletic
events, then a particularly important part of American military life.21 Port calls following a problem were often the occasion for festive receptions, and a fleet problem
sometimes sparked a temporary migration of many Navy families to places such as
Hawaii, the East Coast, or the Caribbean, to be near their sailor relatives, for a bit of
vacation, and to participate in these social events.22 There is even evidence that the
fleet problems were taken into consideration by officers in planning their personal
lives; John “Jimmy” Thach, one of the fleet’s most innovative aviators, advanced the
date of his wedding by several weeks in order to avoid a conflict with Fleet Problem
XIII (1932).23
The fleet problems also seem to have had some influence on popular culture.
References to them occasionally turn up in travel literature, where the presence of
the fleet for a problem is sometimes used to boost the attractiveness of a particular
port.24 More prominently, the movements of the fleet connected with “maneuvers”
were a common theme in many romantic comedies during the period, such as the
motion pictures Follow the Fleet (1936), Sailors Three (1940), and The Fleet’s In
(1941), as well as stage plays such as Sailor, Beware!, which had 500 performances on
Broadway in 1933–34, an impressive run for the times, or Battleship Gertie, which
flopped after two performances in 1935.25
In short, the present work could be seen as just a preliminary look at the role the
fleet problems played in the creation of the modern Navy and, even more broadly,
the shaping of the Navy as part of American society.
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A NOTE ON USAGE
(1) In the interest of brevity, not to mention a smoother narrative, a number of
short cuts have been used in the discussion of incidents during the fleet problems.
The form “the carrier Saratoga was sunk” has generally been used, rather than the
wordier, albeit more accurate, “the umpires ruled that the carrier Saratoga had been
sunk.” Likewise, “opened fire” for “commenced simulated firing” or “firing blank
rounds,” and so forth.
(2) In 1920 the Navy introduced the now-familiar alphanumeric ship type code
designation, such as BB for battleship, CV for aircraft carrier, and so on, with an appended number indicating the particular vessel in question; Lexington (CV 2), Mississippi (BB 41), etc. This designation has been used whenever a particular ship is
mentioned in the text for the first time. Thereafter an attempt has been made to use
the type designation the first time a ship is mentioned in connection with a particular fleet problem, but such usage has not been consistent, particularly for major
warships.
(3) Geographic terminology and spelling conforms to usage prevalent during
the inter-war period.
(4) Times given are usually local. For some problems held in the mid- and late
1930s, the Navy introduced the practice of using Greenwich Civil Time during fleet
problems, which has been converted into local time in this work.
(5) Abbreviations:
AC
Collier
ACR
Armored cruiser; temporary designation used in the early
1920s
AD
Destroyer tender: equipped to serve as a “base” for
destroyers
AG
General: used for special vessels such as target ships, training ships, oceanographic survey ships, and so forth
AK
Cargo ship
AM
Minesweeper/Mine tender
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AO
AR
AS
AT
AV
AVP
BASFOR
BATDIV
BATFLT
BATFOR
BB
C
C/S
CA
CARDIV
CINCUS
CL
CM
CNO
COM

Fleet oiler
Repair ship
Submarine tender
Transport
Aircraft tender
Aircraft tender—Small
Base Force
Battleship Division, usually four ships
Battle Fleet
Battle Force
Battleship
Designation for older cruisers used briefly around 1920
Chief-of-Staff
Heavy Cruiser
Carrier Division, usually two ships
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
Light Cruiser
Minelayer; see also AM, DM
Chief of Naval Operations
Commander, with name or abbreviation of the command
attached
COM [+ numeral] Commander, [indicated] Naval District
COMAIRONS
Commander, Air Squadrons
COMBATFLT
Commander, Battle Fleet
COMBATFOR
Commander, Battle Force
COMDESRON
Commander, Destroyer Squadron
COMSCOFLT
Commander, Scouting Fleet
COMSCOFOR
Commander, Scouting Force
CRUDIV
Cruiser Division, usually four ships
CS
Scout Cruiser, later CL
CV
Aircraft carrier
CVE
Escort aircraft carrier
DD
Destroyer
DESDIV
Destroyer Division, usually four ships
DESRON
Destroyer Squadron, usually eight ships
DM
Light Minelayer/Destroyer Minelayer
FLEX
Fleet Landing Exercise
FP
Fleet Problem
FY
Fiscal Year, which in those days began July 1
GCT
Greenwich Civil Time
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GJE
LCT
NAS
nm
NWC
OTC
PATRON
PATWING
SCOFLT
SCOFOR
SS
SUBDIV
SUBRON
USMA
USNA
VB
VF
VP
VPB
VS
VSB
VT
XO
ZR/ZRS
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Grand Joint [Army and Navy] Exercise
Local Civil Time
Naval Air Station
nautical mile(s), about 1.15 statute miles, 2,027 yards,
1,852 meters
Naval War College
Officer in Tactical Command
Patrol Bomber Squadron
Patrol Bomber Wing, of two or more squadrons
Scouting Fleet
Scouting Force
Submarine
Submarine Division, usually four boats
Submarine Squadron, usually eight boats
United States Military Academy (West Point)
United States Naval Academy (Annapolis)
Bombing Squadron
Fighting Squadron
Patrol Squadron
Patrol Bombing Squadron
Scouting Squadron
Scout Bombing Squadron
Torpedo Bombing Squadron
Executive Officer
Rigid Airship—Zeppelin
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Saratoga (CV 3), June 6, 1935, during the final Phase of Fleet Problem XVI. Very
fast, and roomy enough to park several dozen aircraft forward and still conduct
landing operations, Saratoga and her sister Lexington (CV 2) were the critical
test-beds for the autonomous carrier task force during the fleet problems.
(USN Photo 80-G-651292, Naval Historical Foundation)
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Part 1: “To Train the Fleet”

The enemy carriers and their escorts were proceeding on a northwesterly course under
clear tropic skies. Both flattops had some aircraft spotted on their flight decks in anticipation of imminent action while others were below being serviced, when shortly after
0800 they were spotted by three scout bombers off Lexington. After calling for assistance, at 0815 the three scouts made a dive bombing run on the larger enemy carrier.
Roaring out of the sky almost vertically, they put several bombs into the forward edge of
her flight deck, inflicting serious damage. At 0829, just fourteen minutes after the first
strike, as the carrier’s crew struggled to put out fires and haul aircraft out of danger, the
first of five waves of Lexington dive bombers, forty-two aircraft in all, screamed down
out of the skies, showering the wounded ship with bombs. Aircraft on her deck began exploding, and soon the great ship had been turned into a burning wreck. Four minutes
later, at 0833, fifteen more Lexington aircraft struck the smaller enemy carrier, followed two minutes later by a dozen more, and soon she too was engulfed in flames. In
less than twenty minutes, both enemy carriers had been put out of action.
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Students of the Pacific War may find this incident eerily familiar, reminiscent of
the fate that befell the Japanese carriers at Midway on June 4, 1942. Yet Lexington
(CV 2) was certainly not at Midway, having been sunk in the Coral Sea twenty-seven
days earlier, on May 8th. And none of her missions during the first months of the
war inflicted such damage on the Imperial Navy.
This operation actually occurred in peacetime, near Navassa Island, in the Caribbean southwest of Haiti, on March 14, 1930, during maneuvers designated Fleet
Problem X, when Lexington aircraft were ruled to have inflicted devastating damage
on the “enemy” carriers Saratoga (CV 3) and Langley (CV 1), in just about twenty
minutes.
Between 1922 and 1940, the U.S. Navy conducted an extraordinary series of major free maneuvers called “fleet problems.” Writing in 1939, Secretary of the Navy
Claude A. Swanson noted that the fleet problems were “of the utmost value in training the personnel of the fleet.”1 The fleet problems were an attempt to engage in maneuvers under conditions that approximated those that would occur in actual war.
Decades later, Admiral James O. Richardson, who had served as Commanderin-Chief United States Fleet (CINCUS) in 1940–41, recalled that the fleet problems
were “fought with zest and determination”limited only by considerations of safety.2
It was during the fleet problems that the U.S. Navy evolved from a force that
thought of the future in terms of a series of somewhat more sophisticated battleship
clashes in the style of Jutland,3 to one that saw the future, albeit unclearly, in terms of
surface, air, undersea, and marine forces integrated into a combined arms “naval
force” capable of carrying American power across the Pacific to Japan.

N O T E S 1 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1939
(Washington: Government Printing Office,
1939), p. 11; these documents will be cited as Annual Report, with the appropriate year. Thumbnail biographies of Swanson and other persons
named in this work can be found in Appendix 4,
“Persons Mentioned in the Text.”
2 James O. Richardson’s On the Treadmill to Pearl
Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, U.S.N. (Ret.), as told to George C. Dyer
(Washington: Naval History Division, 1973), p.
44. This work provides an immensely valuable
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look at the inner workings of the fleet by its senior officer, though it has to be used with some
care given the author’s hostility to certain other
officers and the President. The book is often contradictory (e.g., pp. 27, 58–59, 158–60, etc.), badly
edited, and poorly indexed (e.g., there is no index
reference to the mention of Claude Bloch on p.
467, though there is one to p. 451, on which he
does not appear).
3 See, for example, “Battle Fleet Tests Jutland Problems,” New York Times, Mar. 17, 1923, referring
to FP I (1923).
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The Eastern Pacific and Caribbean
(Suggesting the Strategic Scale of
the Fleet Problems)
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I Background and Purpose

T

he fleet problems were genuine free maneuvers, involving most of the available resources of the entire Navy, portions of which operated against each
other under the leadership of the officers who would command it in wartime
in highly unscripted campaigns that sometimes sprawled over hundreds of thousands of square miles of ocean, which provided valuable lessons for the development of the Navy, many of which are still relevant.
Of course the Navy had engaged in regular fleet maneuvers since 1889. The
number of ships involved and the complexity of these maneuvers grew steadily, as
the fleet and America’s strategic interests grew. In the first fifteen years of the 20th
Century, the Navy conducted major maneuvers in the Caribbean, off the Azores, or
off the U.S. east coast on a more-or-less annual basis. The last of these took place in
the Caribbean during the winter of 1916–17, shortly before the United States broke
relations with Germany. Naturally, maneuvers were suspended during World War I.
It was not until more than two years after the Armistice that the Navy once again
held a major fleet maneuver, in January and February of 1921. At that time, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were brought together for maneuvers in the Pacific off Panama. After the maneuvers, the ships of the Pacific Fleet paid port calls in Chile, while
those of the Atlantic Fleet visited in Peru, before returning to their home stations.1
Similar maneuvers were planned for 1922, but the proposal had to be shelved, due
largely to a shortage of funds.2 Later that same year the fleet was reorganized, forming what was essentially one major command, the “United States Fleet,” under a single commander.3 This set the stage for the fleet problems.
Just a few months after the restructuring of the fleet in 1922, the Navy began the
first of what would become a series of twenty-one fleet problems.4 In concept,
procedures, and execution, the fleet problems in many ways resembled the
more-or-less annual large fleet maneuvers that it had conducted in the fifteen years
or so before World War I, and again in 1921.5 But the global political and strategic
environment had changed considerably as a result of the Great War. One of the
most important developments post-war was that the fleet no longer found its training interrupted by foreign crises or wars. Nearly every year from the end of the 1898
war with Spain through the early 1920s, major elements of the fleet were regularly
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engaged in overseas missions, conducting interventions in the Caribbean, making
shows of force or conducting diplomatic missions in East Asia or Europe or North
Africa, and, of course, engaging in World War I, the aftermath of which still found
elements of the fleet deployed abroad into the early 1920s.
From about 1922 until well into the late 1930s, the bulk of the fleet was hardly
ever called upon to show the flag, and it never had to fight. As a result, as naval analyst Peter M. Swartz noted, the fleet became “a giant training center and laboratory,
and its operations giant training drills and fleet battle experiments.”6 In the fleet
problems, “the role of at-sea exercises as not only a schoolhouse but also the fleet’s
laboratory for experimentation and testing of innovative ideas reached its apogee.”7
This continuum of exercises not only laid the foundation for the Navy–Marine
Corps team—the “naval force”—that secured victory in the war against Japan in the
Pacific, but also contributed significantly to the defeat of the European Fascist powers, to success in the Cold War, and to America’s global reach in the 21st Century.
The fleet problems were intended to provide the Navy, and particularly its senior
commanders, with the most realistic possible training short of actual combat, to
teach officers to think through problems and train them in the development of operational plans and orders, and to test doctrines and technologies. They marked the
culmination of the Navy’s training year, which consisted of numerous smaller exercises. For the battle line there were “fleet battle practices” and “long range battle
practices,” essentially gunnery and maneuvering exercises.8 Portions of the fleet operated against each other in “fleet tactical exercises.”9 In “fleet landing exercises” the
Navy and Marine Corps experimented with what were then termed advanced base
operations.10 There were also “light forces exercises,” “submarine attack exercises,”
“air attack exercises,” and more. Some notion of the frequency of such exercises may
be gained by observing that upon conclusion of Fleet Problem XIV in February
1933, the Battle Force engaged in “vigorous exercises” off Long Beach, March 6th
through 9th, culminating in a “fleet engagement,” and then spent March 27th–April
7th in battleship drill, gunnery exercises, and anti-aircraft practice.11
There were also “joint” exercises with the Army, which were often more or less
integrated with or appended to fleet problems. “Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercises”
were held occasionally,12 but “Minor Joint Army-Navy Exercises,” which involved
participation of relatively small elements of the two services, were more common.13
There were also occasional “Coast Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercises.”14 Even
when there was no formal Army participation in a problem, Army observers were
often present with the fleet.15
Like the numerous wargames played at the Naval War College, the fleet problems
often involved addressing major strategic, operational, and tactical questions.16
Conducted in real time, across vast expanses of ocean, often in cooperation with the
Army, “the Fleet Problems, by concentrating a large number of ships in a relatively
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flexible game environment, gave the fleet valuable experience in the more arduous
operating conditions which would be normal in wartime, but were not routinely
possible in the more artificial environment of peacetime.”17
The principal objectives of the twenty-one fleet problems were fairly
consistent:18
• To train the fleet in large-scale maneuvers.
• To train commanders in making estimates of the situation and plans.
• To study war plans, operational instructions, and tactical doctrine.
The fleet problems also provided a convenient opportunity for staffs to exercise
their functions in a realistic environment and for officers to familiarize themselves
with the standing tactics, techniques, and procedures of the fleet.19 In addition, each
fleet problem had a number of more specific objectives. These were often quite varied. Problems frequently dealt with the exploration of particular strategic, operational, or tactical areas. There were also numerous instances of technological
experimentation. In addition, the problems gave the fleet experience on operating
in a wide variety of environments, from the tropical waters of the Galapagos Islands
to the sub-arctic waters of the Aleutians, and from the narrow seas of the Caribbean
to the broad reaches of the Pacific.
Often, the fleet problems also provided convenient “cover” for the exploration of
various places to evaluate their potential as bases, for both friendly and hostile
forces. During Fleet Problem V (1925), for example, the fleet evaluated the suitability of Lahaina Roads, Maui, as an anchorage, an experiment that would be repeated
in several later problems.20 Likewise, during Fleet Problems XVI (1935) and XVIII
(1937) operations in the Hawaiian Chain evaluated the vulnerability of Midway,
French Frigate Shoals, Kure, and several other atolls to amphibious attack and also
their potential value as advanced bases for either friendly or hostile forces.21 Similarly, during maneuvers in Alaskan waters during Fleet Problems XVI (1935) and
XIX (1938) surveys were made of the Aleutians and southwestern Alaska to determine potential sites for air and naval bases, while the fleet gained experience in operating in the weather conditions normally prevailing in such high latitudes.22
One important aspect of the fleet problems that has up to now received no attention in the literature is their value in burnishing the Navy’s public image. From the
start, the Navy’s senior leadership realized the enormous publicity potential of such
major maneuvers. When planning Fleet Problems II, III, and IV, CINCUS Robert E.
Coontz noted that one of their purposes was to “alert” the public to the fleet’s need
for modernization.23 The Navy usually facilitated the presence of political leaders
and members of the press, so that the fleet problems usually received favorable publicity, which sustained public interest in the naval service, particularly in a period,
the 1920s and 1930s, of very tight budgets. A follow-up exercise to Fleet Problem I
(1923) was witnessed by a large delegation of senators and representatives, plus a
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contingent of Navy Department officials and some members of the press.24 During
several fleet problems civilian guests and reporters were even assigned to individual
vessels, to give them the greatest exposure to the maneuvers.25 Even naval officers
seem to have occasionally served as correspondents, most notably Captain Charles
M. Austin, who covered Fleet Problem XIII (1932) for the New York Times while
serving as assistant chief-of-staff of the Blue Fleet.26 The joint army-navy maneuvers
that effectively formed the final part of Fleet Problem VII (1927) were attended by a
large contingent of journalists, who reported the developments in the “war” on a
daily basis.27 By publicizing the massed flights of naval aircraft en route to the areas
where a fleet problem was to be held, the Navy also attracted considerable public attention.28 Of course this high level of public exposure also meant that when something went wrong, the Navy could end up with a lot of unfavorable publicity, as that
which followed the disastrous crashes of the airships Akron and Macon in 1933 and
1935 and a number of other accidents. Despite this risk, the Navy appears to have
found that openness generally led to good publicity, and gave the press considerable
access. During the middle and late 1930s, however, as international tensions rose,
and innovative technologies began entering the fleet, restrictions began to be imposed.29
Perhaps the most important public-relations role of the fleet problems was that
they often ended with grand reviews in New York, San Francisco, and other major
ports. For example, after Fleet Problem XIV (1933), the fleet spent ten days at San
Francisco, taking part in the groundbreaking ceremonies for the Golden Gate
Bridge, and then spent another week at Long Beach. The following year, after Fleet
Problem XV (1934), the entire U.S. Fleet sailed from the Caribbean to New York,
where there was a review off the Ambrose Light, before the ships anchored in the
North River or tied up at West Side docks for several days of festivities, then dispersing to visit other east coast ports. In his memoirs, Harris Laning, among the most
forward-thinking officers in the interwar period, observed that such reviews provided “marvelous public relations for the Navy.”30
So the fleet problems affected the Navy on many levels. The most important of
these was that they helped train the fleet, and particularly its commanders and their
staffs, in conducting protracted transoceanic naval campaigns, and they helped develop the carrier task force and carrier air doctrine. But the other contributions,
from tactical development to technological experimentation to public relations, all
played a role in the development of the Navy during the interwar period, and contributed to the crafting and refinement of War Plan Orange as the service prepared
itself for a trans-Pacific war with Japan.
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N O T E S 1 For these earlier maneuvers, see Peter M. Swartz,
Sea Changes: Transforming U.S. Navy Deployment
Strategy, 1775–2002 (Alexandria, Va.: The CNA
Corporation, unpublished draft, 2002), p. 79ff,
and Wadle, “United States Navy Fleet Problems,”
pp. 22ff. First-hand accounts are available for
some of these earlier maneuvers; Rufus Fairchild
Zogbaum, “From Port to Port with the White
Squadron,” Scribner’s Magazine, Vol. 8, No. 4
(October, 1890), pp. 453–472 (on the author’s
son, also Rufus Fairchild Zogbaum, see below);
Herbert Corey, “Across the Equator with the
American Navy,” National Geographic, June 1921,
pp. 571–624.
2 Annual Report, 1922, p. 39. The FY 1922 Navy
Department budget was only 68.4 percent that of
1921, which itself was only 79.3 percent of the
previous year’s, as postwar cuts kicked in, and
further cuts were in order; see, for example,
“Committee Cuts Navy to 86,000 Men,” New
York Times, Mar. 23, 1922, p. 14.
3 On this reorganization see Section II, below.
4 Although customarily referred to as the “annual
fleet problems,” there were three in 1924 (II, III,
and IV) and two in 1930 (X and XI). As shall be
demonstrated, by the late 1930s, these would have
been distinct parts of a single problem.
5 Swartz, idem., p. 168, n. 290.
6 Swartz, idem., p. 39. From 1904 to 1917, major
elements of the fleet—often whole battle squadrons—were diverted from peacetime routine to
Morocco during the Perdicaris Affair (1904) and
Tangier Crisis (1905–1906), to address problems
in Cuba (1906–1909 and 1912), Nicaragua
(1912–13), Mexico (1914), and Haiti (1915), and
to the Mediterranean during the Balkan Wars
(1913–14), while smaller contingents responded
to lesser crises on a regular basis, and there were
also a half-dozen major “show the flag” cruises, of
which the “Great White Fleet” (1907–1909) was
the largest. In contrast, the inter-war period saw
only three modest diversions of fleet units to cope
with unfolding crises, in 1924, when the Special
Service Force plus two light cruisers, and a destroyer squadron were diverted from FP II due to
tensions with Mexico, and during FP VII (1927),
when two light cruisers were diverted to Nicaragua and four to the Far East, during the Chinese
government’s “Northern Expedition,” and there
was only one major trans-oceanic cruise, when
the fleet visited Australia and New Zealand in
1925.
7 Swartz, idem., p. 79.
8 For a description of one such gunnery exercise
held during 1926 see George W. Allen, Sails to Atoms (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1975), p. 57.
9 Fleet Tactical Exercises usually lasted about three
days, and in the mid-1930s were held about every
six weeks, though apparently twenty were conducted during 1934; George C. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral
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Richmond Kelly Turner (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 121.
10 See Naval War College Archives (NWCA), Newport, Records Group 8, Intelligence and Technological Archives, Carton 61, “U.S. Fleet Exercise
No. 1, 1 Feb 1927”; Carton 56, “Commander,
Special Service Force to CNO.” Reference to materials in this archive will include only NWCA,
plus carton number and document identification.
Note that the holdings of the NWCA regarding
the fleet problems and related maneuvers were reorganized while this study was in progress, to permit access by problem and date. As a result,
specific documents referenced here may no longer be in the carton indicated. However, the revised arrangement makes the documents more
readily accessible using only problem number and
date.
11 See Gerald E. Wheeler, Kinkaid of the Seventh
Fleet: A Biography of Adm. Thomas Kinkaid, U.S.
Navy (Washington: Naval Historical Center,
1995), pp. 77–78.
12 For one “Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise,” see
Leo J. Daugherty, III, “Away All Boats: The
Army-Navy Maneuvers of 1925,” Joint Forces
Quarterly, Autumn–Winter, 1998–99, pp. 107–13.
These were sometimes referred to as “Joint Army
and Navy Problems,” as in Annual Report, 1932,
p. 100.
13 NWCA, Carton 62, “Cdr, BAT DIVS, Battle Fleet,
to CINC, Battle Fleet, July 30, 1929” discusses a
“Minor Joint Army-Navy Exercise” conducted
July 18–19, 1929, during which a BATDIV supported elements of the regular army in an “attack” on coastal defense installations around
Seattle, defended by Naval Reserve and National
Guard units. Some idea of the frequency of these
smaller joint exercises can be gained by noting
that in April of 1929, Richmond Kelly Turner,
Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Asiatic Fleet,
reported, “There have been ten occasions when
operations have been held by this squadron with
units of the Army, since 1 July 1928”; Dyer, Amphibians, p. 101, which was appended to a description of a large joint Army-Navy exercise in
November of that year, pp. 99–101.
14 Several “Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercises” were held during the 1930s. In Exercise No.
4 (August 13–15, 1937), thirty-four B-10s, three
B-18s, and seven YB-17 bombers of the Army Air
Corps “defended” the west coast against a raid by
a carrier, supported by two battleships and nine
destroyers. During the exercises, which were
plagued by charges of “cheating” from Army airmen, the YB-17s claimed an 11.9 percent accuracy against the target ship Utah (AG-16); see
Jeffrey S. Underwood, The Wings of Democracy:
The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt Administration, 1933–1941 (College Station, Tex.:
Texas A&M University Press, 1991), pp. 91–92.
The account in Curtis LeMay, with McKinely
Kantor, Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden
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City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 140–52, is wonderfully vituperative, but fails to note that Army
airmen were very poor at over-water navigation.
On the technical details of the aircraft, see Lloyd
S. Jones, U.S. Bombers, 1920–1980 (Fallbrook,
Ca.: Aero, 1980), pp. 30–32, 45–47, and 51–53.
15 For example, thirty-two Army officers were
aboard various ships for Phase III of FP XVII
(1936), “Fleet Leaves Balboa Today for Exercises,”
New York Times, May 16, 1936, while during FP
XX (1939), two Air Corps officers were present
with Marine Corps air squadrons operating out of
San Juan, “Navy Tender Sets Base at San Juan,”
New York Times, Jan. 23, 1939, and eight Army
officers observed FP XXI (1940), Richardson,
Treadmill, p. 233.
16 Between 1923 and 1940 over two hundred
wargames were conducted at the NWC; see Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War
College and the American Mission, 1919–1941
(Newport: Naval War College Press, 1980), pp.
166–78.
17 Mark Allen Campbell, “The Influence of Air
Power Upon the Evolution of Battle Doctrine in
the U.S. Navy, 1922–1941” (Master’s thesis, University of Massachusetts at Boston, 1992), p. 120.
18 See the summary tasking for each fleet problem in
Grimes, pp. 221–27, Campbell, pp. 212–20, and
Timothy K. Nenninger, Pamphlet Describing
M964-Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet
Problems I to XXI, 1923–1940 (Washington: National Archives and Records Service, 1975), pp.
7–24, in which these themes appear repeatedly.
Note: references to documents in the NARA microfilm series will be made using the formula
“M964-1,1” to indicate roll and target, where appropriate, followed by document title.
19 Trent Hone, “Building a Doctrine: USN Tactics
and Battle Plans in the Interwar Period,” International Journal of Naval History, Oct. 2002, p. 15.
20 Robert E. Coontz, From the Mississippi to the Sea
(Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1930), p. 447.
21 Laning, An Admiral’s Yarn, p. 372. This concern
was well placed. French Frigate Shoals, an atoll
about seventeen miles across, though with only
about forty-five acres of land area, some six hundred miles northwest of Pearl Harbor, played a
minor role in World War II. On the night of
March 4–5, 1942, two Japanese Kawanishi H8K
Navy Type 2 “Emily” flying boats took off from
Wotje in the Marshalls, and landed in the lee of
French Frigate Shoals, where they were refueled
from three submarines. The two aircraft then
made an unsuccessful air raid on Pearl Harbor.
The U.S. Navy shortly afterward began regular
surface and air patrols of the atoll, and later
turned six–acre Tern Island into a 3,300-foot
landing strip. See James F. Dunnigan and Albert
A. Nofi, “French Frigate Shoals,” The Pacific War
Encyclopedia (New York: Facts On File, 1998), references to this work will be by entry, rather than
page number; Steve Horn, The Second Attack on
Pearl Harbor: Operation K and Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II
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(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005); Jerry M.
Lentz, “French Frigate Shoals,” www.radiojerry
.com/frigate/; Jane Resture, “French Frigate
Shoals,” www.janeresture.com/french_frigate
_shoal/; “French Frigate Shoals Aviation & Space
History,” www.letarc.net/ffsavion/. On the “Emily” and all other Japanese aircraft mentioned in
the test, see René J. Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of
the Pacific War (London: Putnam & Co., 1979),
as appropriate.
22 M964-23, 7, CINCUS to Commander Submarine
Force, 6 December 1937, “Operations in Alaskan
Waters During Fleet Exercise Period,” p. 1;
M964-23, 7, Commander Submarine Force to
Commander Submarine Squadron Six, 11 February 1938, “Submarine Squadron Six – Itinerary
for Alaskan Cruise During Fleet Exercises,” p. 1.
See also William B. Breuer, Undercover Tales of
World War II (New York: John Wiley, 2000), p. 8;
U.S.S. Perch (SS 176), www.subvets.org/Requiem/
176.htm; U.S.S. S-28 (SS 133), www.subnet.com/
fleet/ss133.htm.
23 Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt,
U.S. Navy: A Sailor’s Life (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, 1974), p. 229.
24 “Congress Party Sails for Navy Manoeuvres,”
New York Times, Mar. 6, 1923, p. 3.
25 This can be seen from the by–lines for many
newspaper articles on the problems, which include phrases such as “with the fleet” or “aboard
the U.S.S. California.”
26 See, for example, Charles M. Austin, “Victory for
‘Blues,’” New York Times, Feb. 14, 1932, and “Action Off California in March,” New York Times,
Feb. 16, 1932.
27 John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and
John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the United States Naval War
College (Newport: Naval War College Press,
1984), p. 132.
28 Annual Report, 1923, p. 124; Annual Report,
1924, pp. 6, 70; “48 Navy Planes Fly 3,000 Miles,
Land at Canal,” Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1939.
29 It appears that the earliest instance of restrictions
being imposed on press coverage occurred in FP
IX (1929), when reporters were asked not to reveal some details about the maneuvers before
they were officially announced; see “Commander’s Story of Saratoga’s Raid,” by Lewis
Freeman, New York Times, Feb. 19, 1929. For
comment on the imposition of greater secrecy
during FP XIX (1938), see “Navy Orders Secrecy
on Games in Pacific,” New York Times, Feb. 24,
1938; “U.S. War Games To Be Carried Out in Secret,” Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1938; “War Game
Secrecy Tightened by Navy,” by Hanson W.
Baldwin, New York Times, Mar. 13, 1938; “U.S.
Fleet Invokes Strictest Secrecy,” Washington Post,
Mar. 14, 1938.
30 “Fleet Operation Plan Modified by Pratt,” Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1933; Wheeler, Kinkaid, pp.
77–78; Laning, p. 365.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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II The Fleet, 1922–1941

T

he Washington treaty of 1922 limiting naval armaments reduced the fleet
from twenty-nine first-line battleships to twenty,1 and the following year to
eighteen.2 One consequence of this was that on December 8, 1922, Navy Department General Order No. 94 effected a major reorganization of the fleet, one that
would last virtually until the entry of the United States into World War II.3 The bulk
of the operating forces of the fleet were organized as the “United States Fleet” under
the “Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet,” abbreviated as “CINCUS.”4
CINCUS was technically subordinate to the CNO, but in fact the relationship
between the two officers was quite complex. Navy regulations specified that the
CNO was “charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and
readiness of plans for its use in war[,] the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization, maneuvers, gunnery exercises, drills and exercises, and the training of the fleet for war[; that officer] shall from time to time witness the operations
of the fleet as an observer.” But the regulations also stated that both administrative
and tactical command “shall be exercised by the commander in chief through the
force commanders.” Although this originally applied to the commanders-in-chief
of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, when those posts were abolished this authority devolved upon the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. So technically the CNO commanded neither the U.S. Fleet nor CINCUS.5
Under the direct command of CINCUS were:
• The Battle Fleet—from 1932 the Battle Force—in the Pacific, with most of
the battleships, plus the aircraft carriers as they became available, with
attached escorts and the Pacific Submarine Divisions.
• The Scouting Fleet—from 1932 the Scouting Force—in the Atlantic until
1932, when it too was transferred to the Pacific, initially with some older
battleships, but later mostly heavy cruisers and destroyers. 6
• The Atlantic Squadron, established in 1938 from the Training Squadron.
Became the Patrol Force in 1940, to enforce “Neutrality Patrol,” and was
redesignated the Atlantic Fleet in February 1941.
• The Submarine Force, formed in 1932, from Pacific Submarine Divisions
• Fleet Base Force, the fleet train and miscellaneous auxiliary vessels, divided
between the Battle Force and Scouting Force.
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• The Fleet Marine Force, created late in 1933.
Coming directly under the CNO was the balance of the fleet:
• The Asiatic Fleet, usually one or two cruisers, two destroyer divisions, and
some submarines and air units, based in Panama, plus the Yangtze River
Patrol.7
• The Special Service Squadron, several older cruisers and some gunboats
based in Panama, to oversee American interests in the Caribbean, until
abolished in 1940.8
• The Control Force, based on the Atlantic Coast, “in time of peace . . .
largely a skeleton organization,” with only a few cruisers assigned, intended
to support coast defense and amphibious training, and miscellaneous
duties. Disbanded in 1931.9
• The Training Squadron, with some older cruisers and destroyers, and later
with the oldest battleships, occasionally assigned to personnel training and
USNA summer cruisers, and so forth. Initially on the east coast, in 1937 it
was divided, with a training squadron also being established in the Fleet
Base force. The East Coast Squadron became the Atlantic Squadron in
1939.
• The Naval Transportation Service.
There were, of course, also many training, administrative, maintenance, and educational agencies of the Navy, such as the bureaux, the naval districts, the Naval
Academy, the Naval War College, the naval training stations, and more, some of
which came under the aegis of the CNO and some under that of the Secretary. In
terms of the fleet problems, one of the most important of these was the General
Board of the Navy.
The General Board was a purely advisory body, composed of various senior officers, some serving ex officio, such as the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and some appointed, supported by a small staff. Its functions fell somewhere
between those of a general staff and those of a board of trustees, providing advice to
the Secretary and the CNO on matters ranging from personnel, organization, operations, procurement, and materiel, to basing policies, ship design, fleet requirements, and war plans. The Board was often consulted during the planning for the
fleet problems, and Board members often served as observers and umpires during
the problems. As it was a progressive body, many of the most important developments in the Navy during this period were first aired by the General Board; for example, in 1920–21 the Board recommended that the Navy build seven aircraft
carriers, but only four more battleships or battlecruisers.10
During a fleet problem, it was not unusual for all or part of the Special Service
Squadron, the Control Force, or the Training Squadron, or the resources of a particular naval district, to be placed under CINCUS for the duration. It was this concentration of the fleet under one command that may have been the single most
important factor in the effectiveness of the problems as a tool for exploring the

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:18:54 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

THE FLEET, 1922–1941

limits of sea power. To use a more recent phrase, this put everyone in the fleet on
“the same sheet of music.”
The interwar Navy was a very routinized force. It had virtually nothing to do but
train. The fleet training year coincided with the fiscal year, which ran from July 1st
through June 30th. Because personnel turnover generally occurred at the end of the
training year, the first half of that year was devoted to developing “elementary professional skills.” The fleet problems usually took from one to nine weeks in midwinter or early spring, after a concentration of the available ships and aircraft. Upon
completion of a problem, the fleet often made port calls or engaged in other, less intensive maneuvers and exercises, before returning to its home ports, to continue
training.
From Fiscal Year 1923 through 1930, the fleet normally had between 350 and 375
commissioned vessels, including those in reduced commission or undergoing major refits or reconstruction. This figure dropped to 308 in FY 1931 due to Depressioninspired budget cuts, and then slowly climbed upward again, passing 400 by the end of
FY 1939 due to the increased tempo of rearmament.
Throughout the interwar period, the fleet had a mix of obsolescent ships, modernized ships, and new ships. In 1923, two-thirds of the eighteen battleships were
obsolescent or nearing obsolescence, having been commissioned between 1911 and
1918 (the other six were commissioned between 1919 and 1923). The three newest
battlewagons, the Colorado Class, commissioned in 1921–1923, had been designed
in 1916, and thus even they incorporated few of the lessons learned during World
War I. Although the first two cruisers of the new Omaha Class had just joined the
fleet, they too had been designed during World War I, and their construction had
been long delayed. Nevertheless, they were “new” compared to the other eleven
cruisers in commission, which had all been completed before 1909.
On the other hand, all of the 103 destroyers in commission were “four pipers” of
the World War I emergency program. Laid down during the war and completed between 1918 and 1922, they were relatively new during the 1920s. Of similar vintage
were the sixty-nine submarines in commission. The Navy also had a large number
of destroyers and submarines out of commission in reserve, most of which were
new, dating to the World War I emergency program, and they had seen little commissioned service before being laid up. Nevertheless, while quite modern in the
1920s, by the mid-1930s these destroyers and submarines were becoming increasingly obsolete.
While the second round of the naval-limitation treaties reduced the number of
battleships from eighteen to fifteen in 1930, during the 1920s each of the older battleships underwent eighteen to twenty-four months of reconstruction. Although all
received a catapult or two to enable them to operate observation aircraft, the details
of their reconstruction varied depending upon their age and condition. Coal-fired
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ships were converted to oil fuel, most ships were re-boilered, and several were converted from reciprocating to turbine engines. Most were given additional armor;
were provided with anti-torpedo blisters, enhanced anti-aircraft defenses, and
modern fire-control equipment; and had modifications made to their main battery
turrets to increase gun range. Their masts and superstructures were usually replaced
or significantly modified. This led to a considerable improvement in their capabilities. The more modern battleships received somewhat less extensive reconstruction
during the 1930s.
Meanwhile, the fleet added large numbers of new cruisers: eight more units of
the Omaha Class between 1923 and 1925, eighteen heavy cruisers between 1929 and
1939, and nine units of the Brooklyn Class between 1937 and 1939. In addition, after
a building hiatus that had lasted from 1923, between 1934 and 1940 the Navy added
eighty-five new destroyers, scrapping or putting in reserve older units, which greatly
eased the shortage of modern destroyers. On the other hand, only nine submarines
were added to the fleet between 1924 and 1934, and only about forty more by 1940.
Of course, by that year, many new ships in all categories were under construction
and many more had been ordered.
The most dramatic additions to the fleet in this period were aircraft carriers.
Langley (CV 1) entered service in 1922, Lexington (CV 2) and Saratoga (CV 3) in
1927, Ranger (CV 4) in 1934, Yorktown (CV 5) in 1937, Enterprise (CV 6) in 1938,
and Wasp (CV 7) in 1940. By that year Langley had been converted to an aircraft tender, while Hornet (CV 8) was under construction and nine ships of the new Essex
(CV 9) class were on order.
Thus, by 1940 the composition of the fleet had changed considerably, though
still remaining a mixture of obsolescent ships (the three oldest battleships, the
Omaha Class cruisers, the “four piper” destroyers, and most submarines) and modernized ships (the bulk of the battleships), as well as many new vessels, such as the
Yorktown Class carriers, the several classes of heavy cruisers, the Brooklyn Class light
cruisers, many destroyers, and some submarines. In referring to the older ships in
the fleet it is important not to use the modern catch phrase “legacy systems.” The
technological characteristics of these ships had been supplanted not by revolutionary developments, but rather by evolutionary improvements in engineering, materials, and design; the result was that newer vessels, while much more capable than
older ones, were intended to perform the same missions in much the same fashion
as their predecessors.11
Naval aviation had also undergone significant change during this period.
Between 1923 and 1928 the aircraft inventory of the naval services hovered between
700 and 850 machines. In 1929 the figure jumped to slightly over a thousand. Thereafter, despite the Depression, aircraft inventories grew slowly, but steadily, until
1939, when they topped 2,000, falling the following year to less than 1,750 as
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obsolete types were withdrawn from service, and then nearly doubling to 3,400 in
1941, as large numbers of new aircraft entered service.12
Naturally the capabilities of the aircraft increased during the same period. Procurement was in small lots, and design turnover was rapid. For example, between
1922 and 1935, the Navy procured twelve new models of fighter aircraft, totaling
880 machines. The largest lot delivered numbered only 188, the smallest just 28.13
Most of these models remained in first-line service for only three or four years. This
resulted in a relatively high unit cost, but had the beneficial effect of promoting
rapid technological development.14
In terms of personnel, the Navy was quite small. Between 1923 and 1935 it
ranged from a high of about 95,900 officers and enlisted men in 1924 to a low of
about 89,200 in 1933, following drastic cuts in the aftermath of the Crash of 1929.
After 1935, numbers began to rise, reaching nearly 210,000 in 1940.15 Within the
Navy, the number of aviation-rated personnel, including both officers and enlisted,
increased virtually every year during the interwar period, even when overall service
manpower was actually falling. Aviation personnel went from about 2 percent of total manpower at the beginning of the 1920s to 20.4 percent in 1939.
At no time during the interwar period was there sufficient personnel available to
man the entire fleet at full complement. Although submarines were manned at 100
percent, most major warships were usually maintained at 85 percent, and smaller
vessels were often at 65 or even 50 percent. Ships in reduced commission might have
as few as 12 percent of normal personnel. Although intuitively one might conclude
that this was a handicap to training and readiness, Admiral James O. Richardson
observed that it provided relatively junior personnel with the opportunity to fill positions above their actual rank, giving them valuable experience; under-manning allowed the Navy to train “100 Commanding Officers, 100 pilots, 100 navigators, 100
chief boatswains mates or chief water tenders, even 100 leading seamen in 100 ships
and aircraft with only partial crews, [rather] than to train 85 of the same personnel
in 85 ships and aircraft” with full crews.16
Manpower quality was excellent. Particularly during the 1930s, personnel turbulence was extremely low and thus longevity was high, resulting in a very professional, highly experienced force. Throughout the interwar period the Navy never
had a problem recruiting enlisted personnel, and once the Great Depression began
there were consistently far more volunteers than the service could accommodate; in
Fiscal Year 1933, re-enlistments peaked at 93.25 percent of eligible personnel.17 Typically about 70–75 percent of the enlisted force served afloat, with the balance in
shore billets, particularly aviation units, including both aviation rated and
non–aviation rated personnel.18
Until late in the 1930s, line officers were overwhelmingly Naval Academy graduates, as were virtually all flag officers from the unrestricted line. It was not unusual
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for an officer attaining flag rank to have been in the service about thirty-five years.19
There were relatively few flag officers, just fifty-five for most of the period, and only
seventy-four as late as 1939. The highest permanent rank in the Navy was rear admiral (upper half). Higher grades were temporarily assigned to officers holding certain
senior posts. There were just four admirals:
• Chief of Naval Operations
• Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet
• Commander, Battle Force
• Commander, Asiatic Fleet
and three vice-admirals:
• Commander, Battleships, Battle Force
• Commander, Scouting Force
• Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force, created in the early 1930s.
Officers holding these commands relinquished their rank upon completion of
their assignment. Reverting to their permanent grades, they often continued to
serve for many more years. All flag officers normally retired as rear admirals (upper
half), though some were occasionally granted tombstone promotions in higher
grades.
During much of this period there was essentially only one “community” the “big
gun” navy; most officers began their careers in surface warships before opting for
aviation or submarines. Thus, everyone had a common understanding of operational and tactical procedures and materiel, and a shared “culture.” To be sure, the
submarine service and aviation had begun to develop individual identities during
this period, that of aviation being strengthened by the establishment of the Bureau
of Aeronautics. Nevertheless, not only were all senior naval officers Annapolis graduates, but all had begun their careers as surface warriors. Moreover, it was not unusual for officers qualified as aviators or submariners to serve important tours in
surface warships during this period. For example, Edward S. Jackson, who retired
from the Navy as a captain in the early 1930s, was an aviation officer who had commanded both the carrier Langley (1925–26) and the battleship New York (1930–31),
while Wilder D. Baker, who had extensive service in submarines, also commanded
destroyers and a desron, performed important duties in the development of ASW
strategy in 1942, and later served as captain of the North Carolina (BB 55).
All of the notable proponents of naval aviation, such as William Sims, Robert E.
Coontz, William A. Moffett, and Joseph M. Reeves, had distinguished careers in the
“big gun” navy, as did Ernest J. King, who was qualified in submarines as well as aviation. All the great World War II carriermen started out as surface warriors. And
while some of them wore wings, such as William Halsey and Marc Mitscher, three of
the most successful—Frank J. Fletcher, Wilson Brown, and Raymond Spruance—
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did not. Most of the pioneer submariners, such as Chester W. Nimitz and John H.
Brown, Jr., also shared this surface background.20
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Target Ship Utah (AG 16), underway December 10, 1936. Note absence of main armament and the heavy timbers covering her
decks, intended to absorb the impact of practice bombs. Able to maneuver at fleet speeds, Utah proved invaluable in developing
the rules for air attacks on ships used for the fleet problems in the mid-1930s.
(USN Photo 80-G-463398, Naval Historical Foundation)
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T

he fleet problem was the culminating event of the fleet’s training year. It is
important to understand that the fleet “problems” were truly problems requiring a solution. They were free maneuvers in which each commander was
given a mission, usually of a strategic or operational character, which he had to carry
out as he thought best, applying the forces entrusted to him under conditions approaching as closely as possible those that might prevail in an actual war. The very
terminology used underscores this; as part of the planning process, each commander was issued a “statement of the problem” outlining the tasks he was required
to perform.1 This point can be seen in the memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson,
where he opened his discussion of the role of the fleet problems in the Navy’s training year with the phrase “The Fleet Problem to be solved.”2 For virtually the entire
interwar period, the use of the word “exercises” was deliberately avoided in official
documents in favor of “maneuvers” or simply “problem” to describe the fleet problems.3 The only occasion on which the phrase “annual fleet exercises” is found in official documents rather than “fleet problem” was during Fleet Problem XIX (1938),
when Admiral Claude Bloch, one of the least progressive officers in the Navy, was
serving as CINCUS; although Bloch was still CINCUS for Fleet Problem XX (1939),
the usage did not recur.4
Of course the fleet problems did include exercises, repetitive iterations of techniques, tactics, and procedures intended to sharpen the fleet’s skills. And they also
included experiments, controlled tests of new ideas, tactics, or technologies with
particular variables held constant.
Though it may at times not readily be apparent from the documents, the fleet
problems primarily focused on only one strategic concern, war with Japan. The specific problems devised for the fleet were almost always related to that overarching
strategic question. Fleet problems were usually intended to explore the fleet’s ability
as a fleet to execute some aspect of, or contingency related to, War Plan Orange. This
was the case even when the problem was set in the Caribbean and even when a European power was vaguely identified as the “enemy.”5
Of course War Plan Orange envisioned operations across the western Pacific,
and it was unrealistic—as well as diplomatically impossible—to conduct
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maneuvers in the actual potential theater of operations. As a result, during most
fleet problems there was a great deal of what CINCUS Robert E. Coontz termed
“geographic transposition and orientation.”6 That is, the geography of a sizable
chunk of the globe was notionally rearranged to permit the fleet to operate in an
environment that most closely resembled the probable theater of operations. The
actual kinds of operations that were to be included in the fleet problems flowed
naturally from the need to conduct operations across such vast areas. So it was
routine to include exercises in fleet escort and defense, scouting and evasion,
underway refueling, and opposed entry into a friendly port, as well as battle line
tactics, fleet submarine operations, air warfare and fleet air defense, and landing
operations, in scenarios that dealt with different possible aspects of the expected
war. At times the scenario for a fleet problem, or a particular phase of a problem was
inspired by something that had occurred in an earlier problem. There was systemic
interaction between the fleet problems and wargaming at the Naval War College, a
process that resulted at least in part from the introduction of better record-keeping
procedures for wargames in Newport, beginning in 1922.7 Thus, ideas developed or
problems encountered on the game floor were often examined during the fleet
problems and vice versa.8 On at least one occasion, during joint army-navy coast
defense maneuvers that followed Fleet Problem VII (1927), students at the Naval
War College played the same scenario on the game floor that the naval, air, and
ground forces were playing in Rhode Island Sound and adjacent coastal areas,
which seems to have enriched the subsequent critique of the problem.9 Some
problems seem to have been shaped by an effort to explore innovative technologies
or alternative organizational structures, and some by the need to gain familiarity
with new environments, such as Arctic waters.
Creating a fleet problem was a complex task. The normal planning cycle ran
about six to eight months, but in some instances preparations took over a year.10
Setting the Problem
Although the CNO was not actually in operational command of the fleet, the fleet
problems began with him.11 His role was to suggest possible strategic problems and
the ideas and technologies to be tested. The actual work was done by an ad hoc
committee appointed for the purpose each year. For example, shortly after becoming CNO in July of 1923, Admiral Edward W. Eberle appointed a committee of three
captains, five commanders, and a marine lieutenant-colonel “for the purpose of
preparing suitable problems to be carried out” for the fleet maneuvers scheduled for
the following winter. They were to include in their report “how such problems shall
be supervised and directed” and were to ensure liaison with CINCUS.12 The
committee worked quickly, and by the end of July had outlined what became the
basic themes for Fleet Problems II, III, and IV.13 In contrast, preparations for Fleet
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Problem VIII, ultimately held in Hawaiian waters in mid-April of 1928, were in
train by the beginning of 1927.14
The CNO supported the work of this committee by soliciting ideas from
CINCUS and other senior commanders in the fleet. Thus, in July of 1932, CNO William V. Pratt dispatched letters to CINCUS Frank H. Schofield, nearing the end of
his tour, as well as to COMBATFOR Richard H. Leigh (preparing to replace
Schofield), soliciting their ideas regarding Fleet Problem XIV, and making a number
of suggestions of his own, fully seven months before the problem was to be carried
out. In framing his initial proposals, the CNO often drew upon the experience garnered from wargames conducted at the Naval War College or suggestions from the
War Plans Division.15 This initiated a series of communications that led to the development of the final plan for the fleet problem. Since the CNO’s proposals were in
the form of “requests and suggestions, rather than as directives[,] his suggestions
were sometimes overruled,” even though plans for a fleet problem ultimately required his approval.16
Planning
Once the CNO and CINCUS had reached agreement on the nature of a problem,
actual planning began. Planning for a problem was done by officers on the CINCUS
staff, often assisted by personnel from the Naval War College.17 They were at the
apex of a complex process in which the commanders and staffs of the principal
components of the fleet were solicited for comments on the proposed plans and
were free to make suggestions about operational and tactical ideas. These comments and proposals were studied by the CINCUS staff for possible incorporation
into the final plans.
This helped provide a realistic degree of continuity combined with a healthy
dose of innovation, by ensuring input from the service’s senior-most officers, the
General Board, and the Naval War College—who collectively were both the preservers of the Navy’s “institutional memory” and responsible for its future development—as well as from the actual commanders who would have to conduct
operations if war came. Although there was no agency beyond the CINCUS staff
specifically charged with the systematic analysis and distribution of the lessons of
the fleet problems, this process provided a degree of what might be termed
“inter-problem context,” that is, a look at how thinking about strategy, operations,
logistics, and tactics was evolving, as well as about the fleet problem process itself.18
When the overall plan for a fleet problem had been determined, the appropriate
orders could be issued. These not only involved the development of the problem
and the ideas, tactics, and technologies to be tested, but also set the scenario and
outlined the missions for each side, the size and organization of the opposing fleets,
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and more. Final approval of all preparations came in the form of orders from the
CNO scheduling the problem.
Between the CNO’s initial proposals and requests for suggestions and the issuance of final orders for a problem, many months could pass. As noted above, although the initial communications from the CNO regarding Fleet Problems II, III,
and IV were issued in July of 1923, the orders authorizing them were issued in September. Similarly, for Fleet Problem XIV (1933), whereas the initial proposal was
put forth in July of 1932, the final orders were not issued until October.19
In the process of developing and approving the plans for a fleet problem, the
CNO had to issue orders as necessary to place forces or personnel normally under
his direct control temporarily under that of CINCUS. These included the Special
Service Squadron, the Control Force, the Naval Districts, or personnel from the Naval War College. In addition, the CNO was responsible for organizing communications, cryptological resources, and other specialized services.20
Operationally, each side in a problem was usually given a different set of “motives,” the word used to identify training objectives. Fleet Problem VIII (1928) was
fairly typical in this regard. The problem postulated an attempt by Orange (Japan)
battlecruisers, cruisers, and submarines to disrupt the movement of the Blue
(United States) battle fleet from San Diego to the Panama Canal. The motives for
the Orange Fleet were stated as:21
• Exercise in search and contact scouting.
• Exercise in submarine attack on convoy.
• Exercise in attacks against convoy and strong escorts of battleships and
destroyers.
• Exercise at mine laying.
The Blue Fleet’s motives were given as:22
• Exercise in the escort of an overseas convoy.
• Exercise in evasion of enemy scouts.
• Exercise in disposition of escort of overseas expedition in approaching
destination in face of enemy opposition.
• Exercise in disposition of escort and convoy of an overseas expedition for
entry into port in the face of enemy opposition.
Thus, Orange’s motives were designed to oppose Blue’s directly. This complementary “mesh” of motives was a common feature of fleet problems, with the mix
of exercises varying depending upon the strategic objective and the types of operations being studied.
As part of the planning, special contingency instructions were often included in
sealed envelopes. These were entrusted to the respective commanders or specific
umpires. For example, for Fleet Problem XII (1931), Blue was given three sealed envelopes. Two were to be opened before the problem actually began, but “blue Sealed
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Envelope ‘C’” was tagged “to be opened the first time ARKANSAS or BLUE ship in
sight of her is attacked by light bombing planes or at 1800 on 19 February, 1931.”
The instructions in this third envelope read:23
(a) If ARKANSAS or other BLUE ship in sight of her is attacked by light bombing planes.
Commander, BLUE Fleet and Chief of Staff assumed killed in light bombing attack. Commanding Officer ARKANSAS inform second in command BLUE accordingly.
(b) If foregoing has not taken place prior to 1800 on 19 February, following instructions will
obtain:
(1) ARKANSAS alone, no ship in sight of her.
ARKANSAS considered hit by torpedoes fired by submarine. Radio able to transmit one message only to next senior BLUE officer “ARKANSAS sinking take command.” Ship sinks immediately afterwards. She will cease use of radio except for emergencies or as directed by Chief
Observer and will return to port.
(2) ARKANSAS in company with other BLUE ships.
ARKANSAS inform Senior Officer of ships in company, ARKANSAS assumed to be seen sinking
rapidly as result of torpedo explosion. Commander BLUE Fleet and his Chief of Staff not
saved. She will cease use of radio except for emergencies or as directed by Chief Observer
and will return to port.

Once tentative plans for a project had been set and approved by the CNO and
CINCUS, other individuals might have to pass on the proposals as well. When a
problem involved cooperation with the Army, the CNO had to make appropriate
arrangements with the Chief of Staff24 and the Joint Army and Navy Board.25 In addition, the CNO had to request that the Department of the Navy make appropriate
arrangements with the Department of State when problems involved operations in
or near foreign waters such as in Latin America or the Caribbean, and, of course,
when the fleet wished to make port calls in foreign countries during the maneuvers.
For example, Fleet Problem XX (1939), held in the Caribbean, involved diplomatic
communications with Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Great Britain.26
A particularly unusual exchange of diplomatic messages occurred in late 1930,
when the Navy wished to include the airship Los Angeles (ZR 3) as an operational
unit in a fleet problem; the airship had been awarded to the United States for commercial and experimental purposes under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and
the Navy had to seek permission of the Allied Control Commission to use her for
military operations.27
In addition, plans for a fleet problem had to be reviewed—and more or less approved—by a host of other senior naval personnel, such as the respective Directors
of the War Plans Division, the Fleet Maintenance Division, Naval Communications,
and the Ship Maneuvers Division.28
Meanwhile, the commanders of the opposing sides in the fleet problem could
begin making their own plans, based on the specific tasking and special instructions
that they had received. It was common for a fleet commander to hold one or more
conferences with his senior subordinates, to work out plans and then to provide a final briefing. Thus, prior to Part VI of Fleet Problem XXI (1940), the commander of
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the Maroon Fleet twice met with his subordinate flag officers.29 The amount of planning required by the commander and staff of each side in a fleet problem was considerable, reflecting very realistically the volume of work and attention to detail that
would have been required in actual war, thereby providing extensive training in staff
work.30
When planning their operations in a fleet problem, senior commanders sometimes proved quite flexible, and at times major changes could be effected in the initial proposals as a result of input from their subordinates. The best example of this
occurred during the preparations for Fleet Problem IX (1929), which resulted in
one of the most famous developments in the whole series of problems.
The operational problem, defense of the Canal Zone against a naval attack from
the Gulf of Panama, was not a new one. Black, the aggressor, proposed addressing
the problem by using its air assets for reconnaissance and a preliminary air attack,
then steaming the battle fleet into the Gulf of Panama for a surface engagement with
the enemy fleet, or, if that proved elusive, to conduct a surface bombardment of the
canal defenses and then mop up with air strikes. As originally planned, the Black
“Striking Force,” of several battleships and Saratoga (CV 3), was supposed to make a
wide detour, steaming southward to the Galapagos, before racing north to attack the
Canal Zone from the south. But this plan had to be abandoned due to a shortage of
fuel.31 As a result, Black adopted a more direct approach.
Seeing an opportunity, aviation advocate Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves,
COMAIRONS, and his staff submitted a position paper to Admiral William V.
Pratt, COMBATFLEET, who was to command Black. Reeves proposed executing the
southerly approach using only Saratoga and an escort. He suggested that by using
her very high speed, Saratoga could make the long detour to the Galapagos and then
approach the Canal Zone from the south to execute a long-range pre-dawn air strike
against the locks from a distance of 140 miles. This strike would be timed to coincide with one from the seaplane tender Aroostook (CM 3), acting as a surrogate carrier, which was to accompany the battleline on its more direct approach to the Canal
Zone from the northwest.32
When Black’s final plans for the exercise were released, Reeves and his staff were
surprised to find that they embodied no hint of their proposal. Reeves asked to meet
with Pratt to discuss the matter. As it turned out, Pratt’s staff had discarded the proposal without consulting him, so Pratt, a very open-minded officer, agreed to hear
Reeves out. Reeves briefly outlined his idea. After a short discussion concerning
some technical details, and particularly pilot safety in an overwater flight of such
duration, Pratt agreed to adopt the plan. He then proposed that no word of the
change be circulated in the fleet. As a result, it was only after the fleet was under way
that Pratt issued a sudden change in orders releasing Saratoga for an independent
mission, providing an additional bit of verisimilitude.33
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Organization
During a fleet problem the Commander, Battle Fleet, usually commanded one side
and the Commander, Scouting Fleet, the other, while CINCUS acted as chief umpire, accompanying whichever side he thought had the more interesting problem.
The composition of the sides in each of the fleet problems often varied greatly. In
some fleet problems the two sides were “balanced” in terms of forces available, while
in others there was a considerable imbalance between the fleets.
The fleets were most closely “balanced” in Fleet Problem X (1930). The scenario
postulated a Blue (United States) defense of the Panama Canal from attack by Black
(a “European” power). Black had seven battleships, one aircraft carrier, five light
cruisers, and some destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries; Blue also had seven battleships, two aircraft carriers, and five light cruisers, and in addition it had some
smaller warships and some land-based aircraft. A more typical ratio of forces was
that found in Fleet Problem IV (1924), a test of the ability of the fleet to conduct an
offensive across the Pacific. Including surrogate or constructive forces, Blue (United
States) had sixteen battleships, an aircraft carrier, eight cruisers, sixty-eight destroyers, and nearly two dozen submarines, while Black (Japan) had only ten battleships,
seventeen cruisers, fifty destroyers, and about a dozen submarines.
Fleet problems with an imbalance between the sides usually involved the testing
of innovative or unusual operational or tactical concepts. Fleet Problem VIII (1928)
presented “a scouting problem,” and was one of the most unbalanced in the series.
Orange (Japan) was given only eight light cruisers (four of them surrogates for
battlecruisers), twenty submarines with two tenders, two light mine layers and two
mine tenders, and a small train, plus some tender-based patrol aircraft. In contrast,
Blue (United States) had virtually the entire U.S. Fleet. In Fleet Problem XII (1931),
intended to test the capabilities of an “aviation-heavy” force in the defense of the
Panama Canal against a more conventional fleet attacking from the Pacific, the two
sides were also very unbalanced. Blue (United States), the defending force, had only
one battleship, two aircraft carriers plus four aircraft tenders, nine light cruisers,
nearly two dozen destroyers, and an airship, with a total of nearly 190 aircraft, while
the attacker, Black (Japan), had nine battleships, one small aircraft carrier plus four
small aircraft tenders, four heavy cruisers, and nearly thirty destroyers, with a total
of only seventy-two aircraft. For Fleet Problem XIV (1933), a test of the effectiveness of aircraft carriers in conducting raids, Black (Japan), the attacker, was given
just two aircraft carriers, seven heavy cruisers, and thirteen destroyers, in contrast to
the defending Blue (United States), which had ten battleships, a small carrier, nine
light cruisers, forty-five destroyers, twenty submarines, and various mine-warfare
vessels, plus several maritime patrol squadrons.
For fleet problems that were divided into different phases, the composition of
the sides sometimes changed radically from one part to the next. This was

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:18:56 AM

25

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

26

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

particularly common during the later fleet problems. The most extreme examples
of this were Fleet Problem XVI (1935), in which the two sides were reorganized
three times, and Fleet Problem XVII (1936), which saw nearly a dozen reorganizations during its several parts.
Constructive Forces34
During the fleet problems the Navy made extensive use of “constructive” forces.
These were fictional or surrogate ships and aircraft intended to permit experimentation with vessels, aircraft, or capabilities that did not exist. Initially, the Navy preferred not to use constructive forces. In his foreword to the final report on Fleet
Problem I, CINCUS Hilary P. Jones explained why this notion was abandoned:
It was the desire as far as possible to eliminate constructive forces, but as the United States
Navy had no airplane carriers or suitable bombing planes such as we may expect any probable enemy to have in the next war, it was determined to have two battleships represent enemy plane carriers, and to allow these plane carriers a number of constructive bombing
planes. It was felt that unless this were done lessons to be learned from the maneuver would
35
not have been obtainable and the problem would not have been a success.

In short, constructive forces could be useful for exploring the potential value of
innovative ideas. As CINCUS Jones indicated, during Fleet Problem I (1923) two
battleships were designated as constructive aircraft carriers with the characteristics
of the recently completed Langley (CV 1), while during Fleet Problem IX (1929), a
seaplane tender was used in the same way. Later, during Fleet Problem XV (1934),
Langley was used as a surrogate for the new carrier Ranger (CV 4), which was not yet
ready for operations. This technique was also used to multiply the number of ships
“available” for an exercise. During Fleet Problem III (1924), the four oldest battleships, the Florida and Wyoming Classes, acted as surrogates for units of the Maryland Class, the most modern ships in the fleet. For one part of Fleet Problem XVII
(1936), two battleships were used as surrogates for two divisions of three
battlewagons each, while one heavy cruiser stood in for a battlecruiser and a second
heavy cruiser stood in for two battlecruisers. In Fleet Problem XV (1934), Lexington
represented three carriers, and Saratoga two. Similarly, individual destroyers were
sometimes used to represent DESDIVS.
Constructive and surrogate aircraft were also used. Particularly during the
mid-1920s, it was not unusual during a fleet problem for a single aircraft to be used
to represent an entire squadron. Aircraft were also sometimes assigned the
characteristics of more advanced designs. Bomb loads could be notionally
increased, and even greater range simulated, either by basing the aircraft close to
their objective but pretending they were operating from further away or by allowing
attacking aircraft to land in “enemy” territory after hitting their target, rather than
make a return trip.
There were occasions when the use of surrogates appeared quite curious. For a
tactical exercise on April 7, 1938, during Fleet Problem XIX, the carriers Saratoga
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and Ranger were used as constructive light cruisers. As the purpose of the exercise
was to develop coordinated fleet anti-aircraft procedures and tactics, this seemingly
bizarre measure was actually rather reasonable.36 In this vein, it is rather surprising
to note that the carriers were never used as surrogate battlecruisers in any of the
battleline exercises or maneuvers, though the Navy was very concerned about developing ways for the battleline to cope with Japan’s speedy Kongo-class ships. Both
Lexington and Saratoga had originally been designed as battlecruisers and the substitution might have provided some useful lessons. To be sure, the high value and
specialization of the ships might have argued against such employment, but the results might have been of considerably greater value that that derived from their brief
roles as light cruisers.
Of course there were drawbacks to the use of constructive forces. With single
ships sometimes standing in for two or three, determining the “strength” of an “enemy” contact was rather difficult, and assessing damages certainly became more
complex. In addition, several fleet problems involved large numbers of constructive
forces, those numbers seeming to have created difficulties. For Fleet Problem IV
(1924) constructive units amounted to nearly a third of the approximately 210 ships
supposedly taking part, and the percentage was even higher for aircraft.37 Having so
many notional platforms “participating” in the problem presented difficulties in
adjudicating the effects of gunfire and air attacks, and must have considerably complicated post-maneuver analysis.
Despite their drawbacks, the frequent use of constructive forces further demonstrates that the fleet problems were not simply training exercises, but rather
large-scale experiments in organization, strategy, operations, tactics, and technology.
Rules
Initially, judging the results of “engagements” was largely left up to the umpires,
who were expected to use their “professional judgment.”38 This presupposed that
the umpires not only were unbiased but also had a common understanding of the
capabilities of different weapons and the vulnerabilities of various types of ships,
aircraft, and facilities. Although a very poor approach, this method of adjudication
was only gradually superseded by a more structured one.
Extensive critiques in the aftermath of Fleet Problems X and XI (both 1930)
prompted the adoption of more rigid rules. In the course of Fleet Problem X, Black,
having secured air superiority, used spotting planes during the surface action portion of the exercise. The lack of systematic rules governing the use of aerial spotting
led to considerable acrimony, as Black claimed an advantage, while Blue dismissed
its effectiveness. As a result, the Naval War College was asked to replay the engagement using its own wargaming rules, which were well documented and included
provision for aerial spotting. The NWC concluded that Black did indeed possess an
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advantage. This prompted CINCUS William V. Pratt to call upon the Naval War
College to develop formal rules for use during fleet problems.
Now the Naval War College had been conducting wargames since 1887. Until
1922, however, documentation of the college’s wargames had been rather haphazard. In that year Harris Laning became head of the Tactics Department. One of the
most progressive officers in the service, Laning discovered that there were no systematic records of previous wargames. Moreover, a paper that he had written while
a student at the college a decade earlier titled “The Naval Battle” was being used as a
text, virtually unchanged, despite the experience of World War I. Laning proceeded
to revise the paper, and initiated a more systematic approach to the preservation of
the proceedings of wargames and the codification of the rules. Periodically updated,
“The Naval Battle” remained in use until at least the mid-1930s. In addition, Laning
introduced the first rules for the use of aircraft in the wargames, notably as spotters
for battleship gunnery.39 Following his tour as head of the Tactics Department,
Laning went back to the fleet for several years, rising to rear admiral and command
of a battleship division. In 1930 he returned to the NWC as President, just when
CINCUS Pratt was calling upon the college for assistance.
Laning, who had participated in Fleet Problem X as an observer, directed the development of a draft set of umpiring guidelines for the fleet problems based on the
current NWC wargaming rules. These guidelines were presented to the CNO in October of 1930. The guidelines reflected Harris’ belief that measuring the damage inflicted in “sham battles at sea” was not possible. Certainly given the means available
at the time, this was fairly accurate. So rather than focus on “who was sunk and
when and where,” the guidelines concentrated on developing sound measures of effectiveness to evaluate training.40 As was the practice with the college’s wargaming
rules, these guidelines were not intended to be permanent, but were to be updated as
experience suggested. With the agreement of CNO Charles F. Hughes CINCUS
Pratt ordered the use of the NWC guidelines for Fleet Problem XII (1931). Regularly
modified, they continued in use for the balance of the fleet problems.41
A good example of the character of the new guidelines are those regarding
battleship gunfire. In assessing damage from the heaviest guns, the NWC rules used
the Navy’s fourteen-inch shell as the basis for developing a standard metric, the
number of fourteen-inch shell hits, or their equivalent, that could be expected to
strike a target in a given time at a specific range, and the amount of damage that they
could be expected to cause. In 1928 the Navy assumed that at fourteen thousand
yards (about 6.9 nm) a fourteen-inch gun firing three rounds a minute would have
about a 26 percent chance of hitting its target, giving an American battleship with
twelve fourteen-inch guns about 9.3 hits per minute.42 If the target were the USS
Maryland (BB 46), laid down in 1917 and completed in 1921, her life expectancy
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was estimated at 18.6 penetrative fourteen-inch hits, while the contemporary Japanese Mutsu (1918 and 1924) was rated at nineteen hits, and the older British
Ramillies (1913 and 1916) was judged to be able to absorb just fifteen rounds.
Cruisers had lower values; San Francisco (CA 38), a fairly typical American
“treaty cruiser,” laid down in 1931 and completed in 1934, was rated at 4.7 hits, and
the older and smaller Omaha (CL 4) (1918 and 1923) at 3.7. These metrics were
fairly arbitrary, and certainly the assumed accuracy was rather optimistic, but at
least they established a common set of standards.
In actuality, during World War II the highest verifiable accuracy achieved in sustained firing by battleship guns occurred in the Battle of the Denmark Strait (May
24, 1941) and in the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (November 14–15, 1942).
In the Denmark Strait, the German battleship Bismarck engaged the British
battlecruiser Hood at about nineteen thousand yards (about 9.4 nm) at 0555. By
0600, Bismarck had fired twenty-four to twenty-eight fifteen-inch rounds, one of
which struck Hood, for an accuracy of 3 to 4 percent, or perhaps 6 to 8 percent, if, as
is sometimes claimed, Bismarck secured a second hit.43
At Guadalcanal, very early on November 15, 1942, the Washington (BB 56) engaged the Japanese battleship Kirishima at ranges varying from about 18,500 yards
(9.1 nm) down to about 8,500 yards (4.1 nm). Washington fired forty-two sixteen-inch rounds between 0016 and 0019 and another seventy-five between 0100
and 0107. Only nine of these struck their target, all from the second series of firings,
for an overall accuracy of only about 7.8 percent.44 The accuracy attained by both
Bismarck and Washington was thus lower than that expected from the War College
rules.
Similarly, the Naval War College damage guidelines for various classes were not
necessarily borne out by the effects experienced during World War II. To give but
one example, off Guadalcanal on November 12, 1942, San Francisco absorbed an accidental crash dive by a Japanese torpedo plane, and then in the overnight surface
action that followed against Japanese battleships, cruisers, and destroyers was hit by
forty-five enemy rounds, including three fourteen-inch bombardment shells, at
ranges as short as one thousand yards. While this certainly seems to have exceeded
the “4.7 fourteen-inch round” life expectancy of the fleet problem rules, the seriously damaged ship did survive, steaming away under her own power.
The fleet problem rules were somewhat modified during the mid-1930s. The
new rules changed the standard of calculation to the percentage of damage a battleship (with twelve fourteen-inch guns) could inflict in one minute, depending upon
range and target, using aerial spotting. Under these new rules, Bismarck, even assuming aerial spotting, might have been able to inflict 22.5-percent damage on
Hood. This was much lower than the actual results of Bismarck’s firing, given that
the battlecruiser suffered a catastrophic disaster, due to what was essentially a lucky
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hit. These same rules would have given Washington, with its radar arguably substituting for aerial spotting, 100-percent damage on Kirishima, fairly close to the actual results of her nine hits. So the new fleet problem rules seem to have been more
accurate than the older ones.45 Of course, though, when it came to judging the effectiveness of innovative or experimental weapons, there was often a great deal of uncertainty (and not a little acrimony).
A good example of the problem of developing useful metrics was the question of
the effectiveness of air attack against ships. By the end of the fleet problems (and indeed until the outbreak of World War II) there had been very few cases of successful
air attacks on ships in actual war, and almost literally none against ships maneuvering in open waters. During World War I a number of ships had been damaged by air
attack, including some capital ships. But only twenty-five vessels, warships and merchantmen alike, had been sunk. None of these vessels had been maneuvering at the
time they were attacked. In addition, all had at best very limited anti-aircraft capability. Moreover, these were all small vessels, and thus more likely to suffer serious
damage from the small bombs that the aircraft of the day were able to carry operationally, which also helps explain why nearly half of the vessels sunk—twelve—were
submarines, highly vulnerable to any damage. The largest warship sunk from the air
during World War I was the 655-ton Turkish destroyer Jadhigar-i-Millet, struck accidentally shortly after midnight on July 9–10, 1917, by a Royal Naval Air Service
Handley Page bomber attempting to bomb the battlecruiser Yavuz, which was
moored nearby.46
During the early 1920s there was a good deal of experimentation with air attacks
on warships.47 Exclusive of destroyers and submarines, between 1920 and 1925, the
United States expended nine major warships in various types of weapons trials;
seven old battleships, one incomplete new battleship, and one old cruiser. Aircraft
were involved in six of these trials. This series of experiments involved as many major warships as the combined total of major warships sunk in weapons trials in the
same period by Britain (two), Japan (five), or France (two). Save for the battleship
Washington (BB 47), a post–World War I design that was about 76 percent complete
at the time she was expended, these vessels were all obsolete or obsolescent, the newest being the 6,600 metric ton German cruiser Frankfurt, launched in 1913.
The most spectacular of these demonstrations, the sinking of the old German
battleship Ostfriesland in 1921, was also the least useful, given that the attacking
Army aircraft systematically violated the experimental guidelines in the interests of
grabbing headlines. While the lessons learned from the other experiments certainly
suggested that surface warships were not invulnerable to air attack, they also provided ideas that would lead to improved ship design and defensive tactics.
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Major Warships Sunk in U.S. Weapons Trials, 1920–25
Ship
Indiana (BB 1) (1893)
Massachusetts (BB 2) (1893)
Alabama (BB 8) (1898)
Ostfriesland* (BB) (1909)
Frankfurt* (CL) (1913)
Iowa (BB 4) (1896)
New Jersey (BB 16) (1906)
Virginia (BB 13) (1906)
Washington (BB 47) (1921)

Year
1920
1921
1921
1921
1921
1923
1923
1923
1924

Cause
Battleship gunfire
Army coast artillery
Army aircraft
Army aircraft
Army & Navy aircraft
Mississippi (BB 41)
Army aircraft
Army aircraft
Texas (BB 35) & naval aircraft

Note: Year in parentheses is that of launch. * German prize.

The 1920s and 1930s provided a little operational experience involving actual air
attacks on warships, notably during the Sino-Japanese War and the Spanish Civil
War. Unfortunately, documentation of these attacks was very poor, and little of
value could be learned from them. Evidence from both wars appears to have largely
been based on the wildly inflated claims of success by airmen.
The increasingly severe series of Sino-Japanese “Incidents” that began with the
Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 seems to have seen some 200 vessels of various types sunk by air attack, including much of the Chinese Navy, caught at anchor
or in narrow waters off Shanghai at the outbreak of the “China Incident” of 1937,
which initiated full-scale, if undeclared, war between the two nations. Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics on the effectiveness of air attack against ships
during the Second Sino-Japanese War.48
Claims have been made that about 200 vessels were sunk by air attack during the
Spanish Civil War (1936–39). Specifically, German and Italian airmen claimed that
between September of 1937 and March of 1939, they sank 115 Republican and
fifty-one foreign merchant ships, with the Germans adding that another 225
merchant ships were damaged in this fashion. Since these estimates omit losses
caused by Spanish Nationalist or Republican aircraft, and those inflicted by German
or Italian aircraft that may have occurred prior to September of 1937, the suggestion
that 200 ships were sunk by air power during the Spanish Civil War would seem
reasonable, and possibly even too low.49 Nevertheless, an official Royal Navy study of
air attacks on ships during this conflict concluded that of eighty warships attacked,
none had been sunk and only seventeen damaged, a hit rate of 15.6 percent. The
same study examined eighty-one documented cases of air attacks against merchant
vessels and concluded that only six had been sunk and twenty-nine damaged,
yielding a 7.4 percent sinking rate and an overall 37 percent hit rate. At a 7.4 percent
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kill rate for air attack, to have sunk 200 ships would have required over 2,700 attacks,
certainly far more instances of air attack on ships than occurred during the war. In
short, the figures suggest that the Italo-German claims were highly inflated.50
In any case, in both conflicts, regardless of the actual number of ships sunk, there
does not seem to be any instance of a successful air attack against a vessel maneuvering in open waters. In both wars, all of the air attacks that can be shown to have been
successful involved ships that either were not under way or were in very restricted
waters, such as the USS Panay (PR 5) and several merchant vessels sunk by Japanese
aircraft in the Yangtze on December 12, 1937.51
As poor as the data was on the overall effectiveness of air power against ships in
actual combat, there was even less data on its effectiveness against battleships. During World War I several battleships had been struck by bombs, all when they were
stopped or in restricted waters. None of the ships struck had suffered significant
damage, largely because of the small size of the bombs employed.52 Between the wars
there were just three instances of battleships being attacked by aircraft under wartime conditions. On September 6, 1931, a mutiny in the Chilean battleship
Almirante Latorre led to her being attacked by twenty-two miscellaneous aircraft
while at anchor. None of the bombs dropped did any damage, though the ship’s
company did suffer some casualties from machine gun fire. The attackers, in turn,
were not injured by the ship’s anti-aircraft fire.53 Nearly five years later, on August
13, 1936, the Spanish Republican battleship Jaime I was struck in her bow by a bomb
while pier side at Malaga, which caused only minor damage. On May 21, 1937, while
under repair at Cartagena following a recent grounding, the ship was hit by three
small bombs that did not significantly worsen her condition. On June 17, 1937,
while under tow to a naval shipyard, Jaime I was sunk by an internal explosion, a loss
than can hardly be attributed to the air attack in May.54
In short, during the 1930s there was little empirical data on which to base estimates of the effectiveness of air attack on ships in actual combat. So the guidelines
used were essentially speculative, a matter not helped by some carelessness in the
conduct of bombing practice.55 Nevertheless, there was great awareness that the
rules had to be developed with care, lest conclusions drawn from exercises and fleet
problems be inaccurate. Writing later about the danger of introducing artificialities
when crafting gaming rules, on February 17, 1936, Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus,
President of the Naval War College, noted, “we can make any type of ship work up
here, provided we draw up the rules to fit.”56
While most naval officers believed that the rules governing air attacks on warships were too generous, airmen consistently argued that they were too stringent. In
1964 retired naval aviator Austin K. Doyle, who had commanded the second Hornet
(CV 12) in Task Force 38/58 in 1944–45, recounted an incident that occurred during Fleet Problem XXI (1940):57 “I had the old Sara Air Group as we headed for Pearl
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on the annual cruise. We were ordered to attack the ‘enemy,’ three Californias and
three Idahos. We came in from twenty-two thousand feet, effected complete surprise with seventy-four a/c and roughly fifty-four half-ton bombs. Squadrons of the
group had won all the gunnery trophies that year. The Chief Umpire, going by War
College rules, slowed one BATDIV two knots!”
The debate over the probability of hits from air attack sparked interest at the
highest levels.58 Consider, for example, the case of dive bombing, developed during
the late 1920s and early 1930s. Formal guidelines for dive bombing were first included in the rules for Fleet Problem XIII (1932). These guidelines were not made
up out of whole cloth. Dive bombing trials in 1927 employing water-filled hundred-pound bombs against the Putnam (DD 287), a radio-controlled four-piper assigned to test duties, yielded accuracy rates of 38.3 percent with release at one
thousand feet, and 46.5 percent with release from 500 feet, when the ship was proceeding at a modest speed on a steady course. Since this was the only experimental
evidence, the Fleet Problem XIII rules assigned dive bombing the same accuracy
against capital ships as that given to horizontal bombing, 20 percent.59 The experience gained during Fleet Problem XIII caused considerable dissatisfaction as to the
accuracy of the guidelines. The level of the debate grew to be rather acrimonious.
Admiral Luke McNamee, COMBATFOR, made some suggestions, as did Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, Jr., the formidable Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics,
and many others.
Nevertheless, soon after Fleet Problem XIII, some reasonably reliable experimental evidence demonstrated that the guidelines in use were optimistic. Following
the London round of naval arms limitation agreements in 1930, the battleship Utah
(BB 31) had been converted into a target ship. As reconstructed, Utah (now designated AG 16) had a small crew, and could steam and maneuver more or less like a
proper battlewagon. Not long after Fleet Problem XIII, Utah took part in bombing
trials during which dive bombers had a hit rate of about 18 percent, while horizontal bombers attacking from eight thousand feet only managed a hit rate of 5.6 percent.60 It was on the basis of these trials that new guidelines were issued for Fleet
Problem XIV (1933). The new guidelines markedly reduced the likelihood of getting a hit, setting the probability of hits against a battleship or aircraft carrier by
horizontal bombing at only 8 percent, and that by dive bombing at only 16 percent.
Airmen reacted bitterly. Admiral Moffett argued that the new rules “penalized” aviation, and many of his colleagues claimed that not only were the new guidelines inaccurate, but they would have an adverse effect on the morale of naval aviators.61
This vigorous discussion of the rules led to periodic revisions. Thus, on October
5, 1934, CINCUS Joseph M. Reeves cancelled the existing umpiring instructions,
and provided fourteen pages of new guidelines.62 Reflecting Reeves’ strong support
for aviation, in terms of assessing aircraft bombing accuracy, these new guidelines
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were actually even more optimistic than those used for Fleet Problems XIV (1933)
and XV (1934), raising the figure for horizontal bombers against battleships or carriers to 14 percent and that of dive bombers to 26 percent.63 Little more than three
years later, on January 24, 1938, CINCUS Arthur J. Hepburn issued another set of
revisions to the umpiring rules, in which he reinstated the bombing accuracy figures used in Fleet Problems XIV and XV.64
The Air Attack Effectiveness Debate: Attacks Against Capital Ships at Sea65
Rules
Horizontal
Dive

XIII
20%
20

McN
15%
30

BuAer
22%
35

Trials
~ 6%
18

XIV
8%
16

Wartime
~ 0%
~ 15

Note: XIII and XIV indicate the rules in force for Fleet Problems XIII and XIV; McN, rule
changes suggested by Admiral Luke McNamee; BuAer, proposed rule changes from the Bureau of Aeronautics (i.e., Rear Admiral Moffett); Trials, the 1932 bombing trials using Utah;
Wartime, results derived from World War II experience. Horizontal bombing assumed release from eight to twelve thousand feet, Dive bombing, from one thousand.

In retrospect, the claims of the airmen that the rules adopted for Fleet Problem
XIV undervalued the effectiveness of air attacks were not borne out by wartime experience. To be sure, during World War II dive bombing proved quite effective; accuracy in combat was only slightly lower than that provided for by the 1934 rules.
Apparently the highest accuracy attained in a large-scale dive bombing attack occurred at Midway on June 4, 1942, when U.S. Navy carrier aircraft scored ten hits for
thirty-six tries against the Japanese aircraft carriers, a rate of 27.5 percent, a good
deal better than the 16 percent allowed by the guidelines for Fleet Problem XIV.66
This was, however, an anomalous consequence of the uniqueness of the tactical situation combined with some very experienced pilots, and, perhaps, the desperation
of the moment. In practice the overall accuracy for dive bombers during the war was
about 15 percent, not much different from the 16-percent figure found in the rules.
On the other hand, the 1938 rules were decidedly too generous to the horizontal
bombers in assessing their effectiveness at 8 percent. In fact, World War II demonstrated that in practice horizontal bombing was highly inaccurate, particularly as
altitude increased. The Mitchellite ideal, horizontal bombing proved so ineffective
against ships that apparently no warship maneuvering in open water was ever sunk
by this method during World War II.67
Apparently the only warship actually sunk by high-altitude horizontal bombing
while underway in relatively open waters was the Japanese destroyer Mutsuki. On
August 25, 1942, Mutsuki was in the “Slot” northwest of Guadalcanal, attempting to
rescue survivors of the disabled troop transport Kinryu Maru. The destroyer was
thus moving very slowly and maneuvering only minimally. At 1027 a flight of three
B-17s appeared. Having had prior experience of the poor accuracy of B-17s
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attacking from high altitude, the destroyer’s skipper ignored them and continued
his rescue efforts. Soon after, Mutsuki was shaken by an explosion. The crew initially
thought she had struck a mine, but soon discovered that she had taken one bomb.
She sank at about 1140, with the loss of forty lives. Reportedly, at the formal inquiry
into the ship’s loss, Mutsuki’s captain is supposed to have said “even B-17s can get a
hit once in a while.”68
It also seems likely that in the course of the war, the sole incident in which a maneuvering warship larger than a destroyer was damaged by B-17s from high altitude
occurred on the morning of November 13, 1942, following the First Naval Battle of
Guadalcanal. As a result of severe damage taken during the surface action the previous night, the Japanese battleship Hiei was taking water while steering with her engines as she limped away from “Iron Bottom Sound.” In the course of the day, she
was under repeated attack by aircraft. Surprisingly, although she absorbed several
bombs and torpedoes, delivered at low altitudes, she did not sink until shortly after
1800.
Twice during the day, Hiei had been attacked by B-17s.69 At about 0815 three
B-17s were spotted approaching at about fourteen thousand feet. Although the ship
had stopped to pump out her steering compartment, she quickly built speed to
about fifteen knots and initiated evasive maneuvers. The B-17s released their bombs
as Hiei was making a wide sweeping turn to starboard, and she managed to evade all
but one of about twenty-eight 500-pound bombs; the bomb that hit her inflicted
little damage. Shortly after 1430 Hiei, at this point dead in the water from the cumulative effects of bombs, shells, and two torpedo hits, was attacked by fourteen B-17s,
which dropped about fifty-six 500-pound bombs; the airmen themselves claimed to
have inflicted only one hit, and Japanese records are inconclusive.
Hiei went down that evening as a result of her cumulative damage. Little of the
damage had been inflicted by B-17s, which had an accuracy rate of about 2.4
percent.
In contrast to the vigor with which they protested the “unrealistic” accuracy
guidelines for air attacks, the airmen did not protest the unrealistically low effectiveness rates established for anti-aircraft fire. Based upon trials using target drones, the
1940 fleet problem rules allowed only about a 5-percent effectiveness rate for ships’
anti-aircraft gunners, which was much lower than what was achievable by contemporary warships.70 In a short action in the Java Sea, near the Madoera Strait on February 4, 1942, approximately 36 Japanese Navy twin-engined Mitsubishi G3M Type
96 “Nell” bombers attacked an Allied squadron comprising the American cruisers
Houston (CA 30) and Marblehead (CL 12), the Dutch light cruisers Tromp and
DeRuyter, and four American Clemson-class “four-stack” destroyers completed in
1920. All the ships had limited anti-aircraft complements and all lacked radar, nor
was there any friendly air cover available. Moreover, in conformity with the air
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defense doctrine of the day, upon the approach of the attacking aircraft, the ships
had dispersed, on the theory that it would give them maximum maneuvering room,
rather than concentrated, to maximize firepower effectiveness, which was later determined to be the optimal tactic. Although Marblehead was heavily damaged, and
had to return to port, and Houston lost partial use of one of her three turrets, none
of the other ships was seriously injured, while at least six of the attacking aircraft
were shot down, for an anti-aircraft effectiveness rate of over 16 percent.71
Another aspect of the debate was the amount of damage derived from a
particular hit.
Damage Per Thousand-Pound Bomb Hit72
Target
BB
CV, Large
CV, Small
CA
CL
DD

1937 Rules
6%
7%
30%
28%
35%
100%

WW II
5–15%
15–100%
15–100%
15–100%
15–100%
15–100%

Note: As displacement declined, the likelihood that a thousand-pound bomb hit would result in catastrophic damage naturally increased, but a range nevertheless existed.

On the basis of wartime experience, the damage guidelines were in general quite
unrealistic. A better basis of calculation would have been to compare hits to displacement for all classes. Oddly, this was done with regard to the smaller carriers
Ranger (14,500 tons standard) and the three ships of the Yorktown Class (19,800
standard). In contrast to the 7-percent damage per-hit provision for the two very
large Lexington Class ships (33,000 tons), the smaller carriers were assumed to suffer
30-percent damage per thousand-pound bomb hit. In either case, large carrier or
small, the rules stated that three thousand-pound bomb hits would render the ship
unable to operate aircraft.
Even using a displacement-based model, wartime experience demonstrated that
there was a great deal of variation in survivability. Consider the effects of kamikaze,
a weapon wholly unimagined by American naval planners during the interwar period.73 Normally one kamikaze hit was sufficient to sink a destroyer. Nevertheless,
on April 16, 1945, although heavily damaged, Laffey (DD 724) survived six hits, plus
one that bounced off after striking the vessel; during this attack the ship also
incurred sundry damage from bomb hits and near misses, and from strafing runs.
Laffey’s sister ship Aaron Ward (DD 773) survived five kamikaze on May 3rd.74
The debate over the effectiveness of air attack was only one of numerous exchanges among naval personnel, including some very senior officers, during the
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period. Even before Fleet Problem XVI began, in April 1935, a series of exchanges
over the rules took place among CINCUS, the President of the Naval War College,
and the Chief of the Bureau of Air, a discussion that continued until well after the
problem ended in May.75
In addition to guidelines for assessing the accuracy of and damage inflicted by
bombs, the rules covered many other matters. During Fleet Problem XX (1939),
battleships were restricted to fifteen knots (fourteen when in formation), while carriers and cruisers were limited to twenty-seven. The following year, for Fleet Problem XXI (1940), the rules for Part I specified that the highest allowable formation
speed for battleships was to be fifteen knots, while cruisers, carriers, and destroyers
were permitted to make twenty-four knots. During Part II, the speed restriction on
carriers, cruisers, and destroyers was raised to twenty-seven knots. During flight operations, however, carriers and their escorts were permitted to make whatever speed
was necessary to ensure safety while launching and recovering aircraft. In part, these
artificial limits were established as a matter of economy, to save fuel given the tight
budgets of the 1920s and 1930s,76 but the restrictions in 1939 may also have been an
attempt to adjust the “scale” of the theater, the Caribbean, to reflect Pacific
distances.77
At times, ships of the two sides would be given different speed restrictions. For
example, during Fleet Problem XVII (1936), Blue battleships were limited to seventeen knots, while White ones were permitted to make nineteen knots and White’s
constructive battlecruisers were allowed twenty-five.78 This was an attempt to reflect
the relative differences in speed between American and Japanese capital ships. The
fastest U.S. battleships, the units of the New Mexico, Tennessee, and Maryland
Classes, were rated at only twenty-one knots. This was 1.5 knots slower than the
slowest Japanese battlewagons, the two units of the Fuso class. On paper, the
maximum speed of the U.S. battle fleet was only 20.5 knots, while that of the
Japanese battleline as a whole was twenty-two.79 But Japan’s three Kongo Class
battlecruisers could make 27.5 knots; thus, a third of the Japanese battleline had a 30
percent advantage in speed over the U.S. battleline.80 So restricting Blue battleships
to seventeen knots, while White’s were permitted to make nineteen, and their
constructive battlecruisers twenty-five, was an attempt to simulate this very real
difference in battleline speed. In similar fashion, fleet problem scenarios often
assigned operational characteristics of certain Japanese ships and aircraft to vessels
and airplanes acting in the role of “enemy” forces.81
Similar adjustments were sometimes made to the range at which battleships
could fire, to reflect actual or perceived Japanese abilities, or to allow for the development of long-range gunnery tactics in anticipation of improvements in range
during reconstruction of ships. This was done, for example, during Fleet Problems
X (1930), XI (1930), XIII (1932), XVI (1935), XVII (1936), and XX (1939).82
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Safety concerns were also a factor in imposing certain restrictions. During Fleet
Problem XX carriers Yorktown (CV 5) and Enterprise (CV 6), both recently commissioned and not yet fully operational, were limited to operating aircraft only in good
weather during daylight. Such considerations were also important in developing
rules guiding air operations.83 Restrictions of this sort, of course, imposed a certain
degree of artificiality on the maneuvers, as can be seen from this 1940 statement
from CINCUS Richardson:84
It is desired to have patrol planes operated in Fleet Problem XXI in a manner which will permit the development of their value for scouting and attack, but will also prevent imposing
on, or accepting unnecessary risks to, the personnel and material involved. It is essential to
reduce to a minimum the possibility of serious disruption of the operations of surface ships
by the necessity of search and salvage operations in areas remote from those in which surface ships are actually operating.

Umpiring
CINCUS served as the chief umpire.85 At least one umpire was assigned to each participating vessel. In addition, each division and squadron had an umpire. Often an
umpire was recruited from among the members of a ship’s company, usually the executive officer. During Fleet Problem VI (1926), for example, naval aviation pioneer
Commander John H. Towers was the resident umpire aboard Langley (CV 1), of
which he was executive officer.86 Officers were also drawn from other commands to
serve as umpires, particularly for fleet and squadron duty. In this way, Rear Admiral
Harris Laning, President of the Naval War College, served as the chief umpire for
Blue in Fleet Problem XIII (1932), while Captain Edward S. Jackson, of the General
Board, an aviation qualified officer who had commanded both the carrier Langley
(1925–26) and the battleship New York (1930–31), was assigned as the chief umpire
for Black.
During the earlier fleet problems, umpires on “attacking” platforms were responsible for assessing damage to “target” platforms. In practice, this did not work
very well. The damage to the “target” might not be communicated effectively, or it
might take too long to be communicated. This meant that despite having been ruled
partially or totally out-of-action, a ship might still play an active role in the maneuvers. During Fleet Problem XI (1930), for example, a ruling that increased the damage inflicted on Lexington was not properly passed on, and the ship remained in
operation for over six hours, during which her aircraft were ruled to have seriously
damaged Saratoga; once the error was discovered, all of the damage inflicted by
Lexington’s aircraft during the intervening period was cancelled, an extraordinary
artificiality.
In addition, there were often cases in which a ship simply chose to ignore the assessed damage. During Fleet Problem VII (1927), light cruiser Concord (CL 10) had
to chase the destroyer Kidder (DD 319), which had failed to acknowledge that she
had been damaged.
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This and similar incidents, which will be noted below, prompted the assessment
of damage to be put into the hands of the umpires actually aboard a ship, rather
than in an attacking vessel. This worked better. Nevertheless, since there was great
flexibility in the rules, umpires were often under considerable pressure from commanding officers “to view softly the theoretical damage received” by their ships or
aircraft, a matter that prompted more than one CINCUS to issue stern warnings
that “Umpire rules shall be applied promptly and rigidly.”87
Even with more stringent rules and stricter umpiring, however, there was always
a degree of uncertainty associated with the proper assessment of damage during the
fleet problems. As Mark Campbell put it:
Even with a standard set of rules and procedure, assessing the precise amount of damage
done to a ship was not an easy job. The first problem was the means of physically indicating
which ships were being attacked. Searchlights were used to indicate gunfire against other
ships (the firing ship aimed a light at the target ship), smoke pots indicated that torpedoes
had been launched by submarines, and rockets or flares were fired by surface ships to indicate both torpedo launches and AA fire. Planes emitted puffs of smoke from their engines to
indicate bomb or torpedo release when level bombing or making a torpedo attack. No indication was necessary when dive bombing, because the dive itself was a perfect indication of
the target ship. But even with the aid of these artificial devices, uncertainty crept in. Rockets
could fail to fire; at other times, especially at long ranges, it would not be clear which ship a
searchlight was aimed at. Submarines were a notorious problem; when a smoke pot rose to
the surface to indicate that a submarine had fired torpedoes, there was no way to know the
precise target of the torpedoes, so each ship in the vicinity had to decide for itself whether it
had been the target. Finally, it was often difficult to determine the targets of some aircraft attacks (mainly high-altitude level bombers). A puff of smoke could indicate an attack, but
not the target of the attack. Thus ships had to deduce whether they were the target of attack
by observing the course of the attacking planes when the puffs of smoke appeared. In an environment of such frequent and general uncertainties, it was easy and natural for ships to as88
sume the best possible case for themselves, and they often did.

Many of these techniques were unsatisfactory. Over the course of the fleet problems, however, new and more useful techniques were developed. To take but one example, consider submarine torpedo attacks. The release of a smoke pot to indicate
an attack not only was highly unsatisfactory (What ship in range was attacked? How
many torpedoes were fired? Did any of them score hits?) but also gave away the position of the submarine.
Scoring of torpedo hits was initially left up to the judgment of the umpires. During Fleet Problem XIV (1933), the evidence suggests that on average torpedoes were
declared to have hit about 30 percent of the time. During the following year, however, in Fleet Problem XV, one submarine fired two torpedoes at each of three light
cruisers using “sonar attack,” and was scored as having struck each of them once.
The introduction of “dummy torpedoes” during the late 1930s had several beneficial results. The recovery of spent dummies, a measure partially prompted by concerns of economy, helped determine who had fired on whom during maneuvers.
More importantly, they made scoring easier. During Fleet Problem XXI (1940),
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torpedoes fired by surface warships at ranges of 7,000–13,900 yards (3.5–6.9 nm)
scored about 24-percent hits, those dropped from aircraft at ranges of 2,500–5,000
yards struck 45 percent of the time, and those fired from submarines at 900–2,040
yards scored 30-percent hits.89
Until Fleet Problem XIII (1932), the umpires were also handicapped by the
need to use the same radio frequencies that were being used by the ships they were
riding. This often led to delays in disseminating rulings, since the messages had to
be sorted out from ordinary ship’s radio traffic, in addition to the requirements
for coding and decoding. As a result of the major rules and procedural changes
that took place prior to Fleet Problem XIII, certain radio frequencies were reserved for the use of the umpires, which greatly facilitated the transmission of
their rulings. Nevertheless, delays in the transmission of decisions were still common enough to have major effects on the course of operations during several fleet
problems.
Analysis and Evaluation
Normally, each fleet problem was followed by a critique, of which James O. Richardson (CINCUS, 1940–41) later wrote, “The battles of the Fleet Problems were vigorously refought from the speaker’s platforms.”90 These critiques were often long. That
for Fleet Problem III (1924) ran about sixty hours over three days (0600 January
16th to 1400 January 18th); it was followed by about two days of report writing by
participants, and then by about sixteen hours of public critique spread over four
days (January 21–24). All force commanders and senior officers were expected to
attend these critiques, as well as all umpires and observers, and junior officers were
encouraged to do so as well.91 The formal critique after Fleet Problem IX (1929) was
presided over by Admiral William V. Pratt in a theater in Panama, with 700 officers
in attendance, including some from the Army.92 The critique of Fleet Problem XIV
(1933) involved over a thousand officers.93 There often were also extensive critiques
after particular parts of a fleet problem. Thus, a week of intensive discussion and
analysis followed Part II of Fleet Problem XIX (1938); it helped shape Part III, certainly the most important part of the problem that year.
The critiques were valuable for the education of younger officers. Robert Taylor
Scott Keith, who retired from the Navy as a vice admiral, recounted in his memoirs
the importance to his development as a naval officer of the critique of Fleet Problem
IX (1929), in which he had participated as a newly minted ensign in Utah (BB 31):94
“This [critique] added to my knowledge of the Navy, my interest in what was going
on around me. . . . Now I was able to look at what part the Navy was playing, to begin
to look towards what was going on in the world. I never missed a Fleet Problem critique after that. [My] first Fleet Problem gave me a broader picture of the Navy and
what strategy was.”
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The final report on a fleet problem was prepared and issued by CINCUS.95 This
normally included:
• Initial tasking by CINCUS
• Theme and organization of the problem
• Statement of the problem and motives for each side
• Initial disposition of forces for each side
• Planning documents from each side
• Estimate of the situation
• Operations orders
• Letter of instruction
• Narrative of operations
• CINCUS analysis
• Reports and narratives from both sides
• Critique and conclusions
• General
• Lessons learned
• Recommendations
The conclusions, which were often quite frank, the lessons learned, and the
recommendations usually incorporated excerpts of the individual reports, and at
times entire individual reports, of the principal subordinate commanders. This was
done even when the reports of these subordinate commanders did not agree with
the conclusions and recommendations made by CINCUS or the two fleet
commanders.96 The comprehensive fleet problem report was published and widely
circulated for study, evaluation, and comment. At times, developments in a fleet
problem sparked experiments in wargames at the Naval War College. These experiments would explore ideas that might be tested in a later fleet problem, as part of a
“simulation—exercise (and fleet problem)—simulation cycle.”97
As the 1920s turned into the 1930s, obstacles to a thorough analysis of the fleet
problems arose. From the early 1930s the steadily deteriorating international environment in both the Far East and Europe competed for the attention of American
political and military leaders. The outbreak of war in Europe in September of 1939
began to draw increasing resources from the fleet for Neutrality Patrol in the Atlantic. In addition, the increasing tempo of rearmament meant that the fleet was growing. Counting only submarines, destroyers, and larger combatants, from Fiscal Year
1932 to the end of FY 1939 the number of combatant vessels in full commission
grew from 114 surface ships and 55 submarines to 242 surface ships and 125
submarines, with a further 105 combatants under construction, while enlisted
manpower increased from 79,700 to 192,200.98
By the late 1930s, the analysis and evaluation phase of the fleet problems tended
to be curtailed. Part of this was because the problems were becoming so complex
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that it was difficult to fully digest the lessons learned before planning for the next
problem could begin. Given that four days of study had been considered necessary
to evaluate the lessons learned from the sixty-hour Fleet Problem III (1924), how
much study would have been necessary to properly evaluate Fleet Problem XIX
(1938), which ran forty-six days? In short, “No one had time to analyze what they
had just done or to think much about the future.”99 Moreover, even at their best, the
analyses of the fleet problems were essentially extended “hot washes.” There was no
protracted post-exercise analytical effort such as has become common in more recent times, albeit that some recent analyses have taken so long as to be practically
useless to the service. A further complicating factor may have been the turnover rate
of CINCUS; the nearly annual change of the fleet’s commander-in-chief could not
have been good for systematic analysis and study of lessons learned, keeping track of
innovative initiatives, or developing a particular experimental thread. Senior officers were aware of these problems, but the training value of the problems outweighed the limitations of the analytical process; lessons were still being learned,
the fleet was sharpening its skills under conditions approaching actual wartime
conditions, and senior officers and their staffs were gaining experience and skill at
planning and conducting operations.
As CINCUS James O. Richardson would later write,100 “the increasing number
and variety of training exercises, and the complexity thereof[,] too often resulted in
inadequate time for study of results, and their proper evaluation. This lack of thorough analysis, coupled with the strict applications of peacetime safety rules, always
contained the real hazard of sometimes arriving at erroneous conclusions.” It is
hard to disagree with Richardson on this. Certain lessons that ought to have been
drawn from the experience of the later fleet problems were clearly not learned, such
as the ambiguous performance of PBY patrol bombers in massed attacks or the
Navy’s need for training in night fighting. Nevertheless, it is clear that at least for the
fleet problems up to about 1938, the lessons were internalized by many officers, as
some of them would often refer to a particular fleet problem when discussing technical or doctrinal matters, or making proposals for future fleet problems.
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21 M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem
VIII—Report of Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet,” p. 2.
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23 M964-13, 13, U.S. Fleet Problem XII, 1931, Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral J. V. Chase, U.S. Navy, p. 5.
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consultative body, meeting irregularly to discuss
matters of mutual concern, such as strategy or the
lines of responsibility for the respective services in
various situations. It was also responsible for recommending sites for the development of new
bases, and formulated broad policies for both services, including the preparation of joint contingency plans. It had no executive authority;
decisions implementing its recommendations had
to be made by the service chiefs, the secretaries,
or, in some matters of policy, the President. From
1919 to 1941, Army members were the Chief of
Staff, his G-3 (later the Deputy C/S), and the
Chief of the War Plans Division; Navy members
included the CNO, the Assistant CNO, and the
Chief of the War Plans Division. In mid-1941 the
senior aviation officers of each service were
added. There was also a permanent secretary. The
respective Chiefs of War Plans and three of their
senior deputies constituted the “Joint Planning
Committee,” with a small secretariat that met
more frequently. It was this body that actually
managed the necessary plans for joint exercises.
The Joint Board is neglected in the literature. Although not focused on the Joint Board, Steven T.
Ross’s American War Plans, 1890–1939 (London:
Frank Cass, 2002) has extensive information on
its work and workings. See, also, Louis Morton,
“Interservice Co-operation and Political Military
Collaboration,” in Total War and Cold War: Problems of Civilian Control of the Military, edited by
Harry L. Coles (n.p.: Ohio University Press,
1962), pp. 131–60; Mark Skinner Watson’s Chief
of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp.
79–81, 97–100; Furer, pp. 648–49; General Services Administration, Federal Records of World
War II, Vol. II, Military Agencies (Washington:
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National Archives, 1951), pp. 37–38. On the
board’s role in joint exercises, see William Felix
Atwater, “United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations, 1898–1942”
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1986), pp. 54, 61–63, etc.
26 M964-25, 2 includes about a dozen communications preserved between the Department of the
Navy, the Department of State, the American legation in Port-au-Prince, and the embassy in
London, as well as some sent from the Haitian
and British foreign ministries regarding arrangements for Fleet Problem XX (1939). See also
M964-36, 3, CINCUS to CNO, Sep. 29, 1940,
“Outline of Alternative Fleet Problem XXII, to be
held in the Northern Pacific Area,” p. 1; “necessary diplomatic permission to use Hecate Strait
will be required [of the Canadian government].
Permission for certain minor forces to visit Port
Simpson would be desirable.”
27 See “Allies Permit the Navy to Use the Los Angeles in War Game,” New York Times, Jan. 8,
1931.
28 See, for example, M964-21, 2, Director, Fleet
Maintenance Division to Director, Ship Movements Division, Sep. 18, 1935, “Tentative
Draft—Fleet Problem XVII,” detailing vessels that
would be unavailable for the problem due to
overhaul: three battleships, two heavy and two
light cruisers, six destroyers, four others.
29 M964-33, 4, COMSCOFOR (Commander Maroon Fleet) to CINCUS, “Maroon Report of Part
VI, Fleet Problem XXI,” “Narrative,” p. 1.
30 Some idea of the attention to detail that characterized the planning for a fleet problem may be
gained by examining M964-23, 7, “Destroyers
Battle Force to Postmaster,” Mar. 8, 1938, requesting re-rerouting of mail during FP XIX, initiating a test of what would become the Fleet Post
Office system.
31 Campbell, pp. 172–73.
32 Note the anomalous classification of Aroostook as
CM-3: originally commissioned as a mine layer,
although converted for use as an aircraft tender in
1919, when the Navy introduced its now traditional alphanumeric designations, she nevertheless continued to be classed as a cruiser mine layer
(see DANFS).
33 See Eugene E. Wilson, Slipstream: The Autobiography of an Aircraftsman (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1950), pp. 134–39; Eugene E. Wilson, The Gift of Foresight (New York: Columbia
University Oral History Research Office, 1964),
Vol. I, pp. 390–93; Eugene E. Wilson, “The
Navy’s First Carrier Task Force,” Proceedings, Feb.
1950, pp. 163–66; all deal, somewhat redundantly, with the development and “marketing” of
this plan. On the consequences of this change, see
the discussion of FP IX, in Chapter 10.
34 Campbell, pp. 127–29, has a thoughtful evaluation of the use of constructive elements in the
fleet problems, and the drawbacks that such use
entailed.
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35 M964-1, 1, “Report on United States Fleet Problem Number One,” p. 3. To put Jones’ “any probable enemy” into context, in 1923 the Royal Navy
had four carriers converted from other types of
vessel during World War I, plus three more in
various stages of conversion, and was preparing
to commission Hermes, the world’s first purpose-built carrier; meanwhile, the Imperial Navy
had recently commissioned Hosho, its first carrier.
36 M964-27, 7, CINCUS to Fleet, Apr. 29, 1938,
“Part VII, Annual Fleet Exercises 1938—Report
on Exercise 78,” p. 5.
37 Campbell, p. 213.
38 For a fairly detailed analysis of the evolution of
the fleet problem rules, see Campbell, pp. 129–39.
39 See Laning, An Admiral’s Yarn, pp. 274ff. The
1933 version of “The Naval Battle” forms an appendix to this volume, pp. 405–47. What might
be termed the “Laning Rules” were in use at the
NWC from about 1923 until the eve of World
War II, and were used in over 200 wargames; see
Vlahos, pp. 166–78. This is a subject in need of
further study, as it involves the process by which
lessons from wargaming helped shape tactics and
doctrine.
40 Laning, An Admiral’s Yarn, pp. 335–37, 378.
41 Richardson, p. 238.
42 Trent Hone, “The Evolution of Fleet Tactical
Doctrine in the U.S.N., 1922–1941,” Journal of
Military History, No. 67 (Oct. 2003), pp. 1116–17.
43 The number of rounds fired by Bismarck before
Hood received a fatal hit is somewhat uncertain.
Apparently the German “salve” can mean both
“salvo” and “broadside.” Bismarck fired five times
between 0555 and 0600, when Hood was struck.
The first two firings were definitely salvoes of four
guns each. The third may have been a salvo of
four guns or a broadside of eight. The fourth firing was definitely a full eight-gun broadside. It is
not clear whether the fifth firing was of four or
eight guns. Thus the total number of rounds fired
was between twenty-four and thirty-two. William
H. Garzke, Jr., and Robert O. Dulin, Jr., Axis and
Neutral Battleships in World War II (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1985), pp. 219–23, suggest
twenty-four to twenty-eight; David J. Bercum and
Holger H. Herwig, The Destruction of the Bismarck (New York: Overlook Press, 2001), pp.
145–53, imply twenty-eight to thirty-two.
44 For this action see Samuel Eliot Morison, The
Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February
1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), pp 235–54,
277–79; Vincent P. O’Hara, The U.S. Navy
Against the Axis: Surface Combat, 1941–1945
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp.
101–39.
45 Naval Historical Center, HC, Box 270 [hereafter
cited as NHC, Box number], Change # 3, USF 10,
Oct. 5, 1934, p. 17, and CINCUS to Holders of
USF 10, Change # 12, USF 10, Jan. 24, 1938, p. 13.
46 Albert A. Nofi, “WW I: Planes vs. Ships,” Strategy
& Tactics, No. 96 (Mar.–Apr. 1984), p. 9; Naval
History Net, “Navies of World War I: Turkish,”
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www.navalhistory.net/WW1NavyTurkish.htm
#key. See, also, Commander-in-Chief, High Sea
Fleet, Jul. 23, 1918, “Tactical Order No. 11, Aircraft Division,” www.gwpda.org/naval/
gnto1100.htm.
47 What follows is based closely upon Alfred W.
Johnson, “The Naval Bombing Experiments off
the Virginia Capes, June and July 1921” (Naval
Historical Center, 1959), and Dunnigan and Nofi,
Pacific War Encyclopedia, “Battleships and
Battlecruisers.” In the same period, the United
States also expended fourteen submarines, including three German prizes, and two German
prize destroyers in weapons trials or as targets.
From 1925 through the mid-1930s additional vessels were expended, including eight “four-piper”
destroyers of 1919–20 vintage and some old merchant ships, while Britain expended an old battleship, and France and Japan each expended an old
armored cruiser. Methods employed included
coast artillery, surface gunfire, and both Army
and Navy aircraft. See also “U.S. Destroyers Sunk
as Targets,” Warship International, Vol. 40, No. 1
(2003); “U.S. Submarines Sunk as Targets,” Warship International, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2003).
48 Roger Chesneau, editor, Conway’s All the World’s
Fighting Ships, 1922–1946 (New York: Mayflower,
1980), pp. 411–14, suggests that about fourteen
Chinese warships were sunk by Japanese aircraft,
mostly during Aug.–Oct. 1939; the largest was no
more than about 900 tons, and all seem to have
been caught in port or at anchor. There is some
treatment of air attacks on ships in Martin H.
Brice’s The Royal Navy and the Sino-Japanese Incident, 1937–1941 (London: Ian Allan, 1973), pp.
37, 56–65, 95, which suggests that there was a
high degree of inaccuracy.
49 These figures can be found in both William C.
Franks, Jr., “Naval Operations in the Spanish
Civil War, 1936–1939,” Naval War College Review, Jan.–Feb. 1984, p. 46, and Brian R. Sullivan,
“Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War,” Journal of Military History, Vol.
59, No. 4, 1995, pp. 722ff.; both were presumably
citing the same source, which was not indicated.
An attempt to reach one of these authors was unsuccessful.
50 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars,
Vol. II, The Period of Reluctant Rearmament,
1930–1939 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1976), p. 390, n. 7.
51 Samuel Eliot Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), pp. 16–18.
52 The first battleship injured by air attack appears
to have been the Russian pre-dreadnought Slava
(launched in 1904), which took a German bomb
in the eastern Baltic on Apr. 27, 1917; although
she lost five men killed and two wounded, the
ship suffered only minor damage. See Donald
William Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet
Sea Power (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 304.
53 Launched in 1913, the thirty-two thousand–ton
Almirante Latorre had fought at Jutland as HMS
Canada, and was quite similar in design to the
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New York (BB 34). See Leonard F. Guttridge, Mutiny: A History of Naval Insurrection (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. 189; “Chile Hears
Fleet Quit After Fliers Bombed It,” New York
Times, Sep. 7, 1931; and “Last Mutinous Ships
Surrender in Chile,” New York Times, Sep. 8,
1931.
54 Launched in 1914, Jaime I and her sister ships
were the smallest dreadnought battleships ever
built, only 15,700 tons standard displacement; see
James W. Cortada, Historical Dictionary of the
Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (Westport, Ct.:
Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 276, and the highly
inaccurate “Franco’s New Pilots Are Accurate
Shots,” New York Times, Aug. 15, 1936.
55 For a first-hand description of bombing practice
procedures during this period, see Herbert D.
Riley, Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Herbert D.
Riley, U.S.N. (Ret.), interviewed by John T. Mason
(Annapolis: United States Naval Institute,
1972/1994), pp. 73–82.
56 NWCA, Records Group 25, General Subjects,
Kalbfus to Capt. J. W. Wilcox, Jr., Feb. 17, 1936.
57 Cited in Dyer, Amphibians I, p. 124; Dyer does
not mention the occasion, but circumstantial evidence suggests that this occurred during FP XXI.
58 Campbell, pp. 133–36, has an excellent analysis of
the debate over the revision of the 1931–32 air attack rules.
59 Wildenberg, Destined, p. 33.
60 On the inaccuracy of horizontal bombing, see
Stephen L. McFarland, America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910–1945 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), pp. ix–x, 110, 172.
As a ship, Utah could operate either manned or
under radio control; for some details, see R.S.S.
Howman-Meedk, Harold Johnson, K. D.
McBride, and Christopher C. Wright, “Target
Ships,” Warship International, 2002, No. 1, pp.
24–36.
61 NWCA, Carton 56, L. McNamee, U.S. Fleet Umpire Instructions, 1932: Suggested Changes;
NWCA, Carton 56, William A. Moffett, Chief,
BuAir, p. 2.
62 NHC, Box 270, Change # 3, USF 10, Oct. 5, 1934,
pp. 16–24.
63 NHC, Box 270, Change # 3, USF 10, Oct. 5, 1934,
p. 21.
64 NHC, Box 270, CINCUS to Holders of USF 10,
Change # 12, USF 10, Jan. 24, 1938, p. 11–24; aircraft bombing figures are on p. 21.
65 Table constructed from: NWCA, Carton 56, L.
McNamee, U.S. Fleet Umpire Instructions, 1932:
Suggested Changes; NWCA, Carton 56, William
A. Moffett, Chief, BuAir, p. 2; Dunnigan and
Nofi, Pacific War Encyclopedia, “Bombing, Difficulties of Hitting Ships”; McFarland, pp. ix–x,
110, 172. Figures for other types of vessels were
generally proportional to those shown; for example, McNamee suggested that a horizontal
bomber attacking from fifteen thousand feet had
a 12-percent probability of hitting a heavy cruiser

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:18:59 AM

and 11 percent against a destroyer or similarly
sized vessel.
66 Samuel Eliot Morison, Coral Sea, Midway, and
Submarine Actions (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949),
pp. 124–27, 136; Wildenberg, Destined, pp. 205ff.
The 1934 umpiring changes, embodied in NHC,
Box 270, Change # 3, USF 10, Oct. 5, 1934, p. 21,
raised the accuracy figure for dive bombing
against a battleship or carrier to 26 percent, nearly
the optimal level of World War II experience, at
Midway. This was changed in 1938 to 16 percent,
very close to what would turn out to be actual
wartime experience, by NHC, Box 270, CINCUS
to Holders of USF 10, Change # 12, USF 10, Jan.
24, 1938, p. 23.
67 On the “Billy Mitchell Crusade,” see Samuel Eliot
Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September
1939 – May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947),
pp. xliii–xlvii, and Samuel Eliot Morison, The
Two-Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963),
pp. 8ff.
68 Dunnigan and Nofi, Pacific War Encyclopedia,
“Bombing, Difficulties of Hitting Ships” David H.
Lippman “World War II Plus 55 Chronology,
August 25–August 28th, 1942,”
www.usswashington.com/dl25au42.htm.
69 For what follows, see Morison, Struggle for
Guadalcanal, pp. 259–63, and Anthony P. Tully,
“Death of Battleship Hiei: Sunk by Gunfire or Air
Attack?” www.combinedfleet.com/atully03.htm,
which differs from Morison in some details but
reaches the same conclusions. Referring to
slow-moving—four to six knots—coastal shipping attempting to dodge mines and Allied aircraft during the final stages of the Tunisian
Campaign, the official Army Air Corps publication The AAF in Northwest Africa: An Account of
the Twelfth Air Force in the Northwest African
Landings and the Battle for Tunisia (Washington:
Center for Air Force History, 1992) says (pp.
59–60), “High-altitude bombing, very effective
against ships at sea, could sink a medium merchant vessel with an average of 28 tons of bombs;
thus a formation of 18 B-17’s could hope to sink
two ships,” a bit of “spin” that hardly conceals the
dismal performance of the bombers.
70 To be fair, these figures were derived from experiments using drone aircraft conducting various
types of air attacks; see Richardson, Treadmill,
p. 224.
71 Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 298–303; DANFS. The
Japanese reported two cruisers sunk and two
more damaged.
72 Damage figures taken from NHC, Box 270,
Change # 3, USF 10, Oct. 5, 1934, p. 21, which
were repeated in NHC, Box 270, CINCUS to
Holders of USF 10, Change # 12, USF 10, Jan. 24,
1938, p. 21. World War II experience from
Dunnigan and Nofi, Pacific War Encyclopedia,
“Damage, Sinking Ships”; Hone, Friedman, and
Mandeles, p. 63.
73 Perhaps more attention should have been paid to
Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully’s comment

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

PROCEDURE

regarding Ens. Thomas Hederman’s “suicide”
mission during FP III/GJE No. 2 (1924), “this
form of enemy activity is too much relied upon
by other powers for us to be insensible to it”;
M964-2, 1, “Talk on Operations of Black Forces
Delivered by Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on Problem No. 3, 21 January 1924,” p. 7.
74 On the ordeals of Laffey and Aaron Ward, see
Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 235–37,
251–53.
75 NWCA, Carton 56, documents bound as “Instructions for the Conduct of the Strategical and
Tactical Exercises, U.S. Fleet,” including CINCUS
to President, Naval War College (Mar. 18, 1935);
President, Naval War College to CINCUS (May
17, 1935), A16-3/CTO; Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics to President, Naval War College (May 17,
1935), AER-PL 11-EMRNC3; President, Naval
War College to Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
(Jun. 13, 1935) (unnumbered); and so on.
76 For example, during Fleet Problem I battleship
maneuvering speed was limited to twelve knots to
conserve fuel; “Battle Fleet Tests Jutland Problem,” New York Times, Mar. 17, 1923, p. 1.
77 M964-25, 4, “Fleet Problem XX, Estimate of the
Situation by Vice Admiral Adolphus Andres,
Commander BLACK Fleet,” p. 14.
78 NWCA, Carton 64, “Critique, Phase II, Fleet
Problem Seventeen, United States Fleet,” May 15,
1936.
79 In practice, by the end of the 1920s the actual
speed of the American battleline was probably no
more than nineteen knots, as during reconstruction a number of battleships underwent a significant increase in displacement. For example, as a
result of extensive reconstruction during
1927–29, the maximum speed of the Oklahoma
(BB 37) fell to only 19.68 knots, rather than her
rated 20.5; Jeff Phister, Battleship Oklahoma (BB
37) (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2008), p. 32.
80 In fact, the Japanese speed advantage was even
more than the U.S. Navy believed. It was not until
late 1936 that the U.S. Navy became aware of the
fact that the two Nagato Class battleships could
make 26.5 knots; see Friedman, Battleships, pp.
186, 285. Speeds cited, of course, are the theoretical maxima. By the mid-1930s many older battleships were even slower than their official speeds,
often despite overhauls and reconstructions. For
details see the appropriate entries in Friedman,
Battleships, as well as William H. Garzke, Jr., and
Robert O. Dulin, Jr., United States Battleships in
World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1976); Allied Battleships in World War II
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980); Axis and
Neutral Battleships in World War II (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1985); Phister, Battleship
Oklahoma, p. 32.
81 Richardson, p. 244.
82 Hone and Hone, p. 81.
83 Richardson, pp. 238–39, 248; Campbell, p. 142,
n. 84.
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84 Richardson, p. 248.
85 For a good summary of umpiring rules, see
Campbell, pp. 137–93.
86 Clark G. Reynolds, John H. Towers: The Struggle
for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 200–201.
87 Richardson, p. 238.
88 Campbell, p. 137.
89 See, particularly, M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet
Problem XV, CINCUS, Jun. 1, 1934, p. 14; NHC,
Box 270, Change # 3, USF 10, Oct. 5, 1934, p. 23;
CINCUS to Holders of USF 10, Change # 12, USF
10, Jan. 24, 1938, p. 22; Richardson, p. 235.
90 Richardson, p. 46.
91 Reynolds, John H. Towers, p. 201.
92 Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, p. 49.
93 NWCA, Carton 63, CINCUS to Fleet, “Critique,
United States Fleet Problem XIV,” Jan. 31, 1933.
94 Robert Taylor Scott Keith, Reminiscences of Vice
Admiral Robert Taylor Scott Keith, U.S.N. (Ret.),
interviewed by Paul Stillwell (Annapolis: United
States Naval Institute, 1990), pp. 9–10.
95 Campbell, p. 125. The final report for FP I was a
rather high-quality, printed, 141-page, 8.5-inch
by 5-inch, paperbound volume; an actual copy is
preserved in NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on
United States Fleet Problem Number One,” and a
microfilm copy is in M964-1, 1. Apparently, after
the preparation of this report, all original documents from the problem were destroyed; see
Nenninger, p. 3. Thereafter the final reports were
less elaborate, usually consisting of the appropriate documents, in their original mimeographed
form, bound together with a steel clip, occasionally with plotting sheets, maps, or charts attached,
and sometimes even with overhead projector
slides. Unfortunately, it has not always been possible to secure a copy of the final report for some
of the fleet problems, apparently a result of poor
archival practices on the part of the Navy.
96 See the discussion of FP XVIII (1937), in Chapter
19, below, for what appears to have been the only
occasion of command interference being used to
suppress a dissenting opinion.
97 Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, p. 159.
98 Figures, which include recommissioned reserve
fleet ships, are compiled from J. E. Kaufman and
H. W. Kaufman, The Sleeping Giant: American
Armed Forces between the Wars (Westport, Ct.:
Praeger, 1996), pp. 110–20, and Figure 12;
Dunnigan and Nofi, Pacific War Encyclopedia,
“Rearmament” Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics of the United States to 1970 (Washington:
Department of Commerce, 1976), Vol. II, p.
1141. For overall growth of the fleet, including
smaller warships and auxiliaries, see Appendix 1.
99 Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography
of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1974), p. 90.
100 Richardson, pp. 219–20.
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Part 2: The Fleet Problems

Between 1923 and 1940 the Navy carried out twenty-one fleet problems. There is no
published general survey of these maneuvers, even in outline form. What follows is
a short analysis of each of the problems.
For purposes of this study, some liberties have been taken in terms of what
should be included in the discussion of the individual fleet problems. Thus, since
there often were specialized exercises during the periods in which the fleet was concentrating for or dispersing from a fleet problem, or that occurred during intermissions in the fleet problems, these have been included, particularly since documents
relating to such exercises are often found together with those from the related fleet
problem. And since many joint exercises with the Army were often closely associated with a fleet problem, particularly the periodic “Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercises,” some consideration of those has also been included.
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IV

1923

Fleet Problem I, February 18–22, 1923

leet Problem I was the first general fleet maneuver since 19211 and the first occasion on which the newly reorganized U.S. Fleet conducted maneuvers under
the direction of CINCUS. The problem involved 165 ships and nearly 40,000

F

men.2
The premise of the problem was that after weeks of rising tension, during which
the two sides had initiated mobilization measures, Black (Japan) had decided to go
to war with Blue (United States), using a “good will” cruise to Latin America as
“cover” to position its fleet for a surprise attack on the Panama Canal. By disabling
the Canal, Black would prevent the movement of the Blue Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific. The objectives of the problem were to train leaders in the conduct of
large-scale operations, to examine war plans and tactical doctrine, and to exercise
the fleet, using the defense of the Canal Zone as the central theme.
In preparation for the problem, the principal elements of the fleet moved to
Central American waters from its bases in California and Virginia, engaging on the
way in type and force exercises.3 In contrast to the practice of the fleet problems conducted from 1934 onward, neither the movements to Panama and the Caribbean
prior to the problem nor the special tactical and weapons exercises held during
these voyages, nor those held after the maneuvers, nor those conducted during the
return trips to home ports, were considered part of the problem, so Fleet Problem I
was essentially a large-scale tactical maneuver.
The movement of the Battle Fleet from San Diego to Panama was uneventful,
but the Scouting Fleet , proceeding from the East Coast, encountered heavy weather,
though there were no serious problems. As the fleet was engaged in these movements, the two air squadrons normally assigned to the Scouting Fleet conducted
massed flights in stages from their bases near Hampton Roads, the Scouting Squadron (18 aircraft) to Coco Solo, Panama, and the Bombing/Torpedo Squadron (18
aircraft) to Key West.4
Blue was commanded by Vice Admiral John D. McDonald, COMSCOFLEET,
who controlled his own Scouting Fleet plus the Control Force, for a total of five battleships, two old armored cruisers, and 25 destroyers, plus a squadron of 16 submarines (commanded by Ernest J. King), and three aircraft tenders supporting the
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18 aircraft of the Scouting Squadron, plus some miscellaneous auxiliaries. This
force represented the advanced guard of the main body of the Blue Fleet, a constructive force that was presumed to be steaming from bases on the East Coast and would
arrive in Panama on February 25th. Blue was also supported by the resources of the
15th Naval District, which had a handful of aircraft, and the Army’s Panama Division, with 15 aircraft and the 19th Infantry Brigade, on paper comprising 10,000
troops. This gave the problem an interservice flavor.5
Black, commanded by Admiral Edward W. Eberle, COMBATFLT, had the Battle
Fleet, with nine battleships, 38 destroyers, and some auxiliaries, plus a constructive
brigade of Marines aboard a transport. Two of the battleships, New York (BB 34)
and Oklahoma (BB 37), were designated as “constructive” aircraft carriers on the
model of Langley (CV 1), which was not yet ready for fleet service. Although each
battleship had only one catapult plane, each was designated to represent a constructive squadron of 15 aircraft.
During this problem, concern about excessive expenditures of fuel resulted in
caps being imposed on ships’ speed; destroyers were limited to 18 knots, battleships
to 12, and submarines to 10.6
The Black Fleet concentrated in the Galapagos on January 26th, and for several
days conducted various type and force tactical exercises. Black then proceeded to
steam northward, in the general direction of Magdalena Bay, Mexico. During this
movement, and during the fleet problem, the Black Fleet employed a new experimental circular cruising formation championed by Commander Chester W.
Nimitz. Intended to “to furnish the best protection possible to its train,” while permitting a much more rapid deployment into battleline than cruising in a rectangular block of columns, the formation proved so effective that it was shortly adopted
as the standard for the fleet.7 Then, at 0800 on the morning of February 18th, with
his fleet about 1,200 nautical miles directly west of the Canal, Admiral Eberle was
ordered, “Execute your War Mission. There will be no formal declaration of war.”8
Black immediately proceeded on a generally eastward course toward Central America.
Meanwhile, Blue’s Scouting Fleet had begun passing through the Canal. On
February 19th, Blue established destroyer, submarine, and air patrols to the west
and south of the Canal Zone, along the coasts of Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia. Over the next few days the balance of the Scouting Fleet came through the Canal
and was positioned to support the patroling forces. Black, meanwhile, approaching
from the west had made 850 miles by the morning of the 21st, arriving at a point
about 100 miles off Costa Rica, northwest of the Canal.9 During the pre-dawn hours
there was some skirmishing between the destroyers of the two fleets. Little came of
this, however, and later that day, the Black fleet reached Puerto Culebra, in Costa
Rica, about 400 air miles northwest of the Canal. On February 22nd the Black
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“carrier” Oklahoma catapulted a single airplane. Representing a squadron of 15
aircraft, this airplane “destroyed” the locks on the Pacific side, trapping Blue’s
Scouting Fleet in the Gulf of Panama. This success occurred despite the fact that a
ruling by one of the Umpires provided information to the Army Air Service and
coast defense forces derived from a notional Blue secret agent that an air attack on
the Canal was imminent, a warning that was ignored.10 Black battleships followed
this air attack with a mock surface attack on the defenses of the Canal Zone, to
secure an advanced base.11 This ended the fleet problem.
Following the problem, the fleet remained in Panamanian waters for several
weeks. The Navy had arranged for Secretary Edwin C. Denby and 11 officials of the
Navy Department, plus eight senators, 34 representatives, and 28 members of the
press, to observe the maneuvers, providing passage from Virginia to Panama in the
transport Henderson (AP-1), commanded by Captain Arthur MacArthur III, one of
the most promising younger officers in the service. During the actual maneuvers,
most of these guests dispersed to various units of the fleet. The President of Panama
was also a guest for part of the maneuvers, providing a diplomatic dimension to the
proceedings.12
On March 14–16 there was a grand battleline maneuver, testing fleet training
and coordination in tactical evolutions, search, torpedo attack, and gunnery; these
were widely reported in the press as being based on the Battle of Jutland, in 1916.13
During the course of these maneuvers, the radio-controlled pre-dreadnought battleship Iowa (BB 4), built in 1896 and displacing some 11,000 tons, was “sunk in a
spectacular manner” by 14-inch rounds from Mississippi (BB 41), assisted by aircraft that for the first time in a major fleet maneuver gave a practical demonstration
of the value of aerial spotting for the battleline.14
On March 20th, CINCUS Hilary P. Jones conducted a review of the fleet problem
and maneuvers aboard Henderson for officers of the fleet, members of Congress,
Navy Department officials, and journalists.15 Jones was very positive about the success of the problem as a test of the Navy’s abilities, and recommended more such
maneuvers. He praised the performance of the fleet, and was particularly complimentary to its airmen.
Some officers had criticized Black’s decision to use its aircraft offensively, thus
leaving the fleet without air cover. Jones pointed out that Blue had been given no
aircraft suitable for use as bombers, whether real or constructive, and thus the Black
fleet was not at risk from an air attack. But he did note that Blue’s Vice Admiral
McDonald had neglected to use the aircraft he had effectively, to conduct patrols
that might have detected Black’s approach in a timely fashion.16 Jones went on to
observe that the maneuvers demonstrated that there were weaknesses in the
defenses of the Canal Zone. Noting that the Miraflores Locks and Balboa were very
vulnerable to battleship gunfire, he suggested the fortification of additional sites
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covering the approaches to the canal. Jones went on to indicate the need for better
communications in the fleet, for scout cruisers and destroyer leaders, and for
submarines able to keep up with the fleet.
In his critique of the problem, CNO Robert E. Coontz concluded that the Blue
estimate of the situation had been “good,” but that it was “not so complete” as
Black’s, and that this had been an important factor contributing to Black’s success.17
Coontz’ observation was accurate. Black had spent a lot more time studying the situation, producing over 17 pages of analysis that not only had compared the capabilities of the two fleets in some detail, reviewing alternative courses of action against
Blue and probable actions by Blue, but also had carefully evaluated the vulnerabilities of the Canal in order to provide optimal target selection. In contrast, Blue produced only eight pages of analysis, which was largely confined to considering Black’s
options, though it did include a short and accurate discourse on actions that could
not be taken during peacetime maneuvers, that would be possible in wartime.18
The most significant conclusions drawn from the fleet problem were that the
Navy needed aircraft carriers, as well as light cruisers, destroyer leaders, and fleet
submarines, plus auxiliaries able to sustain at least 12 knots, in order to keep up with
the fleet. In addition, more observation aircraft were needed for battleships. An important conclusion was that the maneuvers demonstrated the “susceptibility of certain vital parts [of the Canal] to damage by bombs carried by aircraft.”19
Some of the critiques submitted by various officers proved very insightful. Captain John F. Hines, of the Pennsylvania (BB 38), for example, provided a very perceptive analysis of Black’s air strategy. Outlining the range of the aircraft purportedly
carried by the fleet’s two constructive carriers, Hines criticized Black’s decision to
delay launching Oklahoma’s “air strike” against the Canal until the fleet had entered
Puerto Culebra. Since the fleet had to wait until daylight in order to enter the bay,
this put its ships at risk from attack by enemy surface forces, which were already
trading shots with Black escorts, and in such an action “both plane carriers might be
lost without any planes getting off.” He argued that launching the air strike at 0200,
while still off the coast, would have given the attacking aircraft the benefit of cover
of darkness during its long (roughly four-hour) flight to the Canal, where it would
have arrived around dawn, enhancing the effectiveness of the surprise attack.20
The fleet problem also led to major improvements in fleet communications. In
his review of the problem, CINCUS Hilary P. Jones wrote:21
The Commander-in-Chief considers that rapid communication within the fleet, between the
fleet and its bases, and between the fleet and the Navy Department is neither satisfactory nor
reliable. The maneuvers of the United States Fleet off Panama during both 1922 and 1923
have demonstrated this fact in the most profound manner; and although there has been
some improvement during the past two years, the Commander-in-Chief believes that the
subject of communications still warrants the serious and immediate consideration of the
Department.
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Observing that it would be impossible for the fleet to operate as a united force
in battle unless communications were improved, CINCUS recommended that
communications be included in battle efficiency reports, to create an incentive
for commanding officers to work harder in this important technology. This
recommendation resulted in immediate action. The General Board held extensive
hearings on the subject, and by summer had issued a report concurring with
CINCUS’s recommendations, which were shortly approved by the Secretary of the
Navy.
In their critiques, a number of officers commented on the decided lack of realism that resulted from the limitations imposed on ships’ speed in order to conserve
fuel, and as a result the conclusions also included a recommendation that more fuel
be made available to permit more extensive exercises in screening, scouting, and
tactical maneuvers.22
Because the critiques were presented to the members of Congress and reporters
who had accompanied the fleet, some of the more sensitive conclusions, such as the
vulnerabilities of the Canal, were widely reported in the press.23 Fleet Problem I was
generally considered a great success, and set the tone for the entire series that was to
follow.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:00 AM

55

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

56

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

N O T E S 1 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number One.” A good outline of
the proposed maneuvers can be found in “Reorganized Fleet to Hold Big Tests,” New York Times,
Dec. 26, 1922, and “Admiral Sums Up Canal Manoeuvres,” New York Times, Apr. 8, 1923.
2 Annual Report, 1923, p. 123.
3 In addition, submarines conducted trials of an
improved version of the “Fessenden Oscillator,”
which it was thought might permit short-range
underwater acoustic communications; Ernest J.
King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral
King: A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton,
1952), p. 161; Kenneth D. Rolt, “The Fessenden
Oscillator: History, Electroacoustic Model, and
Performance Estimate,” Papers of the Acoustical
Society of America, 127th Meeting, June 6–10,
1994, www.auditory.org/asamtgs/asa94mit/2aEA/
2aEA3.html.
4 After the fleet problem, both squadrons returned
to Hampton Roads by air. At the time, the movement of the Scouting Squadron was described as
“the greatest overseas air expedition ever attempted”; Annual Report, 1923, p. 124.
5 Grimes, p. 5.
6 Annual Report, 1923, p. 6; “Battle Fleet Tests
Jutland Problem,” New York Times, Mar. 17,
1923.
7 This formation was actually devised by Nimitz’s
USNA classmate Commander Roscoe C. MacFall
while at the Naval War College. Nimitz, also attending the college, became a strong advocate of
the formation, and later, while serving as aide, assistant chief-of-staff, and tactical officer to
COMBATFLEET, he argued for its adoption,
overcoming enormous skepticism from the fleet
staff before securing a trial; E. B. Potter, Nimitz
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), pp.
138–42; Annual Report, 1923, p. 5.
8 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number One,” p. 8. On p. 12 appears the comment “History teaches . . . that
Black does not make war in the usual manner—she does not issue a formal declaration but
starts the War by some overt act—endeavoring by
surprise attack, on an important position or force,
to obtain an initial advantage.”
9 Black’s orders authorized Eberle to “violate the
neutrality of CENTRAL or SOUTH AMERICAN
countries if necessary,” though in fact permission
for port calls had been solicited by the State Department; NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United
States Fleet Problem Number One,” pp. 27–28.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:00 AM

10 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number One,,” p. 84.
11 Annual Report, 1923, p. 5.
12 “Army Vies With Navy in Recess Junketing,”
Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 6, 1923; “Congress Party Sails for Navy Manoeuvres,” New York
Times, Mar. 6, 1923; “Denby Reaches Colon for
Navy Maneuvers,” Washington Post, Mar. 13,
1923. For some amusing incidents during the
problem, see Coontz, From the Mississippi, pp.
424–29, who puts the number of VIPs as “eight
Senators, seventy Representatives, and a few
members of the press.” See, also, “Erring Gob
Wakens Denby at Midnight for Watch on
Bridge,” Washington Post, Mar. 12, 1923, and
“Congressmen Seized, Dressed as Sailors,” New
York Times, Mar. 21, 1923.
13 “Battle Fleet Tests Jutland Problems,” New York
Times, Mar. 17, 1923.
14 Coontz, From the Mississippi, p. 425; H. Kent
Hewitt, The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt,
edited by Evelyn M. Cherpak (Newport: Naval
War College Press, 2004), p. 71, observes that although Iowa had performed well in the fleet
problem and the gunnery exercises that followed
it, she was sunk primarily to avert hostile criticism from the Mitchellites. See, also, “Radio Ship
Will Go Under Fire Thrice,” Washington Post,
Mar. 13, 1923.
15 “Admiral Sums Up Canal Manoeuvres,” New
York Times, Apr. 8, 1923.
16 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number One,” p. 134.
17 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number One,” p. 71.
18 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number One,” pp. 9–26, compared with pp. 41–48.
19 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number One,” p. 131.
20 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number One,” pp. 89–90.
21 Linwood S. Howeth, History of CommunicationsElectronics in the United States Navy (Washington:
Bureau of Ships and Office of Naval History,
1963), Chapter XXXII, Section 4, online at www
.earlyradiohistory.us/1963hw32.htm#32sec4 (Sep.
29, 2006).
22 Annual Report, 1923, p. 6; “Battle Fleet Tests
Jutland Problem,” New York Times, Mar. 17,
1923.
23 See, for example, “Admiral Sums Up Canal Manoeuvres,” New York Times, Apr. 8, 1923.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:00 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

An example of “Geographic Transposition and
Orientation”: The Caribbean reorganized to represent the
China Seas for Fleet Problem IV, 1924
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1924

Fleet Problem II, Fleet Problem III/Grand Joint
Army-Navy Exercise No. 2, and Fleet Problem IV,
January 2–February 1, 1924

T

hese three fleet problems and the grand joint exercise were so closely linked
that it seems reasonable to treat them together, particularly since, only a decade later, they would have been organized as a single problem.1 Although
conducted in Central American and Caribbean waters, all four maneuvers dealt
with the initial operations in a Pacific war against Orange (Japan), that had broken
out in mid-December of 1923. These operations required Blue (United States) to
move the Battle Fleet into the western Pacific while bringing the Scouting Fleet from
the Atlantic, securing the Panama Canal against possible attack, capturing an advanced base, and conducting a major offensive from that base.
• FP II: Movement of the Battle Fleet from the West Coast to Panama, to
simulate as the initial phase an advance across the Pacific from Hawaii.
• FP III/GJE No. 2: Movement of the Scouting Fleet from the East Coast to
Panama and the seizure of an “advanced base.”
• FP IV: Transoceanic offensive operations by the U.S. Fleet from an
advanced base.
By the standards of the mid-1930s such a pattern of maneuvers would have been
treated as distinct phases of a single problem. Curiously, during the preliminary
planning for the fleet’s 1924 maneuvers, the term “phase” was used to describe what
in the event were designated as the separate Fleet Problems II, III, and IV.2

Fleet Problem II, January 2–15, 19243
A test of the fleet’s ability to conduct war against Japan, the problem was to simulate
“the first leg of an advance from Oahu to the westward in the event of an Orange
war.”4 To reflect accurately the actual distances involved, a good deal of “geographic
transposition and orientation” was required.5 Most of North America was considered ocean. Blue (United States) was presumed to have its homeland in Alaska, with
an outlying base at a large island in the San Pedro–San Diego area (representing
Oahu), as well as extensive colonial possessions in southern Peru and northern
Chile (the Philippines). Black (Japan) was an island empire stretching from 21°
South to 31° South, between 92° and 122° West, with colonies in a constructive archipelago that stretched from Panama’s Gulf of Fonseca (Eniwetok) to Peru’s Callao
(Palau), and a major base in the Gulf of Panama (Truk).6

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:01 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

60

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Blue’s task was to attack and seize the Black base in the “Panama Archipelago,”
opposed by limited Black forces, before the enemy’s main body could arrive upon
completion of operations elsewhere. Both the Blue and Black fleets had large contingents of constructive vessels. Including constructive vessels, the Black main body
consisted of six battleships, four battlecruisers, an aircraft carrier, 21 cruisers, 66 destroyers, and 40 submarines, and 100 constructive aircraft, plus an equally constructive expeditionary force of 100,000 troops, with appropriately constructive
transport and train, all operating against Blue’s Peru–Chile colony (i.e., the Philippines). Black’s “Advanced Detachment” was supposed to be based in the Gulf of
Panama (Truk) and consisted of the Special Service Force, a handful of old cruisers,
and a dozen or so destroyers, and was supported by the resources of the 15th Naval
District, including two aircraft, as well as, on paper, the Regular Army garrison in
Panama, constructively raised to about 15,000 troops. Blue had the bulk of the Battle Fleet, with 18 battleships (six of them constructive), a surrogate carrier (25 aircraft), one old armored cruiser with four new light cruisers plus three constructive
ones, as well as 35 real and about 250 constructive destroyers, and some submarines
standing in for about 90. The Blue air force comprised 15 actual aircraft, standing in
for 186.
Blue also had a constructive expeditionary force of about 22,000 marines and
50,000 army troops, with appropriate transport and logistical shipping. In addition,
Blue was given substantial constructive forces mobilizing in the home waters; it was
assumed that they would reach the theater of operations 30 days after the onset of
the problem.7
Blue began the maneuvers with its fleet in the San Pedro–San Diego area (Oahu),
where the constructive expeditionary force was concentrated. A smaller force (one
old armored cruiser, 19 destroyers, 10 submarines, plus six gunboats, two destroyer
minelayers, four minesweepers, and a small train, some of which were constructive,
with 36 constructive aircraft, and a garrison of about 15,000 constructive troops)
was in Bahía Inglés, near La Serena, Chile (representing the Asiatic Fleet based at
Manila, and the local garrison).
On January 1, 1924, the Black main body was supposedly at Latitude 30° South,
off Chile, having landed a force to capture La Serena. Meanwhile, some old cruisers,
four old minelayers, a dozen minesweepers, and 12 constructive submarines had escorted transports carrying a constructive 15,000 troops and some aircraft to the
Gulf of Panama, preparing to reinforce the Black garrison there.
Blue sortied from southern California on January 2nd. Staying between 50 and
100 miles off the coast of Mexico, the fleet engaged in tactical, formation, and type
exercises, including refueling and repair at sea. At approximately the latitude of El
Salvador, the fleet began moving further to sea, to avoid attack by notional enemy
aircraft operating from bases in the numerous islands supposedly controlled by
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Black (i.e., the Mandates). From this point, it had been the intention of the planners
that Black’s “Advanced Detachment” (the Special Service Squadron) would offer
opposition to Blue. In the event, the Special Service Squadron was able to participate only marginally, due to real world “disturbed political conditions in Mexico.”8
As a result, Black resources were limited to some 15th Naval District minesweepers
and such. Although occasional contact occurred between Blue and Black forces, and
one or two Black minesweepers were declared “sunk,” there was really no “combat”
during this fleet problem.9 The problem ended on January 15th, when Blue reached
Cape Mala, Panama. The Battle Fleet then proceeded to Balboa.
The primary purpose of the fleet problem had been to test the ability of the
fleet to undertake a long transoceanic voyage. Refueling at sea was a crucial
element of this ability. During the problem, the over-the-stern tow method was
used to refuel all the destroyers. In addition, on January 11, 1924, the “riding
abeam”—broadside—method was used for the first time during actual fleet maneuvers, when the oiler Cuyama (AO 3) refueled the light cruiser Omaha (CL 4)
and two minesweepers.10
In his critique of the problem, CINCUS Robert E. Coontz stressed its value for
the training and indoctrination of personnel. He also pointed out the need to procure auxiliaries with good maneuvering and sea keeping qualities, able to maintain a sustained speed of at least 12 knots for at least 7,500 miles, in order to keep
up with the fleet, as well as a need for cruisers, destroyer leaders, fleet submarines
(also able to keep up with the fleet), and aircraft carriers, and improvements in
radio communications.11
Fleet Problem III/Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 2, January 4–18, 1924
Fleet Problem III involved the movement of the Scouting Fleet to Panama, a test of
its ability to quickly reinforce the Battle Fleet as part of War Plan Orange. Once in
Panamanian waters, the Scouting Fleet took part in Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 2, with the local Army garrison and the Battle Fleet.12
Black Movement to Panama, January 4–15, 1923
The Scouting Fleet, six older battleships, some older cruisers, and some destroyers,
designated Black (“a European Power”—i.e., Britain, still considered a potential
Japanese ally), departed the Chesapeake Bay (a surrogate for the Azores) on January
4th, bound for Panama. During the movement, a battleship and six destroyers were
designated as the “enemy” and tried to probe the main body’s screen. In this way, a
series of battleline drills and destroyer torpedo attack practices were held by both
day and night. Due to high winds and rough seas, which caused some casualties and
widespread seasickness, these exercises were considered quite realistic. Black
reached Chiriqui Lagoon, on the northern coast of Panama, west of the Canal, on
January 11th.13 There it waited until reinforced on the 14th by the Control Force and
some submarines in preparation for GJE No. 2.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:01 AM

61

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

62

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Grand Joint Exercise No. 2, January 16–18, 1924
The objectives of GJE No. 2 were to test the defenses of the Canal Zone, to practice
amphibious techniques, and to test the ability of the fleet to transit rapidly from the
Pacific to the Caribbean under possible hostile conditions. The mission assigned to
Blue (United States) was the defense of the Canal and the passage of the fleet, while
Black (Britain) was to attempt to capture an advanced base. So, in effect, both sides
were testing U.S. capabilities for a war against Japan.
Blue, commanded by COMBATFLT Admiral Samuel S. Robison, one of the
Navy’s foremost students of tactics, had the Battle Fleet plus the resources of 15th
Naval District and the Army’s Panama Division (roughly 10,000 troops). The Blue
Fleet included nine battleships, one light cruiser, 31 destroyers, 10 submarines, and
the seaplane tender Aroostook (CM 3), Most of these ships were on the Pacific side of
the Canal, but Aroostook and some others were on the Caribbean side. Blue was also
assumed to have an Atlantic Fleet based in Narragansett Bay, which was to keep the
Black Main Body, in Europe, occupied.
Black (Britain) was commanded by Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully,
COMSCOFLT. McCully had the Scouting Fleet, the Control Force, and some additional units. Representing a detached task force of the main Black Fleet, this force
had six older battleships serving as constructive equivalents of units of the Maryland Class,14 as well as Langley (CV 1), with 12 aircraft as surrogates for 75, two light
cruisers standing in for four, 27 destroyers (surrogates for 38), and nine submarines
(22), plus a constructive brigade built around the 5th Marines, actually about 1,650
strong.
The original plans had been for Black to begin operations on the 14th, that is, the
day before the Blue Main Body (the Battle Fleet, just completing Fleet Problem II)
reached Balboa. At virtually the last minute, however, orders changed the starting
date to the 16th. This created a problem, because Blue soon became aware of Black’s
presence at Chiriqui Lagoon, which had been a secret.15 As a result, the commanders
and staffs of both fleets had to revise estimates and plans. This was particularly a
problem for Black, since it had originally intended to land the 5th Marines at
Chagres, in order to seize the Gatun Locks or the Gatun Dam, and thus prevent Blue
from transiting the Canal.16
Despite this setback, Black proved unusually imaginative. The revised Black plan
involved a diversionary bombardment of the defenses at Chagres on the 17th. This
was intended to draw the Blue air force into attacking the Black Fleet, which would
then leave Langley free to bomb the locks. This plan failed, and Langley’s aircraft
were judged to have been badly handled by the Blue air force. Nevertheless, the carrier’s aircraft were ruled to have prevented an attack by Blue Army bombers against
the Black Fleet off Colon.17
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Later that day, as Black aircraft and submarines patrolled for Blue surface forces,
the Black Fleet bombarded the Gatun Locks, notionally expending about 2,800
rounds, practically emptying their magazines, while minesweepers swept an area
near the Chagres batteries. Finding no mines, Vice Admiral McCully concluded
there were none, and decided to land the landing force.18 Meanwhile, having discovered that the Blue seaplane tender Aroostook was anchored off Coco Solo Naval Air
Station, Black arranged to bottle her up by “scuttling” a transport in the exit channel. Then, on the night of January 17th–18th, while the battleships “replenished”
their ammunition, Brigadier General Eli K. Cole’s marines effected a landing despite rough seas and the poor characteristics of the improvised landing craft. The
marines quickly secured the Army coast defense installation at Fort Randolph
against negligible resistance, and moved on to capture the nearby Coco Solo Naval
Air Station, in the process seizing Aroostook and 46 aircraft.19 These operations also
placed Black in physical control of the Caribbean exit of the Canal.
Meanwhile, Black’s Fleet Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Hamilton Bryan, had
initiated a number of “special operations.” On January 14th, Bryan secretly left the
Black Fleet by small boat, and landed in Panama in civilian dress and with bogus papers. Posing as a journalist, Bryan passed easily into the Canal Zone, and gained access to various installations around the Gatun Locks. On the 16th and 17th, he set
notional bombs off at a fuel depot and at the locks and their control station, and notionally cut local telephone and cable connections. He then escaped, returning to
the Black Fleet in a small sailboat.
Meanwhile, on the 15th, one of Bryan’s officers, Ensign Thomas H. Hederman,
had also left the fleet by similar means. Hederman made his way to Colon, where he
checked into a local hotel. There he changed from civilian clothes into an enlisted
man’s uniform. Then, carrying his ensign’s uniform in a sea bag, he proceeded to the
Miraflores Locks on the 16th. Making inquiries, he was able to establish the schedule of the Blue Fleet’s movement through the canal and the order in which the ships
were to do so.
Hederman initially intended to board California (BB 44), the first ship scheduled
to pass through the canal, but as she entered the lock he spotted some Naval Academy classmates on her deck. When the next ship, New York (BB 34), entered the lock,
he tossed his sea bag on deck and climbed aboard via the cable supporting a
bumper. Hiding aboard overnight, early on the morning of the 17th he donned his
ensign’s uniform, entered No. 3 turret, by a ruse gained access to the magazine, and
constructively blew himself and the ship up, “sinking” her in the main channel of
the Culebra Cut, the narrowest part of the Canal, thereby blocking it completely.20
The loss of Coco Solo and the destruction of the New York were irreversible defeats
for Blue, and marked the end of the GJE.
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This was the first fleet problem in which the new carrier Langley took part, and
although she did not play a major role, Vice Admiral McCully singled her out for
praise, saying “Great credit is due her aviators for their effective work against so
much superior air forces, and it indicates the power of the air attack even when the
forces may appear insignificant, and the enemy greatly superior.”21 In his comments
at the public critique of the problem, Vice Admiral McCully was openly critical of
his own failures to properly plan for mine warfare operations. He also recommended improvements in ammunition replenishment, observing that at one point
in the exercises the Black battleships were down to “one round per gun,” and resupply had proven difficult and protracted.22
During this critique, McCully introduced Lieutenant Bryan to the assembled officers, so that he could explain the operations that he and Ensign Hederman had
undertaken. The admiral noted that “this form of enemy activity is too much relied
upon by other powers for us to be insensible to it.” It was an observation that, had
the fleet been more “sensible” to the matter, might well have made the advent of the
kamikaze in October of 1944 less of a surprise.23
A separate critique was issued for the joint Army-Navy exercise. To some extent,
the critique reiterated many of
the conclusions made in the
critique of the fleet problem. In
addition, the joint critique
called for improved Army-Navy
cooperation; it also, stressing
the vulnerability of the canal
to attacks of all types, emphasized the need to improve the
surface, ground, and anti-aircraft
defenses of the Canal Zone,
making numerous specific recommendations.24
Fleet Problem IV, January
23–February 1, 192425
Fleet Problem IV was the capstone of the previous series of
maneuvers. In effect, having
moved to a forward area (FP II and FP III) and secured an advanced base (FP
III/GJE No. 2), the fleet was ready to conduct offensive operations across the Caribbean.26 The goal was to consider the problems of conducting offensive amphibious
operations “from a main base in the Western Pacific to an advanced base within 500
miles of Tsushima Straits.”27
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For the fleet problem, the Caribbean was “rearranged” to reflect the political geography of the western Pacific and China Seas. In this rearrangement Panama stood
in for the Philippines, with Colon as Manila. The Lesser Antilles stood in for Japan,
with Trinidad as Kure and Martinique as Sasebo, while Puerto Rico stood in for
Okinawa, with Culebra as Amami–Oshima. Haiti was China, with Aux Cayes representing the Pescadores Islands, and Jamaica stood in for Formosa.28 Given that Colon is about the same distance from Vieques as Manila is from Okinawa, some 1,100
miles, the scale of the maneuvering area was roughly equivalent to that of the anticipated theater of operations.
The problem opened with Blue (United States) holding Panama. Black (Japan)
held Puerto Rico, plus the Lesser Antilles and Jamaica, which were not actually in
play. As the war was assumed to have begun months earlier, Black also held portions
of Haiti, which was otherwise friendly to Blue.
At the beginning of the problem, the Blue Fleet was concentrated at Panama, in
preparation for an offensive to capture Vieques, where a base would be built for an
attack on the Black homeland. Blue had most of the U.S. Fleet, with 13 actual and
three constructive battleships, plus Langley, one old armored cruiser (serving as
fleet flagship), three real and four constructive light cruisers, 60 real and eight constructive destroyers, and 24 submarines plus four constructive ones, with about 56
aircraft, plus several minesweepers.29 Accompanying the fleet was the transport
Henderson (AP 1), carrying 1,400 marines, and the Control Force, together representing a convoy carrying a full brigade of some 8,000 troops, given the table of organization then in use.30
Black had the Special Service Squadron, with its 10 ships representing six notional battleships and four constructive battlecruisers, plus 14 constructive new
light cruisers, three real old light cruisers, 50 destroyers (mostly notional), and 13
submarines, two of which were constructive. Black had six real and 24 constructive
aircraft based in Puerto Rico, and was supported by Army ground and air forces in
Puerto Rico.
On January 23rd, the first day of the problem, the Blue submarines put to sea.
Vice Admiral McCully’s intention was for some of the submarines to reconnoiter
Black’s bases at Culebra and Aux Cayes, while others formed a screen 240 miles in
advance of the Main Body, to cover its movements from enemy probes. Unfortunately, McCully worded his orders poorly, a matter upon which he would later comment publicly. As a result, the Commander, Blue Submarines, concluded that he was
first to form a screen for the advance of the Main Body, and later to reconnoiter
Culebra and Aux Cayes. Although the confusion was cleared up before the fleet
sailed, there was some delay in getting the reconnaissance submarines off the enemy
coasts.
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Escorted by minesweepers, the Blue Main Body sortied from Colon on the 25th.
The fleet advanced behind the submarine screen, with the Scouting Fleet in the lead
and the Main Body following, steering directly for Vieques. Most of the voyage was
routine. Concerned that the necessity of escorting Henderson and the Control Force
would hamper the flexibility of the heavier warships in the event of an enemy attack,
Blue adopted an experimental cruising formation that was later criticized. Meanwhile, on the 26th several Blue submarines determined that there were no Black
forces at Aux Cayes. Although the Blue Main Body encountered some inclement
weather, this presented no difficulties, and it cleared quickly in any case. On the 29th
a Blue submarine claimed to have sunk the aircraft tender Wright (AV 1) off Puerto
Rico. The next afternoon the Blue main body arrived at its appointed rendezvous,
about 30 miles south of Vieques. “Black aircraft very quickly put in an appearance,
and for about two hours were extremely active,” attacking Wyoming (BB 32),
Langley (CV 1), and the troop transports. These Black air attacks were ruled ineffective, due to the fleet’s anti-aircraft fire and Langley’s fighter aircraft.31
During this air attack, the troop convoy, reinforced with three battleships plus
some destroyers and submarines, proceeded toward Culebra, to undertake a landing. Toward evening, responding to a reported sighting of the Black Fleet to the east,
the Blue Main Body proceeded toward the Virgin Islands, but failed to locate the enemy. From January 30th to the end of the problem, the Blue Main Body covered the
landing exercises and protected the Train, while the Black air force maintained contact, and “very properly confined its offensive activities to Henderson and Langley”:
an extremely well-reasoned observation.32 The fleet problem ended at 0330 on
February 1st.
During the amphibious operations at Culebra, the marines tested a new landing
craft. Troop Barge A, a shallow draft, twin-engined, 50-foot craft rated at 12 knots
and able to carry 110 fully equipped marines, proved to have good beaching and retracting qualities. On the other hand, the Christie “amphibian tank” mounting a
75mm gun, reportedly able to make 7 knots afloat and as much as 35 miles per hour
on land, proved unseaworthy in all but the calmest waters. In addition, three M1917
six-ton tanks, borrowed from the Army for the occasion, proved only marginally
useful. The exercises also demonstrated the usefulness of the “combat loading” of
equipment, a measure that proved highly effective.33 Aside from the aggressive use
of its aircraft, the Black Fleet had been very inactive throughout the maneuvers, for
reasons not explained in its commander’s final report, a matter that came in for
criticism.
Fleet Problem IV had an important influence on the use of constructive forces in
subsequent problems. The problem had involved what was to prove the most extensive use of constructive forces in the entire series of 21 fleet problems. Nearly 10 percent of Blue’s approximately 120 ships were either surrogates or notional, as were
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nearly 70 percent of Black’s approximately 90 vessels, and 80 percent of Black’s aircraft.34 In his critique of Fleet Problem IV, Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully stated,
“In all exercises, constructive forces or features should be reduced to a minimum,
and their functions and scope strictly defined.”35 This proposal was adopted; few of
the later fleet problems had anything near so high a proportion of surrogates.
Following Fleet Problem IV, the fleet paid port calls along the East Coast for
nearly a month. In late March the entire fleet returned to the Caribbean, where it
engaged in a series of battle practices and tactical exercises off Culebra. In early
April, the Battle Fleet proceeded through the Panama Canal, to prepare for its voyage home to the West Coast, while the Scouting Fleet proceeded to its bases on the
East Coast.
It was during this period that the “Blackie Affair” occurred. In early March, while
Arizona (BB 39) was anchored in the North River off West 103rd Street in
Manhattan, several sailors smuggled aboard 19-year-old Madeline Blair, a prostitute nicknamed “Blackie.” The young woman set up shop in an unused compartment, and was not detected until April 12th, by which time the fleet was at Balboa,
in Panama, preparing to return to San Diego. Blackie was put ashore, and capped
her adventures by having a first-class passage back to New York in the Grace Line
ship Cristobal billed to the Navy. This embarrassing episode resulted in severe penalties for Arizona’s crew; 23 enlisted men were convicted by courts martial and received prison sentences of up to 10 years, while the ship’s officers—including
Ensign Arleigh Burke—all received serious reprimands. Rear Admiral William V.
Pratt, commanding BATDIV 4 from Arizona, considered the penalties excessive,
and when he became CNO in 1930 ordered the reprimands removed from the officers’ files, but could do nothing for the enlisted men.36 Some elements of the fleet did
not return to their home bases until early May.
Since Fleet Problems II, III, and IV had taken place within a few weeks of each
other, in addition to individual reports, CINCUS Robert E. Coontz issued a consolidated summary set of conclusions. His principal recommendation was that the fleet
needed more aircraft, and particularly needed to complete the two aircraft carriers
then under construction, Lexington (CV 2) and Saratoga (CV 3).37
Communications again came in for some serious criticism in the aftermath of
these three fleet problems. Critics cited the shortage of trained communications
personnel and the lack of suitable equipment as major problems. Many ships—even
important vessels such as the flagships, Langley, and the new light cruisers of the
Omaha Class—lacked adequate radio installations.38 Coontz also recommended increasing the elevation of battleship guns to improve range, called for the procurement of specialized destroyer leaders, and repeated the request for auxiliaries able to
sustain 12 knots.
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Submarines performed poorly during the three problems. This underscored
what submariners had been saying for some time, that the Navy’s standard submarine model, the “S” boat, was inadequate for operations with the fleet, a matter that
furthered the development of the larger “fleet submarine,” capable of keeping up
with the battleline, which proved so effective during World War II.39
The Marine Corps conducted a separate critique of its role in these fleet problems. The “Marine Corps Expeditionary Force,” over 3,300 troops, had engaged in
offensive and defensive training, and conducted landing exercises at Culebra and
the Canal Zone. Citing Brigadier General E. K. Cole, one Marine Corps historian
would later write, “the 1924 Fleet Problems III and IV were well worth while, because almost every possible mistake occurred.”40 Overall, much experience had been
gained in ship-to-shore operations, but it was clear that the available landing craft
were inadequate, many of the landing boats had missed their beaches or landed late,
off loading was poorly handled, naval gunfire support needed improvement, and
there were serious problems in terms of command relationships, particularly when
operating with the Army.41

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:03 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

FLEET PROBLEM II, FLEET PROBLEM III

N O T E S 1 In Aviation in the Fleet Problems (p. 9, n. 1), Joseph M. Grimes claims that documentation for
FPs II, III, and IV is extremely poor. This is incorrect. Extensive materials do exist, though they
may not have been available to him. See, for example, M964-1, 3, CNO to Captain William D.
Standley, Jul. 23, 1923, “Winter Maneuvers,
1923–1924—Committee to Prepare Problem
For”; “Minutes of Meeting of Special Board to
Consider Problems for the Winter Maneuvers of
the U.S. Fleet,” Jul. 31, 1923; M964-1, 3, CNO to
CINCUS, etc., “Problems for the Maneuvers of
the Winter, 1923–24.” For some general background and observations, drawing upon William
V. Pratt’s recollections, see Wheeler, Pratt, pp.
229ff. There was also some valuable press coverage, “Greatest Armada Going to Panama,” New
York Times, Jan. 2, 1924; “Fleet in Manoeuvres on
the Way North,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 1924;
“War Games Showed Fleet Deficiencies,” New
York Times, Apr. 30, 1924.
2 M964-1, 3, “Minutes of Meeting of Special Board
to Consider Problems for the Winter Maneuvers
of the U.S. Fleet,” Jul. 31, 1923, p. 2. By September, the “phases” had been designated as separate
fleet problems; see M964-1, 3, Chief of Naval Operations to CINCUS et al., “Problems for the Maneuvers for the Winter 1923–1924,” passim.
3 M964-1, 3, U.S. Fleet Problem Number Two,
Blue Situation; U.S. Fleet Problem Number Two,
Black Situation; M964-1, 4, CINCUS to CNO,
Mar. 3, 1924, “United States Fleet Problem No.
2”; NWCA, Carton 61, CINCUS, “Material Effectiveness, Fleet Problems II, III, and IV.”
4 M964-1, 4, CNO to CINCUS, COMBATFLEET,
etc., “Problems for the Maneuvers of the Winter,
1923–24,” p. 1; Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles,
p. 35.
5 M964-1, 4, CINCUS to CNO, Mar. 3, 1924,
“United States Fleet Problem No. 2,” p. 2.
6 M964-1, 4, CNO to CINCUS, CINCBATFLEET,
etc., “Problems for the Maneuvers of the Winter,
1923–24,” pp. 1–2, specifically “Alaska is United
States, San Pedro–San Diego Region is Oahu,
Lobos de Tierra [off Peru] is Guam,” and so on.
7 The enormous number of constructive aircraft on
both sides was due to the fact that most airplanes
in the fleet had been crated up and shipped to
Panama in December, in order to be available to
take part in FP III/GJE No. 2 and FP IV; M964-1,
4, CINCUS to CNO, Mar. 3, 1924, “United States
Fleet Problem No. 2,” pp. 2–3.
8 M964-3, 1, CINCUS to CNO, Apr. 20, 1924,
“United States Fleet Problem, Number
Four—Report on,” p. 2.
9 M964-1, 4, CINCUS to CNO, Mar. 3, 1924,
“United States Fleet Problem No. 2,” Annex F,
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“Commander in Chief, Battle Fleet, Report on the
Problem.”
10 M964-1, 4, CINCUS to CNO, Mar. 3, 1924,
“United States Fleet Problem No. 2,” p. 3; Richardson, p. 206. The “riding abeam” method of refueling ships from an oiler was devised in 1917 by
Lt. Cdr. Henry C. Dinger, skipper of the new oiler
Maumee (AO 2) and by Lt. Chester W. Nimitz; it
was used to a limited extent experimentally during World War I, but not adopted by the fleet. See
Nimitz, Chester W., “The Little-known Tale of
the U.S.S. Maumee and Her Role in the Development of the Navy’s Secret Weapon,” Petroleum
Today, v. 2, no. 3 (Spring 1961), pp. 9–12; Potter,
Nimitz, pp. 27–29; Thomas Wildenberg, “Chester
Nimitz and the Development of Fueling at Sea,”
Naval War College Review, Autumn 1993, pp.
53–62.
11 M964-1, 4, CINCUS to CNO, Mar. 3, 1924,
“United States Fleet Problem No. 2,” pp. 3–5.
12 See general references cited for FPs II, III, and IV,
above; M964-1, 3, U.S. Fleet Problem Number
Three, Blue Situation; U.S. Fleet Problem Number Three, Black Situation; M964-2, 1, “Talk on
Operations of Black Forces Delivered by Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on Problem
No. 3, 21 January 1924”; Brig. Gen. E. K. Cole,
U.S.M.C., “Operations Expeditionary Force, Fort
Randolph and Coco Solo, January 17–18, 1923”;
Chief Umpire to the Navy Department and the
Adjutant General of the Army, “Report on Joint
Army and Navy Exercises, January 1924”; Joint
Army-Navy Maneuvers, 1923–1924, Remarks by
Major General S.D. Sturgis, Commanding, Panama
Canal Department, January 21, 1924; Annual Report, 1924, pp. 5–6, 70; Dyer, Amphibians I,
p. 225.
13 Note that there are two bodies of water named
“Chiriqui” in Panama. Chiriqui Lagoon is on the
Caribbean side, west of the Canal, while the Gulf
of Chiriqui is on the Pacific side, also west of the
Canal.
14 Two of the ships, Wyoming and Arkansas, suffered
boiler problems during this period, which curtailed their participation; Annual Report, 1924,
p. 6.
15 Ostensibly by chance some Army bombers on a
“routine navigation training flight” flew right
over the fleet as it lay in Chiriqui Lagoon, thus revealing its presence; working from oral testimony,
Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American
Army, 1898–1941 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2004), pp. 351–52, attributes
this incident to joint maneuvers held in 1934 or
1935, but it fits GJE No. 2 better than any other
maneuvers held in Panama. There is a strong likelihood that the Army was cheating by conducting
reconnaissance flights under the guise of routine
training.
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16 M964-2, 1, “Talk on Operations of Black Forces
Delivered by Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on Problem No. 3, 21 January 1924,” p. 3.
17 William F. Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffet,
Architect of Naval Aviation (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999), p. 107.
18 If there were mines present, none were detected,
but it is not clear whether McCully was actually
correct in his conclusion that there were none.
19 Atwater, p. 55.
20 M964-2, 1, Lt. Hamilton Bryan to Commander,
Scouting Fleet, Jan. 19, 1924, “Report of activities
in connection with expedition within enemy territory dating from 13 to 19 January” and Ens. T.
H. Hederman to Lt. Hamilton Bryan, Jan. 19,
1924, “Operations as a spy in Canal Zone; report
on.” Rear Admiral Louis M. Nulton, riding the
New York, was not amused when told by Ens.
Hederman, “you are theoretically dead, sir, and so
am I,” and had the young officer’s head shaved
and placed him on bread and water until the end
of the problem; “Naval War Games Have Lighter
Side,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
Feb. 12, 1933.
21 M964-2, 1, “Talk on Operations of Black Forces
Delivered by Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on Problem No. 3, 21 January 1924,” p. 5.
22 M964-2, 1, “Talk on Operations of Black Forces
Delivered by Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on Problem No. 3, 21 January 1924,” pp.
1, 5. As Frank Uhlig pointed out (June 2008), the
expenditure of so many rounds would have
caused considerable wear on the gun tubes as
well, though McCully made no comment about
that additional problem.
23 M964-2, 1, “Talk on Operations of Black Forces
Delivered by Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on Problem No. 3, 21 January 1924,” p. 7.
24 M964-2, 1, Chief Umpire to the Navy Department and the Adjutant General of the Army, “Report on Joint Army and Navy Exercises, January
1924,” pp. 4–5, with the attached “Conclusions of
the Umpire, Joint Army and Navy Exercise Two,
Cristobal, Canal Zone, 24 January 1924,” especially pp. 2–11.
25 See general references cited for FPs II, III, and IV,
above; M964-1, 3, U.S. Fleet Problem Number
Four, Blue Situation; U.S. Fleet Problem Number
Four, Black Situation; CINCUS to CNO, April 20,
1924, “United States Fleet Problem, Number
Four—Report on”; COMSCOFOR to CINCUS,
“Fleet Problem No. 4—History of Operations”;
Critique of Fleet Problem No. 4, by Vice Admiral
Newton A. McCully; Dion Williams, “The Winter
Maneuvers of 1924, Problem No. 4,” Marine
Corps Gazette, IX, 1 (March 1924), pp. 1–27; Annual Report, 1924, p. 6; McFarland, p. 65.
26 M964-3, 1, CINCUS to CNO, Apr. 20, 1924,
“United States Fleet Problem Number Four—Report on,” p. 1.
27 M964-1, 3, OP-126, SC 162–78:4/1 CNO to
CINCUS, etc., “Problems for the Maneuvers of
the Winter, 1923–24,” Sep. 20, 1923, p. 3.
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28 Ibid., p. 3; the documents do not state that Jamaica was intended to represent Formosa, but
this would seem a reasonable conclusion.
29 M964-3, 1, CINCUS to CNO, Apr. 20, 1924,
“United States Fleet Problem Number Four—Report on,” p. 2, observes that in the event, two of
the light cruisers and six destroyers had to be dispatched to Mexican ports, due to “disturbed political conditions” in that country.
30 For both sides together, the maneuvers involved
some 3,300 marines, with six 155mm howitzers
and twelve 75mm guns.
31 M964-3, 1, COMSCOFLT to CINCUS, “Fleet
Problem No. 4—History of Operations,” p. 7.
32 Ibid., p. 8.
33 In combat loading, cargo is stowed in such a way
that items needed first in combat—such as ammunition—can be unloaded first. This is wasteful
of shipping, since it requires four times as much
shipping as more traditional methods, but it
greatly enhances the fighting power of amphibious forces. See Dunnigan and Nofi, Pacific War
Encyclopedia, “Logistics, Troop Movements”;
Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry
Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, Volume I
of History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in
World War II (Washington: Historical Branch,
G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1958), p. 23; William D. Parker, A Concise History
of the United States Marine Corps, 1775–1969
(Washington: Historical Division, U.S. Marine
Corps, 1970), p. 48.
34 NWCA, Carton 60, “U.S. Fleet Problem Number
Four, Blue Situation”; Campbell, p. 213.
35 M964-3, 1, COMSCOFOR to CINCUS, “Fleet
Problem No. 4—History of Operations,” p. 9.
36 The most extensive treatment of this incident is in
Paul Stillwell, Battleship Arizona: An Illustrated
History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991),
pp. 78–81. See, also, Hammond, pp. 48–49; E. B.
Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 30–33. This incident apparently inspired the Broadway play Battleship
Gertie, which flopped after two performances in
1935; Atkinson, “Battleship Gertie,” New York
Times, Jan. 19, 1935.
37 NWCA, Carton 61, CINCUS, “Material Effectiveness, Fleet Problems II, III, and IV.”
38 Howeth, XXXII, 7.
39 On the “S” boats and the “fleet boats,” see Friedman, U.S. Submarines Through 1945.
40 Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The
United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1962), p. 259.
41 M964-2, 1, Brig. Gen. E. K. Cole, U.S.M.C., “Operations Expeditionary Force, Fort Randolph and
Coco Solo, January 17–18, 1923”; William D.
Parker, p. 48; Atwater, pp. 56–57; M.A. Kachilla,
Doctrine Development: A Look at History
(Quantico: Marine Corps Command and Staff
College, 1993), www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/report/1993/KMA.htm.
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VI

1925

Fleet Problem V/Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise
No. 3, February 23–April 1925

B

etween the world wars, 1925 stands out as by far the busiest in the life of the
fleet, involving three major training undertakings that took it very far from
its bases. Fleet Problem V, held in Central American waters, dealt with the
problems involved in attacking and defending isolated bases. It was followed almost
immediately by GJE No. 3, held in Hawaii, entailing first a long voyage from Panama, by way of California; the latter joint exercise essentially dealt with the same
problems. Then, shortly after GJE No. 3, most of the fleet departed from Hawaii on a
protracted good-will tour to the Antipodes. Although not officially linked as a single series of maneuvers and exercises, this series of operations constituted one of the
longest deployments of the fleet between the wars, both in time and in distance, and
it seems reasonable to treat them together.

Fleet Problem V, February 23–March 12, 1925
Fleet Problem V had a simple premise, envisioning a war between Black (Japan), a
major maritime power in the vicinity of Samoa, and Blue (United States), located in
1
the far northeast of the Pacific. Black had an extensive colonial empire that included a major fleet base at Christmas Island, while Blue controlled Guadalupe Island (50 miles off the Mexican coast, about 250 miles south of San Diego) and an
extensive colonial empire in Panama. Tensions between the two having been rising
for some time, Black decided that, with the bulk of the Blue Fleet on maneuvers in
2
the Eastern Caribbean, it would initiate war by a surprise offensive against Blue.
From its base at Christmas Island, the Black Fleet would establish an advanced base
on Guadalupe Island, and then undertake an offensive against Panama. With less
than half its fleet able to reach the Pacific in time to counter Black, Blue would have
to counter the enemy offensive outnumbered until the balance of the fleet could
transit the Canal.
While the scenario for an attack on Panama was perfectly legitimate, it could also
be seen as reflecting a possible Japanese attack on Hawaii, with Christmas Island
standing in for Truk, Guadalupe for Midway, and Panama for Hawaii, although the
distances separating Truk, Midway, and Hawaii are much less than those separating
Christmas, Guadalupe, and Panama.
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The primary objectives of the fleet problem were to study requirements for the
seizure of an advanced base, aviation operations, submarine and anti-submarine
operations, and underway refueling, as well as cooperation with the Army. Involving 145 ships and 45,000 men—nearly half the fleet, including virtually all of its
larger vessels—Fleet Problem V was one of the largest maneuvers ever held by the
3
U.S. Navy to that time.
As was the case with most of the fleet problems prior to the mid-1930s, the
movement of the Scouting Fleet from the East Coast and the Battle Fleet from
Southern California to the starting positions assigned for them by February 23rd
was not considered part of the planned maneuvers. Nevertheless, as was customary,
both forces engaged in various tactical and type exercises during these voyages.
Black, commanded by Admiral Samuel S. Robison, COMBATFLT, had the entire
Battle Fleet, less two submarine divisions. This amounted to nine battleships,
Langley (CV 1) with aircraft tenders Aroostook (CM 3) and Gannet (AVP 8) acting as
4
surrogate carriers and minelayer Shawmut (CM 4) serving as a seaplane tender,
plus one light cruiser and 29 destroyers, 26 constructive submarines, five minesweepers, and five auxiliaries, as well as the airship Shenandoah (ZR 1). Blue, under
Vice Admiral Josiah S. McKean, COMSCOFLT, had a much-reduced Scouting Fleet,
reinforced by the Control Force, with the battleship Wyoming (BB 32) and ten old
cruisers and destroyers acting as surrogates for a dozen battleships, plus seven new
light cruisers, 25 real and 30 constructive destroyers, 11 submarines as surrogates
for 16, plus five minesweepers, and six auxiliaries. This was presumed to be the advanced echelon of a constructive “main body” of a dozen battleships and 30 destroyers moving through the Caribbean in order to transit the Canal and reinforce
5
Blue in the Pacific. Black had superior aviation resources, with about 80 real and
constructive aircraft, roughly half of them assigned to Langley and the two surrogate carriers, plus spotter aircraft on battleships and cruisers, as well as patrol
bombers operating from the seaplane tender. In contrast, Blue had only about 30
6
floatplanes, roughly half notional.
Although “hostilities” had not yet begun, fleet movements began on February
23rd. The Blue Scouting Fleet was presumed to be transiting the Panama Canal,
while the Black Fleet and convoy sortied from San Pedro bound for a point several
hundred miles west of Guadalupe, to simulate a movement from Christmas Island.
Meanwhile, completing its movement through the Canal, the Blue Scouting Fleet
proceeded to patrol stations to the northwest.
Black began operations to “capture” Guadalupe Island from a position about
400 nautical miles to its west. The fleet moved using the circular cruising formation
that had been promoted by Commander Chester W. Nimitz, Robison’s Assistant
Chief-of-Staff. In addition, relying on the high speed and endurance of the new
Omaha Class, Robison sent them well ahead to form a scouting line. This was
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FLEET PROBLEM V

supplemented by aircraft operating off Langley, which often had as many as ten
planes aloft simultaneously, conducting missions that lasted as long as two hours.
On the 28th, Black was ruled to have “captured” Guadalupe Island, initiating hostil7
ities.
By the 28th, as the constructive Blue “main body” began its purported transit of
the Canal, a process that would take several days, Blue divided its forces in the Pacific into five commands:
• Destroyer Striking Detachment, about 1,400 nautical miles northwest of the
Canal.
• Submarine Striking Detachment, about 1,150 nautical miles northwest of
the Canal.
• Scouting Detachment, about 900 nautical miles northwest of the Canal.
• Flagship Wyoming and the Train, together roughly 600 nautical miles
northwest of the Canal.
Over the next few days, Black assumed a somewhat defensive posture, to protect
its new base at Guadalupe Island, while the two fleets probed for each other. During
this period, both sides were fairly careless about communications security, despite
orders to maintain radio silence. As a result, each intercepted some “enemy” radio
messages. Black was particularly careless, giving Blue an intelligence bonanza. For
example, on March 4th, Blue radiomen in Wyoming intercepted communications of
the Black Battle Fleet CinC, three Black battleships, and four other vessels. The next
day, Blue radiomen secured a radio compass fix on Black’s California (BB 44), while
8
Tennessee (BB 43) was located repeatedly (June 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th). Nor was Blue
much better at maintaining radio silence. As each side was using improvised codes,
this carelessness allowed Black cryptographers to break Blue’s code. Although Blue
failed to break Black’s code, it was apparently not for lack of opportunity, but rather
9
due to a lack of diligence.
Actual physical contact between elements of the two fleets did not occur until
March 10th. At that point, the centers of the two fleets were roughly 280–300 miles
from each other, with the Black main body about 300 miles southwest of
Guadalupe, and the Blue Scouting Fleet about 100 miles south of the island, while
Blue’s constructive “main body,” having completed its transit of the Panama Canal,
was steaming hard to reinforce the advanced echelon, but still had some hundreds
of miles to go.
Late on the 10th (2010–2030) several Blue submarines managed to spot elements of the Black Fleet. Shortly afterward, S-11 (SS 116) “fired” four torpedoes at
some Black battleships. All four were ruled to have missed, and S-11 was promptly
10
attacked and sunk by Black destroyers. Blue signals intelligence intercepted Black’s
communications regarding this skirmish, and shortly after midnight the Blue Main
Body altered course to intercept. As the problem terminated at 0512 on March 11th,
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the two fleets never actually came into contact, which is quite surprising, given the
general carelessness with communications security.
Although in his memoirs CINCUS Robert E. Coontz generously concluded that
“In some respects it was a most interesting problem, as it showed that fleets might
11
pass each other unawares,” Fleet Problem V was clearly a disappointment. Nevertheless, there were many useful lessons, outlined in CINCUS Coontz’ final report.
Aircraft operations during the maneuvers so impressed Coontz, already well disposed toward aviation, that he again urged the swift completion of Saratoga and
Lexington, as well as the procurement of more capable aircraft and improvements in
12
aircraft-handling facilities on battleships and cruisers.
Although Coontz found proficiency in radio communication satisfactory, and
in some cases excellent, given that both sides secured repeated radio fixes on each
other’s vessels, he recommended concentration on improving communications se13
curity. Cryptographic operations were criticized for being on a decidedly amateurish level, and Coontz stated, “Code breaking should and will undoubtedly be
14
studied more assiduously in subsequent problems.”
These were among 14 specific recommendations that Coontz made. Notable
among the other recommendations was a call for “fleet” submarines to replace the
short-legged “S-boats,” noting the need for faster auxiliaries and minesweepers,
more light cruisers plus at least ten heavy cruisers, specialized destroyer leaders, all
of which proposals had been made before.
Following the problem, the entire fleet returned to San Diego for rest and replenishment. It then steamed up to San Francisco as part of preparations for Grand Joint
Army-Navy Exercise No. 3, to be held in April. During its voyage from San Pedro to
San Francisco, the fleet was “shadowed” at some distance by the Japanese tanker
Hyatoma Maru, with the result that communications security was tightened up. At
San Francisco, final preparations were completed for the GJE.
Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 3, April 14–27, 1925
On April 14, 1925, the fleet began its part in GJE No. 3 with a sortie from San Francisco. To add verisimilitude to the maneuvers, the Golden Gate was swept for mines
and the fleet’s exit from the port was covered by aircraft patrols. These measures by
no means discouraged the crew of the Hyatoma Maru, which once again followed
15
the fleet, all the way to Hawaii. As was customary, during the fleet’s movement to
16
Hawaii, it engaged in tactical and type exercises.
This movement to Hawaii was the first occasion since before World War I that
the entire U.S. Fleet had conducted a major transoceanic deployment. The voyage,
which involved over 75 ships (eleven battleships, Langley and two seaplane tenders,
several cruisers, some 50 destroyers, and a number of auxiliaries), was the largest
17
transoceanic movement in the history of the U.S. Navy to that time.
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FLEET PROBLEM V

Intended as a test both of the fleet’s ability to attack and secure a forward base,
and of the Army’s ability to defend Hawaii against an attack, GJE No. 3 took a theme
that was similar to that of the fleet problem in some ways, and that developed along
18
similar lines. As the first U.S. naval maneuvers to be held in the Central Pacific, the
fleet problem, and the planned good-will voyage to Australia and New Zealand that
was to follow, elicited widespread protests in some circles. In Japan, ultranationalist
elements called the plans “a menace to the peace of the Far East,” and the Prime
Minister made some hostile remarks in the Diet. In the United States the “National
Committee on American-Japanese Relations” called for the maneuvers and the voyage to be cancelled. To ease the tension, senior State and Navy Department officials
made low-key responses. In addition, senior naval officers on both sides of the Pacific made conciliatory gestures; Vice Admiral Henry A. Wiley, Commander, Battleships, BATFLT, put on a lavish reception at San Francisco for a visiting Japanese
squadron carrying naval cadets on their annual cruise, while the Commanderin-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet publicly indicated that the maneuvers did
19
not trouble the Imperial Navy at all.
The premise of the maneuver was that earlier in the war Black (Japan) had captured the Hawaiian Islands. Blue (United States) had subsequently recovered, and
defeated the main Black fleet, and was now proceeding to recover Hawaii. Blue had
to attack Hawaii from the west, while Black attempted to defend it with limited resources. In addition to examining the offensive and defensive abilities of the Army
and Navy in amphibious operations, a major purpose of the maneuvers was to test a
20
“cooperative” approach to joint command.
For GJE No. 3, Blue, under COMBATFLT Robison, was given the bulk of the
fleet, 11 battleships, Langley (notionally assigned 84 aircraft, making her somewhat of a surrogate for the Lexington-class ships), six light cruisers, and 56 destroyers, plus the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade, some 1,600 marines,
21
representing a two-division amphibious corps of about 42,000 men. Black was
commanded “cooperatively” by Major General Edward M. Lewis, Commander of
the Hawaiian Department, and Rear Admiral John D. McDonald of the 14th Naval
District. The Black Fleet consisted of six destroyers and about 20 submarines, plus
some smaller vessels and the aircraft normally assigned to the 14th Naval District.
Ground forces included the resources of the Hawaiian Division, about 13,800
troops, raised to some 16,000 by the activation of local reservists and National
Guardsmen. Air resources available to Black totaled about 60 Army airplanes and
about 30 naval machines lent by the Scouting Fleet or 14th Naval District, but
there was no unified air command.
The Army treated the maneuvers as a serious test of the defenses of Hawaii, and
Army Chief of Staff General John L. Hines came out from Washington to serve as
“Army General Joint Umpire,” bringing with him Major General Stuart
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Heintzelman, Assistant Chief of Staff for War Plans, and a number of officers, including Colonel Walter Krueger, who would go on to command the Eighth Army in
World War II, while CINCUS Coontz served as “Navy General Joint Umpire.” Both
Hines and Coontz were housed aboard the old armored cruiser Seattle (CA 11),
which had departed San Francisco several days before the fleet. The actual chief umpires were future CNO Captain William H. Standley for the Navy, and for the Army
Brigadier General LeRoy Eltinge, Commanding General of the Operations and
Training Division (G3), HQ, U. S. Army.
“Due either to poor coordination, the weather, bad luck, or a combination of
22
these elements,” the Blue fleet managed to reach Hawaiian waters undetected. Surprise was even more complete than that which had occurred just weeks earlier during Fleet Problem V, when Blue had virtually made it to Guadalupe Island before it
encountered Black. While this may seem strange, in an era of limited long-range aerial reconnaissance capability and no radar, save for the relative speeds involved,
searching for a fleet was little different from what it had been back in Nelson’s day;
ships had to physically spot each other.
As a result of its failure to locate Blue, the landing of the 1st Marine Provisional
Brigade on Molokai on April 25th came as a surprise to Black. The marines quickly
overcame limited opposition from local reservists and guardsmen, and captured a
small airfield. Black aircraft intervened. Army-Navy squabbling caused the air attacks to be conducted in a piecemeal, uncoordinated fashion, and they were ruled to
have had little effect. Nevertheless, Army umpires declared Blue’s Langley
out-of-action due to air attack even before she could launch any aircraft.
Having secured Molokai, the marines re-embarked on the 26th, leaving behind a
notional garrison and some air units. For the attack on Oahu, the primary landing
site was to be near Haleiwa on the northwest coast, with a secondary landing at Barber’s Point, in the southwest. In addition, a major feint was laid on against Diamond
Head, to draw Black’s attention away from the actual landings. Night landings had
been intended, but rough seas caused these to be cancelled, though the feint was carried out as planned. The landings took place on the morning of the 27th, with only
sporadic support by aircraft based on Molokai (Langley not being restored to service). The landing at Barber’s Point failed with “heavy casualties” despite support
from three battleships. But the main landing, at Haleiwa, went well. Covered by a
heavy bombardment from seven battleships, “30,000” marines secured a lodgment
against relatively light opposition, Black having committed too many troops to the
Barber’s Point operation and the feint against Diamond Head.
Meanwhile, Black submarines and destroyers attempted to disrupt Blue’s operations. Despite determined efforts, they managed only to torpedo the battleship Wyoming (BB 32), around which the feint against Diamond Head had been built, and
sink one transport, not to mention the Canadian Pacific liner Empress of France,
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FLEET PROBLEM V

which was successively “bombed” by aircraft, “blown out of the water” by battle23
ships, and “torpedoed” by a submarine, all within a few hours on April 25th.
By noon on the 27th, when Admiral Coontz and Major General Hines called off
the maneuvers, the marines had advanced so rapidly that they were threatening
24
Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.
Following GJE No. 3, 800 officers met for five days in a navy recreation hall to critique the maneuvers, which Admiral Coontz would later describe as “the best I’ve
25
ever seen.” Presided over by Coontz and Hines, the deliberations involved all of the
26
principal commanders down to the individual ship and battalion level. The main
conclusion was that the defenses of Hawaii needed to be strengthened in order to
turn it into a fortress of “the strongest possible character.” The garrison had to be increased to at least 23,000 troops, more extensive facilities for aircraft were needed,
Pearl Harbor had to be turned into a proper base for the fleet, coast defenses had to
be increased, and obsolete and obsolescent equipment of all types needed to be replaced. The critique did find that in terms of interoperability, the services generally
had a good sense of each other’s capabilities, missions, and procedures.
There was, however, a deep rift between the services when it came to the employment of air power, especially when operating in littoral areas. This involved “jurisdictional disputes” over whether the Navy could operate land-based aircraft and
how far out over the sea the Army could operate aircraft. In addition, Army airmen
were more optimistic about their ability to hit maneuvering vessels than were naval
airmen, who actually had experience in the matter, a problem that persisted
27
through World War II. Both sides did agree that during joint operations a unified
air command was necessary; naturally they disagreed as to which service should be
in charge. The maneuvers also revealed—not for the first time—the limitations of
whale boats and ships’ launches as landing craft, though little was done about this
for nearly 15 years.
The Marine Corps had worked hard to make the exercise a success. In late 1924,
all Marine Corps schools “had been suspended and instructors and students had
28
become the landing force staff for the maneuvers.” The results showed the diligence with which these officers applied themselves, and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps later wrote, “The exercises which took place at Hawaii were completely successful from the standpoint of the marines. The plan worked to perfec29
tion and the landing was accomplished.” Critiquing their role in the fleet problem,
the marines concluded that much had been learned since the 1924 maneuvers,
though conceding that there was still room for improvement. Thus, very good progress had been made in developing the amphibious capabilities of the Marine Corps.
Unfortunately, over the next few years the Marine Corps found itself heavily engaged in China, Haiti, and Nicaragua. As a result, during 1926–33 there was only
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limited Marine Corps participation in maneuvers, and much of this valuable expe30
rience was lost.
Fleet Type and Tactical Exercises, April 28–June 30, 1925
Following the conclusion of the joint maneuvers, the fleet spent a month in the Ha31
waii area. Normally, the fleet put to sea on Monday, spent the week in battle practices, exercises, and evolutions, and then returned to base on Friday. This routine
was punctuated from time to time by larger tactical exercises. For example, on May
6–8, the fleet engaged in a major convoy escort exercise. A large number of destroyers and submarines acted as the “enemy,” and attempted to oppose the movement of
the fleet, under Admiral Coontz, as it proceeded from Honolulu to Lahaina Roads,
escorting a notional convoy.
The culmination of these exercises was a massive destroyer attack on the fleet late
on May 8th, initiating a four-hour running fight. Upon reaching Lahaina Roads, the
fleet began an intensive round of tactical exercises, including tests of various fleet
formations.
These maneuvers and exercises ended on May 29th. At that time, the Scouting
Fleet began heading home to the East Coast by way of the Panama Canal, arriving in
32
mid-July. Meanwhile most of the ships in the Battle Fleet began preparations for a
three-month voyage to Australia and New Zealand.
The Antipodean Cruise, July 1–October 1, 1925
The fleet’s visit to the two southwest Pacific Dominions was an exercise in naval di33
plomacy and good will that had been in the planning since 1923. Although officially just a friendly tour of the southwest Pacific, the voyage provided a major test
of the fleet’s ability to undertake protracted operations in unfamiliar waters and was
carried out with surprisingly few problems.
On July 1st the Battle Fleet departed from Honolulu, with eleven battleships,
four light cruisers, about 32 destroyers, and 13 auxiliaries, manned by some 27,000
personnel. First calling at Samoa, elements of the fleet dispersed to various ports in
Australia, and then proceeded to New Zealand. In both countries, the fleet was entertained lavishly by local authorities, and engaged in some tactical exercises with
the Commonwealth navies. Departing New Zealand, the fleet proceeded homeward
by way of Samoa, with some elements going to Tahiti and the Marquesa Islands. The
last elements arrived at San Diego on October 1st, after a 17,000-mile voyage. This
voyage helped convince Australian and New Zealand political leaders and voters
that the U.S. Navy was probably more important to their security than the Royal
Navy—a point that, although perhaps unstated, was one reason for the trip.
At the time, there was some expectation that the visit to Australia and New Zealand would be the first in a series of occasional good-will cruises by the entire fleet.
When plans for the voyage were first announced, in late 1924, Japanese diplomatic

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:05 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

FLEET PROBLEM V

personnel proposed that the fleet also visit Japan. Although the Navy was unable to
arrange the fleet’s schedule to include such a visit as part of the 1925 cruise, it proposed to make a similar voyage to China and Japan in 1928. Unfortunately, despite
official Japanese government interest, the fleet’s tour of the southwest Pacific caused
a storm of protest from Japanese ultranationalists, who deemed it a “provocative”
act, contradicting conciliatory statements from Japanese political and military lead34
ers. As a result, the proposed 1928 Far Eastern cruise was cancelled. Thus, the fleet’s
visit to Australia and New Zealand, the largest extra-hemispheric movement in the
history of the U.S. Navy until World War II, was also the only occasion between the
wars that a substantial part of the entire fleet traveled outside the Western
35
Hemisphere.

N O T E S 1 Documentation for FP V is extensive, taking up
three and a half rolls in the NARA M964 microfilm series, from the middle of roll No. 3 through
the end of No. 6. See, especially, M964-3, 2, Report on Fleet Problem No. V, by Commanderin-Chief, U.S. Fleet; M964-3, 2, “History of Maneuver—Blue Fleet. Chronological Order of
Events.” Grimes, pp. 10–12, has a good summary
analysis of Fleet Problem V. See also Hector C.
Bywater, “American Fleet Maneuvers,” Washington Post, Jan. 5, 1925.
2 The threat of a Japanese attack while the bulk of
the fleet was on maneuvers in the Atlantic was
one reason cited by planners for the shortness of
Fleet Problem XX (1939), held in the Caribbean;
see Chapter 21.
3 Coontz, p. 446.

10 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
11 Coontz, pp. 446.
12 Kaufman and Kaufman, p. 41. Only a few weeks
later, on April 8th, aircraft of VF-1 executed the
first planned night landings on Langley, which is
indicative of the relatively high rate of experimentation in aviation at the time.

4 In 1928 redesignated Ogalala (CM 4).
5 M964-3, 2, Report on Fleet Problem No. V, by
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet; NWCA, Carton
60, CINCUS to COMBATFOR, Oct. 20, 1924.
Samuel Wheeler Beach, The Great Cruise of 1925
(San Francisco: International, 1925), the “cruise
book” for BATDIV 3, has some interesting comments on the problem and the use of surrogates,
p. 15.

13 M964-3, 2, Report on Fleet Problem No. V, by
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, p. 5.
14 M964-3, 2, Report on Fleet Problem No. V, by
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, p. 6.
15 “Japanese on Hand at Our Manoeuvres,” New
York Times, Apr. 30, 1925. In Hawaii, the tanker’s
officers, all reservists in the Imperial Navy, paid
courtesy calls on the officers of the fleet. From the
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6 Grimes, p. 11.
7 In fact, due to the poor state of Mexican-American
relations, no U.S. forces actually landed on
Guadalupe, nor did any operate in Mexican territorial waters.
8 M964-3, 2, “History of Maneuver—Blue Fleet.
Chronological Order of Events,” pp. 3–6.
9 M964-3, 2, Report on Fleet Problem No. V, by
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, p. 6.
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mid-1920s on, Japanese merchantmen and fishing vessels routinely “shadowed” American warships taking part in fleet problems. See also King
and Whitehill, p. 282; Richardson, p. 237 with
particular reference to Fleet Problem XXI.
16 “Fleet Holds Drill on Way to Hawaii,” New York
Times, Apr. 18, 1925.
17 Coontz, pp. 447–48.
18 Williams, pp. 76–88; Atwater, pp. 58–61; and Leo
J. Daugherty, III, “Away All Boats: The
Army-Navy Maneuvers of 1925,” Joint Forces
Quarterly, Autumn–Winter, 1998–99, pp. 107–13.
See also the important, if brief, remarks by
Coontz, p. 447. The joint maneuvers were given
extensive press coverage. See, for example, “The
Hawaiian Manoeuvres,” New York Times, Dec. 9,
1924; “War Games in the Pacific,” New York
Times, Dec. 30, 1924; “Pacific ‘War Game’ to Start
in April,” Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1925; “Seek
Coordination in Pacific War Play,” New York
Times, Apr. 5, 1925; “‘Battle’ for Hawaii to Test
War Plans,” New York Times, Apr. 11, 1925;
“Fleet, Lights Out, Speeding in Effort to Seize Hawaii,” Washington Post, Apr. 16, 1925; Arthur
Sears Henning, “Plane and Subsea Craft Fail to
Save Hawaii From ‘Foe,’” Washington Post, Apr.
28, 1925; “Pacific ‘War’ Ends as Haleiwa Falls,”
New York Times, Apr. 28, 1925; “Joint War
Games of Army and Navy Lauded by Wilbur,”
Washington Post, Apr. 29, 1925; “The Battle of
Oahu,” New York Times, Apr. 30, 1925; etc.
19 See, for example, “Cruise to Hawaiian Waters
Will Not Be Abandoned by Navy,” Washington
Post, Aug. 31, 1924; “Japanese See War Threat by
America in Fleet Maneuver,” Washington Post,
Nov. 30, 1924; “Fleet Maneuvers in the Pacific
Assailed as ‘Tactless’ Move,” Washington Post,
Dec. 20, 1924; “Reassures Japanese,” New York
Times, Apr. 25, 1925; “Tokio Papers Call War
Game a Menace,” New York Times, May 3, 1925;
etc. Some of the Japanese anger was due to the recent passage of the so-called “National Origins
Act,” which imposed insulting limits on Japanese
immigration to the United States; Frederic William Wile, “America Urged to Reconsider Japan
Question,” Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 1,
1924.
20 Dion Williams, “Blue Marine Expeditionary
Force,” Marine Corps Gazette, Sep. 1925,
pp. 77–78.
21 Williams, “Blue Marine Corps,” pp. 79–82, details
the notional organization of the constructive expeditionary force.
22 Atwater, p. 60.
23 “Passenger Liner ‘Sunk’ Three Times in War
Zone,” Washington Post, May 4, 1925.
24 Williams, “Blue Marine Corps,” pp. 85–87, has a
short narrative of the ground operations. Although the umpires, both Army and Navy, passed
on the amphibious operations, in retrospect, their
tempo, two landings by the same troops in only
about 48 hours, and the rate of advance of the
marines on Oahu were highly unrealistic—
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particularly in view of subsequent experience in
World War II.
25 Coontz, From the Mississippi, p. 447.
26 “800 Officers Study Hawaii ‘War’ Data,” New
York Times, May 2, 1925; “Defense of Hawaii Inadequate to Meet the Strain of War,” New York
Times, May 7, 1925; “War Game Umpires Urge
Greater Hawaii Defenses,” Washington Post, May
7, 1925; “Our Hawaiian Base,” New York Times,
May 8, 1925; Hal Smith, “Seek More Troops,
Planes and Guns to Defend Hawaii,” New York
Times, May 10, 1925; Kaufman and Kaufman,
p. 42.
27 Daugherty, p. 111.
28 Heinl, pp. 219–20.
29 Annual Report, 1925, Commandant of the Marine Corps pages.
30 By 1927 of the eight marine regiments, four were
in China, one in Haiti, and two in Nicaragua, not
to mention several miscellaneous units, including
aviation squadrons, that were deployed with
these. Heinl, pp. 260–93; “Professional Notes,”
Marine Corps Gazette, Sep. 1928, pp. 206–08; William D. Parker, p. 48; Kachilla.
31 Beach, passim; Coontz, pp. 429, 451–68, 481–82;
Rufus Fairchild Zogbaum, From Sail to Saratoga:
A Naval Autobiography (Grottaferrato, Rome:
Italo–Orientale [1961?]), pp. 391–96. These maneuvers received some coverage in the press,
“Navy Fights Battle off Oahu at Night in a New
War Game,” New York Times, May 8, 1925;
“Grand Fleet Executes a Forty-Degree Turn,”
New York Times, May 10, 1925; “Battle Fleet Sees
‘Enemy,’” New York Times, May 20, 1925.
32 It is worth noting that by the time the Scouting
Fleet returned to the East Coast, a few weeks later,
it had completed a round-trip voyage of some
30,000 miles; see “Fleet Units Return from Big
War Game,” New York Times, Jul. 18, 1925.
33 Coontz, From the Mississippi, pp. 449–68, and
Laning, An Admiral’s Yarn, pp. 287–303, both
have lively accounts of this voyage. Newspaper
coverage of the visit was extensive; see, for example, “Fleet Quits Hawaii, Off to Australia,” New
York Times, Jul. 2, 1925; “Fleet in Manoeuvres on
Way to Australia,” New York Times, Jul. 4, 1925;
“Davy Jones Accosts Fleet,” New York Times, Jul.
7, 1925; “500 Natives Dance for Fleet at Samoa,”
New York Times, Jul. 14, 1925; “300,000 See Arrival at Sydney,” New York Times, Jul. 23, 1925;
“Bruce Hails Unbreakable Link,” New York
Times, Aug. 6, 1925; “Fleet Is Acclaimed in New
Zealand,” New York Times, Aug. 12, 1925; etc.
34 See reports on stories in the Osaka Mainichi, cited
in “American Fleet Had No War Aim, Japanese
Admit,” Christian Science Monitor, Jul. 3, 1925.
See also Coontz, p. 450; Asada, p. 93; John H.
Mourer, “Fuel and the Battle Fleet: Coal, Oil, and
American Naval Strategy, 1898–1925,” Naval War
College Review, Nov.–Dec. 1981, pp. 71–72.
35 For earlier transoceanic deployments of major
portions of the fleet, see Swartz, Sea Changes.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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VII

1926

Fleet Problem VI, February 11–13, 1926

A

lthough conducted off the west coast of Central America, Fleet Problem VI
was a test of one of the essential features of War Plan Orange, the movement
of the fleet across the Pacific from Hawaii to relieve a beleaguered Army garrison holding out at Manila against an enemy who had overrun the rest of the
Philippines.1
The scenario assumed that the Blue Fleet (United States) had advanced from San
Diego–San Pedro (standing in for Hawaii) to within a couple of days’ steaming of
Balboa (Manila), presumed to be under siege by Black (Japan), which had already
captured the rest of Panama (the Philippines). This focus on the final approach of
Blue to the fortified base at Balboa was done so that “contact between the opposing
forces was made certain in order to ensure a test of the defensive qualities of the
screen around the convoy,” perhaps a reminder that during Fleet Problem V the opposing fleets had missed each other entirely. With the “motives” defined as exercise
in the attack on and defense of slow convoys, refueling at sea, scouting and evasion,
and opposed entry into a friendly port, Fleet Problem VI was thus not only the
shortest in the series of 21 problems, but also one of the few that was purely tactical
in nature.2
Of course, in order to carry out the problem, the Battle Fleet and the Scouting
Fleet had to reach Panamanian waters, movements that were punctuated by type
and tactical exercises, which, by the mid-1930s, would have been integrated more
carefully into the scenario.3 Blue, commanded by Admiral Charles F. Hughes,
COMBATFLT, who would later serve as CINCUS and CNO, was given the Battle
Fleet, with nine battleships, Langley (CV 1) and her 16 aircraft, one old armored
cruiser and one new light cruiser, 34 destroyers, six submarines, plus one destroyer
minelayer, four minesweepers, patrol craft, and auxiliaries, for a total of 67 ships, in
the Pacific. Black, under Vice Admiral Josiah S. McKean, COMSCOFLT, was given
the Scouting Fleet and the Control Force, with three battleships, nine light cruisers,
29 destroyers, 26 submarines, two destroyer minelayers plus one old cruiser minelayer, seven minesweepers, plus some smaller warships and auxiliaries, for a total of
86 ships. Including aircraft carried by battleships and cruisers, Blue was decidedly
superior in the air, 48 aircraft to 24.
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The Scouting Fleet completed its movement from the East Coast and its transit
of the Canal on February 4–5, to anchor off Balboa. There, on the 6th, Vice Admiral
McKean held a staff conference and issued final orders.4 On the 8th the Scouting
Fleet departed Panama for its starting positions, while Blue was about 1,200 miles to
the northwest.
The designated maneuvering area was surprisingly small, confined to the sea
space between 13° N and 5° N, and from the coast of Central America out to about
100° W, a box roughly 500 nm north to south, varying in width east to west from 750
nm to nearly 1,200 nm. The Blue Fleet, moving south with the object of reaching an
anchorage in the Gulf of Panama, adopted a variant of the new circular formation,
in which the warships encompassed the convoy in such a way that an enemy attack
from any direction would meet a quick, strong defensive response.
Rather than await the arrival of Blue in the Gulf of Panama, Black stood out
northwestward, formed into a Main Body and two scouting detachments, one
thrown out northward and the other westward, as it proceeded. The actual start of
the problem, at 0600 on February 11, found the two fleets only about 200 nm apart,
with Black some 500 nm northwest of Balboa. Although neither side had any
knowledge of the actual location of the other, both estimated that they would make
contact within about 12 hours. And in fact Black light cruiser Detroit (CL 8), an element of the northern scouting detachment, spotted the Blue Fleet within the anticipated 12 hours. For some reason, however, Detroit did not pass this information on
to Vice Admiral McKean, and then lost contact. As a result, firm contact was not
made until the morning of February 12th, when Detroit again located Blue, and this
time did pass the word, at 0852.5 There followed two days of skirmishing, in which
Black repeatedly tried to get through the Blue defensive screen. Although a Black
submarine did claim to have torpedoed a Blue battleship, the casualties inflicted by
both sides were ruled marginal.
During this skirmishing, the sea state made it very difficult for battleships and
cruisers to launch and recover their floatplanes. This gave Blue an advantage, since
Langley proved of immense value to Admiral Hughes, her aircraft permitting his
forces to spot and evade Black movements.6 As a result, Black was not able to pin
Blue down. On the 13th, Blue had reached the Gulf of Panama, and by evening was
within a few hours’ steaming of Balboa. By that time, Black’s destroyers were seriously low on fuel, and the fleet problem was terminated at 2200, ending any chance
of a fleet action.
Having lasted only 64 hours, Fleet Problem VI was the shortest in the entire
series, and lessons learned were few. Nevertheless, the critique of the problem
concluded that the fleet’s basic convoy screening procedures were essentially sound
and that underway refueling of destroyers should be considered routine. The problem also demonstrated that operating aircraft from carriers was more reliable than
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operating floatplanes from battleships and cruisers. In addition, Blue had integrated Langley into the fleet’s circular defensive formation, which had worked well.
This was one of several refinements in the new circular formation with which the
fleet continued to experiment throughout the balance of the fleet problems, which
proved immensely valuable during the Pacific War.7 As had been the case with the
previous fleet problem, one of the key recommendations was that Lexington and
Saratoga should be completed as quickly as possible.
During the weeks following the conclusion of Fleet Problem VI, the fleet engaged in a number of tactical exercises, including battleline maneuvers in the Gulf
of Panama, and an important series of joint army-navy exercises testing the Canal’s
defenses. In these tests of the defenses of the Canal Zone, the fleet played the role of
an attacking enemy force. On the Pacific side, the battle fleet engaged in exercises
against the Army’s coast defense installations. Although these had been fairly routine during fleet maneuvers for decades, in this instance an attempt was made to undertake a combined attack that included aviation units, which was deemed rather
successful, and even led some journalists to make claims about the “air capture” of
the Canal on February 18th.
On the Caribbean side of the Canal there was an equally interesting exercise that
was apparently intended to explore the vulnerability of the installations to small
raiding forces, one of the few documented instances of a special operation during
fleet problems and other maneuvers in the interwar period. Under cover of darkness on the night of February 19–20, six “espionage and sabotage parties” were
landed from submarines at several points between the Chagres River and
Manzanillo Bay. After a series of small skirmishes, the raiders were able to “damage”
the Gatun Locks and the associated spillway and dam, and captured important documents. A few days later these maneuvers culminated in air and amphibious attacks
against the Pacific side of the Canal, which were ruled highly successful.
These joint exercises led to some useful conclusions by both Admiral Hughes
and Major General Charles H. Martin, commanding the Panama Department, who
had directed the defensive forces during the joint maneuvers. Both officers stressed
the need to improve the air defenses of the Canal Zone, and expressed concern
about the threat that a combined air–surface attack might pose to the security of the
waterway. Curiously, in a newspaper article reporting on the maneuvers, Major
General Martin is quoted about the need to improve air defense, but not on the need
to defend against small raiding parties.8
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N O T E S 1 M964-7, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “U.S. Fleet Problem No. 6—Report on.” There is some interesting
material on the aviation aspects of this problem
in Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 128–30. Although no restrictions were placed on the press,
coverage of the problem was poor; “Navy Cancels
Trip to Chile and Peru,” New York Times, Nov.
29, 1925; “Maneuvers in Tropics Scheduled for
Fleets,” Washington Post, Dec. 6, 1925; “Big Work
for Navy for Year Planned if Funds are Given,”
Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1926.
2 M964-7, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “U.S. Fleet Problem No. 6—Report on,” p. 2; Miller, War Plan
Orange, pp. 153–54, 204–205, etc. Originally intended to extend as far southward as the coasts of
Peru and Chile, political tensions between those
countries led to a change in plans, which seems to
have shortened the problem; “Navy Cancels Trip
to Chile and Peru,” New York Times, Nov. 29,
1925. Cost was also a factor in the adoption of the
final plan, which essentially pitted the Battle Fleet
against the Scouting Fleet at a point roughly equidistant from their bases, respectively in Southern
California and on the East Coast, thus economizing on fuel; see M964-7, 1, CINCUS to CNO,
“U.S. Fleet Problem No. 6—Report on,” p. 1.
3 The movement of the Scouting Fleet was marred
by a collision between the new cruisers Milwaukee
(CL 5) and Detroit (CL 8) in Guantanamo Bay on
February 1. Although damage was relatively light,
despite repairs at Balboa, the speed of the latter
was limited to no more than 20 knots during the
problem; “Cruisers in Collision,” New York
Times, Feb. 3, 1926 (the date is given incorrectly
as Feb. 4 in M964-7, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “U.S.
Fleet Problem No. 6—Report on,” p. 5). This was
the most serious of several accidents that occurred during the fleet problem.
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4 This was only the second planning conference
that McKean was able to hold before the start of
the problem. When the Scouting Fleet departed
from Hampton Roads for Guantanamo,
McKean’s flagship, Wyoming (BB 32), was completing a refit at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Rather
than transfer his flag to Utah (BB 31) or New York
(BB 34), the admiral had chosen to remain with
the Wyoming. As a result, he had to prepare his
Estimate of the Situation without input from his
subordinate commanders. Wyoming caught up
with the Scouting Fleet at Guantanamo, where
McKean held a short staff conference, before the
Scouting Fleet departed for the Panama Canal. En
route to the Canal, McKean prepared an operations order, which was issued on February 4. See
M964-7, 1, “Critique of U.S. Fleet Problem
Six—Remarks by Commander in Chief, Black
Fleet,” p. 1. Surprisingly, none of the documents
examined commented on McKean’s decision to
remain with the flagship, particularly since it was
by no means clear that her overhaul would be
completed in time for her to take part in the
problem.
5 M964-7, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “U.S. Fleet Problem No. 6—Report on,” p. 2.
6 This was particularly the case for the Scouting
Fleet battleships, Utah, Wyoming, and New York,
which lacked catapults, and had to lower their
floatplanes into the water in order for them to
take off; M964-7, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “U.S. Fleet
Problem No. 6—Report on,” p. 34.
7 Reynolds, John H. Towers, pp. 200–201.
8 “Canal Defense Need Shown by War Game,” New
York Times, Feb. 21, 1926; “Canal Is Menaced in
Panama War Game, New York Times, Mar. 1,
1926.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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VIII Fleet Problem VII, March 1–14, 1927

H

eld in Panamanian waters, partially as an economy measure, Fleet Problem
VII had a scenario similar to those of the previous three problems,1 the
transoceanic movement of a convoy to relieve a besieged garrison.2 The
stated “motives” for the problem focused on scouting and evasion, convoy escort
and attack, opposed entry into a friendly port, submarine operations, advanced
base operations, mine warfare, fleet tactics, air defense of the fleet, and underway refueling, and were thus also similar to those of the three previous problems. Once
again, as was common prior to the mid-1930s, the movement of the fleet from San
Diego—and from Norfolk—to Panama was not integrated into the problem, but
discussion of a preliminary joint Army-Navy exercise, dealing with the defense of
the Panama Canal from naval attack, provides a useful introduction to it.

Preliminary Joint Army-Navy Exercise, March 1–5, 1927
This exercise was an Army-Navy test of the Pacific defenses of the Panama Canal
Zone, conducted by the Battle Fleet prior to its transit into the Caribbean.3 The basic
assumption was that a coalition of Orange (“a Pacific Power”) and Black (“a European Power”) intended to undertake a coordinated attack on Panama, from both
sides. Orange had the Battlefleet, under Admiral Richard H. Jackson, COMBATFLT,
including Langley (CV 1), while Black, under COMSCOFLT Vice Admiral Ashley H.
Robertson, consisted of the Scouting Fleet. Blue (United States) had the resources of
the Army’s Panama Department and those of the 15th Naval District, reinforced by
some submarines and other units. Orange had about 20 aircraft aboard Langley,
plus about 26 more on battleships and cruisers, while Blue had only about 22 aircraft.
Army scout planes spotted elements of the Orange Fleet on March 1st, when it
was still about 150 miles northwest of the Canal. In a predawn raid on the 3rd, a
landing party off Omaha (CL 4) captured Taboga Island, about 14 miles south of
Balboa. The Orange Fleet was spotted off the island by Blue aircraft at about 0500,
and Blue submarines and aircraft attempted to intervene. While the Orange battleline began a systematic bombardment of the Canal’s defenses, Captain Joseph M.
Reeves of Langley laid on a number of strikes by floatplanes and carrier bombers,
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escorted by fighters. These conducted raids on a Blue airfield, put the Miraflores
Locks out of service, and made an unsuccessful raid on the Gatun Locks. In a counter-raid, Blue aircraft managed to strike Langley, inflicting some damage.
The following morning Blue submarines were able to sink the fleet flagship California (BB 44), Omaha (CL 4), and seaplane tender Aroostook (CM 3), but then
ASW patrols off Langley began making the Gulf of Panama dangerous for the defenders. The maneuvers ended on the 5th.
In the joint critique of the maneuvers, the naval bombardment of the coast defenses was ruled relatively ineffective. This was attributed to Captain Reeves’ series
of air strikes on March 3rd, as they drew fighter protection from the observation
planes, a number of which were lost, disrupting the bombardment. Although
Reeves responded by claiming that his air raids had been much more useful than
any bombardment of coast defenses, the criticism underscored the extent to which
the battleships had come to rely on aerial spotting.4 On the Caribbean side, the
Black Fleet was delayed in reaching the Canal; learning of this, Blue was able to
transfer a substantial portion of the troops and aircraft defending the Caribbean
side of the Canal to counter the Orange attack on the Pacific side.
The joint maneuvers led both CINCUS Charles F. Hughes and Panama Department Commanding General Charles H. Martin to conclude, in a joint statement,
that a combined surface and air attack might cause considerable damage, and even
lead to the capture of the Canal. Among their recommendations was a call to
strengthen the air forces and anti-aircraft defenses of the Canal Zone, essentially reiterating the conclusions drawn following Fleet Problem VI.
Fleet Problem VII, March 9–14, 1927
As noted, the scenario for Fleet Problem VII was more or less a variant on that of the
three previous problems, a transoceanic movement to relieve a besieged garrison,
this time staged in the Caribbean.5 This scenario had elicited some protests in Japan,
with even Premier Reijiro Wakatsuki saying that given their “unprecedentedly large
scale . . . Japan can not be pleased with such undertakings.”6 Apparently to reduce
any possibility of offense, care was taken in the wording of many documents. In his
cover letter to the conclusions and documents for the problem, CINCUS Charles F.
Hughes wrote, “there was no deep or underlying strategy attached to Fleet Problem
Seven. . . . [T]he Battle Fleet represented the Battle Fleet, the Scouting Fleet represented the Scouting Fleet, and the Caribbean Sea represented any part of any ocean
where naval operations might be undertaken.”
According to the scenario, Black controlled Puerto Rico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, and had captured the Blue territory of Cuba. Blue controlled Panama,
and had beleaguered garrisons holding out at Guantanamo and Guacanayabo, in
Cuba. Despite CINCUS Hughes’ comments, it is not difficult to see that Black can
be understood to be Japan and Blue, the United States, with Puerto Rico, Haiti, and
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FLEET PROBLEM VII, MARCH 1–14, 1927

the Dominican Republic standing in for Formosa and the Pescadores, Cuba for the
Philippines, with Guantanamo and Guacanayabo as Manila and Mindanao, occasionally proposed as a U.S. bastion, and Panama as an advanced base somewhere in
the Central Pacific. The Blue mission was to escort a major expeditionary force to
relieve one or both of these outposts, in order to establish a major base from which
to conduct further operations. This had to be accomplished by the afternoon of
March 14th.
Based at Colon, in Panama, Blue, under Admiral Richard H. Jackson,
COMBATFLT, had the Battle Fleet and Train Squadron 2 of the Base Force, with ten
battleships, Langley (CV 1), one light cruiser, and 25 destroyers, plus six submarines, five minesweepers, and some auxiliaries, with which to escort a largely notional relief force through hostile waters to either Guantanamo or Guacanayabo.
Black, operating out of Guantanamo but on paper based further eastward, was
commanded by COMSCOFLT Robertson, who had the Scouting Fleet, the Control
Force, and Training Squadron 1, with three battleships, three light cruisers, 23 destroyers, three minelayers, a dozen submarines, and an aircraft tender, plus Army
and Navy aircraft based in Puerto Rico and at Gonaives, on the Gulf of Gonave, in
Haiti, as well as a support base at Samana Bay, in the Dominican Republic.
Blue commander Jackson determined that his objective should be Guantanamo,
despite the fact that it is about a hundred miles further from Colon than
Guacanayabo, and had been “mined” by both sides. He adopted this course because
Guantanamo was held by a much stronger constructive garrison than
Guacanayabo, and was thus more likely to hold out. As the best speed his convoy
could make was 9.5 knots, Admiral Jackson estimated that he could cover the nearly
800 miles from Colon to Guantanamo by the 12th, thus attaining his objective well
within the time allowed.
Although officially the fleet problem began at noon on the 9th, certain preliminary actions were initiated before that time. Black was allowed to post submarine
and destroyer scouts well into the Caribbean prior to that time. Then, from 2400 on
the 8th, participating units were placed under wartime communications controls,
limiting signals and requiring all messages to be coded. Finally, early on the morning of the 9th, Blue was allowed to send a screen of destroyers and minesweepers to
sea, covered by Army and Navy aircraft operating from shore.
Promptly at noon, the Black Fleet departed from Guantanamo, standing in for
a base further east.7 The Blue main body did not put to sea from Colon before
mid-afternoon. Black submarines detected the Blue Fleet’s movement not long after it departed Colon. Actual contact between Black surface scouts and their Blue
counterparts took place on the 10th. From then on the two fleets clashed repeatedly, as Black attempted both day and night destroyer attacks, while Blue conducted both defensive and counter-offensive operations.
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Based on the experience gained in Fleet Problem VI, the previous year, Blue determined to make effective use of aircraft off Langley for fleet air defense and ASW
patrol, and to supplement catapult aircraft off battleships and cruisers in
long-range patrolling, by then routine operations for naval aviators. Blue aircraft
were rather successful in locating and attacking Black submarines, and in reconnoitering ahead of the fleet, maintaining a very high operational tempo, which helped
Blue avoid serious injury from Black attacks.
Despite Admiral Jackson’s estimate as to the Blue Fleet’s rate of advance, it was
not until early on the 13th that the fleet neared Guantanamo. At that time, Blue reconnaissance spotted some Black destroyers not far from the fleet. The high operational tempo that Blue’s airmen maintained had reduced available aviation
resources. Nevertheless, at the urging of Captain Joseph M. Reeves of Langley, Blue
directed an air attack on the destroyers. This air strike coincided with the formal
end of the problem, which was called a day earlier than planned.
By a remarkable coincidence, at about 1000, while the Blue aircraft were strafing
the enemy destroyers, 25 Black land-based Army aircraft turned up over the Blue
Fleet. Operating out of Le Mole St. Nicholas, on the northwest coast of Haiti, 150
miles to the east, the Black aircraft attacked the Blue Fleet near Guantanamo. Although this air strike technically took place after the fleet problem had been called
off, it was adjudicated anyway, and ruled a striking success, though criticized for
poor tactics.8
As was the case with Fleet Problem II (1924), “real world” operations interfered
in the maneuvers. Six light cruisers were unable to take part, having been dispatched
to “show the flag” in China and Nicaragua, while one destroyer division was diverted to search for a steamer reported missing off the Ecuadorian coast. The absence of the light cruisers was particularly felt.9
Afterward: Joint Amphibious/Coast Defense Operations, May 17–20, 1927
When Fleet Problem VII ended, the entire fleet held a review in the Gulf of Gonave
for the President of Haiti, and then steamed for New York. During this voyage, various elements maneuvered against each other, conducting scouting and screening
operations and particularly exercising in torpedo attack and defense.10
After a week at New York, the fleet departed on May 15th for joint amphibious
and coast defense maneuvers with the Army in Rhode Island Sound and
Narragansett Bay.11 For these maneuvers, Blue, under the overall command of Major General Preston Brown, Commander I Corps Area, was tasked with defending
the New England coastline, from the Connecticut River to Cape Cod, against an
amphibious attack by Black. Blue naval forces were under Rear Admiral Noble E.
Irwin, COMDESRONSSCOFLT, and included the Scouting Fleet, with some Marine Corps aviation units to supplement its air resources. Army forces available, including National Guard and reserve personnel, totaled two notional divisions plus
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local coast-defense installations, plus some constructive aircraft.12 Black, under
CINCUS Hughes, was charged with effecting landings in this area. For this purpose,
Admiral Hughes had the Battle Fleet, including Langley, and a small expeditionary
force representing 75,000 troops.
The maneuvers began at 0000 on May 17, with Blue well out to sea. After preliminary movements, Black’s nine battleships conducted a simulated bombardment of
the defenses of Narragansett Bay on the 18th. The next day Black attempted a landing at Watch Hill, Rhode Island, with Langley’s two squadrons providing air cover.
This tied the carrier too closely to the coast, and she was ruled to have been caught
and put out of action by notional Blue land-based aircraft. The maneuvers concluded on May 20th, with Black having failed to secure a foothold, as the landing
was ruled a failure.
Simultaneous with the maneuvering of the ships, aircraft, and troops in the real
world, the students at the Naval War College played the same scenario on the
wargame floor; this enabled the participants to compare the results of the “live” exercises off Rhode Island with those of the wargame, a unique situation that seems to
have enriched the subsequent critique.13 The joint maneuvers in Rhode Island Sound
were closely followed by the public, and there was a robust press presence. Briefings
were held in an improvised press center at Fort Adams, in Newport, and the operations were covered as they unfolded, much as would have been the case in an actual
war. This provided Navy press officers with some uniquely realistic training.14
Although a preliminary critique had been held at Gonaives, Haiti, immediately
after Fleet Problem VII, a final critique of the entire series of maneuvers was held at
Newport under the supervision of CINCUS Charles F. Hughes, in cooperation with
the faculty and students of the Naval War College. A number of conclusions were
stressed, including the need for additional fleet problems, more light cruisers, and
better submarines. In addition, specific mention was made of the need to develop a
procedure by which “friendly” submarines could identify themselves to patrolling
aircraft and, yet again, a need for the procurement of auxiliaries able to keep up with
the battleline.
Considerable attention was paid to the air operations, and there was general
agreement that the fleet still had too few aircraft to evaluate their effectiveness properly. In the course of these discussions, it appears that the idea of having aircraft carriers conduct “scouting and offensive operations at a distance from the battle line”
was first proposed, COMAIRONS, Joseph M. Reeves, arguing that there should be
“complete freedom of action in employing carrier aircraft,” a conclusion with which
CINCUS concurred.15 Reflecting the inter-service nature of some of the recent maneuvers, the critique concluded that there was need for a comprehensive amphibious doctrine and for more joint exercises to establish a smoother working
relationship between the Navy and the Army.16
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N O T E S 1 Documentation for FP VII is extremely rich.
There are nearly four rolls of microfilm in the
M964 series (Nos. 8 through 11), of which see
particularly 8, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “May 4, 1927,
U.S. Fleet Problem Seven—Report on,” with Enclosures, as well as additional materials in the Naval War College Archives. See also NWCA,
Carton 61, CINCUS, Report of U.S. Fleet Problem
Seven (4 May 1927); NWCA, Carton 61, CinC
BATFLEET, Report of U.S. Fleet Problem Seven
and Joint Army-Navy Exercise, Panama Bay, 2–5
March 1927 (May 20, 1927); NWCA, Carton 61,
CDR AIRONS-BATFLEET, Air Exercises, Joint
Army-Navy Exercises, Panama Bay, March 2–5,
1927; Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 144–48;
Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, pp. 131–32;
Grimes, pp. 14–18. In addition, there was some
press coverage, though not as much in most
years; “Navy Game Starts in Caribbean Sea,”
Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1927; “Airplanes Active
in Canal ‘Defense,’” New York Times, Mar. 10,
1927.
2 M964-8, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “May 4, 1927, U.S.
Fleet Problem Seven—Report on,” p. 1. CINCUS
Hughes added, “In order to conserve fuel the geographic separation of the Scouting Fleet and Battle Fleet at the beginning of the Fleet
Concentration on nine March was taken advantage of in the conduct of the operations,” turning
a necessity into a virtue.
3 For this exercise see Grimes, pp. 14–15; “War
Game Begins,” New York Times, Mar. 2, 1927;
“Attacks Canal in War Game,” New York Times,
Mar. 4, 1927; “Advance on Canal in Mimic War,”
New York Times, Mar. 5, 1927; “Canal ‘Invaders’
Captured,” New York Times, Mar. 6, 1927.
4 Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 146–47.
5 In addition to documents cited earlier, see
Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 147–48; Grimes,
pp. 16–18; “Navy Game Starts in Caribbean Sea,”
Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1927, p. 4; “Airplanes
Active in Canal ‘Defense,’” New York Times, Mar.
10, 1927.
6 “U.S. Fleet Displeases Japan,” Washington Post,
Feb. 13, 1927.
7 Because Black was notionally operating from a
base further eastward, for this sortie it was permitted to ignore the mines that supposedly closed
Guantanamo.
8 M964-8, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “May 4, 1927, U.S.
Fleet Problem Seven—Report on,” pp. 2–3;
Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 147–48. Apparently the Army airmen had not been notified that
the maneuvers had been ended a day early.
9 M964-8, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “May 4, 1927, U.S.
Fleet Problem Seven—Report on,” p. 2; “Coolidge Sends More Ships and Marines to Nicaragua,” New York Times, Jan. 7, 1927; “Three More
Cruisers Reach Balboa,” New York Times, Feb. 2,
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1927; “Rely on Our Forces in Changhai Crisis,”
New York Times, Mar. 20, 1927; “5,881 Men, 21
Ships in Our China Force,” New York Times, Mar.
25, 1927.
10 “Our Fleet Reviewed by Haitian President,” New
York Times, Mar. 19, 1927; “Record Armada to
Visit New York,” New York Times, Mar. 20, 1927.
11 Reynolds, John H. Towers, p. 208; Hattendorf,
Simpson, & Wadleigh, pp. 131–32. These maneuvers were very well covered in the press; see, for
example, “Army and Navy War Games Date Advanced,” Washington Post, Jun. 6, 1926;
“Army-Navy War Game to Have Huge Air
Force,” Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1926; “Fleet of
122 Warships Gathers at New York,” Washington
Post, Apr. 20, 1927; “Fleet Visit Ending; War
Game Due,” New York Times, May 13, 1927;
“Fleet to Quit New York Tomorrow for War
Game,” Washington Post, May 15, 1927; “Wait
Beside Guns to Repel Invaders,” New York Times,
May 16, 1927; “Fleet Shells Forts in Day of Mimic
War,” New York Times, May 19, 1927; “Invader
Battleship Sinks Blue Defenders’ Flagship,” Washington Post, May 19, 1927; Charles M. Lincoln,
“The Navy Opens Sham War on Our Coast,” New
York Times, May 19, 1927; “Land Forces Claim
War Games Victory,” New York Times, May 20,
1927; “War Game Umpires in Secret Session,”
New York Times, May 22, 1927.
12 The Army had almost cancelled its participation
in the maneuvers due to a shortage of money, but
additional funds had been provided by Congress;
see “Army Seeks Funds for Joint War Game,”
Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1926; “Poverty Bars
Army from Manoeuvres,” New York Times, Dec.
11, 1926; “No Army Manoeuvres,” New York
Times, Dec. 13, 1926; “Joint Manoeuvres Probable in May,” New York Times, Feb. 2, 1927. Despite the additional funds, the Air Corps claimed
to be unable to take part due to its maneuvers
with the 2nd Division in Texas, though these involved only about 100 aircraft; “To Fight Mimic
War with 100 Airplanes,” New York Times, Mar.
7, 1927.
13 Hattendorf, Simpson, & Wadleigh, pp. 131–32.
14 Hattendorf, Simpson, & Wadleigh, p. 132.
15 NWCA, Carton 61, CINCUS, Report of U.S. Fleet
Problem Seven (4 May 1927), p. 2; Clark G.
Reynolds, The Fast Carriers (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 16, 17; Reynolds, John H.
Towers, pp. 214–17; John D. Hayes, “Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, USN (1872–1948),” Part 1,
Naval War College Review, Nov. 1970, pp. 54–55;
Clark G. Reynolds, On the Warpath in the Pacific:
Admiral Jocko Clark and the Fast Carriers
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 74.
16 NWCA, Carton 61, CINCUS, Report of U.S. Fleet
Problem Seven (4 May 1927), pp. 3–4.
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USS Langley (CV 1), off Hawaii with 34 aircraft on her flight deck, shortly after Fleet
Problem VIII, about the time of her May 17, 1928 raid on Pearl Harbor.
(USN Photo 80-G-424475, Naval Historical Foundation)
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1928

Fleet Problem VIII, April 18–28, 1928

P

lanning for Fleet Problem VIII began in late 1926, and the outline of the proposed maneuvers was publicly announced early the following year.1 The scenario for what was officially described as a “scouting problem,” was once
again a variant of that considered in several previous years, the movement of Blue
(United States) across the Pacific against opposition from Orange (Japan).
As with many of the problems, Fleet Problem VIII involved a good deal of “geographic transposition.”2 The Blue homeland was assumed to be somewhere to the
northeast of the West Coast, which was mostly considered part of the ocean. In this
ocean, Blue controlled a large island in the San Francisco Bay area, a surrogate for
Hawaii, as well as Guam, which represented itself. Orange (Japan) was a major
power based far to the southwest of Hawaii, with a colonial empire that included an
advanced base at San Pedro, constructively taken to represent an atoll in the Mandates. In this rearranged ocean, Hawaii stood in for the Philippines, with Pearl Harbor as a surrogate for Manila.
The scenario presumed that tensions were rising between Orange and Blue but
that war had not yet broken out. In this circumstance, Blue decides to reinforce its
garrison at Pearl Harbor, but its forces are under orders to avoid initiating hostilities. Orange, with the bulk of its fleet still mobilizing in home waters, has available
limited forces with which to monitor the Blue movement and ultimately to initiate
hostilities by harassing tactics.
As was normal, each side had different exercise motives, but these essentially
came down to scouting and evasion, convoy attack and defense, opposed entry into
a friendly port, and fleet air operations. Although both Lexington (CV 2) and
Saratoga (CV 3) had recently been commissioned, they were not included in the
problem, as they were still working up. Nevertheless, during the problem, both ships
were ordered to Hawaii, and they took part in subsequent maneuvers. Fleet Problem
VIII was followed by several supplementary maneuvers and exercises, including the
Navy’s first-ever multi-carrier maneuvers, which are also dealt with here, as are also,
briefly, joint Army-Navy maneuvers held off Long Island in June between the Scouting Force and local coast defense installations.
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Fleet Problem VIII: April 18–28, 1928
Uniquely, Fleet Problem VIII was the only one that did not involve both the Battle
Fleet and the Scouting Fleet which remained in the Atlantic and engaged in its joint
maneuver with the Army.3 This fleet problem was also the least “balanced” in the entire series.
Admiral Louis R. de Steiguer, COMBATFLT, commanding Blue, was given the
Battle Fleet and Training Squadron 2, based at San Francisco, with all ten active battleships, plus Langley (CV 1) with 42 aircraft, as well as aircraft tenders Aroostook
(CM 3) and Gannet (AVP 8), plus one light cruiser, a large number of destroyers,
two submarine divisions, and a large fleet train. Orange, commanded by Rear Admiral George C. Day, COMCRUDIV 2, had slender resources, and these were widely
dispersed. In Hawaii, Orange had the resources of the 14th Naval District, including
some land-based reconnaissance aircraft. Based at Lahaina Roads, Maui, were 20
submarines and two tenders, two destroyer minelayers, two minesweepers, and a
small train. Operating out of the notional atoll at San Pedro, Rear Admiral Day had
his own CRUDIV 2 (four Omaha Class ships), and some land-based patrol aircraft.
In addition, Orange had four battlecruisers of the Kongo Class, represented by the
four Omaha Class ships of CRUDIV 3, just then approaching Guam, en route home
from duty with the Asiatic Fleet.4
In terms of major warships, although heavily outnumbered, Orange had the
faster fleet, since the Omaha Class light cruisers could make well over 30 knots.5 Orange also had a very large constructive fleet assumed to be concentrating in its home
waters.
Starting times for the problem were staggered. The Orange units in Hawaii were
free to begin operations on April 17th, Blue forces began operations at 0001 on the
18th, and the Orange cruisers at San Pedro initiated operations at 0030 on April
20th.
Blue’s mission was to reach Pearl Harbor by noon on April 30th. To effect this,
Blue developed an innovative plan. Blue’s submarines were mostly S-boats, able to
sustain only 10.5 knots on the surface. Blue was further burdened with the repair
ship Procyon (AG 11), able to sustain only 9.5 knots. Moreover, although permitted
to begin operations just after midnight on April 18th, Blue was further hampered by
the fact that the tide at San Francisco would still be rising at that time, and would
not turn until shortly after 1000.
H. Kent Hewitt, later to gain fame commanding amphibious operations in
northwest Africa and the Mediterranean, served as an aide and staff officer to de
Steiguer for several years; Hewitt described him as “a very able officer with perhaps
the unfortunate trait of flying off the handle if he thought things were not going
right or someone was not doing his job,” adding that the admiral “had the service
reputation of being what might mildly be described as difficult.”6 Certainly de
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Steiguer’s analysis of the problem facing Blue demonstrated his abilities. Apparently
knowing his opponent, de Steiguer concluded that Day would assume that Blue
would not sortie from San Francisco Bay before 1000 on April 8th, and that it would
be unable to make more than 9.5 knots.
Demonstrating considerable ingenuity, de Steiguer decided to “increase our
speed beyond anything the enemy force would think possible.” First, he arranged to
have some of the larger and faster ships tow the submarines and the Procyon. As a result, the Blue fleet speed rose to 12 knots. Secondly, de Steiguer dispatched the slowest vessels at the earliest possible moment—that is, at 0001 on April 8—so that
despite the adverse tide and their low speed, they would be able to reach the vicinity
of the San Francisco Light Ship, some eight miles west of the harbor entrance, by
0600. There they were to await the arrival of the main body of the fleet, which departed San Francisco later, but caught up due to their higher speed and the slackening tide. Admiral de Steiguer used the “extra” time these measures gained him to
take the fleet by a more southerly route, which also permitted him to take advantage
of more favorable winds and currents, thus gaining still more time. Altogether, these
expedients enabled the fleet to “gain” 500 miles; that is, the time required to reach
Pearl Harbor was shortened by more than 48 hours.7
In addition, in his analysis, de Steiguer addressed various contingencies, notably
the probable mission of the Orange “battlecruisers.” As they were the only ships
available to the enemy that could pose a significant threat to the Blue Fleet as it approached Hawaii, de Steiguer outlined tactics for engaging them if they could not be
avoided.8
Orange’s analysis was by no means as complete as Blue’s. Rear Admiral Day did
precisely what Admiral de Steiguer thought he would do. Knowing the limited
speed of Blue’s submarines and repair ship, Day calculated that Blue could make no
more than 9.5 knots and, based on tidal conditions, would be unable to depart San
Francisco Bay until the forenoon. On the basis of these assumptions, Day ordered
the cruisers at San Pedro to use their high speed to probe westward for Blue, that is,
essentially from astern. In addition, Day ordered his minelayers, minesweepers, and
submarines to form a series of patrol lines 800 miles east of Oahu on the great circle
route from San Francisco. Day intended that the submarines form two scouting
lines—so that he would have a total of three patrol lines—but his orders were somewhat vague and his submarine commander misinterpreted them. Finally, Day completely omitted reference to the Orange battlecruisers, which were his most
powerful units, possibly on the assumption that he would not actually have them,
and made no contingency plans in the event he failed to locate Blue by some specific
date.9
Because Admiral de Steiguer had precisely calculated Orange’s plans, Blue was
able to slip around the southern end of the Orange patrol lines, passing south of the
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main island of Hawaii, and approach Pearl Harbor from the southwest. Meanwhile,
the Orange light cruisers were left far behind, still probing for the supposedly
slow-moving Blue Fleet.
Bad weather impeded air operations by both sides, particularly those of the battleship and cruiser catapult aircraft, which had to make water landings and then be
hoisted aboard. COMAIRONS Reeves protested that Langley was further hampered
by Admiral de Steiguer’s decision to keep her 2,500 yards behind his battleships in
the fleet’s cruising formation, probably a legitimate objection. Nevertheless, Langley
was able to conduct limited aerial reconnaissance on four days, her aircraft reaching
out as far as 75 miles from the fleet, searching for enemy surface vessels and submarines, though no contacts were made.
On one occasion, Langley actually maintained 16 aircraft aloft
simultaneously, a record for the times.10 With only the resources of catapult aircraft off several cruisers, Orange’s air operations were even more limited, though several
reconnaissance patrols were undertaken.
The combination of Blue’s careful planning and Orange’s
slipshod effort had the result that Orange never detected Blue.
On April 28th, Langley aircraft reconnoitered Oahu from
about 70 miles to the southwest, and later that day the Blue
fleet entered Pearl Harbor, well before the prescribed “no later
than” date of April 30th.11
On May 3, 1928, a critique was held in Honolulu, attended
by several hundred naval officers, as well as by the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Major General Fox
Conner, one of the most brilliant officers of the interwar period, and about 50 other Army officers. The critique by
CINCUS Henry A. Wiley was perhaps the most scathing of any
issued following a fleet problem. In the published text, Wiley
devoted ten of the 21 paragraphs of his general comments to
often severe criticism of the performance of Orange, and one
to praising Blue’s “thorough preparation and forceful
execution.”12
While conceding that Orange’s problem had been a difficult one, given the slender resources available, Wiley raked the Orange commander over the coals for a
great many serious errors that compounded his difficulties. Day’s most serious error was that he had thrown away his greatest asset, the high speed of his ships and
his knowledge of Blue’s objective, Hawaii. Even assuming that his estimate of Blue’s
speed was correct, Day should have ordered his cruisers to proceed toward Hawaii at
the highest practical speed, taking advantage of their flanking position to probe
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northward for Blue. The worst possible outcome of this approach would have been
that even if they failed to locate Blue, the Orange cruisers would still have arrived in
the vicinity of Hawaii before the Blue Fleet. His second error was the vaguely
worded orders that reduced the effectiveness of his submarines as a scouting force.
His third error was to place his patrol lines too far to the east; they were well beyond
the range of his land-based reconnaissance aircraft, and if the patrolling submarines, minelayers, and minesweepers had actually encountered the Blue Fleet, they
would have had difficulty falling back to Hawaii, given the speed differential between most of them and Blue’s destroyers.
Moreover, the patrol lines were disposed on the assumption that Blue would take
the shortest possible route from San Francisco to Hawaii. Finally, Rear Admiral Day
had failed to provide a “plan for an ultimate concentration of his forces in vicinity of
enemy destination prior to possible enemy arrival there”; even given the failure of
his light cruisers to make contact, there would still have been available in Hawaiian
waters sufficient forces (i.e., the cruisers, mine warfare vessels, and submarines, supplemented by aircraft) to carry out the Orange mission of impeding Blue’s movement, “had they been suitably disposed.”13
In sum, Day had made numerous errors of judgment, compounding them by
making vague suggestions to several of his subordinates when he ought to have issued orders. Wiley went on to take note of specific aspects of the maneuvers. Commenting that overall the performance of Langley’s aircraft held out some promise of
greater things to come, he rightly concluded that “little could be expected from a
problem in which air operations were so limited and where air forces available were
so small.”14
The admiral was critical of laxity in communications security. Blue was able to
secure fixes on the Orange light cruisers on several occasions, and adjusted its
movements accordingly. Orange managed to use intercepts to break Blue’s code, but
was unable to determine Blue’s course.
Wiley then added a list of recommendations, starting off with the almost customary call for more cruisers and faster auxiliaries. He discussed issues that needed
to be considered in planning movements, addressed some questions concerning the
professional education of officers, dealt with communications security, recommended developing a secure anchorage in Hawaii, and noted the need for a
short-range radio that could be used for communications within the fleet. Wiley
then returned to aviation, to make some comments about aircraft, which focused
on the limitations of the equipment available.15
During the fleet problem there had also been some experimentation with the use
of ultraviolet and infrared lights to help ships to keep station. Admiral Wiley was
apparently impressed with the results of this experiment, and recommended the
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continuation of work on the technology, but there does not seem to have been any
follow-up.16
Rapid Sortie from Pearl Harbor
After spending a few days at Pearl Harbor, the fleet tested plans for a “rapid sortie”
from a fortified base against enemy opposition.17 This was a matter of particular
concern for naval planners due to the narrowness of the exit channel from Pearl
Harbor. With CRUDIV 3, now arriving from the vicinity of Guam, standing in for a
raiding force of enemy battlecruisers, the fleet tested a plan that permitted it to exit
the channel and go immediately into action. The exercise was considered highly
successful.
Joint Army-Navy Hawaii Defense Trial, May 16–17, 192818
In mid-May, at the request of Major General Fox Conner, Commander, Hawaiian
Department, a “minor joint army-navy” exercise was developed to test the defenses
of Hawaii against a surprise air–sea attack. On the afternoon of May 16th, the fleet,
organized into two battleship task forces plus a small carrier task force built around
Langley and commanded by Rear Admiral Reeves, steamed south from Lahaina
Roads. After dark, the three task forces proceeded northward. By 0300 on the 17th,
the three task forces were approaching their objectives; Langley was south of Diamond Head, where coast defense searchlights were probing the sea and skies, while
four battleships lay to the southeast of Diamond Head and five others to the south
of Pearl Harbor.
At about 0430, Langley commenced launching two squadrons, 35 aircraft, getting them off very quickly.19 Soon afterward, at dawn, these aircraft—described as
“swarms”in the press—achieved complete surprise, despite the fact that the defenders had been warned that an exercise was underway. The aircraft conducted simulated raids on Wheeler Field and other installations on Oahu. Then, while some
destroyers battled simulated submarine attacks, others covered the battleships as
they took the coast defense installations under fire. At 0730, the battleships drew off,
covered by Langley aircraft, which had proven able to keep the Army Air Corps away
from the fleet.
Following this exercise, Major General Conner, who had accompanied the fleet
aboard the flagship California, commented favorably on the performance of naval
aircraft during the operation, and joined with Admiral de Steiguer in stressing the
importance of aviation to the defense of Hawaii and the operations of the fleet, calling for an increase in the numbers of aircraft and ships in service.20
Aircraft Carrier Tactical Exercises
Meanwhile, although they took no part in Fleet Problem VIII, the fleet’s two new
carriers, Lexington (CV 2) and Saratoga (CV 3), both commissioned very late in
1927, arrived in Hawaiian waters under special orders from Rear Admiral Joseph M.
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Reeves.21 Soon after his successful “raid” on Wheeler field, Reeves transferred to
Lexington.
Over the next few weeks the two big carriers engaged in daily training in the conduct of flight operations. They then undertook a series of exercises testing how two
carriers could operate together, becoming the first operational carrier division in
the fleet. In addition, aviators engaged in a great deal of experimentation, including
trials in dive bombing, then a new tactic, while the ships’ gunnery officers worked
out optimal anti-aircraft tactics.22
Joint Army-Navy Coast Defense Exercises, Long Island, June 1–15, 1928
While the Battle Fleet was engaged in Fleet Problem VIII and associated maneuvers
in the Pacific, the Scouting Force, which had remained in the Atlantic, participated
in joint maneuvers with the Army to test the coast defenses of eastern Long Island
and Rhode Island Sound.23 Although on paper the exercise ran from June 1st
through the 15th, the Scouting Force played a direct role only on the 12th and 13th.
For the first ten days, the maneuvers were largely an Army affair, with exercises that
involved coast artillery firing on towed targets with the assistance of spotter aircraft
and an innovative sound ranging system, coordinated firing by several forts,
anti-aircraft drills, and mine warfare operations, as well as a command post exercise. The defenders, designated “Blue,” numbered only about a thousand, mostly
Regular Army coast defense personnel, plus some National Guard and Reserve officers, manning the forts covering the eastern end of Long Island Sound, and supported by a handful of Air Corps aircraft, two Army mine planters, and a Navy tug,
all under the command of the 11th Coast Artillery.
Designated “Black,” the Scouting Fleet had the battleships Florida (BB 30), Utah
(BB 31), and Arkansas (BB 33), carrying 1,400 Naval Academy midshipmen on their
annual summer cruise, as well as aircraft tender Wright (AV 1) and 18 destroyers.
There were five observation planes on the battleships and five flying boat bombers
supported by the aircraft tender. Black’s mission was to conduct a raid on Long Island Sound some time after 1700 on June 12th, neutralize the defenses on Fisher’s
Island, and then run the defenses to attack the submarine base at New London, supposedly as a prelude for an attack on New York City by a strong follow-on force.
The 13th started out well for Black. Operating from Wright, which had taken station on the east side of Block Island, five flying boats conducted an air raid on Watch
Hill, Rhode Island, and then eluded pursuing Blue aircraft to return safely to their
base. But then, despite their relatively limited air and surface reconnaissance resources, Blue had a run of excellent luck. By 1300, Blue had located Wright at Block
Island, one battleship and her escorts some 20 miles southeast of Block Island and
another just off Montauk, and two detachments of Black destroyers trying to approach the entrance to the Long Island Sound by sneaking through the Fisher’s Island Sound along the coast of Rhode Island. Soon afterward, the area began to be
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blanketed by a heavy fog. Although officially the maneuvers ended early on the following day, already they were effectively over.
Although Fleet Problem VIII did not involve any spectacular developments, it
did have a number of unusual distinctions. It was the only one in the entire series of
fleet problems that did not unite the Battle Fleet with the Scouting Fleet, it had one
of the simplest scenarios, it was certainly the least “balanced,” and it had turned out
to be the least eventful. But some of the supplemental maneuvers, notably Joseph M.
Reeves’ improvised carrier exercises, had proven of considerable interest.
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N O T E S 1 M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem
VIII—Report of Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet”; M964-11, 2, “U.S. Fleet Problem
VIII, Blue Estimate of the Situation”; M964-11, 2
“U.S. Fleet Problem VIII [Orange Estimate of the
Situation].” Harris Laning, then a rear admiral,
served as Chief-of-Staff to the Commander, Battle
Force (i.e., Blue), for this problem, and has some
interesting observations; Laning, pp. 312–13. See,
also, Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 157ff;
Grimes, pp. 19–22; “Plan Navy Exercises off the
Hawaiians,” New York Times, Jan. 6, 1927.
2 M964-1, 4, CINCUS to CNO, Mar. 3, 1924,
“United States Fleet Problem No. 2,” p. 2.
3 No specific explanation was found in fleet problem documents for the omission of the Scouting
Fleet from this problem, but it was probably an
economy measure, intended to minimize expenditures on fuel.
4 Because Guam was west of Longitude 180°, and
thus on the Japanese side of the Pacific, this was
apparently the only time it had a role in a fleet
problem, and that a passive one: to serve as a Blue
observation post, keeping tabs on CRUDIV 3,
representing the Orange battlecruisers, a mission
that was performed efficiently. See M964-11, 2,
CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem VIII—Report
of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,”
p. 10.
5 For the Omaha Class, see DANFS, Vol. 5, pp.
153–54.
6 Hewitt, Memoirs, p. 76.
7 Harris Laning claims to have had a role in proposing that the slower vessels be towed. As he
noted, it was anticipated that towing the slowest
vessels would permit the fleet to make 12.5 knots,
but in practice 12 proved the best speed the towed
vessels could manage; Laning, An Admiral’s Yarn,
pp. 312–14.
8 M964-11, 2, “U.S. Fleet Problem VIII, Blue Estimate of the Situation,” pp. 5, 8, 15, etc.
9 The role of the “battlecruisers” in the problem is
unclear. Although noted in the statement of the
problem issued to Blue, they are not mentioned
in that issued to Orange, but the Orange command was certainly aware of their potential availability. They actually played no role in the
problem, beginning it very far from Hawaii, west
of Guam, and were later ruled “out of the problem.” See M964-11, 2, CINCUS to COMSCOFLT,
COMLICRUDIV2, etc., Dec. 7, 1927; M964-11, 2
“Fleet Problem VIII—Report of Commander in
Chief, United States Fleet,” p. 10.
10 Wildenberg, Destined, p. 50; Grimes, p. 21.
11 “Fleet in War Array Reaches Honolulu,” New
York Times, Apr. 29, 1928.
12 M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem
VIII—Report of Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet,” pp. 3–5.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:09 AM
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States Fleet,” p. 3.
14 M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem
VIII—Report of Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet,” p. 8.
15 M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem
VIII—Report of Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet,” pp. 10–11.
16 M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem
VIII—Report of Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet,” p. 9. Perhaps somewhere in the
bowels of the Office of Naval Research there reposes a report on the subject.
17 NWCA, Carton 64, Blue Fleet OpOrd 6–28, 28
April 1928.
18 “100 Planes Concentrate to Defend Hawaii in
Manoeuvres,” New York Times, May 16, 1928;
“‘Attackers’ Subdue Oahu in War Games,” New
York Times, May 18, 1928; Wilson, Slipstream, pp.
125–26, and Wilson, Foresight, Vol. I, p. 366;
Hayes, Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, Part I, p. 55;
Norman Polmar, “Bombing Pearl Harbor,” Naval
History, XVI, 3 (June 2002), pp. 14, 16;
Wildenberg, Destined, p. 52; Wildenberg, All the
Factors, p. 162. It is unclear when Conner proposed this enterprise, nor is the mechanism by
which local commanders could initiate minor
joint exercises known. This would seem a ripe
area for further research.
19 Reportedly, all 35 aircraft were airborne in just
seven minutes; see Wildenberg, All the Factors, p.
162, n. 31, citing Langley’s log entries.
20 See Vern Hinkley, “Aircraft and Ships Country’s
Big Need,” New York Times, Jun. 10, 1928, p. 54.
21 Lexington made the 2,228-mile voyage from San
Pedro to Pearl Harbor in 72 hours and 34 minutes, at an average speed of 33.42 knots, setting an
official record that apparently still stands;
Wildenberg, All the Factors, p. 162.
22 NWCA, Carton 64, White Task Force OpOrd No.
1, Task Organization, 18 May 1928; Wildenberg,
Destined, pp. 52–53; Wildenberg, All the Factors,
pp. 162–64; Hayes, Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves,
Part I, p. 55.
23 “War Games to Test New York Defenses,” New
York Times, Jun. 1, 1928, p. 18; “Gather for ‘Battle’ of Long Island,” New York Times, Jun. 2,
1928, p. 19; “Artillery Assigned to War Game Duties,” New York Times, Jun. 3, 1928, p. N22;
“Guns Score 92 Hits on Aerial Target,” New York
Times, Jun. 9, 1928; “Army ‘Defending’ City Rehearses War Game,” New York Times, Jun. 10,
1928, p. 18; “Forts Test Defense of Long Island
Sound,” New York Times, Jun. 11, 1928, p. 21;
“Black Fleet Will Raid Base at New Haven,” New
York Times, Jun. 12, 1928; “‘War’ Is Declared at
Fort Wright,” New York Times, Jun. 13, 1928, p.
17; “‘Blues’ Quickly Locate Hostile ‘Black’ Fleet,”
New York Times, Jun. 14, 1928, p. 52; “Newport Is
Host to 1,400 ‘Middies,’” New York Times, Jun.
16, 1928, p. 24.
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Rear Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, COMAIRRONSBATFOR, center, the “Father of
Carrier Aviation,” with Adm. William V. Pratt, COMBATFLT, left, called by some
the “Midwife of Carrier Aviation,” and Capt. Frank R. McCrary, COM NAS San
Diego, who proved an aggressive carrier commander during the fleet problems, at
North Island, December 27, 1928.
(NH-75877, Naval Historical Foundation William V. Pratt Collection)
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Fleet Problem IX, January 23–27, 1929

F

leet Problem IX was arguably the most important in the entire series for the
development of aircraft carrier operations.1 The strategic situation postulated
was complex, but realistic. It presumed that war had broken out between Blue
(United States) and an alliance of Black (Japan) and Brown (Britain) in November
1928. Blue had a sizable fleet in the Atlantic and a small squadron in the Pacific. Despite having to confront Brown, a major naval power, in the Atlantic, Blue had ordered some additional forces to the Pacific to bolster its position there. Black, a
weaker maritime power, was intent on attacking Blue in the hope of defeating its Pacific squadron before these reinforcements could arrive from the Atlantic.
This problem required no “geographic transposition and orientation,” as it was
set in the actual theater under study, Panama and the adjacent portions of the Pacific and Caribbean.2
As was normally the case, each side had its own “motives,” but the overall objectives of the problem were to test the fleet in scouting and evasion, convoy escort and
defense, opposed entry into a friendly port, defense of the canal from submarine attack, delaying operations against superior forces, mine operations, attack on fortified places, and cooperation with the Army in coast defense. This was the first fleet
problem in which Lexington (CV 2) and Saratoga (CV 3) took part. Initially Langley
(CV 1) was also scheduled to participate, as part of Black, but shortly before the fleet
sailed from California she suffered a mechanical breakdown and had to go to a yard
for extensive repairs. The seaplane tender Aroostook (CM 3) was substituted as a
surrogate for Langley. Although the Blue command was notified of the substitution,
it failed to inform friendly Army forces in Panama, an omission that had interesting
consequences later.3
To prepare for the problem, the Battle Fleet had to move from its bases in California to a position off Magdalena Bay, a relatively routine cruise of about 650 nautical miles. The Scouting Fleet, however, had to steam from the East Coast to the
Caribbean, and then through the Canal in order to take up its starting positions in
the Gulf of Panama and adjacent waters, a major movement. As was the case with all
the fleet problems prior to the mid-1930s, these movements and the tactical exercises that took place during them were not considered part of the maneuvers.
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On January 23, 1929, at the start of the actual fleet maneuvers, Black, commanded by COMBATFLT William V. Pratt, had the Battle Fleet and Training Squadron 2, for a total of nine battleships, plus Saratoga and seaplane tender Aroostook
(standing in for Langley), a light cruiser, 36 destroyers (plus six constructive ones),
and eight submarines (plus four constructive ones), with a large contingent of auxiliaries. The Blue Pacific squadron, commanded by Vice Admiral Montgomery
Meigs Taylor, COMSCOFLT, consisted of the Scouting Force, with the Control
Force and Training Squadron 1, totaling four battleships (each representing a division of three), Lexington and three aircraft tenders, five light cruisers, 29 destroyers,
and 24 submarines. Blue also had the resources of the 15th Naval District, including
about a dozen aircraft, and the Army’s Panama Division, with about 5,000 troops
and 37 aircraft of all types. Including the aircraft attached to these two territorial
commands, Blue had a very large air force, 145 aircraft. The notional Blue Atlantic
Fleet, which was presumed to have sailed from Hampton Roads on January 21st,
supposedly comprised 11 battleships, two carriers, one light cruiser, 40 destroyers,
15 submarines, and various auxiliary vessels.
Since the Blue force had an inter-service dimension, in an unusual development,
the chief umpire for Blue was Major General Malin Craig, the Assistant
Chief-of-Staff of the Army.4 In addition, Charles A. Lindbergh, a colonel in the
Army Air Corps Reserve, served as an observer aboard Saratoga and actually took
part in flight operations.5
Black began the problem off Magdalena Bay, Mexico, about 650 miles south and
somewhat east of San Diego, roughly 2,750 nautical miles northwest of Panama.
The Black plan called for air and surface attacks on the Canal; initial air attacks were
to be made against the Gatun and Miraflores Locks, to be followed by a surface
bombardment of the latter. To this end, Admiral Pratt organized his fleet into three
task forces:
• Striking Force: four battleships, Saratoga with two plane guard destroyers,
plus Omaha (CL 4), and a destroyer squadron.
• Support Force: three battleships, “aircraft carrier” Aroostook, two destroyer
divisions, and a submarine division.
• Train: two battleships, a destroyer division, all otherwise unassigned
submarines, a mine squadron, and the fleet train.
Initially, the Black plan envisioned an indirect descent on the Canal by the Striking Force, which would steam south to the vicinity of the Galapagos Islands, and
then turn northward for a rapid approach to attack the locks from an unexpected
direction. Circumstances required that this be changed.
In his analysis of probable Black intentions, Blue’s Vice Admiral Taylor rightly
concluded that the enemy would attempt to attack the Canal with an early morning
air strike followed by a surface attack. Not certain of the route the Black Fleet would
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take, he organized his forces to maximize his ability to locate Black, hoping to provide at least 48 hours’ notice before the enemy was in a position to attack the Canal.
Taylor created six separate subordinate commands:
• Western Scouts: cruisers and destroyers.
• Southern Scouts: destroyers.
• Main Body: battleships, Lexington, four destroyers, and two destroyer
minelayers.
• Submarine Force: all submarines and their tenders.
• Base Air Force: aircraft tenders, initially at Bahia Honda.
• Base Mine Force: 15th Naval District mine warfare resources.
On the assumption that an air attack could not be launched against the Canal
from a distance greater than 150 miles, Taylor positioned his Main Body about 280
miles southwest of the Canal, with the scouting forces and the Submarine Force
thrown further out to feel for the enemy. Once Black was located, the Blue Main
Body would respond appropriately, with air strikes off Lexington supported by the
two dozen tender-based torpedo bombers at Bahia Honda, followed by surface
action.
When making his plans, Taylor failed to include the 49 land-based aircraft attached to the 15th Naval District and the Army’s Panama Division, at Coco Solo and
France Field, almost all of which were combat types. Thus, although on paper Blue
had 25 percent more aircraft than Black (145 compared to 116), in practice Taylor’s
oversight reduced this margin to an inferiority of about 17 percent, a serious error
no one on his staff seems to have noticed at the time.6 On the other hand, Taylor did
make one very important decision, that once contact was made, his aircraft were to
make neutralization of Black’s carriers their first priority, and only then to attack
enemy battleships.7
As noted in chapter 3, even before the maneuvers began, Black had been forced
to change its plans.8 The original plan, to take the Striking Force south to the
Galapagos, and thence northward to attack the Canal, could not be carried out due
to concerns about fuel consumption. As a result, based on a suggestion by
COMAIRONS Reeves, on January 21st, when the respective forces were still taking
up their initial positions for the maneuvers, Black detached Saratoga for an independent mission. Thus, Black now had two battleship forces approaching Panama
directly, the Striking Force (from which Saratoga had been detached) and the Support Force; meanwhile, a little task force built around Saratoga headed for the
Galapagos.9
Saratoga, commanded by Captain Harry Yarnell, was escorted only by the light
cruiser Omaha, one of the few ships in the fleet with the speed (33 knots) and endurance to keep up with her. Omaha was the flagship of Rear Admiral Thomas J.
Senn, Commander, Destroyers, who was senior to Reeves. Nevertheless, when the
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cruiser joined Saratoga, Senn, apparently realizing that an air mission should best
be commanded by an aviator, shouted through a megaphone, “What do you want
me to do, Bull?” (using Reeves’ nickname in the fleet), thus ceding tactical command of the operation.10 Reeves took Saratoga and Omaha on a relatively
high-speed but uneventful trip south of the Equator.
Meanwhile, on the morning of the 24th, Blue carrier Lexington had sent up routine air patrols from a position about 280 miles west of Panama, which were supplemented by patrol bombers operating out of Bahia Honda. At 0903, a Blue destroyer
spotted the battleships of the Black Striking Force at a range of roughly 22,000 yards
(about 10.9 nm). Although taken under battleship fire, the destroyer escaped.
Throughout the rest of the day, Blue aircraft, destroyers, and light cruisers made
occasional contact with the Black Striking Force, one light cruiser coming close
enough for a battleship to open fire. As evening fell, Black intercepted and deciphered a Blue message ordering a destroyer concentration to conduct a nocturnal
surface attack on the Striking Force. Acting on this intelligence, the Black Striking
Force adopted a defensive formation, but the Blue destroyers failed to attack.
By nightfall on the 23rd, Saratoga and Omaha had reached a position east of the
Galapagos. Appropriate honors were rendered to Neptunus Rex on the morning of
the 24th. Then, at noon, on receipt of information that Blue had located the Black
Striking Force, the two ships proceeded northward at high speed.11
As Saratoga and her escort proceeded northward, the main bodies of the two
fleets continued to spar northwest of Panama. Late on the morning of the 25th, Blue
aircraft and destroyers again established contact with the Black Striking Force.
Somewhat later, Blue’s Lexington was ordered to engage the Black battleships, reported as being 22 miles from her position. In fact, the Black battlewagons were only
about 15 miles distant. As a result, even before the first airplane took off, Lexington
was spotted by the Black battleships, which emerged from a local rain squall and
took her under fire at 1218, range about 30,000 yards (14.8 nm). The firing continued for 23 minutes, during which Lexington managed to get a number of aircraft
aloft, which made strafing and bombing runs on the Black battleships. At 1241
Lexington managed to flee out of battleship gunnery range by virtue of her high
speed and another rain squall.
This incident, in which a fast carrier was intercepted by much slower battleships,
would be repeated often during the fleet problems, due partially to the lack of radar,
but primarily to the need for carriers to approach targets very closely as a consequence of the short range of contemporary aircraft. The incident also presented
some difficulties for the umpires. In the end, they ruled that because during her encounter with the battleships, Lexington’s aircraft had taken off “under fire,” the attacks they made during the engagement were not assessed against Black. In
addition, although the “damage” Lexington suffered during this encounter should
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certainly have merited a ruling of “sunk,” desirous of securing the maximum benefit
of having a carrier in the maneuvers, the umpires simply ruled her “heavily damaged,” limiting her ability to operate aircraft for a time and reducing her speed to 18
knots.12
At about 1340, as Black’s battleships closed on the Gulf of Panama, Blue destroyers attempted to make a torpedo attack on them, but rain squalls and Black destroyers interfered, and they retired. Desultory contact between Blue and the Black
Striking Force continued until evening.
Meanwhile, of course, Saratoga and Omaha, coming up from the Galapagos,
were fast approaching the Blue patrol areas. At 1600 on the 25th the Blue destroyer
Breck (DD 283) was spotted and shortly put “out of action” by gunfire. But Breck
had managed to get off a signal. The black cruiser Detroit (CL 8), nearby, picked this
up and began searching for the carrier. At about 1800 the cruiser was close enough
for Saratoga to “open fire” with her eight-inch guns, and Detroit was ruled to have
been sunk. Since by this time Omaha was running low on fuel, Detroit was ordered
to take her place. Despite officially being “sunk” and also now detached to Black,
Detroit continued to relay information on Saratoga’s position to Blue; although this
was one of the more egregious instances of cheating in the fleet problems, Detroit’s
skipper, Captain Richard Drace White, does not seem to have suffered for it, retiring
as a rear admiral several years later.13
During the night of the 25th–26th, alerted to Saratoga’s approach by Detroit,
Blue commander Taylor ordered Lexington to intercept the Black carrier. Delayed by
the restriction on her speed, Lexington was unable to locate the enemy carrier. As a
result, at 0548 on January 26th Saratoga began launching 70 aircraft from a point
about 140 miles south of the Canal. The “strike package” consisted of 17 T4M
bombers, 49 F2B and F3B fighters, three O2U-2 scouts, and one OL-8 amphibian
communications aircraft.14 Despite Detroit’s continuing communication with Blue,
Saratoga’s air strike achieved complete surprise, arriving undetected at about 0700
to “destroy” the Miraflores and Pedro Miguel Locks, before going on to attack an
airbase and other facilities. Although a patrol of six Army fighters attempted to intercept them, and several other Army fighters sortied as well, the attackers escaped
without loss to “enemy action.” Some aircraft, however, lower on fuel than others,
were forced to land at “enemy” airfields, where they were interned; several of these
Black airmen failed to destroy their code books, providing Blue with an intelligence
coup.15
Saratoga’s success was compounded when aircraft tender Aroostook, the surrogate carrier accompanying the Black Support Force, launched a Sikorsky XPS-2 amphibian, representing a notional 24 aircraft.16 As Saratoga’s aircraft were hitting the
Pacific side of the Canal, the amphibian made a nearly simultaneous attack on the
Caribbean side, to “destroy” the Gatun Locks. Providing a cautionary lesson on the
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use of surrogate and constructive forces, the approach of the amphibian had been
detected by the defenders.
The Army was still laboring under the assumption that Black would have both
Saratoga and Langley, the Blue naval command not having informed them that
Aroostook was serving as an emergency stand-in for Langley. As a result, the Army
expected that any “attack” would be in squadron strength.
Thus, when only a single amphibian was detected, it was assumed to be a routine reconnaissance flight and no effort was
made to intercept.17 Since the amphibian was launched at very
long range, upon completing his mission, as instructed, the pilot landed at a nearby Blue field and interned himself. Unfortunately, in his enthusiasm to be the first to inform the enemy
that the locks had been destroyed, he too neglected to destroy
his code book before landing, providing the enemy with yet
another intelligence bonus.
Following her rather spectacular raid on the Canal,
Saratoga now had a run of bad luck. To recover her aircraft, she
had to approach rather close to the Canal Zone. As planned by
Pratt and Reeves, the Black Striking Force, steaming from the
northwest at a lower speed, was supposed to join Saratoga in
the Gulf of Panama. However, a navigational error, and the
tentative engagements with elements of the Blue Main Body
on the 24th, caused the Striking Force to miss the rendezvous
by about 140 miles. As a result, shortly after her air strike was
away, at about 0615, Saratoga, operating in foggy weather, was
located by Blue battlewagons making a sweep of the Gulf of
Panama. Taken under fire at relatively close range, she was
ruled “sunk.” Soon afterward a Blue submarine fired four torpedoes at her from only 1,200 yards, again “sinking” her.
Although sunk, by fiat of the umpires Saratoga was restored to full operational
status. This was done so that maximum benefit could be gained from her participation in the rest of the problem. As a result, Saratoga launched a “second wave” of 13
O2U bombers, which arrived over the target at about 0805, and a third consisting of
T4M bombers that had recycled, which hit at 0950. As the defenders were by then
alerted to the carrier’s presence, these strikes were less successful in inflicting damage on ground targets.18
Meanwhile, through the morning of the 26th the Black Striking Force had been
lightly engaged against elements of the Blue Fleet. This skirmishing included a submarine attack that reduced Blue’s Tennessee (BB 43) to 15 knots and an exchange of
fire with Blue’s Wyoming (BB 32), which suffered a reduction in speed to eight
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knots. In return, Wyoming had managed to knock out one turret on Black’s California (BB 44). The two battle lines finally came to grips at 0921, and had it out for
about 45 minutes, with only light damage, to which several Lexington air strikes
added nothing. Shortly after this action, Saratoga joined the Striking Force. At 1300
the maneuvers were temporarily halted, so that the ships could get into position for
the final phase, for which all damages previously assessed were cancelled. During
the night “combat” resumed, but despite occasional exchanges of fire between the
respective battleships and various ancillary vessels, no serious injuries seem to have
been inflicted.19
At about dawn on the 27th, Black battleships bombarded the Pacific defenses of
the Canal, supported by bombing and strafing runs from Saratoga’s aircraft. Blue
surface forces attempted to intercept, leading to another exchange of fire between
dreadnoughts. At about 0630 on the 27th there occurred what was perhaps the most
aberrant moment in the history of carrier aviation; as the fleets were maneuvering
in relatively close proximity, Blue’s Lexington and Black’s Saratoga encountered each
other at 17,000 yards (roughly 8.4 nm) and for a time “exchanged” eight-inch gunfire.20 A bit later, Blue land-based aircraft turned up. Mistaking Lexington for
Saratoga, they briefly attacked her, before realizing their error and turning their attention to the Black carrier, in an attack that was ruled to have sunk her.
Meanwhile, Blue surface forces undertook a series of attacks, and some light
cruisers managed to sink Aroostook, and to take Saratoga, officially “sunk” but still in
the battle area, under fire. Meanwhile Blue’s submarines made 18 attacks, sinking
two Black battleships and the already “sunk” Saratoga. During these operations, the
sky was so full of aircraft—counting carrier-, tender-, and land-based machines,
some 180 naval aircraft were operating over the Pacific end of the Canal—that
Army aviators assigned to support the Blue naval airmen reportedly decided it was
impossible to determine friend from foe and kept clear of the engagement.21 Although some of the Army aircraft made attacks on surface ships, there was little
damage assessed. The fleet problem was declared over at 0730.22
A general critique of the problem was held at Balboa on February 5th. CINCUS
Wiley’s final report on the fleet problem was critical of Blue. Wiley conceded that
Blue had a good grasp of the situation, but noted that Blue had made a number of
serious errors.
Blue’s failure to notify the Army of the substitution of Aroostook for Langley had
disastrous consequences. Blue had also not provided for the air defense of the Caribbean side of the Canal and had failed to use its destroyers in night torpedo attacks
against Black, giving up a potentially valuable advantage. During the air-surfaceunderwater fighting on the 26th and 27th, Blue had directed its aircraft to attack
the enemy’s battleships rather than gain control of the air, to deny Black the use of
aerial spotting. (In contrast, Black had given priority to hitting aviation targets.)23
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Wiley noted a number of specific “lessons learned”and made a good many recommendations. He also called for closer cooperation with the Army during joint exercises
and more careful attention to navigation, while chiding battleship commanders for
a propensity to fire on enemy destroyers even when at very long range.
Wiley was particularly interested in the role of aircraft in the maneuvers, and devoted 18 of the 36 pages of his critique to an analysis of the air operations. He
praised the quality of Navy aircraft and aviators, noting that in several air-to-air engagements between Army and Navy fighters, “the superiority of the F3B was clearly
demonstrated.” He stressed “the great usefulness of aircraft carriers,” recommending that more be procured, though noting the difficulty of protecting carriers, and
suggesting that Lexington and Saratoga were too large.
Although Wiley’s critique ranged over the entire gamut of air operations, several
of his conclusions were particularly important. Most notably, underscoring Vice
Admiral Taylor’s instructions to his airmen, Wiley identified the primary objective
in naval air operations as the enemy carriers. In addition, he urged that the development of naval aviation be done taking into consideration “the air forces of our most
powerful probable enemies.”24
Wiley was highly critical of the way in which the carriers were operated. He criticized Pratt’s decision to operate Saratoga independently, arguing that it placed “this
valuable carrier unit in grave peril,” which was certainly true, though the payoff had
been great as well. In the very next paragraph of his summary comments, Wiley also
criticized Lexington’s actions of January 25th, when it attempted to launch aircraft
upon encountering Black battleships, rather than make use of her greatly superior
speed to escape, a decision that also put the valuable carrier at risk.25 Despite his
clear interest in naval aviation, Wiley did end his critique by stating, “the heavy capital ship is still the backbone of the Fleet”; given the capabilities and limitations of
naval aviation at the time, this was by no means an unreasonable conclusion.26
Fleet Problem IX was notable for some much less heralded, but extremely important, developments in communications security and cryptography. As was common
practice during the fleet problems, the opposing sides each had a distinct set of cryptographic assets. During the problem, there was a “complete breakdown of Blue radio
communications so far as secrecy is concerned.”27 This provided a bonanza for the
Black cryptanalysts, who were headed by Laurence F. Safford, with Joseph J. Rochefort
and Thomas Dyer (the team that later broke the Imperial Navy’s JN25 code, greatly
facilitating the American victory at Midway on June 4, 1942). Safford and his team
managed to compromise Blue’s ciphered communications, which led Wiley to observe that this indicated a “serious lack of knowledge” of radio security.28
In a similar act of carelessness, some Black airmen who had interned themselves
at Blue airfields—among them the pilot of the Sikorsky amphibian that had
bombed the Gatun Locks—had failed to destroy their code books, thus putting
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Black’s secret communications at risk. These two developments led to greater attention being paid to communications security, and the Navy’s cryptologists were directed to “make a cipher which could be broken but not allow messages to be read
before the problem is over.”29 As had by then become customary in critiques of the
fleet problems, Wiley’s final recommendations included a request for more light
cruisers and faster auxiliaries.
CNO Charles F. Hughes was also impressed by Saratoga’s performance. Later,
when questioned before a Congressional committee about the enormous expense
of operating the two big carriers, he stated that they would be the “last ships he
would remove from the active list.”30
Admiral Pratt, one of the most progressive thinkers in the Navy, called Saratoga’s
air raid on the Canal “the most brilliantly conceived and most effectively executed
naval operation in our history.” For the voyage back to California after the fleet
problem, he transferred his flag to the Saratoga, so that he could “see what makes
airmen tick.”31 Although always holding the battleship as the primary arbiter of sea
power, Pratt was an important advocate of naval aviation, as can be seen by the increasing role of aviation in fleet problems during his tour as CNO (1930–33).32
Writing many years later, Eugene E. Wilson, who had been one of Reeves’ staff
officers in 1929, would rightly state that Saratoga’s exploits during Fleet Problem IX
marked “the first step in the development of the Carrier Task Forces which were so
effective in the Pacific.”33 This operation convinced naval aviators—and some surface warriors, such as Pratt—that task forces built around carriers would be of importance in the future of naval warfare.34 Indeed, after Fleet Problem IX “the issue
wasn’t whether or not carriers were needed but how best to achieve the optimal
number of carriers within the limits set by the Washington and London [naval limitation] agreements,” a view shared by most battleship admirals as well.35
Saratoga’s daring raid on the Canal was well covered in the press, and the U.S. Navy
was widely—and correctly—seen as having a clear lead over its rivals in carrier aviation.36 At the time, neither the Royal Navy nor the Imperial Navy was capable of undertaking so large an air strike as that conducted by Saratoga on January 25, 1929. The
Royal Navy—which had pioneered the development of aircraft carriers, but had then
lost its lead as a result of inter-service rivalry and political mismanagement—took
notice.37
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1930

Fleet Problem X, March 10–15, 1930

H

eld in the Caribbean, Fleet Problem X was a test of the “Tentative Fleet Disposition and Battle Plans, 1930,” and like several of the earlier problems was
largely tactical in nature.1 As was customary before the mid-1930s, the
movement of the fleet from its bases on the East and West Coast to the theater of operations was not included as part of the problem. These movements, which began in
January, were characterized by a variety of tactical exercises and evolutions, and experiments with variations of the new circular fleet formation. For the Battle Fleet,
which departed the West Coast on February 14th, these maneuvers also included a
joint Army-Navy coast defense exercise, including a “concentrated air attack” on the
Pacific defenses of the Canal, before beginning a transit of the Canal on March 1st.
Once in the Caribbean, the fleet began preparations for the fleet problem, as ships
and aircraft proceeded to their starting positions.2 Because CINCUS William V.
Pratt was attending the London conference on naval arms limitation, the Chief Observer for this problem, and Fleet Problem XI as well, was COMBATFLEET Admiral
Louis McCoy Nulton, who normally would have commanded one of the fleets during the maneuvers.3
The scenario presumed a threat to the Caribbean by a coalition of hostile European powers. Blue (United States) had to transit from the Pacific through the
Panama Canal, to defend the Caribbean against Black (the European coalition).
Blue, commanded by Rear Admiral Lucius Allyn Bostwick, Commander, Battleships, BATFLT, was given the seven newest battleships in the fleet, plus Saratoga (CV
3) and Langley (CV 1), with aircraft tender Aroostook (CM 3), four light cruisers,
five destroyers, eleven submarines, and 10 auxiliaries. Black, under Vice Admiral
William C. Cole, COMSCOFLEET, had the seven oldest battleships, with Lexington
(CV 2) and aircraft tender Wright (AV 1), plus five cruisers, 14 destroyers, 12
submarines, a minelayer, and 15 auxiliaries. For purposes of this Fleet Problem all
the battlewagons were considered constructive equals to those of the Maryland
Class. Thus, although Blue was inferior in air assets and destroyers, otherwise the
two fleets were very nearly the same strength. This permitted a test of surface tactical doctrine under optimal circumstances. The maneuvers focused on the problem
of gaining tactical superiority over a force of approximately equal strength, the
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employment of light forces and aircraft in scouting, and the difficulties of operating
in a tropical environment.4
Geographically, Blue was assumed to control the eastern seaboard of the United
States, plus Panama, which were considered immune from attack. Cuba, including
Guantanamo, and Haiti were considered ostensibly neutral. Black was assumed to
control the Lesser Antilles and much of the southern littoral of the Caribbean.
Blue was further handicapped in that its Navy was divided into two fleets. The
main body was in the Pacific, with a smaller, but substantial force in the Atlantic. As
a result, before the Blue Pacific Fleet could reach Panama, Black had undertaken a
surprise offensive and secured command of the Atlantic. Blue’s primary strategic
goal was to “Gain control of the Caribbean Area at the earliest date.”5
Having successfully transited the Panama Canal, on March 10th Blue opened the
problem by initiating a move into the Caribbean from Colon, screened by a submarine scouting line. Deeming the weather and sea state too rough for carrier operations, however, the Blue air commander would not permit reconnaissance by
seaplane or carrier aircraft. As the weather did not impede Black from getting carrier aircraft aloft that day, Blue was probably being too cautious.6
In a major “diplomatic development,” on the first day of the maneuvers Black
was given access to Haitian territorial waters. This allowed Black to use Great Mesle
Bay to refuel and as a base for the aircraft tender Wright and her reconnaissance aircraft. Although this inject was communicated to the Fleet Observer with Blue, he
failed to pass the information on to Rear Admiral Bostwick, a matter that had some
important consequences.7
The Black fleet began the problem north of Haiti on the 10th. In an innovation
certainly inspired by the performance of Saratoga during Fleet Problem IX, Vice
Admiral Cole organized an independent carrier strike group built around
Lexington, a light cruiser division, and two desrons. With the destroyers and cruisers
forming a scouting line, Lexington proceeded southwestward, through the Windward Passage and then south at 23 knots. Thus, by the morning of the 11th the “Carrier Group” was about 100 miles south of Navassa Island, between Haiti and
Jamaica, far in advance of the Black Main Body.8 Meanwhile, from the Black fleet
concentration area north of Haiti, Vice Admiral Cole dispatched his train with a
suitable escort eastward, and then south, to enter the Caribbean through Mona Passage, between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico.
Due to inclement weather, Blue again put no reconnaissance aircraft up on the
11th. As a result, worried about possibly encountering Black surface ships during
the night, late that day Rear Admiral Bostwick decided to reverse course for a time.
This maneuver probably prevented Black’s Carrier Group from spotting Blue. Although Wright, operating in Great Mesle Bay, in Haiti, maintained dawn-to-dusk
seaplane patrols, and Lexington averaged six fighters and six scouts aloft at all times
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during daylight hours, Black had no luck locating Blue. On the 12th Blue resumed a
northeastward course, and the Commander, Blue Air Squadrons, concluding that
the weather had cleared sufficiently, air patrols were flown from both Saratoga and
Langley. Although both sides flew numerous reconnaissance missions on the 12th
and 13th, neither attained any success, nor did surface search prove any more efficacious. There were, however, several false contacts, that resulted in some confusion
on both sides. For example, at about 0300 on the morning of the 13th, having failed
to respond promptly to a challenge, the Black destroyer King (DD 242), was “sunk”
in a “friendly fire” incident by the Black battleship Wyoming (BB 32).9
On the afternoon of the 13th leading elements of the two fleets began to make
contact and some skirmishing developed. At 1435 the Black Trenton (CL 11) found
and sank the Blue Contocook (AT 36), serving as a minesweeper. About two hours
later the Blue submarine S-12 (SS 117) encountered four Black submarines on the
surface and was promptly sunk. But this tentative contact was lost overnight, during
which four Blue destroyers strayed from the Main Body, and did not rejoin until the
following day. It was not until early on morning of Friday, March 14th, that the two
fleets actually made contact, initiating what the press would dub the “Battle of
Navassa Island,” arguably the first “carrier battle” in history.10
Early on the 14th, both of Blue’s carriers, Saratoga and Langley, had all of their
aircraft aloft, Saratoga’s providing fleet defense and Langley’s conducting reconnaissance. Due to some rain squalls and poor visibility this reconnaissance failed to locate Black, missing Lexington only by about 25 miles. Meanwhile, shortly before
0600 Lexington launched three scouts, and spotted her aircraft on deck for a series of
offensive strikes once the Blue carriers had been found. At about 0710 a surfaced
Blue submarine saw the three Lexington scouts, but failed to report the contact.
Meanwhile, by 0715 all of Blue’s aircraft were back on their carriers save for a patrol
of six scouts, five fighters, and a radio relay off Langley.
Langley’s patrolling fighters saw the three Black scouts at 0725. The fighters attempted to engage the intruders, but were unsuccessful. Although they promptly
broadcast the presence of the enemy scouts, the Blue command did not respond.
Shortly afterward, the Black scouts, finding the Blue carriers, called for assistance,
and Lexington began putting strike packages into the air. Then, at 0810 the three
Lexington scout bombers made a dive bombing attack on Saratoga, “damaging” the
forward edge of her flight deck. Saratoga promptly began to respot aircraft as far aft
as possible, to permit them to take off on the undamaged portion of her flight deck.
At 0829, just 14 minutes after the scout bomber strike, the first of five waves of
Lexington dive bombers, 42 aircraft in all, began a series of attacks that rendered
Saratoga’s flight deck useless, wrecked half her aircraft, and destroyed a number of
anti-aircraft guns. Then, four minutes later, at 0833 15 Lexington fighter-bombers
made a pass at Saratoga, and then hit Langley. Within two minutes a dozen more
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Lexington fighter-bombers hit Langley. The umpires ruled that the flight decks of
both carriers had been destroyed, as well as all their aircraft, and assessed damages
to one of their plane guard destroyers as well.11 In twenty minutes both Blue carriers
had been put out of action, in an incident eerily resembling the fate of three Japanese carriers at Midway on June 4, 1942.
No longer concerned about intervention from Blue’s carriers, Lexington’s aircraft turned their attention to the Blue battle fleet. For about 15 minutes
(0835–0850), Black fighters
armed with 30-pound bombs
made repeated attacks, inflicting varying degrees of
damage on the battleships
West Virginia (BB 48), New
Mexico (BB 40), and California (BB 44), which had two of
her 14-inch guns ruled out of
action, reducing her firepower by a sixth. Combined
with the fact that the loss of
Blue’s carriers deprived their
battleships of fighter protection for aerial spotters, this
gave the Black battleline a
considerable advantage.12
At 0849, even as Lexington’s attack on the Blue battleline was in progress,
Langley’s dozen aircraft returned from their patrol, only to be fired upon by
Saratoga, which took them for Black aircraft.13 A brief lull followed this friendly fire
incident.
At 0925, alerted to the location of the Blue carriers, four Black light cruisers came
up and brought the injured Langley and the nearby aircraft tender Aroostook under
fire. The cruisers were in turn taken under fire from Saratoga’s eight-inch main batteries at 24,000 yards (c. 11.9 nm). Soon after, at about 0935, the Black battle line
started coming up. A general fleet engagement began to develop at extremely long
range, during which Lexington aircraft made bombing and strafing runs against
Blue battleships. The surface engagement began at 28,000 yards (c. 13.4 nm), but
quickly fell to 16,000 (7.9 nm). Both sides were ruled to have scored numerous hits.
These left Black’s overall battleline firepower reduced by about 35 percent, with one
battleship in sinking condition. Blue’s losses were heavier, with battleline firepower
cut by about 49 percent; one battleship described as “practically destroyed” and two
others ruled to have taken over 65 percent damage.14 In contrast, aircraft attacks
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inflicted only light damage, while torpedo attack by aircraft from Wright (by this
time near Navassa Island), were ruled ineffective. Nevertheless, complete control of
the air permitted Black destroyers to undertake torpedo attacks, while Black’s observation aircraft spotted fire for its battleships, and its bombers struck Blue ships,
all without interference from enemy aircraft.15 Although the problem did not formally end until the following morning, Black had attained a decisive victory.
The outcome of Fleet Problem X was essentially determined by “ the suddenness
with which Black gained complete control of the air.” This strengthened the impression about the potential effectiveness of carrier aviation created by Saratoga’s raid
on the Panama Canal the previous year, and demonstrated the importance of striking enemy air assets first before taking on his surface combatants, a tactic first articulated by Vice Admiral Montgomery Meigs Taylor during Fleet Problem IX, the
previous year. As James M. Grimes would note in his discussion of Fleet Problem X,
“The suddenness with which an engagement could be completely reversed by the
use of aerial power was brought home to the fleet in no uncertain terms.”16
A good many recommendations were made during the critique and in the final
reports regarding aviation. Virtually all observers commented on the importance in
carrier warfare of getting in the first blow, urged the acquisition of more carriers,
and recommended the procurement of longer range scouting aircraft, able to carry
light bombs, both to increase the carrier’s reconnaissance reach and to enable them
to make preliminary strikes on enemy carriers, a proposal particularly endorsed by
CINCUS Pratt. The Commander, AIRONS, Scouting Fleet, pointed out the importance of operating carriers in autonomous high speed strike forces.17 The
Chief-of-Staff, Battle Fleet, observed that carriers had to adopt operational procedures that not only ensured continuous scouting, but also permitted the maintenance of an offensive reserve always ready to strike the enemy, while air defense of
carriers had to be strengthened. As there had been several instances of “friendly fire”
by both sides during the maneuvers, the need for improved methods and training in
aircraft recognition was noted in the final report, a difficult matter given that both
sides were operating the same types of aircraft. The navigational skills of aviators
was criticized, and more training was called for. One interesting suggestion was that
carrier air groups be specialized, so that some carriers might be equipped primarily
with bombers, while others would be equipped primarily with scouts and fighters.18
In addition to recommendations about carrier aviation, all of the senior participants in the fleet problem seem to have agreed that the Navy needed more cruisers.19
Although less publicized than the fleet’s progress in aviation, cryptography
also made considerable progress during Fleet Problem X. A new system of cryptographic procedures, codes, and ciphers had been introduced for the problem.
Each fleet was assigned a decryption team, of three officers, assisted by six yeomen
and three messengers. Since operators lacked familiarity with the new system,
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there was considerable confusion in communications. Naturally, the decrypt
teams on both sides did well. The Black unit cracked the Blue signal cipher, while
the Blue team recovered Black’s signal cipher, contact code, and call sign system.20
Following Fleet Problem X, the entire fleet undertook firing and type exercises
off Guantanamo from late March through early April. On April 4th, in preparation
for Fleet Problem XI, the fleet began dispersing to various ports in the Eastern Caribbean, where personnel were given liberty.
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N O T E S 1 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., which is particularly valuable for having a series of diagrams
illustrating dispositions of the two fleets a critical
times; NWCA, Carton 61, COMSCOFOR to President, Naval War College, 28 March 1930; Grimes,
pp. 54–64; Fry, pp. 37–38; Hone and Hone,
pp. 75, 83–84.
2 For example, air elements of the Scouting Fleet
began leaving the East Coast on January 5th,
while the fleet itself departed on the 10th; “60
U.S. Warships Go to Maneuvers,” Washington
Post, Jan. 5, 1930; “Lexington is Delayed,” New
York Times, Mar. 2, 1930; “Fleets Assemble for
Biggest Battle,” New York Times, Mar. 2, 1930;
“‘Battle of Caribbean’ Near with Fleets Out,” New
York Times, Mar. 11, 1930.
3 Andrew R. Broome, “156 Planes Will Accompany
Fleet,” New York Times, Feb. 9, 1930.
4 NWCA, Carton 61, COMSCOFLEET to President,
Naval War College, 28 March 1930. Scot MacDonald, “Last of the Fleet Problems,” www.history
.navy.mil/download/car-6.pdf (Jan. 21, 2009), pp.
2–3, has some particularly useful comments regarding FP X.
5 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., Tasking, p. 1.
6 Grimes, p. 56.
7 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., Tasking, p. 3;
main text, pp. 30, 63.
8 A U.S. territory, Navassa Island, at 18° 25' N,
75° 01' W, with a land area of about two square
miles, is c. 100 miles south of Guantanamo Bay,
between Haiti, about 50 miles to the east, and
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Jamaica, about 180 miles to the southwest;
“Navassa Island,” C.I.A. World Fact Book.
9 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., p. 38.
10 “American Fleets Fight ‘Deadly’ Battle,” New York
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11 Wildenberg, Destined, pp. 83–84; Grimes,
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X, 1930, Report of the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., p. 46.
12 Trent Hone, “The Evolution of Fleet Tactical
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13 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., p. 43.
14 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., pp. 58–59.
15 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., pp. 44–45.
16 Grimes, p. 62.
17 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., p. 67.
18 This proposal was later tested during Grand Joint
Army-Navy Exercise No. 4, in 1932, on which see
Chapter 14.
19 “Maneuvers Reveal U.S. Needs Cruisers,” Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1930; John A. Park, “Navy
Men See Need for More Cruisers,” New York
Times, Mar. 17, 1930.
20 Frederick D. Parker, p. 9.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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Fleet Problem XI, April 14–18, 1930

F

leet Problem XI was quite similar to Fleet Problem X, with “balanced” forces
fighting it out in the Caribbean.1 Designed as a further test of the “Tentative
Fleet Disposition and Battle Plans, 1930,” the problem had more of an operational character, addressing the difficulties of the opposed concentration of a widely
dispersed fleet. In addition, the other main objective were “to train commanders in
making quick estimates and decisions and in writing and transmitting orders and
plans in coded dispatches,” to test communications, including radio intelligence
and security, and to exercise in scouting and evasion.2
Preparations for this problem required extensive work by the State Department
to secure permission for the use of eight ports in various British colonies, as well as
access to Dutch, Haitian, Dominican, Cuban, and Venezuelan territorial waters and
air space.
The scenario assumed that war between Blue (United States) and Black (again
representing a coalition of trans-Atlantic powers) had been going on for some
months. In a surprise offensive Black, which was on friendly terms with Venezuela
and Colombia, had captured the Lesser Antilles south of Montserrat (16° 40'), plus
Trinidad and Barbados. The Lesser Antilles from Montserrat northward, plus
Puerto Rico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Cuba, Mexico, and Central
America, as well as the U.S. mainland, where all controlled by, allied with, or friendly
to Blue. The Blue mainland (i.e., the East Coast of the United States) was considered
immune from attack, while the Canal Zone was considered secure from capture, but
not from attack. As CINCUS Pratt was still in attendance at the London naval arms
limitation conference, COMBATFLT Admiral Louis McCoy Nulton again served as
Chief Observer.
Black, commanded this time by Rear Admiral Lucius Allyn Bostwick, Commander, Battleships, BATFLT, was given six battleships, plus Saratoga (CV 3) and
Langley (CV 1), a seaplane tender, four light cruisers, eight destroyers, three submarines, and some auxiliaries. Blue, commanded by Vice Admiral William C. Cole,
COMSCOFLT, had five battleships, plus Lexington (CV 2) and aircraft tenders
Wright (AV 1), Teal (AVP 5), and Sandpiper (AVP 9), with 15 destroyers, 10 submarines, four mine sweepers, one mine layer, and three submarine tenders.
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Blue’s mission was to prevent Black from establishing a permanent presence in
the Caribbean. The exercise “back story” presumed that Blue and Black had already
been heavily engaged, with Black having taken much the greater losses while seizing
the southern Antilles. On April 1st a strong Black reinforcement convoy had then
been intercepted by a small, fast Blue task force. Before Blue could bring the Black
reinforcement convoy to battle, however, an armistice had been concluded, and the
forces of both sides had retired on their nearest bases. As a result, when the armistice
was terminated at 0800 on the 14th, both fleets were very dispersed, though the Blue
fleet was generally positioned across the northeastern part of the Caribbean and
Black across the southeastern part.
The end of the armistice at 0800 on the 14th marked the actual beginning of the
fleet problem, the weather across much of the eastern Caribbean was poor, with a
haze extending from about a thousand feet to as high as seven thousand, and
frequent rain squalls, conditions that prevailed for most of the problem. Despite the
Fleet Dispositions, 0800 April 14, 1930
BB

CV

AV

CL

DD

SS

Notes

3
2
-

-

2*
1*
-

1
-

5
-

10

*Wright, Teal

St. Thomas, VI
Frederiksted, VI
Kingston, Jamaica
St. Kitts
Nevis
Antigua

-

1*
-

-

3
1

3
1
1
1
3

-

Black
Port-of-Spain
Grenada
Barbados
St. Vincent
14° N, 71° W
13° 45 N, 72° 15 W

4
2
-

1*
1*
-

-

2
4
2
-

2
3

3
-

Blue
Guantanamo
Ponce, PR
Mayaguez, PR
San Juan, PR

*Sandpiper
Also one AS, one CM,
four AM
*Lexington

*Langley
*Saratoga
Also one AS
Late arriving at
14° N, 71° W

weather, the fleets went immediately to sea in order to effect concentrations, and
begin searching for the enemy. By nightfall on the 14th the principal Blue squadrons, from Ponce and Mayaguez in Puerto Rico, had concentrated off Samana Bay,
on the northeast coast of Santo Domingo, where they were joined by Lexington.
Leaving Sandpiper to establish a flying boat base in Samana Bay, the rest of the Blue
main body proceeded westward, intending to steam around the north coast of

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:13 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

FLEET PROBLEM XI, APRIL 14–18, 1930

Hispaniola. By the evening of the 15th the Blue fleet was just entering the Windward
Passage, between Cuba and Haiti. Routine patrols by Lexington, Sandpiper, Teal, and
Wright aircraft found no evidence of Black activity.
Meanwhile, the two main squadrons of the Black fleet, operating out of
Port-of-Spain and Barbados, had effected a rendezvous around dawn on the 15th, at
a point somewhat less than half-way from Trinidad to Puerto Rico. Black then proceeded northwestward to an area in the central Caribbean. Thus the Black battleships and Langley were roughly halfway between Puerto Rico and the Netherlands
West Indies, while a 100-mile-wide cruiser-destroyer scouting line was out about
150 miles ahead of the main body, with Saratoga in between, but closer to the scouts.
Saratoga maintained dawn-to-dusk air patrols out to about 25 miles in advance of
the scouting line. That evening, however, Saratoga was forced to break radio silence
in order to guide some aircraft home. Presuming that this had revealed the carrier’s
position to the enemy, Rear Admiral Bostwick ordered her to take evasive action
and rejoin the main body the next morning.
By the morning of April 16th the Blue battleships were concentrated not far
south of Guantanamo Bay, with Lexington operating south of Navassa Island behind a cruiser screen, sending scout aircraft to the southeast in an arc out about 150
miles, while patrol aircraft from Guantanamo Bay covered areas to the west. During
the day there was some sporadic contact, with one Blue cruiser firing on some Black
submarines. The most important development of the day was that Blue
cryptanalysts broke one of Black’s codes, which would later have a significant impact on the maneuvers.
Despite the fact that both sides had conducted extensive aerial reconnaissance
for some days, poor weather had impeded its effectiveness. As a result, contact
between the two fleets only developed on the afternoon of the 16th, as the Black
scout cruisers began approaching the outer edge of the Blue cruiser scouting line
south of Navassa Island. At 1605 the Blue cruiser Milwaukee (CL 5) closed on some
smoke and twelve minutes later engaged the Black cruiser Memphis (CL 13). This
high-speed, long-range skirmish was joined by the Blue Cincinnati (CL 6) at 1644
and the Black Trenton (CL 11) at 1700. By 1722 Milwaukee was declared out of
action and Memphis ruled sunk, while Trenton pulled out of range, pursued by
Cincinnati. Meanwhile, Detroit (CL 8), escorting Lexington and her two plane guard
destroyers, reported contact with an enemy cruiser, which had been missed by the
carrier’s air scouts and was now dangerously close to the flattop. At 1655 Detroit
engaged the Black cruiser Richmond (CL 9), which fired on Lexington. The action
ended at 1715, with the Blue ships retiring, Detroit having been ruled to have had
her speed reduced to 20 knots by enemy fire and Lexington losing six aircraft
“destroyed” on her flight deck to a Black shell. This was the first contact between the
two fleets. Meanwhile, at about the same time that these two skirmishes were
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unfolding, a Black submarine sank Sandpiper, proceeding from Samana Bay to
Guantanamo.
Early on the 17th, the Blue main body had closed on Lexington, which had fallen
back closer to Navassa Island. Scouts off Lexington had, meanwhile, spotted three
Black submarines at Aux Cayes Bay, on the southwestern coast of Haiti, but succeeded in sinking only one of them. The Black scouting line was now also quite near
Navassa. Two scouts off Saratoga found Lexington, evaded the eleven aircraft flying
combat air patrol, and were ruled to have struck her with several light bombs, interrupting flight operations for 15 minutes and damaging some of the 31 aircraft on
her flight deck. Alerted to Lexington’s location, about an hour later, at 1100, another
squadron from Saratoga attacked. These aircraft tangled with Lexington’s CAP,
downing five fighters in the process, and then put the Blue carrier’s flight deck out of
service for an hour, while destroying 15 more aircraft. Chief Observer
COMBATFLT Nulton considered the assessed damage too light, and increased it to
24 hours, with 38 aircraft damaged or destroyed. In a serious staff failure, Lexington
was not informed of this decision until the evening.3 Thus, Lexington resumed flight
operations at the end of the originally assessed hour, launching four scouts and a
dozen bombers, followed shortly by a squadron of torpedo bombers, and after that
five more bombers. The first “strike package” located Saratoga, which was some 60
miles to the south. Stout resistance by Saratoga’s fighters was ruled to have caused
the loss of half the attacking aircraft, two scouts and six bombers. Only two of the
attackers were credited with hits on Saratoga, causing light damage. The torpedo
bombers failed to locate Saratoga, while the third strike, of five bombers, managed
to inflict only light damage on the Black carrier.
Meanwhile, the two fleets were beginning to come into sustained contact on the
surface as well. Lexington was the object of an ineffective torpedo attack by a Black
destroyer, which was sunk by the carrier’s five-inch secondary battery, assisted by
gunfire from her plane guard destroyer. While Blue’s Lexington and Black’s Saratoga
had been exchanging aerial blows, a Blue seaplane out of Guantanamo spotted the
Black main body, turning in a particularly accurate report. At about 1108 four Blue
light cruisers, with three destroyers, engaged in a spirited hour-long skirmish with
three Black light cruisers and two destroyers from Saratoga’s screen, which left one
of the Black cruisers sunk. Attempts by Saratoga aircraft to sink Lexington and these
Blue light cruisers were ineffective.
It was not until a little after 1800 that Lexington learned of Admiral Nulton’s earlier ruling increasing the damage she was ruled to have taken at 1100. The carrier
promptly suspended further flight operations until 1100 on the 18th, while all damage inflicted by her aircraft in the nine hours since 1100 was cancelled, thus nullifying the damage assessed against Saratoga. To replace Lexington’s scouts, Wright was
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ordered to assume the mission of keeping track of Black’s movements with seaplanes. This naturally constituted a considerable artificiality in the proceedings.
Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the 17th, Blue intelligence analysts working
from decoded intercepts concluded that the Black Main Body would pass through
17° 51' N, 76° W at about 0200 on the 18th, on course 050° (about northeast), at 12
knots. This was only about a dozen nautical miles east-by-south of the westernmost
point of Jamaica. Although the Blue main body was still well to the north, about two
dozen miles off Guantanamo Bay, light cruiser Concord (CL 10) and five destroyers
were nearby, and undertook a torpedo attack on the Black battleline and its escorting destroyers. The action lasted about an hour (c. 0220–0320), during which the
Blue ships fired nearly 50 torpedoes, while coming under heavy fire themselves. Two
of the attacking destroyers were ruled sunk, as were two of the defending ones.
Damage to the battleships was not assessed, due to the lack of an effective way to
communicate torpedo hits, though the umpire in Tennessee subsequently said he
would certainly have allowed one hit had the information on the attack been received in time.4
Later on the morning of April 18th, despite receiving a proper recognition signal, two Black battleships, West Virginia (BB 48) and Tennessee, mistook Saratoga
for Lexington, opening fire at 9,000 yards (c. 4.4 nm) for 12 minutes (0430–0442),
expending several dozen rounds before realizing their error. There was a failure—perhaps deliberate—to communicate this incident promptly to the Chief
Observer; Admiral Nulton did not learn of what had happened until about 0913.
Thus, it was only at that time that he ruled Saratoga out of action.5 As in the case of
the earlier mix-up over damage to Lexington, in the interval between the “damage”
being inflicted, a report on the damage reaching the Chief Observer, and the communication of Admiral Nulton’s decision to the ship, Saratoga continued flight
operations.
By dawn on the 18th the Blue fleet, including Lexington (not permitted to operate aircraft before 1100), was concentrated just north of Navassa Island, while Black
was to the southwest, proceeding directly for Blue. During the morning, Blue’s light
cruisers, patrol bombers operating from Wright, and submarines maintained contact with Black, inflicting some damage, while keeping Vice Admiral William C.
Cole well informed about the enemy’s movements. This allowed him more than an
hour to dispose his battleships, launch spotter planes, and make other preparations
for a battleline action. Black was less effective at ascertaining Blue’s movements,
though aircraft off Saratoga and Langley made several attacks on Blue ships.
The two battleline began to come into contact at 0800. By 0815 a battleline engagement was underway, with aircraft from Wright and Guantanamo attempting to
support Blue’s battleships with direct attacks on the against enemy vessels during
the surface engagement. Since Saratoga remained in operation, together with
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Langley she gave Black overwhelming air superiority. At 0845 Saratoga’s aircraft undertook torpedo and high altitude bombing attacks against several Blue battleships,
though these generally were ruled ineffective. About 30 minutes later Saratoga was
informed that as a result of “friendly fire” from her own battleline, she had been out
of action since 0442.
The surface engagement proved interesting. Lacking sufficient light forces to reconnoiter, Black used California as a “detached wing,” moving ahead and to one side
of the battleline. Although she proved effective in this role, California was ultimately
overwhelmed by the fire of the Blue battleships, and was essentially out of action by
0839. As Mississippi, which had taken a Blue torpedo during the night, proved unable to keep up with the Black battleline, this meant that five Blue battleships were
engaged against four Black ones. During the action Concord (CL 10) and a Blue
desron made a number of torpedo attacks against the Black battleships, during
which the cruiser and three of the destroyers were sunk by gunfire. Only one Black
destroyer was able to attempt a torpedo attack in turn, and she was unsuccessful. As
Blue was clearly going to overwhelm the Black battleline, Fleet Problem XI was terminated at 0930.6
During this problem, as in the two previous ones, cryptography and signals security were again found wanting. The new special codes that were supposed to be
unbreakable within the duration of the Fleet Problem proved clumsy, and not particularly more secure than the older ones.7 Worse, during the maneuvers a Black aircraft off Lexington, lost and low on fuel, had made an emergency landing at
Guantanamo, a Blue base. Not only did the pilot neglect to destroy his codebook
and some documents that he should not have been carrying, but he talked freely,
giving Blue a major intelligence bonanza.8
Fleet Problem XI had been plagued by a number of blunders, which tended to
have a cumulative effect on the operations. Communications misadventures, notably major failures related to passing information to and from the Chief Observer, as
well as the “friendly fire” incident involving Saratoga, resulted in calls for improved
communication and recognition procedures. In addition, the final recommendations included calls for, a better carrier-based scout airplane, with greater range,
smaller size, folding wings, and higher speed, plus a much increased bomb capacity,
a need that was not filled until the introduction of the SBD “Dauntless” in 1940. An
increase in the strength of scout squadrons to 18 aircraft was also recommended, as
well as several technical improvements in seaplanes and in operational procedures.
The most important recommendations to come out of Fleet Problem XI dealt
with aircraft carriers. Concluding that Lexington and Saratoga were operating
under capacity, an increase in their aircraft complements was recommended. In
addition, Vice Admiral William C. Cole, who while commanding Blue had formed a
carrier group around Lexington, proposed that permanent carrier task forces be
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established, each consisting of one carrier, with a division of four heavy cruisers, a
type of ship just then coming into the fleet, and a squadron of eight destroyers, to
train together on a more or less permanent basis. Cole, a “Gun Club” member to be
sure, had outlined the composition of the carrier task forces that would shoulder
the burden of the American war effort in the first twelve months of World War II in
the Pacific. Nevertheless, although the idea found considerable support over the
following years, it would not be formally implemented early 1941.9
Of even greater consequence, however, was that the lesson of Fleet Problem X as
to the importance of “getting in the first blow” against enemy carriers was clearly reaffirmed in Fleet Problem XI. Carriermen were now firmly convinced that in carrier
warfare it is much better to give than to receive.10 Experimentation in the succeeding
editions of the fleet problems turned this into a fundamental tenet of American carrier doctrine, accepted even by so-called “battleship admirals.”11
With Fleet Problem X, Fleet Problem XI had been a major test of some innovative ideas in battle tactics. The tests of the “Tentative Fleet Disposition and Battle
Plans, 1930” proved immensely successful. Vice Admiral Cole, who had commanded Black during Fleet Problem X and Blue during XI, wrote of them:12
The ‘Tentative Fleet Disposition and Battle Plans, 1930’ give to us the greatest single advance
in fleet tactics I have known in my years of service in the fleet. It affords to the O.T.C. an extraordinary increase in the flexibility of control from the beginning of tactical scouting
through the general engagement, and until the final dispersion of the enemy. Our greatest
danger lies in an inflexible adherence to a conception of the enemy’s strength and disposition made even under the best conditions of visibility for tactical surface and air scouting,
but made with the fleets separate by forty to sixty thousand yards. We must have the tactical
forms to admit of quick change, and the flexibility of mind to use them.

Following Fleet Problem XI, both the Battle Fleet and the Scouting Fleet spent
ten days in New York before proceeding to Hampton Roads on May 18th.13 Off the
Virginia Capes on May 20th, a mock battle was staged for President Herbert Hoover,
who observed from the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City (CA 25), following which there
was a fleet review.14 A few days later, the Battle Fleet began its return to the West
Coast. While the BATFLT made its way home, the Scouting Fleet engaged in a joint
Army-Navy exercises off eastern Long Island.
The scenario for this joint exercise, conducted on May 26–28, essentially reprised
that of the 1928 coast defense maneuvers. The purpose was to test coast defense tactics, new Army fire control and communications systems, and Army-Navy cooperation in coast defense. In contrast to the 1928 maneuvers, however, the Scouting
Force was able to carry out its mission, bombarding New London despite adverse
weather and the intervention of substantial numbers of Army aircraft.15
CINCUS William V. Pratt had not taken part in either of the two fleet problems
held in 1930. Nevertheless, upon returning from the London naval arms limitation
conference, he reviewed the documents, conclusions, recommendations coming
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out of them, and issued some comments of his own. Most notably, Pratt commented that Blue’s unwillingness to operate aircraft in weather that Black found
manageable, during Fleet Problem X, may have been attributable to “degrees of
opinion concerning the safety and security factors involved and differences in personal attitude toward responsibility,” which arguably was an indirect criticism of
Black’s air commander.16 In addition, Pratt endorsed the recommendation by the
Commander, AIRONS, Scouting Fleet, that carriers should operate in autonomous
high speed strike forces, terming Black’s “Carrier Group” an “offensive scouting
force.”17
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N O T E S 1 M964-13, 7, United States Fleet Problem XI, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N.; Grimes, pp.
65–80; Fry, pp. 39–40; Zogbaum, From Sail, pp.
413–17. Zogbaum, who commanded Wright during this fleet problem, wrote from memory many
years later, and must be used with some caution.
2 Nenninger, p. 9.
3 M964-13, 7, United States Fleet Problem XI, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., p. 46.
4 M964-13, 7, United States Fleet Problem XI, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., pp. 50–53.
5 Since this was a “friendly fire” incident, Black’s
failure to communicate the matter promptly to
the Chief Observer Nulton, who was actually with
the Black Main Body, suggests a bit of cheating.
Of the incident, Nulton optimistically remarked,
“Under actual war conditions it is doubtful that
this would have occurred, as the simulated star
shell spread, two minutes before the main battery
opened up, would have revealed the vessel as the
Saratoga.” Given that the silhouettes of the two
ships, while very distinctive, were also virtually
identical, this seems unlikely, and was one of the
problems inherent in conducting maneuvers with
sister-ships on opposing sides; M964-13, 7,
United States Fleet Problem XI, 1930, Report of the
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral
W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., pp. 48–49, 54, 57.
6 Trent Hone, “Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine,” p. 1120.
7 Frederick D. Parker, p. 9.
8 Zogbaum, From Sail, p. 416.
9 Belote and Belote, p. 17; Dunnigan and Nofi, Pacific War Encyclopedia, “Carrier Task Forces,
Composition, U.S.”
10 Wildenberg, Destined, pp. 84–85; Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, p. 50.
11 Norman Friedman, conversation, May 31, 2002.
In contrast, when the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor, on December 7, 1941, the tasking read,
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“the order of targets will be battleships and then
aircraft carriers”; “Carrier Striking Task Force
Operations Order No. 3, 23 November 1941,” in
Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans, Japanese Monograph No. 97
(Washington: Office of the Chief, Military History, 1953), p. 14. This was contrary to the initial
operational plan, drawn up in early September
1941 by Cdr. Minoru Genda, Air Staff Officer,
Headquarters, First Air Fleet, which had specifically given the American carriers the highest priority; The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese
Plans, edited by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (Washington: Brassey’s, 1993),
pp. 19–20, 24.
12 M964-13, 7, United States Fleet Problem XI, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., p. 65.
13 “Two Fleets Anchor Here Next Week,” New York
Times, Apr 27, 1930; “City to See Fleets of Air and
Ocean,” New York Times, May 4, 1930; “Mighty
Fleet Here with Parade Up Bay,” New York Times,
May 8, 1930; “10,000 Sailors Land; Crowds Visit
Fleet,” New York Times, May 9, 1930; “800 Sailors
of Fleet Hear Manning Preach,” New York Times,
May 12, 1930; “Throngs See Fleet as Farewell
Nears,” New York Times, May 18, 1930.
14 “Hoover Today to Witness Mimic Battle by U.S.
Fleet,” Washington Post, May 20, 1930; “President
Praises Admiral and Fleet,” New York Times, May
21, 1930. This seems to have been the only occasion during his presidency that Hoover visited a
commissioned warship.
15 “‘Blacks’ Put Force on Fishers Island,” New York
Times, May 28, 1930; “‘Black’ Ships Shell New
London,” New York Times, May 29, 1930.
16 Grimes, p. 57, in a critical gloss on M964-23, 1,
United States Fleet Problem X, 1930, Report of the
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral
W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., p. 30, paragraph (f).
17 M964-23, 1, United States Fleet Problem X, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., p. 67.
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USS Los Angeles (ZR 3), moored to USS Patoka (AO 9) off Panama during Fleet
Problem XII, February 1931. Despite widespread confidence in the value of
airships to the Navy, the performance of these “flying cruisers” during the fleet
problems and their poor safety record demonstrated that they were a dead end.
(NH-73285, Naval Historical Foundation)
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XIII Fleet Problem XII, February–March 1931

P

lanning for Fleet Problem XII had begun in the summer of 1930. Set in the
Caribbean and off the west coast of Central America, the strategic scenario
was a complex one.1 It postulated that acute tensions in the Pacific between
Black (“a Pacific power”) and Blue (United States) had reached the point where a
surprise offensive by Black was possible at any time. In the event of a Black–Blue
war, Brown (“a European power”) might, depending upon diplomatic and military
developments, ally with either Black or Blue, or remain neutral. Thus, despite the
imminence of war in the Pacific, Blue was forced to retain considerable forces in
New England, to defend its interests in the Atlantic. In Central America, both Panama and Nicaragua, where a second isthmian canal was assumed to exist, were presumed bound by treaty to come to the aid of Blue in the event of war, but Costa Rica
was presumed to be inclined to neutrality.2
The fleet problem was followed by a series of special exercises in Central American waters and in the Caribbean, which are also discussed here.

Fleet Problem XII, February 16–20, 1931
The higher level objectives of the problem were once again “to train commanders in
making quick estimates and decisions and in writing and transmitting orders and
plans in coded dispatches,” and to test communications, including radio intelligence and security, as well as testing the fleet in the employment of aircraft carriers,
attack and defense of convoys, underway refueling, and the defense of a long coastline, with particular focus on the defensive capabilities of air power.3 Two new experimental dimensions were added to this fleet problem. The airship—“flying
cruiser”—Los Angeles (ZR 3) was employed for the first time, with great expectations for her effectiveness.4 In addition, four recently commissioned heavy cruisers
were on hand, “a type new to our navy and their employment in war not fully
determined.”5
For the purposes of the fleet problem, the entire coast of Central America from
Nicaragua to Costa Rica was assumed to extend 30 miles further to the southwest
than is actually the case.6 In addition, a second isthmian canal was assumed to be
“almost completed” across Nicaragua.
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There was considerable public interest in this fleet problem, due to the presence
of both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and of the CNO, as
well as a visit by several ships of the Royal Navy, including HMS Nelson, flagship of
the British Atlantic Fleet, which resulted in unusually extensive press coverage.7
Vice Admiral Arthur L. Willard, COMSCOFLEET, commanded Blue, built
around the Scouting Force and the Control Force.8 Although Willard had a battleship, Arkansas (BB 33) as flagship, the Blue Fleet was essentially an aviation-heavy
force, with Saratoga (CV 3) and Lexington (CV 2), plus four aircraft tenders, and the
Los Angeles, supplemented by nine light cruisers, 22 destroyers, ten submarines, one
minelayer, and two minesweepers, plus a substantial train, including the oiler
Patoka (AO 9), which had been fitted with a mooring mast for Los Angeles. Altogether Blue had nearly 185 aircraft, including those carried on Arkansas and the
light cruisers. Blue also had a large constructive battle fleet supposedly based in New
England. Black, commanded by Admiral Frank H. Schofield, COMBATFLEET, had
the Battle Fleet, with nine battleships, plus Langley (CV 1) and several “constructive” seaplane tenders of very limited capacity. These were supplemented by all four
of the new heavy cruisers, 29 destroyers, four submarines, two minelayers, and two
minesweepers, plus a large train. Black’s aviation resources totaled only 72 aircraft,
nearly half of which were on the battleships, cruisers, and constructive tenders.
Black also had a constructive expeditionary force of 15,000 combat troops with 200
equally constructive aircraft and appropriate ground components, ready to “seize”
an advanced base and establish airfields from which to attack the canals in Panama
and Nicaragua. In addition, Black was also assumed to have substantial constructive
forces engaged elsewhere in the Pacific, where its main strategic interests lay. The
disparity in the character of the participating forces indicates that a major objective
of this fleet problem was to test the relative capabilities of an aircraft-heavy force
against a conventional battle fleet.9 In the event of war, Black’s primary objective was
to destroy the Panama and Nicaragua Canals, before Blue could reinforce its Pacific
Fleet from the Atlantic. This would permit Black’s constructive forces elsewhere in
the Pacific to secure its primary strategic objectives.
Although not formally considered a part of the fleet problem, for the first time
the movements of the fleet to the maneuvering theater were accounted for in the
scenario. Black was presumed to have begun preparing for war in December of
1930, intending to commence hostilities on February 20th. These plans had become
known to the Blue government, and on January 10th Blue dispatched its Scouting
Fleet from Hampton Roads to Panama, to secure the Pacific side of the isthmian canals from attack. Meanwhile, the Black Fleet had supposedly sailed for Panama from
its western Pacific homeland some weeks earlier (though actually departing Southern California on February 7). As was customary, both parts of the fleet engaged in
practices and exercises and even small maneuvers during these movements. On
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February 9th, the Scouting Fleet, which had spent a few days in firing practice at
Guantanamo, began a transit of the Panama Canal.10 Once in the Pacific, the Scouting Fleet was joined by the carriers and other vessels that had been detached from
the Battle Fleet, and in turn detached a battleship and four heavy cruisers to the Battle Fleet. On the 11th Blue was authorized to institute submarine patrols along the
western coast of Central America. All units of both sides were in position by February 15th. That evening, Blue was informed that the Black Fleet could be expected to
attack the canals at any time, and that a declaration of war was imminent.
On the evening of February 15th, the Black Fleet was located northwest of the
Galapagos, between 2° and 3° North, some 850 nautical miles southwest of the Gulf
of Panama. Admiral Schofield, commanding Black, organized his train into three
bodies. There were two convoys, each escorted by some battleships, two heavy cruisers, and several destroyers, with orders to effect landings in Central America and establish air bases. The objective of the southern convoy was Bahia Honda, Panama,
while of the northern convoy was bound for Puerto Culebra, Costa Rica. In addition
to the convoys, Black’s cruisers and submarines formed a scouting group, to move
ahead of the convoys and seek out and destroy the Blue carriers.
Aware of his great inferiority in surface forces, but with superior air resources
and having a general idea of Black’s objectives, Vice Admiral Willard, commanding
Blue, decided to concentrate his efforts on attacking the enemy’s expeditionary
forces, rather than his combat forces. To this end, he kept fleet flagship Arkansas off
the southern coast of Panama, and formed the carriers into a “Striking Force” under
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, COMAIRONS. Reeves formed two task forces, each
of one carrier, two cruisers, and four destroyers, resembling the organization proposed by Rear Admiral C. W. Cole in the critique of Fleet Problem XI.11 The mission
of both carrier task forces was to seek out and attack the enemy transports. The
Saratoga task force, directly under Reeves, was to operate west and northwest of
Panama, covering the approaches to the constructive Nicaragua Canal, while the
Lexington task force, commanded by the carrier’s skipper, Captain Ernest J. King,
covered the approaches to the Panama Canal, operating southwest of Panama, with
special instructions from Reeves to scout as far as the Galapagos. These task forces
were to operate behind a scouting line of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The
airship Los Angeles was assigned to patrol sectors along the demarcation line between the operating areas assigned to the Saratoga and Lexington task forces. Aircraft tender Wright was located at Bahia Honda, and the Control Force covered the
approaches to Puerto Culebra, while Blue’s remaining aircraft tenders and train
were in the Gulf of Panama.12
Operations began at 1800 on February 16. During that evening and through the
night, the ships of both sides began their planned movements. On the morning of
the 17th, Blue undertook extensive air patrols by carrier aircraft, seaplanes, and
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Los Angeles, and sent light cruisers probing for Black. Despite the fact that both
Black convoys were moving toward their destinations, the only contact that that day
occurred when a Black destroyer briefly spotted the Blue airship.
During the 18th, Blue flying boats made some tentative contacts with Black submarines and cruisers, and aircraft supported by Wright made seven bombing runs
against these target, with little effect. Finally, at about 1630, the Black Puerto
Culebra convoy (five battleships, a cruiser, ten destroyers, and five transports) was
located by Blue surface scouts. At about the same time, the Black cruisers Pensacola
(CA 24) and Northampton (CA 26), sprinting ahead of the Bahia Honda convoy,
raided into the Gulf of Chiriqui, close to the Panamanian coast, to sink a Blue minesweeper and an oiler. This attracted the attention of some of Wright’s patrol planes,
which made several unsuccessful bombing runs against the raiders. Shortly afterward the two Black cruisers engaged in an inconclusive exchange with Arkansas at
long range off Coiba Island. The action could have gone badly for the old battleship;
although her main battery was more powerful than that of the heavy cruisers, their
range was shorter, due to a low angle of elevation, and the faster cruisers could have
showered her with shells from their lighter but longer-ranged guns. As Admiral
Schofield would later write, “I had expected that any . . . heavy cruiser falling in with
the Arkansas . . . would be able to defeat that vessel by staying out of range of that
vessel’s guns, and by raining 8 inch shells on her. The difference in range of the guns
of these two vessels is 10,000 yards in favor of the cruiser, but without plane spot
these cruisers lost all that advantage.”13 The battleship was saved, however, by poor
weather and poor ship design, which combined to frustrate efforts of the cruisers to
launch their catapult aircraft to spot for the guns, causing Schofield to comment, “I
was greatly disappointed to find that our 8" cruisers have such acrobatic characteristics that they could not launch their planes and recover them at sea. This took
away from them their great advantage of long range fire.”14
Meanwhile, because Lexington was probing eastward toward the Galapagos,
while Saratoga remained west of Panama, by 1800 on the 18th the carriers were
about 420 miles apart, almost directly north–south. Surprisingly, despite air reconnaissance, Blue had only managed to get a fix on the Black northern (Puerto
Culebra) convoy at about 1800, by which time both Black convoys had actually
passed between the Blue carriers.
During the night of the 18th–19th, Pensacola and Northampton retired on
Black’s Puerto Culebra convoy, while Black submarines began probing into the Gulf
of Panama.
Meanwhile, Blue abandoned its scouting line to concentrate its ships against
Black’s Puerto Culebra force, with Saratoga preparing for a dawn strike and
Lexington steaming north from the vicinity of the Galapagos.
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On the morning of the 19th, a Saratoga scout located Black’s Puerto Culebra
convoy, and the carrier launched several air strikes, achieving modest success, aided
by surface attacks from Blue cruisers and destroyers. Apprised of these attacks, Captain King of the Lexington, inbound from the Galapagos, altered course to support
Saratoga, and sent out reconnaissance aircraft. One of these aircraft spotted Black’s
southern (Bahia Honda) convoy, and managed to signal the information to Blue
just before being ruled shot down. The sighting was confirmed by the airship Los
Angeles, which was in turn also shot down, by a dive bomber off Langley.15 Aircraft
from Lexington and Wright carried out several attacks during the afternoon, hitting
Langley. Due to an underestimation of the distance between the Blue carrier and
Langley (40 miles when it was actually 75), some of Lexington’s aircraft returned so
late in the evening that King ordered his searchlights turned on to help recover
them.16
Late on the 19th, Black’s Puerto Culebra convoy, despite some serious injury
from attacking Blue cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft, reached its destination.
Shortly afterward, the umpires ruled that a landing had been effected, and that
Black personnel had begun to establish a base.17 Blue had little more success against
the Black southern convoy, which, although heavily engaged by cruisers and destroyers continued its approach to Bahia Honda, while a Black submarine to sink a
Blue auxiliary in the Gulf of Panama.
In the early evening of the 19th, the Blue flagship Arkansas was sunk by an inject,
the loss attributed to a Black submarine. This resulted in the transfer of command
from Vice Admiral Willard, who constructively went down with the ship, to Rear
Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, COMAIRONS, who had been commanding the Striking
Force, built around Saratoga.18
During the night of the 19th–20th, the Blue carriers, operating far forward—a
consequence of the relatively short range of their aircraft—both encountered Black
surface warships. Both avoided being “sunk” by dint of their very high speed and the
timely intervention of their escorts. In addition, a Blue light cruiser that fell in with
Black’s Bahia Honda convoy was sunk by its escort.
On the morning of the 20th, as Black continued to “develop” its base at Puerto
Culebra, Saratoga began a series of air strikes that continued until the Chief Observer called an end to the northern half of the problem at 1000, Black having attained its objective.19 The forces further south continued their operations.
As Black’s southern convoy approached Bahia Honda that morning, elements of
its escort came within 30,000 yards (14.8 nm) of Blue’s Lexington. The carrier’s
escorts began making smoke and engaged the Black ships, while Lexington launched
an airstrike that accounted for Black’s Pensacola (CA 24), though not before the
heavy cruiser had sunk a Blue light cruiser. The Black battleships serving as convoy
escorts soon destroyed two more Blue light cruisers, and then sank Wright. The
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convoy reached Bahia Honda at about 1400, and began to establish a base. About an
hour later, as Lexington began launching aircraft to attack Bahia Honda, Black’s
Northampton (CA 26) was spotted at some 25,000–30,000 yards (12.3–14.8 nm).
While her escorting light cruisers engaged the heavy cruiser, and her destroyers
made smoke, Lexington altered course, and launched more aircraft to attack the
Black ships. These Blue airstrikes inflicted some damage on Langley and several
Black battleships, while three Blue light cruisers accounted for Northampton. The
fleet problem was officially ended at 1800.
Admiral Frank H. Schofield, the Black commander, thought that the problem
was by far the best in the series. “It was by long odds the most interesting Problem
that I have yet participated in, and I feel that the lessons derived from it and the experience garnered have been of more importance, both in character and in number,
than those derived from any other Problem, in the solution of which the Fleet has
participated.”20
Schofield went on to identify what he considered the two most important lessons derived from the problem. The performance of the “flying cruiser” Los Angeles
led him to conclude that the cost of using airships was “out of all proportion to their
probable usefulness,” adding that “they had an appeal to the imagination that is not
sustained by their military usefulness.” These were telling comments, given that airships had considerable support in the Navy, and that this was the first fleet problem
to include one.21 In fact, Schofield’s opponent in the exercises, Vice Admiral Willard,
endorsed the use of airships, as did the Secretary of the Navy, who was present as an
observer. In contrast to his scathing criticism of airships, Schofield concluded that
dive bombing was “the most effective form of naval attack on ships.”22
Although the overall performance of naval aviation during this fleet problem
had revealed many shortcomings, it had also again demonstrated that carriers could
serve as an offensive arm of the fleet. Rear Admiral C. W. Cole’s recommendation after Fleet Problem XI that carrier task forces be formed consisting of one carrier, plus
some cruisers and destroyers, had proven sound. Nevertheless, both Blue carriers
had suffered close encounters with Black surface forces, only escaping by speed,
luck, and the gallant efforts of their escorts. This, of course, was a consequence of
the short range of their aircraft, which forced the carriers to approach very close to
their objectives. Although this limitation on carrier operations would pass as newer,
“long legged” aircraft became available, and later with the introduction of radar, the
impression that carrier task forces were highly vulnerable to surface attack caused
some senior officers to view this as a critical limitation on their operations.
The fleet problem had also revealed the serious logistical demands of carrier operations. The high speed and high operational tempo that the carriers maintained
during the maneuvers resulted in both running very low on fuel, aviation gas, ordnance, and aircraft, about half of which were “lost” in combat or due to mechanical
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problems. At the time these logistical difficulties were also viewed as a limitation of
carrier aviation, but they were caused by the absence of an effective underway replenishment system. Although logistical problems would plague carrier operations
through the first year of the Pacific War, they were shortly resolved as effective underway replenishment techniques were developed and suitable vessels acquired.23
The heavy cruiser scout planes had proven to be of only marginal value, since the sea
state was generally unsuited to their safe operation. Although CNO Pratt concluded
that “the battleship is the backbone of the Fleet,” he remained a proponent of naval
aviation, and Admiral Reeves “cautioned that the operation’s results should not be
incorrectly interpreted, nor the strength of air power underestimated.”24
In fact, Reeves’ advice was sound, at least for the long term. In the short term,
Fleet Problem XII established that at a minimum a carrier task group had to include
at least two cruisers and two destroyers able to keep up with the carrier in both
speed and fuel capacity, and that a carrier task force commander had to be in the aircraft carrier, in order to better exercise command and control. An additional development was the practice of maintaining a permanent combat air patrol over the
carrier, a practice initiated by Captain King of Lexington.25
Press coverage of the problem had been extensive, even making the cover of
Time. This increased public awareness of the value of the fleet maneuvers, developments in technology and tactics, notably the heightened role of carrier aviation and
the new heavy cruisers, as well as to debates over the value of the airship and the battleship, sparking letters to the editor on some issues.26
Afterward: Fleet Aviation Maneuvers, March 22–30, 1931
Following the problem, the united fleet spent more than a month engaging in exercises and practices in Panamanian waters, intended to ensure that both parts of the
fleet were able to operate together smoothly. Early in March, the bulk of the Battle
Fleet began returning to the West Coast, leaving behind its carriers, Langley,
Lexington, and Saratoga.
Together with the Scouting Fleet, the three carriers entered the Caribbean for a
series of three special maneuvers exploring the capabilities of naval aviation.27
The first of these maneuvers, and the most interesting, occurred on March 22nd.
The scenario required Rear Admiral Reeves, with Saratoga, to defend the Caribbean
side of the Canal from an attack by Captain Ernest J. King’s Lexington. Each carrier
formed the center piece of a task force that included four light cruisers and two destroyers. The Lexington was given a day’s head start, in order to “lose” herself in the
Caribbean, and when the maneuvers began was positioned well northwest of Colon. Saratoga began the maneuvers about 150 miles east of Colon, in a position to
move in whatever direction the “enemy” might appear from. Considering King’s
options, Reeves concluded that the Lexington was most likely located northwest of
Colon. He sent a destroyer in that direction, calculating that the aggressive King
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would not be able to resist the “bait.” Reeves then positioned Saratoga to cover the
destroyer from a reasonable distance echeloned off her track to the southeast.
Reeves’ estimate of the situation was exactly correct. When Lexington scouts found
the destroyer early on the morning of March 22nd, King promptly laid on a deck
load strike, assuming the destroyer was patrolling ahead of Saratoga. Meanwhile, a
Saratoga scout plane had already located Lexington, and Reeves had put a major
strike in the air and vectored some cruisers toward the enemy carrier’s position. As
Lexington’s aircraft looked for Saratoga in the sea well astern of the destroyer, 70
Saratoga aircraft “sank” their carrier, aided by gunfire and torpedoes from the cruisers, which arrived during the action; from the time Saratoga aircraft located
Lexington until the latter was “sunk” was little more than an hour.
On the 28th, Lexington operated against a force of four battleships (represented
by Arkansas), supported by Langley, to test fleet tactics against air attack. The third,
and final, phase of the fleet aviation maneuvers took place on March 30th. A task
force built around Saratoga, with six light cruisers, some destroyers, and some shore
based aircraft, was given the mission of protecting a stretch of coastline against an
attack by a considerably stronger force. The attacking force, four battleships (again
represented by Arkansas), Lexington and Langley, six light cruisers, and some destroyers, “won through, effecting a dispersement of the defending forces and gained
complete control over the shore and sea area in question.”28 In April, the carriers began returning to the West Coast, while the Scouting Force proceeded to Hampton
Roads, and later engaged in a joint Army-Navy coast defense exercise in the Chesapeake Bay area.
Conclusions from these maneuvers were mixed. The “loss” of the Lexington on
March 22nd, led to some in the Navy to call for the construction of “small carriers
and flying deck cruisers,” to avoid losing too many aircraft with a single vessel. Although mistaken, the concern about the loss of air resources indicated the increasing importance of aviation to the fleet, despite repeated expressions reaffirming the
importance of the battleship.29
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N O T E S 1 M964-13, 13, U.S. Fleet Problem XII, 1931, Report
of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Admiral J. V. Chase, U.S.N. There is a detailed
analysis in Keith, “United States Navy Task Force
Evolution,” pp. 22–57, and an overview focused
on air operations in Grimes, pp. 81–96. Fry, pp.
44–45, has some useful comments.
2 M964-13, 13, U.S. Fleet Problem XII, 1931, Report
of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Admiral J. V. Chase, U.S.N., p. 2; Wildenberg, All
the Factors, pp. 219–23; Wildenberg, Destined,
pp. 90–91.
3 Nenninger, p. 9.
4 Use of the Los Angeles (ZR 3) required permission
from Britain and France, since the German-built
airship had been given to the United States for
“scientific purposes” under the terms of the
Treaty of Versailles; “Allies Permit the Navy to
Use the Los Angeles in War Game,” New York
Times, Jan. 8, 1931.
5 Laning, p. 351. Officially the term “heavy cruiser”
for the eight-inch gunned vessels had not yet been
introduced, and they were actually referred to as
“light cruisers” apparently to distinguish them
from armored cruisers, which were using the
“CA” designation at this time, a usage that has
been ignored here.
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6 It is not clear what benefit was derived from
“shifting” the coastline in this fashion. It may
have been intended to keep operations as far offshore as possible. Apparently permission to use
Costa Rican and Nicaraguan territorial waters had
not been secured, perhaps due to sensitivity over
the presence of U.S. Marines in the latter country.
7 See, for example, “Nation’s Full Fleet to ‘War’ at
Canal,” New York Times, Aug. 24, 1931; “Adams
Will Attend Assembly of Fleet,” Washington Post,
Jan. 4, 1931; “War Game to Pivot on Isthmian
Canals, New York Times, Jan. 5, 1931; “Major Aircraft Test in Coming War Games,” New York
Times, Jan. 11, 1931; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Warships Prepare at Balboa for War,” New York
Times, Feb. 9, 1931; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Mimic
War to Start Tonight Off Panama,” New York
Times, Feb. 15, 1931; Hanson W. Baldwin,
“Planes Save Panama from ‘Enemy’ Attack in Naval War Games,” New York Times, Feb. 21, 1931;
Hanson W. Baldwin, “Navy Men Compare Our
Ships to Nelson,” New York Times, Feb. 28, 1931;
etc.
8 The fleet was down to just ten effective battleships
at this time. Five more battleships were undergoing refit or reconstruction. In addition, the London round of new naval arms limitation talks in
1930 had caused the three oldest battleships,
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Florida, Utah, and Wyoming, to be decommissioned, the first to be scrapped, the second converted to a target ship, and the third becoming a
gunnery training ship. These three had formed
part of the Scouting Fleet, which was thus reduced to just two battleships, and would be restructured as a heavy cruiser force later in the
year; “Scout Fleet Plan Will Be Revised,” Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1930.
9 Campbell, pp. 139–40.
10 See, for example, Hanson W. Baldwin, “Scouting
Fleet off to Enter War Game,” New York Times,
Feb. 5, 1931; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Scout Ships
Clash in a Mimic Battle,” New York Times, Feb. 6,
1931.
11 King and Whitehill, p. 222; Belote and Belote, p.
17; Dunnigan and Nofi, Pacific War Encyclopedia,
“Carrier Task Forces, Composition, U.S.”
12 King and Whitehill, pp. 220–21.
13 M964-13, 13, U.S. Fleet Problem XII, 1931, Report
of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Admiral J. V. Chase, U.S.N., p. 21. The battleship’s 12"/50 Mk 7 rifles dated from 1912, and
had a range of 23,900 yards at 15° maximum elevation, while the new 8"/55 Mk 9s aboard the
heavy cruisers could reach c. 31,000 yards at 41°
elevation, with a penetration of four inches, more
than sufficient to pierce the battleship’s 2.5-inch
deck armor; see “United States Naval Guns,”
www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Main
.htm.
14 M964-13, 13, U.S. Fleet Problem XII, 1931, Report
of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Admiral J. V. Chase, U.S.N., p. 21.
15 Paolo E. Coletta, “Dirigibles in the U.S. Navy,” in
New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Tenth Naval History Symposium, ed.
Jack Sweetman et al. (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1993), p. 223. Wildenberg, Destined, p. 91,
observes that this appears to have been the only
useful thing ever done by an airship during one of
the fleet problems. A more favorable treatment of
the role of Los Angeles in FP XII can be found in
William F. Althoff, USS Los Angeles: The Navy’s
Venerable Airship and Aviation Technology
(Dulles: Brassey’s, 2004), pp. 138–44.
16 Wildenberg, Destined, pp. 91–92.
17 Given the existence of the 30-mile “exclusion”
zone along the western coasts of Nicaragua and
Coast Rica, in fact the convoy remained off shore
and no actual landings were made.
18 This is the incident referred to in the discussion
of injects in Chapter 3; M964-13, 13, U.S. Fleet
Problem XII, 1931, Report of the Commander in
Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral J. V. Chase,
U.S.N., p. 5.
19 M964-13, 13, U.S. Fleet Problem XII, 1931, Report
of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Admiral J. V. Chase, U.S.N., p. 32.
20 NWCA, Carton 62, Comments of Adm. Frank H.
Schofield, U.S.N., C-in-C Black Fleet, on Problem
XII (Mar. 2, 1931), p. 1.
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21 Coletta, “Dirigibles,” p. 223; this is the best treatment of the history of airships in the Navy. Airships took part in several of the fleet problems
and other exercises. Despite great hopes placed
upon them by such luminaries as Adm. Moffet,
who considered Schofield a personal friend and
was shocked by his comments, airships proved
not only operationally ineffective, but dangerous
to operate. See also, “U.S.S. Akron: Fleet Operations,” Navy Lakehurst Historical Society,
www.nlhs.com/fleet.htm.
22 NWCA, Carton 62, Comments of Adm. Frank H.
Schofield, U.S.N., C-in-C Black Fleet, on Problem
XII (Mar. 2, 1931), p. 2. That June, during a fleet
tactical exercise off San Diego, Lexington and
Saratoga hit the battleline with a massive coordinated attack, in which the torpedo bombers
proved singularly ineffective, though the dive
bombers did extremely well; Trimble, p. 320.
23 The development of underway replenishment is
discussed at length in Wildenberg’s Gray Steel and
Black Oil and “Chester Nimitz.” For a look at the
logistical limitations on carrier operations in the
first year of the war, and their effect on one senior
officer’s reputation, see John B. Lundstrom, Black
Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral
Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2006), passim.
24 M964-13, 13, U.S. Fleet Problem XII, 1931, Report
of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Admiral J. V. Chase, U.S.N., p. 35; Hanson W.
Baldwin, “Value of Battleship Proved, Pratt Says,”
New York Times, Feb. 27, 1931.
25 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Seapower: A Biography
of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1980), p. 74.
26 “Fleet Problem 12,” Time, Mar. 2, 1931. See, also,
Hanson W. Baldwin, “Planes Save Panama from
‘Enemy’ Attack in Naval War Games,” New York
Times, Feb. 21, 1931; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Naval
Games Prove New Cruisers’ Value,” New York
Times, Feb. 26, 1931; “Value of Dirigibles Proved
in War Game,” New York Times, Feb. 22, 1931;
“Fleet Manoeuvres of Great Benefit,” New York
Times, Mar. 8, 1931. For an instance of a letter to
the editor, see “Airship’s Value Defended,” New
York Times, Feb. 26, 1931.
27 “227 Planes to Fight in Caribbean ‘War,’” New
York Times, Mar. 22, 1931; “Navy Fliers Aloft this
Week in Test Over Caribbean Sea,” Washington
Post, Mar. 22, 1931; “Says Navy Must Get Small
Plane Carriers,” New York Times, Mar. 28, 1931;
“Naval Planes Show Power in War Game,” New
York Times, Mar. 29, 1931; “A Lesson of the War
Game,” New York Times, Mar. 30, 1931; “Ships at
Canal Rush to Nicaragua’s Aid,” New York Times,
Apr. 1, 1931; “War Game Victory Due to Battleships,” New York Times, Apr. 1, 1931.
28 “War Game Victory Due to Battleships,” New
York Times, Apr. 1, 1931.
29 “Says Navy Must Get Small Plane Carriers,” New
York Times, Mar. 28, 1931; “War Game Victory
Due to Battleships,” New York Times, Apr. 1,
1931.
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Rear Adm. Harry E. Yarnell, COMAIRRONSBATFOR, inspecting the crew of his flagship, Saratoga (CV 3), as she lay in Lahaina Roads, February 17, 1932,
just ten days after his highly successful dawn airstrikes against Oahu during Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 4.
(NH-94887, Naval Historical Foundation, courtesy PHC John L. Highfill, USN (Ret.))
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XIV

1932

Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 4/Fleet
Problem XIII, January 31–March 18, 1932

A

lthough not formally linked, GJE No. 4 and Fleet Problem XIII were both
held in Hawaii within the space of a few weeks, and involved scenarios dealing with expeditionary operations. Moreover, a number of the ideas developed during GJE No. 4 were reexamined in the fleet problem and some of the
conclusions were similar. Thus, it seems reasonable to treat them together.1

Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 4, January 31–February 12, 1932
Two years in the planning, GJE No. 4 was the first major Army-Navy maneuvers
held since 1925.2 The premise was that Blue (United States) was at war with Black, a
coalition of European and Asian powers. At an early stage in the conflict, Blue had
defeated a major European naval expedition in the Atlantic. But the diversion of
Blue resources from the Pacific to secure this victory, had permitted the Black Asian
partner to capture the Hawaiian Islands. The attacking fleet had then retired westward on its bases, leaving an 18,000-man garrison supported by strong air and submarine forces to defend the islands. Blue’s mission was to undertake an expedition
from the West Coast to recapture Hawaii, while the Blue Atlantic Fleet transferred
in the Pacific in preparation for further operations against Black. In short, the maneuvers were designed to test the fleet’s ability to conduct expeditionary operations
across vast distances, and to test the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
Major General Briant Harris Wells, who had a distinguished career as a staff officer and was currently serving as Commander General of the Army’s Hawaiian
Department, commanded Black, and had the resources of his department as well as
those of the 14th Naval District, some 20,000 men, 45 aircraft, 17 submarines, a
number of minelayers and minesweepers, and some constructive forces. Blue,
commanded by Admiral Richard H. Leigh, COMBATFOR, had most of the Battle
Force, nine battleships, Lexington (CV 2) and Saratoga (CV 3), four light cruisers, 24
destroyers, several mine layers and mine sweepers, some aircraft tenders, and auxiliaries.3 In addition, Blue had a constructive expeditionary force of 25 troop transports carrying 40,000 troops under the command of Major General Malin Craig, at
the time Commander, IX Corps Area, supposedly concentrated on the West Coast.
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Finally, Blue had substantial constructive forces en route from the Atlantic, which
were expected to arrive after the recapture of Hawaii.4
In developing his plans, Admiral Leigh adopted a proposal for a surprise attack on
Oahu by a carrier task force. The plan was developed by Captain John H. Towers,
chief-of-staff to Leigh’s air commander, in cooperation with his boss, Rear Admiral
Harry E. Yarnell. Two of the most veteran airmen in the fleet, Towers having earned his
wings in 1911 and Yarnell in 1922, they proposed sending Lexington (CV 2) and
Saratoga (CV 3), with a small escort, ahead of the main body to raid Black installations,
thus securing air supremacy to support amphibious operations against the islands.
To effect this plan, the carriers swapped aircraft, to form two specialized
airgroups, as had been suggested during the critique of Fleet Problem X (1930).
Saratoga ended up with 97 aircraft, mostly Boeing F4B fighters, while Lexington
had only 58 aircraft, mostly bombers and scouts. It was hoped that by giving each
carrier an essentially homogenous air group, a higher operational tempo could be
attained.5 With their escorts, the two carriers formed the “Advance Raiding Force.”
The Blue Fleet departed the West Coast for Hawaii at the end of January, proceeding under radio silence. On February 5th, the Advance Raiding Force separated
from the fleet to proceed independently to Hawaii at high speed. The next day the
carriers refueled their escorting destroyers and then made a 25-knot run to a point
about 400 miles north of Oahu. That night they made a fast run in under cover of
darkness to a point about 100 miles north of Oahu. Shortly before dawn on Sunday,
February 7th, despite rough seas, the carriers launched their aircraft. The attack was
organized in two waves totaling more than 150 aircraft. Leading the fighters of the
first wave was Lieutenant Commander J. J. “Jocko” Clark, who would crown his career commanding the carriers of Task Group 58.1/38.1 in the Pacific in 1944–45. Total surprise was achieved. After striking the Army air fields across Oahu, the
bombers went after the fleet and service installations at Pearl Harbor. Despite the
fact that the airstrikes had attained utter surprise, however, when the umpires came
to assess damages, they did so rather sparingly. Thus, as the attacking aircraft began
returning to their carriers, the umpires allowed defending aircraft to begin taking
off, though by the time they were airborne, all the first wave attackers had left the
area. At 0700, as the Army aircraft began returning to their bases, Admiral Yarnell’s
second wave arrived. This wave inflicted heavy “casualties” on the Army aircraft,
though suffering some losses themselves. Shortly afterward, at 0725, as Saratoga was
recovering aircraft from the first wave, the Black submarine S-42 (SS 153) was ruled
to have put a torpedo into her, causing 19 percent damage. Despite this setback, and
the “loss” of 26 aircraft during the raids, the operation was a clear success.
Meanwhile, taking advantage of the diversion created by the carrier strikes
against Oahu, the main body of the Blue Fleet arrived undetected off the main island of Hawaii, and put troops ashore to capture Hilo.
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After recovering their aircraft, the carriers took evasive action northward. During this movement, the umpires, seeking to make optimal use of the fleet for the maneuvers that were to follow, ruled that all casualties were nullified for both sides.
After nightfall, the carriers reversed course to run southward between Kauai and
Oahu, peeling off two destroyers to conduct bombardment missions, and proceeded to rendezvous with an oiler southwest of Oahu.
On the afternoon of February 8th the carriers parted company. With a single destroyer, Lexington continued moving south, to avoid any contact with Black, while
Saratoga and the balance of the escort turned back toward Oahu. At dawn on February 9th, Saratoga raided Black installations in southern Oahu once more, and again
reconnoitered appropriate landing sites; 10 of the 66 aircraft engaged were ruled destroyed. Heading south, Saratoga rendezvoused with Lexington overnight and the
two carriers prepared for another day of operations against Oahu.
On the 10th Blue warships and transports arrived at Lahaina Roads, to effect
landings on Maui, Blue’s second invasion in three days. Meanwhile the two Blue carriers launched a major diversion, sending 90 aircraft against Oahu from a position
about 60 miles southwest of the island, to strike ground installations. Soon after this
strike was dispatched, however, both carriers were hit by Black aircraft. Saratoga was
ruled heavily damaged, and her “remaining” aircraft were permitted to land on
Lexington, which, counting all adjudicated losses, was left with only 52 operational
aircraft; in two days of highly successful operations the carriers had lost about
two-thirds of their aircraft.
February 11th saw Saratoga, once more back in action, jumped yet again by
Black aircraft, as she was proceeding to Lahaina Roads for notional repairs at the
Blue advanced base being established there; she was ruled to have suffered 70 percent cumulative damages. Meanwhile Lexington proceeded north of Oahu, to be in a
position to cover the main Blue landings the next morning. This was Blue’s third
amphibious operation in five days, and was supported by patrol bombers operating
from aircraft tenders and aircraft from Saratoga, at Lahaina Roads. The landings, on
the coast of Oahu, from Kahuku Point to the southwest, went off well, and the GJE
was declared over at 1630 on the 12th.
By the end of the maneuvers, Blue was down to one operational carrier,
Lexington, with only 23 aircraft, but the Advance Raiding Force had been rather
spectacularly successful. Black never recovered from the initial shock of the February 7th airstrikes, and never managed to regain the initiative.
A public critique of GJE No. 4 was held at Pearl Harbor on February 18th. Present were about 350 officers from each of the services. In his analysis, CINCUS
Schofield observed that in amphibious operations, aircraft carriers should be used
to cover landings intended to secure airfields, which would then relieve the carriers
of having to loiter close to shore, where they were vulnerable to land-based air
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attacks. He also pointed out that safety concerns that put limitations on carriers in
peacetime might not apply in war, such as a requirement to operate closer to land
than the maximum range of the aircraft might permit. Naval aviators in general,
including Rear Admiral Yarnell, were critical of the “stinginess” with which umpires
awarded damages following the February 7th airstrikes across Oahu, noting that
they believed the raid would have devastated Army air assets. There was probably
more than a little truth to this assertion, given what would actually occur just over
nine years later. The umpiring of those attacks was done by Army officers who were
perhaps embarrassed by the degree of surprise the naval aviators had attained; some
Army officers reportedly complained “about the ‘legality’ of attacking on a Sunday
morning.”6
The performance of carrier aviation in GJE No. 4 prompted Rear Admiral Harris
Laning, President of the Naval War College, who had served as an umpire, to state
that their mobility gave carriers an advantage over land-based air power. This was
an odd observation, given that on several occasions in earlier maneuvers carriers
had proven highly vulnerable to land-based air attack. But Laning was being prescient. The vulnerability of Blue’s carriers was due to the fact that there were only
two of them. In the campaigns across the Pacific in 1943–45, larger groupings of
carriers—four to six—operating in strong task forces proved more than able to
overcome Japanese air forces based on major land masses as well as isolated atolls
beyond the range of reinforcement.
Following GJE No. 4, the Battle Force lay at Lahaina Roads from February 15th
to early March, when Fleet Problem XIII began, performing maintenance and resupply and engaging in drills and practices, while the commanders and their staffs
prepared for the fleet problem. In early March, the Scouting Force arrived from the
Atlantic, and final preparations for the problem could begin. Normally during such
a layover, the personnel of the Fleet would have been allowed to go ashore, but this
was sharply curtailed due to heightened racial tensions in Hawaii as a result of the
“Massie Affair.”
In September of 1931 Mrs. Thalia Massie, wife of Lieutenant Thomas Massie,
falsely accused five men of Asian and Hawaiian descent of rape. Although the men
were cleared by a jury, “white” opinion considered them guilty. On January 8, 1932,
Lieutenant Massie, his mother-in-law, and two sailors murdered one of the accused,
Joseph Kahahawai, a native Hawaiian. This met with widespread approval by the
white community, but the Honolulu police acted promptly and arrested the perpetrators. They were convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Territorial Governor Lawrence Judd reduced this to an hour’s confinement in
his office. With racial tensions in the islands thus heightened, senior naval personnel decided that giving thousands of white sailors liberty would result in race riots.7
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Fleet Problem XIII, March 8–18, 1932
The objective of Fleet Problem XIII was to examine some of the problems associated with an offensive against the Japanese Mandates in the Central Pacific, the
Marshalls, Marianas, Carolines, and Palaus.8 The scenario postulated a more meticulous—“Cautionary”—approach to a Pacific War than had been the case in earlier
problems.9 For purposes of the fleet problem, the geography of the Pacific was essentially reversed. The Blue (United States) homeland was considered to lie to the
west of Longitude 180, with Hawaii as a forward possession. Black (Japan) was a
large nation east of 75° West Longitude, which possessed a substantial island empire
stretching westward to “atolls” at Puget Sound, San Francisco, and Magdalena Bay,
in Mexico (representing the Mandates).10 Blue’s mission was to conduct an offensive
against these “atolls” as the preliminary to operations into the heart of the Black
empire. Black’s mission, naturally, was to disrupt the Blue preparations with a small,
mobile force, while the main body of its fleet conducted operations elsewhere. Once
the Black main body had completed its operations, it would join the carriers, cruisers, and submarines that had been conducting delaying operations against Blue, to
undertake offensive operations. The problem was designed to further explore carrier tactics and defense against carriers, the use of submarines as fleet scouts, defense of a friendly coast, and transoceanic power projection.
Blue was commanded by Admiral Richard H. Leigh, COMBATFLT, with Vice
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell as air commander. Blue had nine battleships, plus Saratoga
(CV 3), plus five light cruisers, 34 destroyers, a cruiser minelayer, four destroyer
minelayers, and two minesweepers, plus six fleet auxiliaries and two transports
serving as surrogates for 30. Blue air resources included 72 aircraft in Saratoga,
which was commanded by Captain Frank R. McCrary, an aggressive veteran aviator,
as well as 36 patrol planes and torpedo bombers based at Pearl Harbor, plus 35 spotter and scout aircraft carried on the battleships and cruisers.
Black was commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur L. Willard, COMSCOFLT. His
fleet was built around a reinforced Scouting Force, consisting of Lexington (CV 2),
commanded by Captain Ernest J. King, and Langley (CV 1), four seaplane tenders,
seven heavy and four light cruisers, 28 destroyers, 21 submarines, and a substantial
train, partially constructive. In addition, on paper, Black had a small notional force
of battleships and battlecruisers and their escorts, somewhere east of the atolls,
which were the first echelon of the large constructive battle fleet en route from Black
home waters.11 Black air resources included 98 aircraft in Lexington and Langley, 36
patrol bombers supported by the aircraft tenders, and 36 scout planes off the cruisers, plus the airship Los Angeles (ZR 3).12 CINCUS Frank A. Schofield served as Chief
Umpire and Observer in Pennsylvania (BB 38), the Blue fleet flagship, Rear Admiral
Harris Laning, President of the Naval War College, was Chief Umpire for Blue, and
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General Board member Captain E. S. Jackson, a naval aviator and former Langley
skipper, served as Chief Umpire for Black.
War was assumed to have broken out on January 1, 1932. As a result, the Blue Fleet
had concentrated at Hawaii, in anticipation of conducting an offensive to secure one
of the atolls on the outer edge of Black’s colonial empire. The problem was scheduled
to begin at 0000 March 8th. At that time Blue was have its fleet concentrated at
Lahaina Roads, Hawaii, with its transport echelon scheduled to arrive on the 9th, and
the entire combined force was to be ready for sea the following day. Blue planned to
depart Lahaina Roads on a course that would bring it to the California coast somewhat south of San Francisco. Since Blue’s movement would surely attract notice from
Black’s submarines, known to be operating near Hawaii, the course had been carefully
selected as a deception measure. Proceeding as if bound for San Francisco obscured
Blue’s objective, since it permitted the fleet to continue on to the San Francisco area,
or, with only relatively minor adjustment, to alter course for Magdalena Bay or Puget
Sound. In fact, Blue had decided to attack the Puget Sound atoll.
To effect this plan, the Blue Fleet was organized into three task forces:
• Convoy: Seven auxiliaries and transports as surrogates for 30.
• Convoy Guard: Six battleships, four light cruisers, and about a dozen
destroyers.
• Offensive Screen: Three battleships, Saratoga, and about ten destroyers.
The Convoy and Convoy Guard constituted the Blue Main Body. The Convoy
Guard was to see that the Convoy reached its objective, while the Offensive Screen
supported the operation by screening against enemy forces, providing reconnaissance, and inflicting damage to Black as opportunity presented itself; once well out
to sea, after refueling all destroyers, the Convoy and Convoy Guard would alter
course northward, and later northeastward, to attack Puget Sound. The Offensive
Screen would maintain the pretense of an attack on the San Francisco atoll as long
as possible, while putting itself between the Blue Main Body and Black.
The Black Fleet, seeing its mission as preventing the establishment of an enemy
foothold in the chain of atolls, decided to erode the Blue force as it crossed the Pacific, through a combination of air and submarine attacks, and then to follow up
with surface action “when relative strength conditions are favorable.” To implement
this plan, Black organized its fleet into a Force Flagship division (Augusta, CA 31)
and five task groups:
• Tracking Group: Five submarines to monitor Blue’s movements, starting
the problem well into the Pacific.
• Striking Group: Lexington, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and about
25 destroyers, to intercept Blue at the earliest opportunity, and inflict
maximum possible attrition on his forces.
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• Submarine Attack Group: About 16 submarines plus four submarine
tenders, to harass Blue’s movements in cooperation with the Striking
Group.
• Atoll Guard: Langley, four seaplane tenders, and two destroyers, with an
oiler and four minesweepers, to patrol the atolls and mine their entrances.
• Train: 15 auxiliaries, for logistical support and service.
At the start of the problem, 0000 on March 8th, the Black Fleet was largely concentrated between the Channel Islands, San Pedro, and San Diego, roughly 400 air
miles south of San Francisco and about 500 north of Magdalena Bay, at which they
were ostensibly based. The Tracking Group submarines Tracking Group were
poised at sea just east of Hawaii. The Blue Fleet lay at Lahaina Roads.
At the start of the problem, Black Tracking Group submarines proceeded into
the Hawaiian Islands to began searching for Blue. First contact occurred at 1700 on
the afternoon of the 9th, when they located the Blue concentration at Lahaina
Roads. Blue did not sortie from Lahaina Roads until shortly before noon on March
10th, heading 065° at 9.5 knots. Despite heavy air and surface patrols from Hawaii
and harassment by Saratoga aircraft, Black submarines very quickly spotted the
movement; although they lost one of their number, they were able to inform the
Black command of Blue’s course and speed.
During the night of the 10th–11th, the Black submarines lost contact with Blue,
which changed course under cover of darkness. Meanwhile, the units of Black’s
Atoll Guard began dispersing to cover their assigned positions, while late in the day
the Striking Group sortied from the Channel Islands and proceeded southwestward
at 15 knots, to be prepared to intercept Blue, while the Submarine Attack Group remained in the northern part of the islands.
Over the next few days both fleets moved cautiously, with cruisers forward as scouts,
and carriers held back. There was only limited contact. On the 12th a Black submarine
managed to detect the Blue fleet, still on a course that seemed likely to bring it to San
Francisco. The submarine passed this vital information on before being ruled sunk by
enemy aircraft. The next day another Black submarine confirmed the Blue course, only
to suffer the same fate; in six days of operations the Tracking Group had lost three of its
five submarines, and the remaining two boats were no longer in position to track Blue.
Soon after the third Black submarine had been sunk, on the afternoon of March 13th,
with the Blue fleet about 650 miles northeast of Lahaina, it began to implement the
Puget Sound plan. While the Offensive Screen (Saratoga and her consorts) continued
on course 065°, the Main Body altered course to 350°. As the Main Body began the first
leg of its movement to Puget Sound, the Offensive Screen feinted toward San Francisco,
while still providing security for the expeditionary force. By this time, Black’s carrier
Langley had shifted to a point northwest of Magdalena Bay, arriving at about noon on
March 12th. Later that afternoon Black’s aircraft tenders began arriving at their assigned

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:17 AM

157

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

158

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

stations and began operating patrol bombers to establishing tight coverage over most of
the waters along the West Coast.13
At 0700 on March 14th, the Black Striking Group, some 900 miles southwest of
San Diego, increased speed to 20 knots and began scouting to the southwest on
course 240°, putting a line of cruisers miles out from Lexington on a 75-mile front.
Just an hour later, the Blue Offensive Screen, which was itself roughly 900 miles
northeast of Lahaina, altered course to 070° and increased speed to 17 knots. At this
point, the two carrier forces were about 450 miles apart, heading directly for each
other, with some of the cruisers and destroyers in their outer screens considerably
closer than that.
At 0830 on the 14th Blue air scouts from Saratoga detected three Black cruisers,
which in turn sighted the aircraft. Thus mutually alerted to each other’s presence,
the two carriers launched airstrikes against each other early that afternoon. Saratoga
aircraft hit Black’s Lexington, inflicting 38 percent damage, at almost the same time
that Lexington’s aircraft hit Saratoga, causing 25 percent damage. Captain King of
Lexington protested that these damage decisions had been excessively high. As a result, the injuries to both carriers—and apparently their heavy aircraft “losses” as
well—were shortly declared “repaired” by the umpires, so that the ships could continue operating at full capacity, a decision that was in turn protested by Captain
McCrary of Saratoga but which remained in force. As a result, later that afternoon,
Blue’s Saratoga aircraft inflicted 64 percent damage on Black’s Trenton (CL 11).
Meanwhile, Captain King of Lexington convinced Black commander Willard—a
“Gun Club” member who was warming to aviation—to let him operate his ship and
her escorts independently, with the object of hitting Blue’s carrier, and thus easing
the air threat to Black. King moved Lexington out of range of Saratoga under cover
of darkness, gaining sea room. During the 15th, with the Blue Main Body still well
out to sea, more or less west of San Francisco, clashes between surface forces began
to develop as Black cruisers probed the outer perimeter of Blue’s Offensive Screen.
In support of friendly cruisers and destroyers, Saratoga aircraft worked over the
Black cruisers, sinking Marblehead (CL 12) and Salt Lake City (CA 25) and very
heavily damaging Louisville (CA 28). Naturally, these strikes gave away Saratoga’s
position. Calculating that Saratoga would be recovering aircraft just before dusk,
King moved Lexington in at high speed and launched a 49-plane strike that hit
Saratoga just as he had figured; the Blue carrier was ruled to have suffered 49 percent
damage, rendering her incapable of operating aircraft.14
On the 16th the Black cruiser-destroyer force located and tangled with the Blue
Main Body, which was accompanied by the “heavily damaged” Saratoga, effectively
reduced to functioning as an oversized heavy cruiser. Casualties were severe.
Saratoga was “sunk” in a destroyer torpedo attack, and Blue Fleet flagship Pennsylvania (BB 38) was seriously damaged by air and surface attack, and then reduced to
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only 20 percent effectiveness by bombers off Lexington. Total damage to Blue from
the combined air and surface action on the 16th was one carrier, one light cruiser,
and one destroyer “sunk,” plus three battleships and five destroyers “damaged,” with
little loss to Black. The action drew praise from CINCUS Schofield.15
Meanwhile, at 1050 that same day, CINCUS Schofield instructed both Blue and
Black that, due to adverse weather, Puget Sound was out of play. Blue promptly
changed its objective to Magdalena Bay, and altered course accordingly. Black, however, still believed that Blue’s objective was San Francisco, and continued moving its
forces on that assumption. As a result, the two fleets lost contact on the 17th.16 On
the 18th, Black continued concentrating its forces to cover San Francisco, while Blue
regrouped, the Offensive Screen rejoining the main body at 0900, and both shortly
proceeding southeastward to Magdalena Bay. As a result, by afternoon, the two
fleets were actually moving away from each other. Admiral Schofield declared the
problem over at 2000 on the 18th, by which time it was estimated that there was no
chance of further contact between the two fleets for at least 36 hours.
Conclusions Concerning GJE No.4 and Fleet Problem XIII
For naval aviation, GJE No. 4 and Fleet Problem XIII essentially reaffirmed the lesson first clearly demonstrated in 1930, that in carrier warfare, the first strike is likely
to be the most important.17 At the end of the problem, Admiral Yarnell, who had
served as Blue air commander, concluded that the number of carriers available to
the Navy (just two, Lexington and Saratoga, since Langley was at best an improvised
test bed of limited operational value), was totally inadequate to the needs of an actual war in the Pacific. Reasoning that the side with the greater number of carriers
would have a tremendous advantage, he proposed a minimum of six, if not eight, as
a basic operational necessity, a conclusion underscored when Captain Ernest J. King
argued that the problem demonstrated that carriers should be operated by divisions.18 Although there was not much discussion about the matter, the experimental
formation of “homogenous” air groups during GJE No. 4, originally proposed in
the critique of Fleet Problem VIII (1928), was tried again once or twice during the
problems. In practice, however, the concept never became a fixture of carrier operations, apparently being seen as putting too many eggs in one basket; while mixed air
groups did cause some diminution of operational tempo, the loss of one carrier
would not immediately result in the loss of all aircraft of a particular type.19
Fleet Problem XIII added further evidence that the airship was a weapon of
doubtful value. Proponents of zeppelins tried to brush aside the poor performance
of Los Angeles (ZR 3) as a result of her age, having been built in 1924, while touting
the merits of the new “flying aircraft carriers” Akron (ZRS 4) and her sister Macon
(ZRS 5), neither of which had taken part in the maneuvers. Nevertheless, in a
prescient comment to CNO William V. Pratt, Admiral Schofield said “the need for
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aircraft is not more Akrons, but more carriers,” which seems to have summed up the
fleet’s opinion as well.20
A number of other important lessons were learned. During the problem heavy
cruisers again had difficulties operating float planes, as recovery time was often excessive in any weather but a virtual calm, due to the ships’ heavy rolling.21 The maneuvers
also indicated a need for more anti-aircraft defenses on ships. Although submarines
had done excellent work in keeping track of Blue’s movements, four of Black’s five boats
assigned to this duty were spotted, attacked, and “sunk”by enemy carrier-based aircraft,
revealing a serious vulnerability of submarines to detection from the air, a conclusion in
which the commanders of the submarines involved concurred. Experiments conducted
by the oiler Brazos (AO 4) demonstrated the feasibility of simultaneously refueling two
destroyers from one oiler by the broadside method, leading to a recommendation for
further refinement of the technique.22 In his review of the fleet problem, Chief Umpire
for Blue Harris Laning of the Naval War College criticized the umpiring guidelines, calling for greater rigor in recording, assessing, and enforcing damages.23
Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 4 and Fleet Problem XIII were among several
maneuvers that some journalists, some members of the public, and occasionally even
some political leaders in various countries claimed were attempts by the United States
to use the movement of the fleet to influence international events. In this case, the
Manchurian Crisis was still unfolding, following Japan’s invasion of northern China
in September of 1931, and there was considerable speculation in the press in both the
United States and Japan that the movement of the U.S. Fleet to Hawaii was somehow
intended to influence Japanese policy, speculation that was not helped by an unfortunate comment by COMBATFLT Richard H. Leigh; asked if the movement of the fleet
to Hawaii was related to the unfolding crisis, Leigh replied that the fleet was “fully prepared for any contingency.” Nevertheless, there was no such intention; planning for
GJE No. 4 had begun in mid-1930, and that for Fleet Problem XIII in the Spring of
1931, while the crisis had erupted in September of 1931.24
Following the fleet problem, apparently at the suggestion of the State Department, concerned over rising tensions in the Far East, the Scouting Fleet remained in
the Pacific, joining the Battle Fleet in Southern California.25 Soon afterward the
Fleet was somewhat reorganized, and its main components renamed, becoming the
“Battle Force” and the “Scouting Force.”
GJE No. 4 and the fleet problem were well covered in the press. Newspaper articles, some by naval officers, not only dealt with the operations of the fleet during
these maneuvers, but they also covered the views of various senior officers concerning the relative merits of the battleship versus the airplane and on the state of the
fleet in general. These helped the public understand the new developments in the
Navy at a critical time, given that the service was suffering from a decade of budgetary parsimony, exacerbated by onset of the Great Depression in 1929.26
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N O T E S 1 The Navy originally intended GJE No. 4 to be
“Fleet Problem XIII,” which was to be followed a
few weeks later by “Fleet Problem XIV,” based on
a scenario different than that used in the actual
FP XIII; see M964-14, 1, Ingersoll to Poteat,
June 16, 1931.
2 Thomas Fleming, “February 7, 1932—A Date that
Would Live in Amnesia,” Kazine No. 27;
Reynolds, On the Warpath, pp. 96–99; Wadle,
“United States Navy Fleet Problems,” pp. 78–84;
“Grand Joint Exercise No. 4,” Time, Feb. 15,
1932; Charles M. Austin, “Victory for ‘Blues,’”
New York Times, Feb. 15, 1932; “Blue Forces Seize
Hawaii in Darkness,” Washington Post, Feb. 14,
1932; “Manoeuvres Close with ‘Blue’ Ahead,”
New York Times, Feb. 14, 1932; “Joint Exercise
Highly Successful,” Washington Post, Feb. 21,
1932.
3 Six of the fleet’s 15 battleships were undergoing
long-term reconstruction or overhaul, partially as
an economy measure during the depths of the
Great Depression.
4 This constructive Atlantic Fleet was built around
the Scouting Force, with seven heavy cruisers,
four light cruisers, 26 destroyers, and various auxiliary vessels, which actually was en route to join
the Battle Fleet in Hawaii, for Fleet Problem XIII.
Its movement thus provided an additional connection between the GJE and the fleet problem.
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5 Reynolds, John H. Towers, p. 237.
6 Keith, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution,” pp. 84–85, cites some of the comments.
7 See David E. Stannard, Honor Killing: How the Infamous “Massie Affair” Transformed Hawai’i
(New York: Viking, 2005); Peter Packer, The
Massie Case (New York: Bantam, 1966). For some
contemporary accounts see, “Honolulu Guarded,
Troops Held Ready, Following Murder,” New
York Times, Jan. 10, 1932; “Navy Orders Fleet to
Avoid Honolulu,” New York Times, Jan. 10, 1932;
“Massie Grand Jury Indicts for Murder in Second
Degree,” New York Times, Jan. 27, 1932; “Curb on
Shore Leave Eased,” New York Times, Feb. 12,
1932. New York Times coverage of the “Massie Affair” eventually totaled over 200 stories. Yates
Stirling, Sea Duty: Memoirs of a Fighting Admiral
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939), pp.
244–71, written by the officer who commanded
the 14th Naval District during the affair, gives a
very racist account of the events.
8 M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of
the Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H.
Schofield” (This document can also be found in
NWCA, Carton 62). See, also, Keith, “United
States Navy Task Force Evolution,” pp. 58–118;
Grimes, pp. 97–107. Some newspaper accounts
are of interest, such as Charles M. Austin, “Action
off California in March,” New York Times, Feb.
16, 1932; Hanson W. Baldwin, “The Admirals
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Play Their Game of War,” New York Times, Mar.
13, 1932; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Fleets, Far at Sea,
Play Hide-and-Seek,” New York Times, Mar. 13,
1932; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Black Planes ‘Sink’
Carrier Saratoga,” New York Times, Mar. 18,
1932; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Aviation Triumphant in Naval War Games,” New York Times,
Mar. 27, 1932.
9 For the “Thruster/Cautionary” views of war with
Japan, see, Miller, War Plan Orange, pp. 35,
77–87, 101–121, 153–54, 204–205, 277–81, etc.
10 For purposes of the Fleet Problem, the entrance
to Magdalena Bay was “shifted” 30 miles to the
southwest, outside of Mexican territorial waters,
apparently in order to avoid having to negotiate
accessibility with the Mexican government;
M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of
the Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H.
Schofield,” p. 2.
11 This advanced echelon was vaguely defined as being “in BLACK home territory or they may be in
a position of readiness to support the BLACK
Force in the atolls.” Aside from its listing in the
statement of the problem, there is no evidence
that it played any role in the maneuvers. Its purpose may merely have been to force some contingency planning by the two sides, and to provide
the umpires with opportunities for possible injects; M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, Adm.
Frederick H. Schofield,” p. 2.
12 The airship Akron (ZRS 4) had also been assigned
to Black, but was unable to take part due to unscheduled repairs.
13 Black’s aircraft tenders supposedly at Magdalena
Bay were actually based in the San Pedro–San
Diego–Channel Islands area, and were not permitted to begin operating aircraft until early on
March 13th, the date on which they were presumed to have reached the bay.
14 Wildenberg, Destined, pp. 97–98.
15 Reynolds, John H. Towers, pp. 238–39.
16 Had radar been available, it is possible that Black
scouting cruisers and destroyers may have detected the Blue main body on the afternoon of the
17th; see, M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII,
Report of the Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H. Schofield,” p. 55 and track charts accompanying the report.
17 Wildenberg, Destined, p. 96.
18 M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of
the Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H.
Schofield,” pp. 32, 38–39; Reynolds, John H. Towers, p. 247; Belote and Belote, p. 17; Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, p. 56.
19 During FP XX (1939), Rear Admiral Ernest J.
King swapped Lexington’s scout bomber squadron
for Enterprise’s fighter squadron; see below. Aside
from a few air groups on escort carriers assigned
to support amphibious operations during World
War II, there appears to have been only one actual case in which somewhat specialized air
groups were assigned to fleet carriers in wartime.
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In the Spring of 1943, the two Allied carriers in
the Pacific, USS Saratoga and HMS Victorious,
pooled their air groups, both of which consisted
of American-built aircraft. Saratoga ended up
with 72 TBF Avenger and SBD Dauntless bombers, but only 12 F4F Wildcat fighters, while Victorious had 36 Wildcats and only 12 TBF Avengers.
The experiment was not judged a success and was
not repeated. See Dunnigan and Nofi, Pacific War
Encyclopedia, “Air Groups, Aircraft Carriers.”
20 Coletta, “Dirigibles,” p. 224. Los Angeles was
shortly decommissioned, to be dismantled in
1939. Akron and Macon, commissioned in 1931
and 1933 respectively, could each carry four
Curtiss F9C Sparrowhawk fighter aircraft, intended both to extend their reconnaissance reach
and provide them with a self-defense capability.
Both crashed in accidents, Akron, Apr. 4, 1933,
taking Adm. Moffett to his death, and Macon,
Feb. 11, 1935.
21 M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of
the Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H.
Schofield,” pp. 12, 42, etc.
22 Wildenberg, Gray Steel, p. 43.
23 M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of
the Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H.
Schofield,” pp. 38–39.
24 “Our Fleet Is Ready for Far East Call,” New York
Times, Jan. 30, 1932; “U.S. Battle Fleet to Sail for
Hawaii,” Washington Post, Jan. 31, 1932, p. 1.
25 Suggestions that the State Department had
prompted the transfer of the Scouting Force to
the Pacific were soft-pedaled. Initially, the Navy
reported that the Scouting Force would remain in
the Pacific for extended maneuvers. Later, CNO
William V. Pratt justified this as a “temporary”
measure to improve training and save fuel.
“Fleet’s Maneuvers Extended 15 Days,” Washington Post, May 14, 1932; “Scouting Ships to Stay in
Pacific,” New York Times, Oct. 1, 1932; “Scouting
Fleet Likely to Stay on West Coast Another Year,”
New York Times, Feb. 10, 1933; Harold J. Horan,
“Navy Strength in Pacific Will Be Augmented,”
Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1933.
26 See, for example, Charles M. Austin, “Victory for
‘Blues,’” New York Times, Feb. 14, 1932; Charles
M. Austin, “Action off California in March,” New
York Times, Feb. 16, 1932; “Joint Exercise Highly
Successful,” Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1932;
Hanson W. Baldwin, “Manoeuvres Show that We
Need Ships,” New York Times, Mar. 22, 1932;
Hanson W. Baldwin, “Holds Battleship Is Still Supreme,” New York Times, Mar. 23, 1932; Hanson
W. Baldwin, “Aviation Triumphant in Naval War
Games,” New York Times, Mar. 27, 1932; “Moffett
Says Navy Needs 11 Aircraft Carriers Now,”
Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1932. Both Austin and
Baldwin were Naval Academy graduates; Austin
(Class of 1905), a captain in 1932, served as
chief-of-staff of Blue in FP XIII, and was a “special correspondent” for the Times, while Baldwin,
a former naval officer (USNA 1924), had resigned
his commission and gone to work as military correspondent for the Times in 1928.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:18 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Blue defensive patrol sectors, Fleet
Problem XIV.
(NWC Historical Collection)
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1933

Fleet Problem XIV, February 10–17, 1933

S

everal scenarios were considered during the planning for Fleet Problem XIV.
One proposal was for a Caribbean problem, uniting the Fleet with the Special
Service Squadron and the Control Force. A Hawaiian problem was also suggested, with an attack on the islands from the West Coast. But these were both similar to problems carried out in the recent past. In addition, the Navy Department
budget had been slashed again, and major transoceanic operations by the bulk of
the fleet were viewed as too costly.1 The scenario finally selected was one that had
not previously been used, the conduct of, and defense from, a series of enemy carrier raids against the West Coast.2 Despite the fact that this scenario was one of the
simplest in the entire series of fleet problem, the results were among the most
controversial.
The scenario was intended as a test of the fleet’s ability to defend against carrier
raids, and as a test of the ability of carriers to operate independently from the battle
force. It postulated that Black (Japan) was planning a massive offensive to overrun
Southeast Asia, but was concerned that Blue (United States) might intervene before
the conquest was completed. Black thus decided to use carrier raids against Blue’s
principal bases in Hawaii and on the West Coast immediately after the issuance of a
declaration of war. This attack would disrupt Blue’s preparations for war long
enough to permit Black to overrun Southeast Asia and redeploy its forces to cope
with the expected Blue offensive. (In broad outline this essentially would be the reasoning that led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.)
As initially proposed, the problem was planned as a joint maneuver to test the
ability of the navy to defend against such raids in cooperation with Army coast artillery and air forces. In the event, full scale participation by the Army was not possible
“on account of lack of funds.” The War Department did, however, authorize the
Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian and Panama Departments and of the IX
Corps Area, covering the West Coast, to cooperate with the Navy if possible, and the
Hawaiian Department was able to offer some support.3
The striking power of the Black Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Frank H.
Clark, COMSCOFOR, lay in its carriers Saratoga (CV 3) and Lexington (CV 2), supplemented by seven heavy cruisers. These were the fastest ships in the Navy, able to
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sustain 32 knots for extended periods. In addition, Black had thirteen “four piper”
destroyers, a number of “constructive” submarines, and two oilers. Black was presumed to be operating out of a hypothetical base in the vicinity of Midway.
In preparation for the problem, the ships of the Black Fleet departed for Hawaii
in late January. Upon approaching Hawaii, the Black Fleet engaged in a joint
Army-Navy exercise with elements of the Army’s Hawaiian Department and the
14th Naval District.4
Joint Army-Navy Maneuvers, January 27–February 1, 1933
The scenario for this joint maneuver presupposed that the defenders were aware of
an imminent carrier raid on installations in Hawaii. As was the case during GJE No.
4, in 1933, the Blue forces, Army and Navy, were again commanded by Major General Briant H. Wells of the Hawaiian Department. The general and his staff concluded that the carriers would probably strike on Tuesday, January 31st. In
anticipation of this, they put their forces on full alert on January 27th, giving troops
time to establishing anti-aircraft positions and man coast defense installations. On
the 29th, 24-hour air patrols were initiated out to 150 miles, while destroyer minelayers and some other vessels were assigned patrol sectors eastward of the archipelago. Wells discounted the possibility of nocturnal air operations because “aircraft
could hope to accomplish little by dropping ‘bombs’ at random during darkness,
and the necessity of lighting decks of aircraft carriers for returning planes would
make them easy targets for defense aircraft.”5
Although Vice Admiral Cole was not an aviator, the plan adopted for the raid on
Hawaii showed a considerable understanding of the capabilities and limitations of
carrier aviation. Avoiding Blue air patrols, the Black carriers and their escorts arrived at a position north of Molokai around midnight on January 30–31. Meanwhile, a task group of heavy cruisers was dispatched to approach Oahu from the
south. During the last hours of darkness on the morning of the 31st the two carriers
put a strike force of about 90 aircraft in the air, reserving about 40 for fleet defense.
The strike force arrived over Pearl Harbor around dawn, and was ruled to have inflicted serious damage. Although Army and Navy bombers from Hawaii attempted
pursuit, the carriers successfully eluded them after recovering their aircraft. The following day, February 1st, Black’s detached heavy cruisers, operating south of Oahu,
attracted Blue’s attention; the distraction permitted the Black carriers to undertake
another series of airstrikes, also deemed successful.
This marked the end of the joint Army-Navy maneuvers. Although no one seems
to have been declared the “victor” in these maneuvers, the carriers certainly had
done well, particularly in view of the failure of the Army’s elaborate preparations to
avert surprise and despite the vaunted effectiveness of the sister-service’s new
anti-aircraft guns, supposedly able to “keep attacking planes at altitudes where
bombing aim would be haphazard.”6
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Fleet Problem XIV, February 10–17, 1933
While Black steamed for Hawaii and then engaged in its joint maneuver with the
Army, the Blue forces prepared for the fleet problem by dispersing along the West
Coast. Blue had been virtually everything in the fleet not assigned to Black; the ten
active battleships, Langley (CV 1) and the seaplane tender Wright (AV 1), nine light
cruisers, 45 destroyers, 20 submarines, the “Minecraft Battle Force,” based in Hawaii, and a large train, plus the resources of the naval districts in Hawaii and on the
West Coast. In addition, a large constructive Blue “Scouting Force,” with several notional aircraft carriers, was assumed to be concentrating at Colon, in Panama,
scheduled to arrive at San Diego–San Pedro to reinforce the fleet by February 18th.
Blue expeditionary forces were presumed to be concentrating at Puget Sound, San
Francisco, San Pedro, and San Diego.
Blue was commanded by Admiral Luke McNamee, COMBATFOR, who like his
Black counterpart Vice Admiral Clark, was not an aviator. As was customary,
CINCUS Richard Henry Leigh served as chief umpire. Rear Admiral Thomas J.
Senn, Commander, 11th Naval District, was Chief Umpire for Blue, and Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, currently Commander, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, for Black.
Senn was an “aviation friendly” officer and Reeves, of course, was a major air power
advocate.
Under instructions to use all means available to prevent a Black raid on Hawaii
or the West Coast, Blue’s Admiral McNamee concluded that Black was most likely to
operate its carriers individually, and thus conduct a series of simultaneous raids.
Since the most critical Black targets were in the San Francisco and the San
Pedro–San Diego areas, and knowing the range of the probable attacking aircraft,
McNamee organized his fleet to keep Black no less than 100 nautical miles from
these areas. He formed two large task forces, each with five battleships, plus some
cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, submarines, and even auxiliaries. The Northern
Group established a picket line in an arc 100 miles from the San Francisco lightship,
while the Southern Group was picketed 125 miles from Points Fermin and Loma, to
cover San Diego and San Pedro. The picket lines comprised destroyers, submarines,
mine warfare vessels, and even some auxiliaries, all more or less within sight of each
other. The pickets were supported by patrol bombers flying along the outer edges of
the patrol sector. Close behind the ships posted on the outer arc were some light
cruisers, and about 25 miles behind the outer arc battleships were situated so as to
provide prompt heavy support. Langley (CV 1), part of the Northern Group, was
positioned about ten miles east of the Farallon Islands, just about equidistant from
the extreme ends of the Northern Group’s patrol area. McNamee also formed a
Scouting Group of four submarines which established a patrol line 390 miles west
of the Point Concepcion Light, in Santa Barbara. Puget Sound was assigned four
submarines, supplemented by the forces of the 13th Naval District and constructive
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Army resources. Likewise, the resources of the 14th Naval District plus the mine
warfare vessels of the Battle Force and local Army forces, were deemed adequate to
defend Hawaii, then not a major fleet base.
On the eve of the fleet problem, Black’s Vice Admiral Clark received confidential
orders from CINCUS, instructing him to do no more than feint against Hawaii, but
undertake at least one raid each against the Puget Sound, San Francisco, and San
Pedro–San Diego areas, striking military and industrial targets. Clark decided to use
his carrier individually, in order to conduct a total of four strikes—in effect two
pairs of strikes on each of two days, to hit San Francisco twice, and Puget Sound and
San Pedro once each; this was more or less what Admiral McNamee had estimated
he would do. Clark organized his forces into three groups:
• The Northern Carrier Group, under Vice Admiral William H. Standley,
comprising Lexington and three heavy cruisers.
• The Southern Carrier Group, under Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, with
Saratoga and three heavy cruisers, including Clark’s own flagship Augusta
(CA 31).
• The Support Group, comprising one heavy cruiser, all 13 destroyers, and
two oilers.
The apparent anomaly of assigning all the destroyers to the Support Group was
dictated by the fact that they were obsolescent units of the Clemson Class, designed
during World War I, with limited fuel capacity and unable to keep up with the carriers or heavy cruisers in heavy seas.7
The Black Fleet departed Hawaii on February 6th, which gave it plenty of time to
get lost in the Central Pacific.8 The problem actually began at 0001 on February
10th. At that time, the Black Support Group proceeded from a point on the 158th
meridian some 500 nautical miles north of Hawaii, toward a point well out to sea
northwest of Monterey, where it was to rendezvous in turn with each carrier task
force. After refueling the task forces, the Support Group was to disband, with the
cruisers and destroyers joining the Saratoga task force to help cover its movements,
while the oilers returned to base, ostensibly somewhere to the northwest, but actually at San Pedro.
Meanwhile, the Black carriers began the problem at approximately 13° North,
158° West, roughly 500 nautical miles south-southeast of Oahu. Black’s plan was
that the Lexington task force, after refueling, would raid San Francisco on the 16th,
as the Saratoga group hit San Pedro. Both task forces were then to take high-speed
evasive action by steaming northwestward, before changing course to proceed to
their second objective. Overnight on the 16th–17th, the Saratoga task force would
refuel. Then, on the 17th, Lexington would raid Puget Sound, while Saratoga, reinforced by the cruisers and destroyers from the Support Force, hit San Francisco. The
task forces were then to head back toward Hawaii by a northern Great Circle route.
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For the first four days of the problem nothing happened; the two forces were too
far apart for any contact to occur. Blue forces patrolled energetically in search of
Black, while Black steamed eastward. Twice during this period the Support Group
destroyers were refueled from the oilers, and a successful attempt was made to refuel
a destroyer from a heavy cruiser. Despite the distance between the forces, scouts on
both sides made several false sightings.
Things began to heat up on the 15th. As the Lexington task force neared the
planned launching point for its raid on San Francisco, Louisville (CA 28) reported
spotting a destroyer in the distance, while a scout plane reported sighting a submarine on the surface. Although both of these were false contacts, Admiral Standley
concluded that the two vessels were scouts for the Blue battle fleet. Fearing the possibility of a surface engagement, he ordered his three heavy cruisers to form line of
battle well ahead of Lexington. This deprived the carrier of both her screen and her
plane guard.
Meanwhile, that same day, to reflect the existence of Black’s “constructive” submarine force, the umpires inflicted surprise submarine attacks on Blue ships. Battleships Arizona (BB 39), of the Blue Northern Group, and West Virginia (BB 48), of
the Southern Group, were each ruled to have each absorbed 18-percent damage.9
During the night of the 15th–16th, the weather worsened, costing Lexington
contact with her heavy cruisers. The carrier reached her planned launch point at
0447. As the weather was too poor to conduct air operations, with rain squalls and
extensive fog, she attempted a surface search for her missing escorts. Despite the
foul weather, Blue destroyers operating in the vicinity spotted the Black carrier.
They alerted the Blue Fleet and attempted a torpedo attack, which they did not execute. Surprisingly, Lexington did not become aware of the presence of these vessels.
She continued searching for her escort, which proved fruitless. By 0600, with the
weather clearing into patchy fog, Lexington altered course to return to the launch
point, while readying aircraft for their mission. Then, at 0605, as aircraft were beginning to be brought up to Lexington’s flight deck, the Blue battleship Oklahoma
(BB 37) emerged from a fog bank at 4,500 yards. Although as surprised by the encounter as the carrier, the battleship promptly “opened fire.” Lexington increased
speed and began taking evasive action, but within minutes a second Blue battleship,
Texas (BB 35), appeared out of the fog on a different bearing, and also opened fire.
Just about then Lexington’s errant escorting cruisers turned up, as did some Blue destroyers. The ensuing engagement was short; the carrier and the cruisers were all
ruled sunk by the chief observer present, Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, who was
in Louisville. Blue had eliminated the Black Northern Carrier Group, though at
some cost; one destroyer was ruled sunk, and Oklahoma, Texas, and another destroyer took heavy damage.10
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This left Saratoga as the sole Black carrier, commanded by Captain Rufus F.
Zogbaum, a veteran destroyerman turned aviator. The Saratoga task force had an
uneventful voyage to the West Coast. On February 14th the task force made a minor
change of course to avoid being spotted by a merchant ship. This serendipitously
took her around the northern edge of the Blue submarine scouting line. A second
result of the course change was that Saratoga was now approaching her planned
launch point, in the Santa Barbara Channel, from the northwest, rather than the
southwest. The carrier entered the Channel undetected on the morning of the 16th.
Saratoga commenced launching aircraft at 0630. This had hardly begun when, at
0634 the Blue submarine tender Beaver (AS 5) was spotted nearby, and promptly
sunk by eight-inch gunfire. By 0642 a large air strike was on its way from Saratoga to
San Pedro, while the carrier began putting up a combat air patrol. The strike aircraft
were spotted by several Blue submarines and surface pickets, but they miscalculated
their point of origin as the Santa Cruz Channel. As a result, Blue vessels alerted to
intercept the carrier were misdirected.
As Blue vessels searched for Saratoga in the Santa Cruz Channel, the carrier’s aircraft, led by Commander J. J. “Jocko” Clark, Fighting Squadron 2 (VF 2), who had
led the “surprise attack” on Pearl Harbor the previous year, conducted a series of
strikes in the San Pedro area.11 The umpires ruled that these had damaged oil refineries, a power house, some docks, and the seaplane tender Gannet (AVP 8). Blue air
opposition was non-existent until the Black aircraft were about to return to the
ship, when they were intercepted by eight fighters. In the ensuing air combat, the
umpires ruled that Black had lost four bombers and Blue two fighters.
At 0759, even as Saratoga’s air group was winging its way back to the ship, the Blue
picket ship Ortolan (AM 45) established the correct location of the carrier and passed
the word. A few minutes later, Saratoga’s CAP spotted Milwaukee (CL 5) and the Blue
flagship Pennsylvania (BB 38) nearby, sightings confirmed by an intercepted Blue
communication. As the range was long, the carrier maneuvered to escape, while her
escorts maneuvered to cover her movements. At 0845, shortly before Saratoga began
recovering her aircraft, the Black cruisers engaged the Blue cruiser Milwaukee. By
0920, with almost all of Saratoga’s aircraft aboard, the Black cruisers had left Milwaukee in sinking condition. A few minutes later, Pennsylvania came up, followed shortly
by several more warships. With most of her aircraft back on the carrier, the Black task
force attempted to disengage. They were successfully in this, due to their much higher
speed, though the heavy cruisers took some damage, while giving as well as they received. At 1000, as Saratoga’s last stray aircraft finally returned, the task force was already steaming away at high speed. A few minutes later Saratoga was jumped by eight
Blue land-based dive bombers, that had followed her errant aircraft. This strike was
ruled to have inflicted 16 percent damage on the carrier, destroying 20 aircraft and
putting half her flight deck out of action for two hours.
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The air strike against Saratoga marked the end of combat operations on the 16th.
Aside from the damage to Saratoga, two of Black’s heavy cruisers had taken 10 and
20 percent damage respectively, but the third had suffered no injury. Blue’s losses in
the action were Milwaukee, a destroyer, and a minesweeper sunk, plus 14 percent
damage to Pennsylvania, and Gannet put out of operation, as well as extensive damage to port facilities and other installations in and around San Pedro. Since Saratoga
and her escorts had by this time eluded the Blue surface ships, the umpires ruled
that the damage to all ships was to be considered “repaired,” so that the maneuvers
could continue the next day.
The Saratoga group proceeded northwestward about 200 nautical miles, to rendezvous with the Support Group some 140 miles southwest of San Francisco. Blue
aerial reconnaissance and surface patrols proved unable to locate her. After refueling on the evening of the 16th, the carrier loitered overnight in an area about 150 off
the California coast, while the Support Group proceeded homeward, with its escorts, a change in the original plan. On the morning of the 17th, Saratoga and her
task force arrived at her planned launch point, only about 30 nautical miles west of
Point Sur, shortly after 0500, before dawn. There were Blue vessels in the area, and
over the next half hour or so, lookouts on both sides spotted opposing ships at considerable range. At 0538 the Blue cruiser Richmond (CL 9) signaled a contact to the
rest of the Blue fleet and launched two floatplanes with the intention of bombing
Saratoga, while continuing to close with the Black task force. Shortly after 0600,
Richmond engaged Saratoga’s escorting heavy cruisers, and even managed briefly to
take the carrier under fire. As the Blue light cruiser was so engaged, her floatplanes
attempted to bomb the carrier, but failed. Soon afterward, at 0627, Saratoga began
launching aircraft, a task completed by 0642. In the middle of this operation,
Saratoga and her escorts were attacked by a dozen bombers and nine fighters off
Langley (CV 1), which had been launched upon confirmation of the carrier’s presence. These inflicted 37-percent damage on Saratoga, rendering about a third of her
flight deck out-of-service for 38 hours, while one of her escorting cruisers was
heavily damaged, one less so, and one not at all. Meanwhile, some of the Saratoga’s
aircraft en route to San Francisco encountered Langley and disabled her in a dive
bombing attack. At 0845, just as Saratoga was preparing to recover aircraft, the Blue
battleship New York (BB 34) began to engage her escort. Although two of the escorting heavy cruisers incurred considerable damage, they managed to cover Saratoga
long enough for her to retrieve all her aircraft by 0934, when the entire group made
its escape at high speed.12 The engagement off San Francisco had cost Black 37 percent damage to Saratoga (with her flight deck out of action for 38 hours and 36 aircraft lost) and two heavy cruisers damaged (48 and 20 percent respectively), serious
casualties at such distance from a friendly base. In contrast, Black had lost a minesweeper and suffered heavy damage to Milwaukee (78 percent) and New York
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(34 percent), as well as lighter damage to Langley (14-percent damaged, with her
flight deck out of service for 3.3 hours), and, of course, damage to port installations,
air units, and other facilities in the San Francisco area.
CINCUS called an end to the fleet problem on the morning of the 18th, since little could be expected to be accomplished by the scheduled termination time, later
that same day.
Although the outcome of Fleet Problem XIV was seized upon by skeptics as a
demonstration of the fragility of carrier operations, carrier advocates rightly observed that the poor results, including the loss of Lexington, were due to faulty planning and tactics, and to the limitations of training and equipment, rather than to a
flawed concept. Operating the carriers separately meant that they could not provide
mutual support, and that attacks could not be delivered with maximum possible
force. The air advocates also pointed out that if carriers and aircrew had been
equipped and trained to conduct night operations, their effectiveness would have
been greatly enhanced, though this criticism applied equally to the fleet’s surface
warships. Most importantly, however, they noted the need for better aircraft;
longer-ranged bombers, torpedo planes, and fighters were necessary so that carriers
would not have to operate so close to their objectives. Admiral McNamee’s selection
of the 100–125 mile exclusion zone around the critical ports had been logical given
that the carriers had to get closer than that in order to launch effective strikes. This
put the carriers well inside the patrol zones, making them vulnerable to surface attack; in all three actions during the fleet problem the carriers had been intercepted
by surface ships, and even battleships, despite a 12-knot speed advantage over the
latter. As a result, in his recommendations during the critique of the problem, Vice
Admiral Standley called for aircraft that could be launched at 350 miles from their
objectives, and recovered at 250.13
Another critical factor in the failure of the carrier operations was the absence of
destroyers. Rear Admiral Senn, Chief Umpire for Blue, observed that depriving the
carriers of destroyers had affected the problem in several ways. Lacking destroyers,
the heavy cruisers had to serve as plane guards. This was a task for which they were
too big and otherwise unsuited, and also reduced the carriers’ security by tying such
strong units too closely to their movements. The lack of destroyers also reduced the
carrier’s screen, which proved disastrous for Lexington and very nearly so for
Saratoga. Senn argued that in developing its plans, Black should have made arrangements to refuel the destroyers so they could accompany the carriers, rather than
leave the flattops poorly protected.14
Echoing the formal conclusions of the fleet problem, Vice Admiral Yarnell, the
aviator who had commanded the Saratoga task force, again called for more carriers,
observing that had the Black attack been made with six or eight carriers, it would
likely have been devastating. He noted that existing treaty limitations permitted the
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Navy to acquire three more vessels, a goal that was already well in hand; the
14,500-ton Ranger (CV 4), was about to be launched, while the 19,800-ton
Yorktown (CV 5) and Enterprise (CV 6) were about to be laid down, and progress
was being made in ordering the 14,700-ton Wasp (CV 7).15
In addition to the call for more carriers, the formal conclusions included recognition of the fact that while attacks by carrier aircraft could be devastating, the
ships themselves were highly vulnerable and their loss could a critical blow to the
fleet’s effectiveness. This resulted in some discussion as to the proper timing of
carrier attacks and the optimal number of aircraft that had to be held in reserve
for “self protection.”
One interesting recommendation was that in the interests of speeding up communications, some tactical messages might not need to be encoded. The argument
was that had Richmond’s 0538 signal to the Blue fleet reporting her sighting of
Saratoga been sent in clear, Langley’s aircraft could have struck the Black carrier at
least ten, and possibly twenty, minutes earlier than was actually the case, catching
her with aircraft readied on deck. Since Black was already aware that they had been
spotted, such a message would not have compromised Blue security.16
The conclusions also included a recommendation that larger, more capable destroyers were needed to replace the aging four pipers, so that carriers would have
proper escorts. In addition, there was some discussion of the need for a better
air-dropped torpedo.17
Recognizing the vulnerability of carriers to surface attack, the critique further
recommended that when battleship construction resumed, the new ships be provided with very high speed, to permit them to accompany carriers for defensive
purposes or to hunt for enemy carriers.18 Some of the officers present commented
on the absence of Army participation, since Blue lacked sufficient land-based air
defense resources, which in actual war would have been provided by the sister service.19 Other developments during the problem included further successful experimentation in the simultaneous refueling of two destroyers from one oiler using
the broadside method, as well as the refueling of destroyers from heavy cruisers,
which would eventually became routine in the fleet,20 and moderately successful
experiments in the coordinated use of land-based radio direction finding stations
to help track ship’s movements.21
There was an interesting possible side effect of Fleet Problem XIV. Apparently
Vice Admiral Clark had been widely expected to be appointed CINCUS in 1934. But
in the event, the post went to Reeves, the highest-ranking aviator in the fleet, while
Clark was transferred to the Navy’s General Board. Some aviators believed that
these developments were the result of Clark’s mishandling of the operation, notably
by dividing his carriers and then undertaking strikes against land targets before first
dealing with surface and air opposition.22
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N O T E S 1 The FY 1933 Navy Department budget was only
$349.4 million, about 8 percent less than that of
FY 1932. Money was so tight that as an economy
measure the selection of umpires for the problem
was restricted to officers on the West Coast;
M964-15, 1, United States Fleet, Problem XIV, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral R. H. Leigh, 20 April 1933, p. 1. See,
also, Keith, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution,” p. 122, note 11; Reynolds, On the Warpath, pp. 104–105.
2 M964-15, 1, United States Fleet, Problem XIV, Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral R. H. Leigh, 20 April 1933; NWCA,
Carton 62, U.S. Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the
CINCUS, Adm. R. H. Leigh, 20 May 1933 (note
the different dates on these two otherwise identically titled documents, which differ in some detail); NWCA, Carton 63, CINCUS to Fleet,
“Critique, United States Fleet Problem XIV, 31
January 1933.” In addition, Keith, “United States
Navy Task Force Evolution,” pp. 119–86 provides
some excellent analysis. There are also some useful observations in Grimes, pp. 108–19; Reynolds,
John H. Towers, pp. 245–68; Reynolds, On the
Warpath, pp. 104–107; and Fry, pp. 60–61. The
problem received extensive press coverage; “Naval Manoeuvres Ordered in Pacific,” New York
Times, Dec. 1, 1932; “Pratt Approves Fleet Operations,” Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1932; “Navy
Manoeuvres in Pacific Feb. 6,” New York Times,
Jan. 17, 1933; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Our Fleet
Plays a Far-Flung War Game,” New York Times,
Feb. 5, 1933; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Rival Fleets
Near Air and Sea ‘War,’” New York Times, Feb. 5,
1933; “Navy to Launch Air Raid on West Coast,”
Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1933; Hanson W.
Baldwin, “‘Enemy’ Warships Now in MidPacific,” New York Times, Feb. 8, 1933; “Fleet
Problem No. 14,” Time, Feb. 13, 1933; Hanson
W. Baldwin, “‘Raid’ Hurled Back by Defense
Fleet,” New York Times, Feb. 17, 1933; Hanson W.
Baldwin, 60 ‘Enemy’ Planes Raid San Francisco,”
New York Times, Feb. 18, 1933; Hanson W.
Baldwin, “Navy Games Leave Doubt Air Raiders
Could Bomb Coast,” New York Times, Feb. 19,
1933.
3 NWCA, Carton 62, U.S. Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the CINCUS, Adm. R. H. Leigh, 20 May
1933, p. 1.
4 “Honolulu Awaits ‘Attack’ From Sea,” Washington Post, Jan. 30, 1933; “Hawaii Guns Await ‘Foe’
in War Games,” New York Times, Jan. 30, 1933;
“Air Assault Opens Hawaii War Game,” Washington Post, Feb 1, 1933.
5 “Hawaii Guns Await ‘Foe’ in War Games,” New
York Times, Jan. 30, 1933.
6 Ibid.
7 On the Clemson Class see Friedman, Destroyers,
pp. 40–48, 402–403.
8 The statement of the problem included a directive
that Blue was not to track Black’s movements
prior to February 10th—a reminder that cheating
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was not unknown; M964-15, 1, United States
Fleet, Problem XIV, Report of the Commanderin-Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral R. H. Leigh,
20 April 1933, p. 8.
9 The “effectiveness” of Blue’s constructive submarines elicited some negative comment in Leigh’s
final report; NWCA, Carton 62, U.S. Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the CINCUS, Adm. R. H. Leigh,
20 May 1933, p. 26.
10 Surprisingly, there does not seem to have been
any critical comment regarding the unusually severe damage the three heavy cruisers were able to
inflict on the two battleships, with Oklahoma taking 66 percent damage and Texas 40 percent, an
artifact of the gunnery rules then in use.
11 J. J. Clark, with Clark G. Reynolds, Carrier Admiral (New York: McKay, 1967), pp. 48–49.
12 It is worth noting that Saratoga had an enormous
flight deck for the time, 888 feet by 106 feet, giving an area of over two acres, and that the aircraft
of the day did not need much landing room.
13 NWCA, Carton 62, U.S. Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the CINCUS, Adm. R. H. Leigh, 20 May
1933, Section 4, p. 2.
14 Ibid.
15 For details see Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers
and DANFS, under the appropriate entries.
16 NWCA, Carton 62, U.S. Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the CINCUS, Adm. R. H. Leigh, 20 May
1933, p. 12. Of course, had Richmond’s signal
been sent in clear, Saratoga would also have been
able to hear it, and take appropriate action.
17 Fleet aircraft were using a modified version of the
1912 Mark 7 torpedo, designed for surface vessels.
A dedicated air droppable torpedo, the Mark 13,
would not become available until 1935. On U.S.
torpedoes see www.navweaps.com/Weapons/
WTUS_Main.htm.
18 In addition to addressing the practical need for
fast battleships, this proposal seems likely to have
been a reminder to the President and Congress
that under the terms of the London Naval Arms
Limitation Treaty of 1930, the United States
would be permitted to begin laying down new
battleships as replacements for ships reaching
prescribed age limits in 1937, and it was essential
to begin planning for this; see “Treaty Between
the United States of America,” Vol. 1, p. 260. By
early 1936, the CNO was openly calling for new
battleship construction; “14 New Warships Urged
by Standley,” New York Times, Apr. 4, 1936; this
included a request for two new battleships.
19 Grimes, p. 119.
20 Wildenberg, Gray Steel, p. 43.
21 NWCA, Carton 62, U.S. Fleet Problem XIV, Report of the CINCUS, Adm. R. H. Leigh, 20 May
1933, Section 3, p. 1.
22 Reynolds, John H. Towers, pp. 245–47, 268; note,
for example, that Saratoga’s strikes against San
Francisco on the morning of February 17th were
launched with Blue vessels in sight.
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Pennsylvania (BB 38), Flagship, U.S. Fleet, Panama Bay, during Fleet Problem XV, April 21, 1934, in an
image taken from an Army Air Corps aircraft. During the fleet problems, the fleet evolved from thinking
about the future of naval warfare in terms of great clashes of battleships, such as had occurred at Jutland
in 1916, to something much more like what would unfold beginning in 1942.
(NH-93548, Naval Historical Foundation)
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XVI

1934

Fleet Problem XV, April 19–May 12, 1934

leet Problem XV almost did not take place.1 At $296.9 million dollars, the FY
1934 Navy Department budget was the lowest since 1916, some $50 million
less than that for FY 1933, and, adjusted for inflation, only 69.5 percent of that
for FY 1923:2 so tight were funds that at one point CNO William H. Standley directed that the problem be cancelled in favor of holding chart maneuvers. CINCUS
David Foote Sellers objected, and convinced the CNO to reverse his decision.3
Standley then proposed a Caribbean scenario, such as had been initially considered
for Fleet Problem XIV, and this was adopted.
According to CINCUS Sellers, the principal objective of Fleet Problem XV was to
present “the officers of the fleet with the challenge of evaluating a constantly changing situation,” for which purpose he deliberately rejected the use of fixed battle
plans.4 The problem was also intended to “prove” the importance of keeping the
fleet together, perhaps as a counter to the argument put forward by the aviation enthusiasts that carriers should be allowed to operate freely. The scenario postulated
that Gray (a “European coalition”) was making aggressive moves in the Caribbean,
requiring the intervention of the fleet, then mainly in the Pacific, a movement
which might be complicated by interference from Brown, a Pacific power more or
less allied to Gray, though possibly neutral. Some of the “motives” were the concentration of a divided fleet in the Caribbean, the defense of the Panama Canal, fleet
tactics, and the capture of an enemy advanced base.
As finally structured, Fleet Problem XV consisted of three parts. These were designated “Exercise L,” “Exercise M,” and “Exercise N,” in sequence with the normal
fleet tactical maneuvers conducted that year. Supplementing these three parts were
various exercises and practices that began when Blue departed San Diego–San
Pedro on April 9, continued in the intervals between the three main parts of the
problem, and went on after the problem until the fleet returned to base, in early November; although the maneuvers and exercises were not continuous, the fleet was
effectively “deployed” for some seven months.
Although each of the three parts involved a different situation, with the opposing fleets organized differently each time, taken together they could be seen as different segments of an ongoing naval campaign, though each portion presented
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what was essentially an elaborate tactical problem, rather than an operational or
strategic one. In addition to nearly 200 carrier aircraft and scores of catapult planes
on battleships and cruisers, over 320 Navy and Marine Corps land- and sea-planes
operated out of San Juan and Ponce, in Puerto Rico, arriving there in stages from the
United States, via Guantanamo and Haiti. Fleet Problem XV was the first since 1925
to involve substantial numbers of marines, and the first in which marine aviation
played an important role, as a result of the withdrawal of constabulary forces from
China, Haiti, and Nicaragua. In addition, as a result of Navy Department General
Order No. 241, issued December 7, 1933, the “Fleet Marine Force” had been established as a component of the U.S. Fleet, comprising forces “in a state of readiness for
operations with the fleet,” thus firmly committing both services to the development
of amphibious capabilities.5 Every subsequent fleet problem involved significant
Marine Corps participation.
Preliminary Movements: April 9–18, 1934
In preparation for the first part of the problem (“Exercise L”), the fleet was divided
into Blue and Brown fleets while still at San Diego and San Pedro.6
Blue (United States) was commanded by Admiral Joseph M. Reeves,
COMBATFOR since June of 1933, who was not only the fleet’s senior aviation officer, but had a solid grounding in the “Big Gun” Navy. Reeves was given the Battle
Force and most of the Scouting Force, with nine battleships, Langley (CV 1) as a surrogate for the incomplete Ranger (CV 4), Lexington (CV 2), and Saratoga (CV 3),
plus five aircraft tenders, as well as five heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and 51
destroyers. Brown (the “Pacific power”), commanded by Rear Admiral John W.
Greenslade, COMSUBFOR, had only five heavy cruisers (one constructive), plus 20
submarines (eight constructive) with a tender, and no aircraft beyond those carried
by the cruisers. Blue thus was enormously superior.
Prior to departing its bases in the San Diego–San Pedro area, Blue conducted a
“secret” mobilization. This brought ships’ companies up close to normal wartime
complements by seconding personnel from the Naval Training Station at San
Diego and other West Coast installations. After Blue departed for Panama, ships
assigned to Brown departed on a different course, to be in position for the start of
the problem. Notional movements of the Gray Fleet in the Atlantic were managed
by the umpires, who from time to time provided injects to the respective commanders regarding Gray’s movements. During their voyages to the maneuvering
area, both Blue and Brown practiced various cruising formations and engaged in
anti-submarine operations and air exercises.
There was also a battleline drill on April 13th that found Blue, under Admiral
Sellers, engaged against Rear Admiral Frederick J. Horne’s Gray “battlefleet,” composed of fleet auxiliaries, during which, according to a press report, “Admirals received flashes that their flag bridges had been shot away, and their staffs, including
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FLEET PROBLEM XV, APRIL 19–MAY 12, 1934

themselves, wiped out. Engineer officers were advised that their power plants were
crippled. Navigators learned their ship’s propellers had been destroyed. Communications were cut off, turrets disabled, and compartments flooded.”7
On April 18th, Brown, proceeding on a different course, received from the umpires occasional messages from “merchant
ships.” These informed Rear Admiral Greenslade of the location,
course, and speed of Blue, which enabled him to move his cruisers
and submarines in anticipation of Exercise L. Blue, however, was
not informed of Brown’s movements.

Fleet Problem XV: Cruising
Disposition 4-S—Defense against
submarine attack, tested April
9–18, 1934.
(NWC Historical Collection)

Exercise L: Concentration of the Fleet, April 19–21, 1934
The first part of the problem8 dealt with an “attack by a large submarine force, assisted by a division of heavy cruisers, against the
remainder of the Fleet in the Pacific approaches to Panama.”9
Blue’s mission was “to bring the Blue Fleet as quickly as possible to
Panama with the least possible reduction in fighting strength,”
while Brown was “to destroy or damage vessels of the Blue Fleet.”
In short, Exercise L was focused on the challenges and opportunities created when an outnumbered but still strong force attempted
to interfere in the movement of the main body of a fleet.
Exercise L began at 0500 on April 19th, with both sides northwest of the Canal, off the coast of Central America. Technically
hostilities had not yet begun. Nevertheless, in anticipation of hostile action, Admiral Reeves had reorganized the Blue fleet, creating
six task forces:
• “Striking Group,” Lexington (CV 2) with several cruisers and destroyers.
• “Battleship Group” of eight battlewagons and some destroyers.
• “Carrier Group,” consisting of Langley (CV 1) and Saratoga (CV 3), aircraft
tenders, and two cruiser divisions, with escorting destroyers.
• “Scouting Group,” some light cruisers and two DESRONS.
• “Train Group.”
• “Command Detachment,” flagship California (BB 44) and two destroyers.
The fleet moved at 11 knots behind a screen formed by the Scouting Group,
backed up by the Carrier Group, while the Striking Group was tasked with long
range anti-submarine patrol. At daylight, the carriers and cruisers launched
reconnaissance aircraft, while a patrol bomber squadron based in the Gulf of
Nicoya maintained three aircraft over the fleet on ASW patrol.
Brown’s Rear Admiral Greenslade, his forces well to the west of Blue’s, formed
two submarine attack groups, and a cruiser group, keeping his submarine tender
separate. Based on the information provided to him on the 18th, Greenslade made
an estimate of the probable location of Blue by the time Exercise L began, and
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deployed his forces accordingly, with orders to concentrate their attacks on major
enemy units. At the start of Exercise L, Brown also put up reconnaissance aircraft,
using the handful that were aboard his four heavy cruisers. Despite the small number and short range of his air assets, Brown’s reconnaissance aircraft were the first to
make contact, and Brown was better able to maintain contact on the first day,
through a combination of effective air scouting and poor radio discipline by Blue.
As early as 0545, a floatplane from Northampton (CA 26) spotted the Blue main
body and got away undetected. On the basis of this information, Brown’s cruisers
began probing the Blue fleet. At 0745, Brown heavy cruiser Salt Lake City (CA 25)
exchanged fire at about 22,000 yards (9.9 nm) for some 40 minutes with two light
cruisers from Saratoga’s screen, with the carrier herself just 18,000 yards (8.9 nm)
beyond. Blue’s Admiral Reeves went to the support of the outgunned cruisers with
his flagship California, which had the immediate effect of removing him from direct
control of the main body. Meanwhile, nine Saratoga scout planes already on patrol
were ordered to attack the Brown heavy cruiser. Since Salt Lake City was zigzagging
at 24 knots, she was hit but three times, and then only with notional 100-pound
bombs, which did little damage. At 0932 Reeves’ flagship California was within
range, and opened up on the cruiser at 22,000 yards. In 22 minutes of firing Salt
Lake City was ruled to have absorbed three 14-inch rounds, causing the loss of two
turrets and a speed reduction to 18 knots. Afterward, a second airstrike put two
more 100-pound bombs into her; the cruiser was ruled out of action at 1538, and
later declared sunk.
Meanwhile, that same morning, three Blue heavy cruisers had begun a sweep
southward to locate and engage any Brown cruisers that might be ahead of the fleet.
Though Blue aircraft regularly spotted, and occasionally attacked, Brown ships, to
little effect, surface contact proved elusive. By 1510, no contacts having been made,
the sweep was called off. Just 13 minutes later, Blue’s Houston (CA 30) spotted
Brown’s Chester (CA 27), Rear Admiral Greenslade’s flagship, at very long range. As
the two ships closed, Chester launched a floatplane to supplement two already aloft,
while Houston followed suit. Houston opened fire at 1545, but deeming the range
too great, Chester did not respond for 12 minutes. The two ships “fought” for 35
minutes, each suffering only minor damage. Then, at 1632, Chester had to declare a
temporary halt to the maneuvers in order to recover her aircraft, an artificiality dictated by safety concerns; her captain, Martin K. Metcalf, later noted that in actual
war he would have withdrawn without a fight, abandoning his planes.10 This effectively ended surface action for the day.
Meanwhile, Blue ships were several times spotted and stalked by Brown submarines. These submarines were, however, prevented from undertaking any attacks by
aggressive Blue destroyer and air patrols, although the latter apparently only engaged in two “attacks” against the submarines.
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Exercise L was recessed at 1800. In anticipation of renewing the maneuvers, during the evening and overnight the fleets regrouped, while continuing their movement toward Panama. Admiral Reeves reorganized the Blue Fleet, merging the
Striking Group into the Carrier Group, giving the latter Lexington, Saratoga, and
Langley.
When Exercise L resumed, at 0500 on the morning of the 20th, clouds hampered
aerial reconnaissance. Despite the cloud cover, Blue opened the day’s operations at
first light with extensive antisubmarine patrols by aircraft and screening by destroyers. This was fortuitous, as two of Brown’s submarine divisions were very close to
the Blue position. Nevertheless, despite the ASW patrols, during the morning
Brown submarines made several attacks, scoring hits on four battleships and a light
cruiser, and in the early afternoon managed a hit on a carrier.
About noon, Brown’s three remaining heavy cruisers formed a scouting line and
probed the Blue formation. Blue heavy cruiser Portland (CA 33) spotted two of the
Brown intruders, and engaged Northampton (CA 26) and Pensacola (CA 24). Blue
aircraft sent to support Portland bombed her in error due to low visibility and poor
ship recognition by the airmen, but fortunately did no damage. Blue battleships and
additional cruisers, supported by aircraft off Lexington, began coming to Portland’s
aid. A protracted air–surface action ensued, and Blue’s superiority proved decisive,
though there was some initial confusion; arriving in the midst of a complex melee,
Blue’s Louisville (CA 28) fired on Portland for several minutes before identifying her
as a friendly vessel. Despite heavy fire from Blue surface ships, it was Blue’s dive
bombers that inflicted the decisive blows; using simulated 1000-pound bombs, they
were ruled to have inflicted heavy damage on Pensacola, leaving her in sinking condition, and then sank Northampton as she was attempting to recover her floatplanes.
Exercise L was ended at 1800.
Overall, during Exercise L Blue suffered one heavy cruiser sunk, plus three battleships, Saratoga, two heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers heavily damaged, and
lesser damage to several other vessels. While Brown had lost heavily, three cruisers
and two submarines sunk, and one heavy cruiser seriously damaged, it had done
well considering its great inferiority.
In his analysis of this part of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS Sellers took Blue commander Reeves to task for several of his decisions. Sellers firstly observed that the organization adopted by Reeves was much too complex for ease of command. In
addition, when organizing his six task forces, Reeves’ had distributed vessels rather
ill-advisedly, noting that the ships of two light cruiser squadrons had been distributed among three different commands. One of these commands was the Carrier
Group, and the light cruisers had previously proven inadequate to help protect the
carriers. As a result, on the morning of the 19th, when Brown heavy cruisers engaged the carriers’ screen, Reeves had to intervene with his flagship, taking himself
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away from the main body of the fleet.11 Although this could be seen as fairly scathing
public criticism of a senior officer by his superior, in fact Sellers’ remarks were not
unusual in fleet problem critiques. In the very same critique, Sellers also praised
Reeves for a number of his actions, such as his conduct of anti-submarine
operations.
Panama: April 19–May 4, 1934
The Blue Fleet reached Panamanian waters on the 19th. The following day, the fleet
began two days of maneuvers to test the defenses of the Canal. Although these maneuvers were not formally part of the fleet problem, the forces involved were the
same as those in Part L, with Blue still commanded by Vice Admiral Reeves and
Gray by Rear Admiral Greenslade. Greenslade’s forces were supplemented by Army
coast artillery, anti-aircraft, and air forces, but the “main event” as it were, was a test
of the ability of Greenslade’s submarines and his division of heavy cruisers, to defend the Canal. The maneuvers ran for 36 hours on April 20–21. Initially, the dozen
submarines, including the Navy’s newest and largest, Argonaut (SS 166), Narwhal
(SS 167), and Nautilus (SS 168), tested new attack tactics and evasion procedures
against air reconnaissance, while the approaching Blue Fleet tested new anti-submarine tactics, experimented with detection technologies, and tried out new depth
charges. On the morning of April 21st, the fleet engaged in a massed attack on the
Canal’s defenses, including major air strikes, which were opposed by coast artillery
fire and Army Air Corps attacks. While the Navy claimed to have wrought great destruction on the Canal’s defenses, and the Army claimed to have sunk two aircraft
carriers, in fact no formal rules for umpiring had been agreed upon, and the results
were tactfully declared a “draw.”12
Upon conclusion of the coast defense exercises, the fleet anchored off Balboa,
where the government of Panama had prepared an elaborate welcome. During the
festivities, the fleet was to begin to transit the Canal, an operation that generally required about two weeks.
Meanwhile, of course, notionally the “war” was still going on. Various “events”
were unfolding in the Atlantic as determined by the umpires. On April 23rd, the
umpires informed Blue that a Gray expedition was in the mid-Atlantic en route to
the Caribbean. Upon receipt of this news, Admiral Reeves urged CINCUS Sellers to
attempt a test of the fleet’s ability to make a rapid transit the Canal, rather than the
scheduled “normal” 14 day passage. Securing permission from the Governor of the
Canal Zone, and in consultation with Army and Canal officials, Sellers directed the
entire fleet to begin an immediate transit. By closing the Canal to commercial traffic
and crowding ships through at faster than normal intervals, it proved possible to
move 110 ships through the Canal in 47 hours.13 Since the movement was
improvised, the transit left the fleet vulnerable to possible enemy attack as it
emerged into the Caribbean.14 As a result, special plans began to be developed to
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allow for a “rush” transit of the Canal, which were tested when the fleet returned to
the Pacific in October.15
Following the transit of the Canal, the fleet was joined by the erstwhile Brown
Fleet, and spent some time replenishing supplies, engaging in routine maintenance,
and preparing for Exercise M, while personnel were allowed liberty.16 To further
maintain verisimilitude, the Fleet continued to maintain wartime routines, including
strict censorship and heightened security against sabotage. The most important activity in this period was the reorganization of the fleet to form a new Blue Fleet
(United States) and a Gray Fleet (European).17 This done, the Gray
Fleet had to proceed eastward into the Caribbean to take up its positions for the beginning of Exercise M.
On May 2nd, Blue was informed that Gray had captured San
Juan, and Ponce, in Puerto Rico, as well as the Virgin Islands, and
was heavily engaged against the garrison at Culebra, an island
just northeast of Puerto Rico, with additional reinforcements expected to arrive on or after May 11th. The Umpires also granted
permission for Blue submarines to begin taking up station in the
Caribbean. Apparently in order to better reflect the original
plans for the fleet problem, the presence of Blue in the Caribbean, following the unplanned Canal transit recommended by
Admiral Reeves, was ignored. As a result, when news of Gray’s
successful operations against Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
arrived, Blue was deemed to still have about a quarter of its ships
in the Pacific, due to a number of incidents of sabotage. On paper, the Blue movement through the Canal was “completed” on
May 4th.
Fleet Problem XV: Cruising
Disposition 4-N—Normal
disposition of readiness.
(NWC Historical Collection)

Exercise M: Movement to Contact, May 5–10, 193418
Although set in the Caribbean, with Gray vaguely defined as a
“European coalition,” it takes little imagination to see the theater as the Central Pacific, with Japan as Gray. At the beginning of Exercise M, Gray was assumed to have
established an advanced base in the Virgin Islands, put small forces ashore at San
Juan and Ponce, and landed troops on Culebra, who were meeting fierce resistance
from the local garrison. Meanwhile, some Gray forces had pushed well forward, patrolling toward Panama in anticipation of an offensive by Blue. Gray’s objective was
to secure Culebra and defend its advanced bases until the arrival of massive reinforcements on the 11th, which would ensure Gray superiority in the theater. Blue,
having just brought its fleet through the Panama Canal on May 4th, had to advance
across the Caribbean, engage and destroy the Gray Fleet, and prevent the capture of
Culebra by May 10th.
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Exercise M involved the most extensive use of constructive and surrogate forces
in any of the fleet problems. In
most cases single units were
taken to represent as many as
five ships or aircraft of like
type. Commanded by Admiral
Reeves, Blue began the exercise
at Cristobal. The backbone of
the fleet was seven battleships
(representing 14), plus Saratoga
(representing
herself
and
Lexington) and Langley as a surrogate for Ranger. In addition,
there were five aircraft tenders,
four heavy cruisers (representing 12) and two light cruisers
(five), 27 destroyers (82), 12
constructive submarines, and
Macon (ZRS 5) representing
two “aerial cruisers.” The fleet was accompanied by seven auxiliaries, representing 14
transports carrying a constructive division of 12,500 Marines. There were also four destroyer minelayers as well as 16 minesweepers and a modest train, several of the latter two groups partially constructive. Supporting Blue was a mostly constructive
group of auxiliaries at Guantanamo, where there were also a large contingent of real
patrol planes, and two Marine air squadrons at San Juan. Gray, under Vice Admiral
Frank H. Brumby, COMSCOFOR since May 1933, was given four battleships (surrogates for four battleships and four battlecruisers), Lexington (representing three
carriers), with five heavy (15) and six light (18) cruisers, 28 destroyers (88), plus 12
submarines (60), and a largely constructive brigade of some 6,500 troops on
Culebra. Both sides were also assumed to have substantial forces in other theaters. A
supposed Blue task force in the eastern Atlantic was assumed to have one carrier of
the Langley type, three heavy and four light cruisers, and 26 destroyers, while Gray
was assumed to have a large constructive expeditionary force en route from Europe,
comprising seven battleships, four carriers, 16 heavy cruisers, 19 light cruisers, 58
destroyers, and 28 submarines, escorting transports carrying two infantry divisions.
Operationally, Exercise M was one of the “busiest” in the entire series of fleet
problems.
At the beginning of Exercise M, at 0500 on May 5th, Gray had its forces well out
into the Caribbean. Gray had cruisers and destroyers on a scouting line in an arc 240
miles out from Colon, with its main body hovering just behind these at about 30°
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Fleet Problem XV: Cruising
Disposition 4-D—Defense against
destroyer attack, tested during
Exercise M.
(NWC Historical Collection)

bearing from Colon. When the maneuvers began, the Gray scouting line pressed
forward, while the main body, consisting of a battleship/battlecruiser force and a
carrier force, held back.
Meanwhile, Blue, with its constructive submarines already on patrol, sortied
from its bases, in two bodies. A “Striking Force” of two carriers, 16 heavy cruisers,
and eight destroyers (represented by Saratoga, four heavy cruisers, and two destroyers) supported by Macon, ran at high speed to the northwest,
while the main body proceeded to the northeast. Although the
movement of Blue’s main body was hampered by the slowness
of the constructive troop ships and train, contact between the
two sides came quickly.
First contact was made by fiat of the umpires, an inject informing Blue that its constructive submarines had encountered
the Gray patrol line at 0530. Around noon Blue air scouts
sighted some of the patrolling Gray ships. Surface units began
making contact at 1600, when, though widely separated, both
the Blue Striking Force and the main body began encountering
elements of the Gray screen. From then into the night there
were a number of minor skirmishes between surface units.
Late on May 5th, Gray destroyers began making torpedo
attacks on Blue. Saratoga and seven Blue battleships suffered
varying degrees of damage, though Gray lost eight of the attacking destroyers.19 This began a pattern of surface, submarine, and air skirmishing, by day and night, that went on
almost continuously until Blue reached the vicinity of
Culebra, on the 9th.20 There were a total of 31 separate actions; 15 surface engagements, including five surface torpedo attacks involving from four to twelve destroyers, plus a
very successful Gray heavy cruiser raid that wiped out Blue’s
aircraft tenders in Great Mesle Bay, Haiti, as well as numerous submarine attacks, and seven major air attacks, including one by Consolidated P2Ys. 21 In the
course of these operations, Gray proved highly successful in locating and attacking Blue vessels, aided partially by the presence aboard the battleship Mississippi
(BB 41) of an experimental high-frequency direction-finding device that helped
locate enemy ships, since Blue seems to have been somewhat careless about communications security.
On the 10th the Gray Fleet engaged the Blue main body off Culebra. What followed was a general action characterized by coordinated air–surface attacks, in
which Gray dive bombers and torpedo bombers provided tactical support to battleships, cruisers, and destroyers engaged against Blue vessels.22 During this action,
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Gray benefited from the division of Blue’s heavy surface forces into several task
groups. As a result, the united Gray battleline—constructively four battleships and
four battlecruisers—was able to jump a much weaker detachment of Blue battleships. Just in the final battle on the 10th, air strikes and surface action resulted in the
sinking of three Blue battleships, a carrier, eight heavy cruisers, and three destroyers,
plus damage to two battleships and several other vessels, while Gray suffered only a
light cruiser and seven destroyers sunk, plus damage to its four battlecruisers, two
light cruisers, and several destroyers. Despite Gray’s tactical success, by the end of
the day Blue was locally very much superior, and Gray’s battleships and
battlecruisers were very low on ammunition.23 Meanwhile, Blue’s Marines had
landed on Culebra at about 0900 to relieve the garrison and secure the island by
noon, the formal end of Exercise M.24 The remarkably numerous series of engagements between May 5th and the 10th resulted in very heavy overall “losses” for both
sides.
Warship Losses, Exercise M, May 5–10, 1934

BB/CC
CV
CA
CL
DD
SS
Aux

Blue
Fleet
14
3
12
5
82
12
38

Sunk
6
3
6
2
25
0
8

Dmg
8
0
8
4
11
0
5

Gray
Fleet
8
3
15
18
88
60
0

Sunk
0
2
7
8
52
4
0

Dmg
6
1
8
9
10
0
0

Note: Figures are approximations, as losses are given differently in different sections of the
final report. Losses include double-counting of vessels “restored” to service by the umpires
and subsequently sunk or damaged. Fleet indicates total force available, including constructive vessels. Sunk indicates vessels ruled lost, Dmg those ruled damaged. Losses of aircraft tenders could not be established, but Blue also lost the Macon (ZRS 5) to air attack, its
25
notional assets in airships thus being halved.

The “fighting” had left both sides with approximately equal fleets, though Gray
was seriously short of destroyers. In the air, the picture was different. Both sides had
suffered heavy casualties among their aircraft, and Blue no longer had a carrier,
while Gray was down to a single damaged one. Blue, however, still had available a
good many land- and tender-based aircraft, which could operate out of Puerto Rico,
which meant that Gray was seriously short of aviation resources. Nevertheless,
given the presumptive arrival of Gray’s constructive expeditionary force on May
11th, Blue would have been decidedly inferior in naval and air assets thereafter, but
lacking a base, which set the stage for Exercise N.
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While some individual fights during the world wars attained the severity of
many of the individual actions in the series of engagements that characterized Exercise M, historically, there is no operation that displays the same length and intensity.
In terms of length, the most intensive naval action in World War II between the U.S.
Navy and the Imperial Navy on essentially equal terms was the protracted “Naval
Battle of Guadalcanal,” November 12–15, 1942, an almost continuous series of surface, air, land, submarine, air-surface, and land–sea engagements. The Japanese
committed two battleships, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and 33 destroyers
to the battle or to covering the movement of 11 transports. They lost two battleships, one heavy cruiser, three destroyers, and all eleven transports sunk, plus two
heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and three destroyers damaged. Thus, damaged
vessels and transports aside, the Japanese lost about 13 percent of the warships they
committed. The U.S. Navy committed two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light
cruiser, two anti-aircraft cruisers, and 17 destroyers to the fighting or to cover the
movement of seven transports, and lost two anti-aircraft cruisers and nine destroyers sunk, for losses in sunk vessels of about 38 percent, plus one battleship, three
heavy cruisers, and two destroyers damaged. While American losses were proportionately much higher than those of the Japanese, and U.S. assets in the theater
much less numerous, the strategic consequences of this action were enormous.
None of the Japanese reinforcements reached Guadalcanal, and the Japanese lost
control of local waters, while all of the American transports reached the island.
Thus, at great cost the United States ensured that the Japanese on Guadalcanal were
doomed. This suggests that the willingness to absorb casualties that manifested itself in Exercise M was not misplaced.26
Interestingly, notional casualties during Exercise M and actual casualties during
the protracted fighting off Guadalcanal on November 12–15, 1942, were much
more serious as a proportion of forces involved than losses suffered by either the
British or German fleets at Jutland in 1916. In several hours of fighting on May
31–June 1, 1916, the British Grand Fleet, with 37 battleships and battlecruisers,
eight armored cruisers, 34 light cruisers, and 79 destroyer-type ships, plus two other
vessels, lost three battlecruisers, three armored cruisers, and eight destroyers, about
8 percent of the warships committed. The German High Sea Fleet, of 27 capital
ships, nine light cruisers, and 55 destroyers, lost two capital ships, four light cruisers,
and five destroyers, about 12 percent.
The final report for Fleet Problem XV outlined the damage suffered by the ships
on both sides during Exercise M, with an emphasis on casualties to battleships. For
battleships, the primary cause of sinking was the torpedo, in surface action. All six
Blue battlewagons ruled lost succumbed to destroyer torpedo attacks, albeit that
some of them had already been damaged earlier, by torpedoes, gunfire, air attack, or
some combination thereof. In contrast, for carriers, heavy cruiser gunfire proved
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the most dangerous, accounting for both Gray carriers ruled sunk during the maneuvers, and two of Blue’s; the third Blue carrier, which succumbed to a Gray carrier
air strike, was apparently the only ship actually sunk solely by air attack during the
exercise. The effectiveness of nocturnal destroyer torpedo attacks was quite realistic,
as later demonstrated in numerous actions between the U.S. Navy and the Imperial
Navy in the Southwest Pacific in 1942–43.27
Reflecting the effective work that carriers had done during Exercise M, in his critique CINCUS Sellers wrote, “It is generally accepted in the Fleet that our carriers,
accompanied by strong cruiser forces, should be used offensively.” Going on to call
for better aircraft, he specified that at a majority of carrier bombers should be capable of carrying 500 and 1,000 pound bombs. He also pointed out the need for larger
and faster tenders for patrol aircraft and continuing problems with cruiser scout
planes.28 Other recommendations included the usual call for faster auxiliaries, the
need for some improvements in umpiring, and a recommendation that all personnel receive more training in maintaining radio silence, based on Gray’s successful
use of the experimental high frequency direction finding equipment fitted to Mississippi.29 Unfortunately, reflecting contemporary American racial attitudes, Sellers
missed the full importance of Gray’s effective whittling down of Blue during Exercise M, writing “it is by no means probable that an Asiatic power could wage such an
efficient war of attrition as that waged by the GRAY Fleet.”30
Exercise N: Fleet Tactics, May 11–12, 1934
Exercise N31 was essentially a battle practice rather than a free maneuver, and a good
example of how the fleet’s standard type and tactical practices and exercises were often worked into a fleet problem.32 The premise of Exercise N was that the Gray reinforcements had finally arrived to beef up the surviving Gray fleet in the Caribbean,
and intended to “force action upon Blue” in order to recover the lost bases. The Gray
Fleet, under Rear Admiral Greenslade, who had commanded Brown during Exercise L, consisted almost entirely of constructive ships; 13 auxiliaries stood in for 12
battleships and two battlecruisers, and there were also three constructive aircraft
carriers, 15 constructive heavy and light cruisers, and nearly 40 constructive destroyers, all represented by a handful of actual ships. Including some constructive
ships, Blue, commanded directly by CINCUS Sellers, had twelve battleships,
Lexington and Saratoga, nine heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, 46 destroyers, and
three divisions of submarines. In air resources, Gray had only the 126 constructive
aircraft aboard its carriers plus some constructive battleship and cruiser floatplanes,
while Blue had 144 carrier aircraft, plus three squadrons of patrol bombers operating from tenders, as well as battleship and cruiser floatplanes, and Marine aircraft
based in Puerto Rico. So on paper, while the two fleets were more or less equal in
surface combatants, Blue was decidedly superior in the air.
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Exercise N opened at 1500 on the 11th, as Blue submarines proceed to take up
their assigned stations, with the Gray fleet already at sea. The actual maneuvers began at 0501 (dawn) on the 12th, as the Blue main body put out from its anchorage at
Culebra while destroyers of the Blue scouting force proceeded from St. Thomas.
Both sides initiated operations with air–sea searches. Contact was made by aircraft
and submarines in the mid-morning. There followed numerous air and submarine
attacks, with little damage inflicted. Shortly after 1330 surface units began encountering each other. Over the next hour contacts became increasingly frequent, as
more and more ships began to engage, and by 1418 a general battleline action had
begun. This involved simulated gunnery exchanges, with aerial spotting, destroyer
torpedo attacks, submarine attacks, and air tactical support of the battleline, with
Blue aircraft making a nicely coordinated attack in combination with their battleships. Exercise N concluded in late afternoon.
In commenting on Exercise N, CINCUS Sellers commended all hands for a “well
conducted” exercise. He particularly noted that although he had not issued specific
tactical instructions, nor subsequent orders to any of the air, submarine, or scouting
forces, they had performed well in accordance with existing Battle Instructions, suggesting that these had reached a degree of refinement that required no further adjustment, though he cautioned that since the “fighting” had been against a totally
constructive enemy, care should be taken in not making the wrong conclusions.
Afterward: May 12–November 9, 1934
Following Exercise N, the fleet lay in Gonaives Bay, Haiti, for nearly two weeks, while
personnel worked on their reports. Departing on the 25th, the fleet arrived off New
York on the 31st. Off the Ambrose Light, a review was held for President Roosevelt,
who was aboard Indianapolis (CA 35). Then, with Indianapolis in the lead, the fleet
steamed into New York Harbor to anchor in the North River or tie up at piers along
Manhattan’s West Side. There followed a busy schedule of public receptions and entertainments for the officers and men of the Fleet, including a parade on Riverside
Drive. Press coverage was extensive, providing the Navy with excellent publicity at a
time when the administration was developing plans to rebuilding the fleet to treaty
standards.33 Among the ceremonies was a change-of-command aboard Pennsylvania on June 15, 1934, as Admiral Joseph M. Reeves took over as CINCUS. Reeves
combined a thorough grounding in the “Big Gun” Navy with a remarkably innovative understanding of air power, having earned observer’s wings in the mid-1920s,
and he was the only aviator to serve as CINCUS in the interwar period. The most influential officer in the development of carrier aviation, repeatedly “pushing the envelope,” Reeves also proved one of the most popular senior officers in the history of
the Navy.34
A few days later, the entire fleet steamed for Newport, Rhode Island, were it remained for several weeks. August found most of the fleet in the Caribbean for
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gunnery exercises. Then it proceeded to Panama. Arriving off Panama on October
22nd, the fleet spent the following day in joint maneuvers with the Army to test the
defenses of the Canal against an attack from the Pacific side. While the Army rushed
troops and aircraft from the Atlantic side of the Canal to the Pacific side, CINCUS
Reeves ordered a second “rush” transit of the Canal, so that the fleet could confront
the “enemy” in the Pacific. Despite not having provided the Army advance notice of
his intention, the operation was successfully carried out on October 24–25, when 79
ships passed through the Canal in 42 hours.35 The fleet lingered in Panama for Navy
Day, and shortly afterward steamed home, returning to Southern California on November 9th. It had been away from its bases in Southern California for seven
months, one of the longest deployments of the U.S. Fleet in the interwar period.36
In his account of aviation in the interwar fleet problems, James M. Grimes noted
that the principal result of Fleet Problem XV37 “was the realization brought out by
air operations during the problem, that if the carrier was to be the offensive weapon
it was considered to be, carrier-based planes would have to be so armed that they
could carry the offensive to the enemy.” It was seen that planes carrying 100-pound
bombs were obsolete and of little use against an enemy force equipped with planes
capable of carrying 500- and 1000-pound bombs. The need for heavier bombs, and
thus aircraft capable of carrying them, had been pointed out before, most recently
in the critique of Fleet Problem XIV; nevertheless, it seems that the Fleet Problem
XV finally drove the point home to the fleet’s senior leadership.
The extensive trials devoted to coordinated air–surface attacks during Fleet
Problem XV, which were ruled quite successful, became a common feature of the
subsequent problems. Despite considerable optimism about such tactics, however,
there does not seem to have been any occasion during World War II when such tactics were employed.38
The fleet problem continued to demonstrate difficulties with battleship and
cruiser float planes, which had not performed as effectively as expected. During Exercise L, for example, cruiser floatplanes from both sides had made repeated attacks
against opposing ships, but, unable to carry more than the lightest bombs, had inflicted only superficial damage. Moreover, recovery of the aircraft in any but calm
seas was difficult and dangerous, and exposed their ships to enemy attack;
Northampton was lost on April 20th because she was caught virtually motionless,
while trying to recover her floatplanes. In addition, the floatplanes were a potential
hazard aboard ship during a surface engagement, not only were they vulnerable to
blast damage from the ship’s own guns, but if damaged they became serious fire
hazards. CINCUS Sellers also made a particular point of criticizing the penchant of
spotter plane pilots to make attacks on their targets, a dubious undertaking given
their limited bomb capacity, which led him to conclude that floatplanes were of
“doubtful war value.” This conclusion was too broad.39 While it was true that during
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World War II the U.S. Navy no longer considered floatplanes the principal means of
aerial reconnaissance, and dismissed them as a reliable offensive arm, they certainly
proved valuable in spotting for battleship and cruiser gunfire.40
The problem also finally settled the question of the value of airships. At 1015 on
May 6th, during Exercise M, Macon had spotted the Gray main body and was
promptly “shot down” by Gray fighters, as also were two of her Sparrowhawk “parasite” fighters that tried to intervene. During Exercise N, Macon was unable to conduct a reconnaissance due to contrary head winds, and was assigned to “make
continuous and complete weather reports in the area between the two fleets,” while
Blue fell back on the much more reliable flying boats operating out of Puerto Rico.
Fleet Problem XV was the last in which an airship was used. Macon herself crashed
in a storm in early 1935, and shortly afterward the Navy abandoned the use of rigid
airships.41
In contrast to the poor performance of floatplanes and the airship, other elements of the fleet’s air forces had done excellent work. The dive bombers had proven
formidable. In addition, the Consolidated P2Y amphibian patrol bomber had
turned in a creditable performance, which seemed to justify the confidence placed
in them in some circles, as they had done well on reconnaissance missions and had
inflicted considerable damage in their role as bombers, which held out the promise
of even better results once the new Consolidated PBY came into service, in 1935.
There were many other recommendations, including the oft repeated calls for
the procurement of faster auxiliaries, to improve fleet speed, and for better communications discipline. Some officers commented publicly that the Navy had to increase crew sizes, and to spend more time at sea and less in competitions between
ships, which had developed to a “cut throat degree.”42
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N O T E S 1 For FP XV, M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem
XV, CINCUS, 1 June 1934, also available at
NWCA, Carton 63; NWCA, Carton 63, CINCUS
to Fleet, “Fleet Problem XV—1934.” There is a
good analysis in Keith, “United States Navy Task
Force Evolution,” pp. 187–276, and Grimes, pp.
120–42, though he gets his geography wrong (e.g.,
putting the Gulf of Nicoya on the Caribbean side
of Costa Rica, p. 120). For some useful observations, see Laning, pp. 362–69, and Wildenberg,
All the Factors, pp. 231–35. There was considerable press coverage; “102 Navy Vessels Open
‘30-Day War,’” New York Times, Apr. 11, 1934;
“Submarines Aid in Fleet ‘Battle,’” New York
Times, Apr. 12, 1934; “Fleet Begins Trip Through
Panama Canal,” Washington Post, Apr. 22, 1934;
Hanson W. Baldwin, “4 Caribbean Bases Await
Fleet War,” New York Times, May 5, 1934;
Hanson W. Baldwin, “Gray Fleet Seizes Culebra
Island,” New York Times, May 11, 1934; Hanson
W. Baldwin, “Final ‘Battle’ Ends Fleet Manoeuvres,” New York Times, May 18, 1934; etc.
2 This excludes additional funds provided to the
Navy under the terms of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, some $238 million
of Works Progress Administration money, a sum
equal to 80 percent of the official budget, which
could be used only to build new warships. On the
intricacies of the budgeting process for FY 1934,
see John C. Walker, “The Navy Department and
the Campaign for Expanded Appropriations,
1933–1938” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Maine at Orono, 1972), pp. 35–79.
3 Keith, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution,” pp. 190–91, has some discussion of this.
4 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, p. 66. See Trent Hone, “Evolution of
Fleet Tactical Doctrine,” pp. 1128–29, has a short
discussion of the senior leadership’s concerns
about reliance on the “canned solution.”
5 See Annual Report, 1934, p. 10; Hough, Ludwig,
and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, pp.
11–14; William D. Parker, pp. 48–49.
6 “113 Naval Vessels to Leave Pacific,” New York
Times, Apr. 8, 1934.
7 “Staffs ‘Wiped Out’ in Naval ‘Battle,’” New York
Times, Apr. 14, 1934. There is no information on
this exercise in the documents associated with
FP XV.
8 NWCA, Carton 63, CINCUS to Fleet, “Fleet
Problem XV—1934,” p. 1, and Enclosure A. Note
that during this part of the problem, ships were
referred to not by their names, but only by their
Navy alphanumeric classification code; thus, in all
communications and documents the battleship
California, for example, was referred to simply as
“BB-44.” Moreover, in some cases, ships’ alphanumeric identifiers were also changed; Chester
(CA 27) was referred to only as “CA-4.” For the
present purposes, this curious practice has been
ignored.
9 NWCA, Carton 63, CINCUS to Fleet, “Fleet
Problem XV—1934,” p. 1, and Enclosure B.
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10 This comment, made during the critique of the
problem, was endorsed by CINCUS Sellers;
M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, p. 3.
11 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, pp. 1–8.
12 “Canal Defenses Trained on Fleet,” New York
Times, Apr. 20, 1934; “Submarines Give Test,”
New York Times, Apr. 20, 1934; “Great Fleet
Heads for Canal Attack,” New York Times, Apr.
21, 1934; “Warships Mass in Pacific,” New York
Times, Apr. 21, 1934; “Battle for Canal results in a
Draw,” New York Times, Apr. 20, 1934.
13 The movement ignored the “existence” of constructive vessels. Normally the fleet passed
through without interrupting commercial traffic,
each ship requiring about eight hours to make the
50-mile trip. See “Fleet Begins Trip Through Panama Canal,” Washington Post, Apr 22, 1934;
“Fleet will Rush Through Canal,” New York
Times, Apr. 23, 1934; “Fleet on Dash Through
Canal,” New York Times, Apr. 24, 1934; “Last of
War Fleet Leaves the Pacific,” New York Times,
Apr. 26, 1934 (noting that the first ship to pass
the canal following the fleet’s movement was the
British heavy cruiser Exeter); “Fleet Transit Canal
in 2 Day,” New York Times, Apr. 26, 1934. Rumors of a sabotage attempt prompted the Canal
Zone government to impose very tight security
and press censorship; “Plot Story Causes Heavy
Guard,” New York Times, Apr. 26, 1934.
14 Annual Report, 1936, pp. 10–11; Laning, pp.
363–64; John D. Hayes, “Admiral Joseph Mason
Reeves, USN (1872–1948),” Part II, Naval War
College Review, Jan. 1972, p. 58.
15 “Navy Adopts Unit Passage Rule at Canal,”
Washington Post, Jun. 21, 1934; Hayes, II, p. 38.
16 “Sailors Swarm into Cristobal,” New York Times,
Apr. 25, 1934; “Sailor Throngs Win Colon
Praise,” New York Times, Apr. 27, 1934; Hanson
W. Baldwin, “Canal Zone Rings to Navy’s
Hymns,” New York Times, Apr. 30, 1934.
17 Hanson W. Baldwin, “Fleet Is Dividing for New
‘Battle,’” New York Times, May 4, 1934; Hanson
W. Baldwin, “4 Caribbean Bases Await Fleet
War,” New York Times, May 5, 1934.
18 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, pp. 13–34, which has a detailed operational narrative; see also NWCA, Carton 63,
Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force, to CINCUS.
19 NWCA, Carton 63, Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force, to CINCUS, pp. 3–4.
20 On the afternoon of the 8th there occurred an
unusual development in which the dynamics of
the maneuvers posed a serious threat to the safety
of the fleet. The Umpires had ruled that due to serious “damage” the Blue flagship California had
lost all communication capability. As the fleet was
steaming on a 15-mile front approaching narrow
waters off Culebra, this posed a serious danger.
Adm. Reeves had to threaten to use the emergency communications circuit to order a change
of course before the Umpires relented and
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allowed “normal” communications at 1530. See
Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 232–33.
21 Compiled from M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS, 1 June 1934, pp. 71ff.
22 None of the documents examined discussed what,
if any, deconfliction measures were taken during
this, and subsequent, “three dimensional” engagements, some of which saw opposing
subsurface and surface vessels and air units all
maneuvering in the same battlespace simultaneously.
23 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, p. 53.
24 There was a salient typo in the New York Times
account of the capture of Culebra; Hanson W.
Baldwin, “Gray Fleet Seizes Culebra Island,” New
York Times, May 11, 1934.
25 Compiled from M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS, 1 June 1934, pp. 15–50, 71ff.
26 For short treatments of these actions, see
Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 225–87,
and O’Hara, The U.S. Navy Against the Axis, pp.
99–129. Note that total U.S. Navy destroyer losses
during the entire Pacific War were only about the
same as those incurred by Gray during Exercise M.
27 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, pp. 39ff. For the U.S. Navy’s problems in night fighting during World War II,
see below.
28 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, p. 36.
29 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, p. 57; Thomas Hone, “Evolution of
the U.S. Fleet,” p. 67; Hone and Hone, p. 11.
30 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, p. 36.
31 NWCA, Carton 63, CINCUS to Fleet, “Fleet
Problem XV—1934,” p. 1, and Enclosure C.
32 NWCA, Carton 63, CINCUS to Fleet, “Fleet
Problem XV—1934,” p. 1.
33 See, for example, “Roosevelt Will Review Whole
Fleet Here in June When Ships Mass From Two
Coasts,” New York Times, Jan. 11, 1934; “Roosevelt to See Air War Simulated,” New York Times,
May 3, 1934; “President, Aids to View Huge Fleet
May 31,” Washington Post, May 20, 1934; “City
Awaits Sea Pageant,” New York Times, May 31,
1934; “50,000 Afloat See Fleet Sail up Bay,” New
York Times, Jun. 1, 1934; “Throngs Flock to Fleet
as City Welcomes Navy,” New York Times, Jun. 2,
1934; “8 Navies Honored at Brilliant Ball,” New
York Times, Jun. 2, 1934; “Clergy Hail Fleet as
Force for Peace,” New York Times, Jun. 4, 1934;
“Fleet Sails Away as City Bids Adieu,” New York
Times, Jun. 19, 1934. See also, “Visit of the United
States Fleet to New York, May 31 – June 17,
1934” (New York: New York Public Library,
1934), a compilation of documents related to the
visit. Frank Uhlig, Jr., provided some eyewitness
commentary on the review, which he witnessed as
a six-year-old from one of “a horde of private
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small craft” that hovered around the fringes of
the fleet; private communication, June 2008.
34 A notion of Reeves’ popularity may be gained by
noting that when his dog Punch died, obituaries
ran in several newspapers and service publications; see, for example, “Punch, Dog Friend of
Navy, Is Dead,” New York Times, Jul. 13, 1936.
Surprisingly, Reeves had to wait until 2003 for a
biography, Thomas Wildenberg’s All the Factors
of Victory: Adm. Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Air Power (Dulles: Brassey’s, 2003).
35 “Strong Naval Force Will Attack Panama,” New
York Times, Oct. 23, 1934; “U.S. Fleet Racing for
Canal Transit Mark,” New York Times, Oct. 24,
1934; ““Canal Defended from Naval Raid,” New
York Times, Oct. 25, 1934; “War Conditions Simulated,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1934; “79 Ships
Go Through Canal in 42 Hours In United States
Battle Fleet Manoeuvres,” New York Times, Oct.
25, 1934. In 1939 the fleet officially made the
transit in just 36 hours; “Navy War Game,” New
York Times, Jan. 22, 1939.
36 Hayes, “Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves,” Part II,
p. 58. Some elements of the fleet returned even
later; e.g., Salt Lake City (CA 25), not until December 18th.
37 Grimes, pp. 140–41.
38 Trent Hone, “Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine,” pp. 1139–41, has a short analysis of these
tactics. Arguably, the U.S. Navy employed such
tactics during the Battle off Samar (October 25,
1944), when Japanese battleships “jumped” a
clutch of escort carriers and their screening destroyers and destroyer escorts, but this was a matter of desperation, rather than reasoned
calculation; for a short treatment, see Samuel
Eliot Morison, Leyte (Boston: Little, Brown,
1958), pp. 242–316.
39 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, pp. 3–4.
40 Grimes, pp. 229–30. Conclusions drawn from
other problems were similar; see Richardson, p.
246, with reference to FP XXI, etc. In contrast, the
Imperial Navy continued to rely on floatplanes
for reconnaissance and even attack throughout
the war.
41 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS,
1 June 1934, p. 54; Grimes, pp. 127–28; “Macon
Fails in Fleet Test,” Washington Post, May 10,
1934, p. 1; “Airship Building Will Come to Halt,”
New York Times, Feb. 14, 1935.
42 See, for example, NWCA, Carton 63, Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force, to CINCUS, p. 7;
“Cruise Emphasizes Navy’s Weak Points,” New
York Times, Jun. 10, 1934. One unusual recommendation dealt with the management of garbage
at sea; little more than two hours into Exercise L,
CINCUS Sellers observed, “a large amount of refuse was being thrown overboard by Batdiv 1,”
and commented in his critique that this could
have helped the enemy determine the course of
the fleet; M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV,
CINCUS, 1 June 1934, p. 1.

193

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Vice Adm. Harris Laning, COMBATFOR (left), in the flag plot of the USS California (BB 44), with his Chief-of-Staff, Capt. R. S. Holmes, May 4, 1935,
during Phase II of Fleet Problem XVI. Despite a superior performance commanding the White Fleet during Phase III, Laning’s most important contribution to
the service came during his several tours at the Naval War College, where, when an instructor, he devised the first rules for the use of aircraft carriers in
wargames, and later, as college president, helped devise formal rules for adjudicating the fleet problems.
(NWC Archives)
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1935

Fleet Problem XVI, April 29–June 10, 1935

F

leet Problem XVI was the largest yet held in the Pacific, and the first to be truly
strategic in scope, with multiple operations across an enormous theater, some
5,000,000 square miles stretching from the West Coast to Hawaii and the Aleutians, a region promptly dubbed the “North Pacific Triangle.”1 It was also the first
problem in which four aircraft carriers took part, Langley, Lexington, Saratoga, and
Ranger, and involved nearly 500 aircraft, between those in the fleet and those based
ashore, nearly 50 percent more than had taken part in any previous problem. It was
also characterized by unusual restrictions on press coverage, and while large numbers of reporters were permitted to accompany the fleet, their dispatches were subject to some censorship.2
The premise was that Black (Japan), operating from bases in the Aleutians, had
captured Midway and established a strong advanced base there, threatening Hawaii.
White (United States), which held the West Coast and Hawaii, had to take the offensive, securing Midway and the Aleutians.
Plans for Fleet Problem XV were announced on December 28, 1934, the very
same day that Japan formally withdrew from the Washington and London naval
arms limitation treaties. This caused some politicians, peace groups, religious leaders, and journalists in both the United States and Japan to assert that the fleet problem was being staged in response to the Japanese action, as a not-so-subtle threat.
Some self-proclaimed peace advocates argued that holding maneuvers west of Hawaii was “provocative.” And, since Japan had announced that its own maneuvers
were to be held in the Kurile Islands and North Pacific, some pundits even prattled
on about the possibility of an “accidental” encounter between American and Japanese ships that might initiate an international incident. Responding to the claim
that the choice of the Aleutians put the U.S. Navy in a position to “threaten” Japan,
Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson pointed out that not only were American
ships limited to operations east of the 180th Meridian, but that the Aleutians were
actually further from Japan than the Marshalls, where Japan had held recent maneuvers, were from Hawaii. He also noted that not only did the defined boundaries
of the maneuvering area put some 900 miles between the U.S. Fleet and Japanese
territory, but that the Imperial Navy’s maneuvers were not to begin until the fleet
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problem was over. Nevertheless, the shrillness of some of the rhetoric actually
prompted the Japanese Navy Minister to have an aide make some extremely conciliatory comments.3
The problem was intended to test the fleet’s abilities in different aspects of a naval campaign, including strategic movement, fleet engagement, submarine and
anti-submarine operations, amphibious operations, underway refueling, carrier
operations, and more. Fleet Problem XVI was the first that clearly incorporated the
movement of the fleet from its bases to the maneuver areas into a comprehensive
plan of campaign. The actual maneuvers were divided into five parts, each focused
on different aspects of an unfolding naval campaign. This segmented approach permitted the fleet to be reorganized and redeployed for each of the different phases of
the problem, making for a more flexible exercise schedule, while still maintaining a
unified strategic picture. In Phases I, II, and III, the opposing fleets were designated
White (United States) and Black (Japan); for Phases IV and V, White was changed to
Blue.
Although CINCUS Admiral Joseph M. Reeves invited the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department to participate, Army involvement in the problem was
limited to some anti-submarine patrols by Army Air Corps aircraft when the fleet
was entering or leaving Pearl Harbor.4 The Coast Guard, however, took part at its
own request, and was later commended for its services.
Phase I: Concentration of the Fleet, April 29–May 3, 1935
Phase I consisted of a series of movements intended to simulate the concentration
of a major expeditionary force in preparation for an offensive, under the threat of
enemy submarine attack. White, was based at San Pedro and San Diego under the
command of CINCUS Reeves, who was also serving as Chief Umpire, which may
have caused some confusion during the maneuvers, as shall be seen. The White fleet
included virtually the entire U.S. Fleet; a dozen battleships, four carriers and three
aircraft tenders, 13 heavy and eight light cruisers, 59 destroyers, 23 submarines, and
four destroyer minelayers, with over 20 auxiliaries and transports, carrying a largely
notional Marine Corps expeditionary force. For this phase, White was organized
into four task forces:
• Northern Force, under Vice Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, COMSCOFOR, of
two battleships, some cruisers, and several destroyers, to proceed to Puget
Sound, and thence on to Alaska and the Aleutians.
• Western Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Thomas C. Hart,
COMCRUDIV 6, with Lexington and some cruisers and destroyers, plus the
target ship Utah (AG 16/ex-BB 31), serving as a transport for the marine
assault force, to conduct an amphibious landing on Midway.
• Main Body, directly under Admiral Reeves, with the balance of the fleet,
which was to sortie from San Pedro and San Diego, steam to San Francisco,
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where it was to pick up a constructive expeditionary force, and then
prepare to proceed to Hawaii.
• Train, commanded by Rear Admiral Watt Tyler Cluverius, COMBASFOR,
with various auxiliaries, and Langley plus a small escort, was to follow the
fleet to Hawaii.
During this phase of the problem, Black, commanded by Rear Admiral Cyrus W.
Cole, COMSUBFOR, had only nine submarines. Black’s mission was to disrupt the
White concentration, and the submarines began the problem deployed to intercept
the fleet as it moved from Southern California northward.
White was scheduled to depart from its bases in Southern California beginning
on the 29th.5 The Northern Force departed at midnight on April 28–29, and reached
Puget Sound on May 2nd, it then proceeded northwestward toward the Gulf of
Alaska. The Western Force departed at 0100 on May 1, and the Train departed later
that same day, both bound west. These three forces found Phase I uneventful.
In contrast, the Main Body, which departed Southern California on April 29th,
had a more eventful time, a consequences of several errors. First, anxious to get to
sea as quickly as possible, Admiral Reeves sortied from the fleet bases too early for
preliminary ASW air patrols; The San Diego contingent departed at 0400, roughly
civil twilight, and the San Pedro one about 0500, more or less at sunrise. Reeves’ second error was to set the initial fleet speed at only 10 knots, so that the two contingents could unite easily later that day. Then the San Pedro contingent selected a
course that by coincidence led it to pass through the area where the Black submarines were concentrated.
These errors were compounded by a confusion in communications. Shortly after
noon on April 29th Vice Admiral Hepburn, commanding the Northern Force, executing sealed instructions, signaled the Mare Island Ship Yard that one of his ships
had taken damage from a submarine. No actual damage was assessed to any of his
ships, the inject being intended to cause some emergency repair planning at the
shipyard. The message was, however, taken by the Chief Umpire (i.e., Admiral
Reeves) to mean that Black had initiated hostilities, which had not been intended to
begin so soon, and Admiral Reeves promptly informed all parties of this.6 As a result, on the afternoon of the 29th Black submarines attacked several White battleships, though none were damaged. Once out at sea, the carriers began routine ASW
patrols, supplementing those of land-based patrol planes. This helped reduce the
ability of Black submarines to operate, but air coverage tended to be erratic, and on
April 30th and May 1st, Black submarines made repeated attacks on major warships
in the White Main Body, although no damages were assessed. The White Main Body
entered San Francisco Bay on May 1st.
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Phase II: Strategic Advance Across the Pacific, May 3–15, 1935
The premise for Phase II7 illustrates that despite nearly a decade’s experience with
carrier operations the principal goal of senior naval commanders, including Admiral Reeves, remained getting the battleline across the Pacific in order to engage
the Imperial Navy in a surface engagement that would decide the war. White, under the overall command of Admiral Reeves, was to advance across the Pacific to the
Hawaii–Aleutians line, and effect the capture of Midway from Black, which would
presumably provoke a major response from the enemy. The fleet organization remained essentially the same as that adopted for Phase I, save that all submarines
were assigned to Black. Still under Rear Admiral Cole, Black now had 31 submarines
with which to attempt to impede this broad front advance.
Acting quickly to rectify some of the errors made during Phase I, Admiral Reeves
directed that White maintained a higher fleet speed, intensified air and destroyer
ASW patrols, increased zigzagging, and greater attention to communications
intelligence.
As a result of these measures, the movement of all the White task forces, including the Train, to the Hawaii–Aleutians line was relatively uneventful. Nevertheless,
as the various contingents of the fleet reached Hawaiian waters, Black submarines
did manage to make several attacks. Although damages were not assessed, due to the
difficulty of communicating information about torpedo attacks, it seems probable
that one or two White battleships should have been ruled damaged and Langley and
one or two other vessels should have been ruled sunk. By May 11th, the White Main
Body and Train had reached Hawaii, while the Northern Force had begun operations in Alaskan waters.
The most interesting operations during this phase were those of Rear Admiral
Hart’s Western Force against Midway. His movement toward Midway was relatively
uneventful until May 7th. By then the Western Force consisted of Lexington, three
heavy cruisers, a destroyer squadron, four destroyer minelayers, an oiler, and a destroyer tender, plus Utah with its 700 marines, and could count on the support of
several patrol bomber squadrons operating out of Pearl Harbor and French Frigate
Shoals. On the 7th, with the task force about 700 miles north of Hawaii, the Black
submarine S-44 (SS 155) made an attack. Due to discrepancies in the times of log
entries it was not possible to determine whether S-44 had attacked Lexington, Utah,
or the destroyer tender Dobbin (AD 3); had it been either of the first two, Hart’s mission would have been seriously imperiled. On May 11th, under cover of heavy
cruiser gunfire and Lexington’s air group, and supported by well-timed attacks from
five squadrons of patrol bombers, the 700 marines were ruled to have captured undefended Midway in a simulated amphibious landing.8
During this phase, both sides had considerable success using an experimental
high-frequency direction-finding system that permitted them to locate “enemy”

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:26 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

FLEET PROBLEM XVI, APRIL 29–JUNE 10, 1935

submarines that attempted to send radio signals.9 The poor performance of the old
“S” boats underscored the need for larger, faster submarines that not only could act
as fleet scouts, but would be better able to act aggressively against enemy vessels.
The Northern Force had, in the meanwhile, engaged in “routine” tactical exercises and evolutions, and in the process learned a good deal about the difficulties of
operating ships and aircraft in very high latitudes. While the heavier ships in this
force would shortly take part in Phase III, some vessels remained in arctic waters, to
explore various bays and inlets as far as west as Kiska to evaluate their potential as
air and naval bases.10
Phase III: Offensive Operations against Midway, May 15–23, 1935
Phase III was the “main event” of the fleet problem,11 and the fleet was substantially
reorganized in preparation for it. White, now commanded by Vice Admiral Harris
Laning, COMBATFOR, was given ten battleships, Saratoga, Ranger, and Langley
(173 aircraft), along with three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, 28 destroyers,
and six submarines, as well as the Fleet Marine Force, with some support from the
Army’s Hawaiian Department. Black, commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, had most of his former Northern Force plus most of Hart’s former Western
Force; battleships New York (BB 34) and Oklahoma (BB 37), each representing a division of three, Indianapolis (CA 35) standing in for a pair of battlecruisers,
Lexington (74 aircraft), and six actual heavy cruisers and four light cruisers, plus 25
destroyers, 19 submarines, and four destroyer minelayers, supplemented by 45 flying boat patrol bombers operating out of Midway. White had a clear advantage in
air resources, with 173 carrier- and 62 ship-borne aircraft against Black’s 74 carrier
aircraft, 42 battleship and cruiser planes, and 45 tender-based patrol bombers. On
the other hand, Black was distinctly superior in submarines.
When Phase III began, on May 15th, most of the White fleet was at Pearl Harbor,
though three heavy cruisers were at sea 230 miles northeast of Midway. The Black
fleet was divided into three groups. Lexington, with 13 destroyers and four destroyer
minelayers, was positioned about 165 miles north-northwest of Midway, where 45
flying boats were based, while Black’s six battleships and their escorts were at 40° 35'
North, 176° 53' West, roughly 560 miles north of Lexington’s position, but with
“two” battlecruisers still off Dutch Harbor and some light cruisers off Adak. In addition, a “Hawaiian Attack Force” of submarines was deployed off Pearl Harbor and in
the general vicinity of Hawaii, with the mission of harassing the White Fleet.
This phase of the problem was designed to study the defensive capabilities of aircraft and submarines against an offensive by a conventional fleet, or, conversely, the
impact of sustained air and submarine attack on a fleet in the course of a protracted
movement. White’s primary mission was the recovery of Midway, with the secondary mission of protecting the Aleutians. In his memoirs, White commander Laning
observed,12 “On the face of it, the problem for the battle force was not encouraging
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to contemplate. It seemed hardly possible the enemy could fail to locate us and deliver attacks incessantly from the moment we left Hawaii.”
After analyzing the strategic and tactical problem, Laning decided on what
would today be termed an “asymmetric” approach. Having been Commander,
Cruisers, Scouting Force, for two years prior to becoming Commander, Battle Force,
Laning was extremely familiar with the capabilities of the Navy’s new heavy cruisers.13 Rather than attempt to push directly through to Midway, he opened the operation with a daring raid on the enemy base there by the three heavy cruisers of
CRUDIV 6, Chicago (CA 29), Portland (CA 33), and Louisville (CA 28), commanded
by Rear Admiral Thomas C. Hart.14
On May 15th, the first day of Phase III, Hart’s heavy cruisers were at sea about
240 miles northeast of Midway. This was actually about 250 miles east of Black’s
Lexington task force, but neither force was aware of the presence of the other, due to
poor weather which made reconnaissance difficult. Hart kept approximately in this
position for two days, until the weather cleared.
Meanwhile, the balance of the White fleet began moving out of Pearl Harbor,
covered by Army bombers on anti-submarine patrol. This movement was made in
two echelons. An advanced force of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers departed on
the afternoon of the 15th, and the main body followed on the morning of the 16th.
Despite the Army’s air patrols, Black submarines made several attacks on both contingents as they exited Pearl Harbor, inflicting injury to three battleships and three
cruisers, while losing six of their number. Initially the White fleet proceeded to the
northwest, more or less directly for Midway, save for Ranger and her escorts, which
Laning ordered to steam northward to support Hart. Then, after dark on the 16th,
Laning ordered his main body to change course to the west, permitting it to “lose”
itself in the Pacific west of Oahu.
On the 17th Hart ran in toward Midway, and by sunset his cruisers were little
more than a hundred miles from the atoll. Black aerial reconnaissance had detected
the approaching cruisers, and coast defenses had been put on alert. As darkness fell,
the cruisers pressed in at high speed directly toward Midway. Shortly after 0000 on
the 18th, with a full moon rising, the cruisers were about ten miles off the atoll. Each
cruiser began catapulting its four lightly armed Vought O3U-1 floatplanes into the
air. When all aircraft were aloft, the cruisers steered a pre-determined course directly away from Midway. The O3Us began their attack on Midway at 0150 on the
18th. In two waves of six aircraft each, they strafed the Black flying boats clearly visible at anchor in the lagoon. Hart’s aircraft “destroyed” 12 of the patrol bombers and
“damaged” another dozen, putting just over half of Black’s flying boats out of action
at the cost of only three casualties. The White floatplanes then followed the track of
the cruisers for a dawn rendezvous. After recovering their aircraft, the heavy cruisers
steamed eastward at high speed. Later that afternoon, Hart’s cruisers made contact
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Heavy Cruiser Portland (CA 33),
at sea August 23, 1935, three
months after taking part in the
raid on Midway by scout planes
from CRUDIV 5 during FP XVI
on May 18, 1935.
(NH-97832, Naval Historical
Foundation)

with Ranger, two heavy cruisers, and a light cruiser, which Admiral Laning had sent
to their support from the main body. Hart’s reinforced task force began a series of
diversionary maneuvers that lasted for several days, teasing the outer edge of Black’s
patrol bomber reconnaissance envelope and probing for the Black main body, moving southward from the Aleutians. In this way, Hart’s operations had not only usefully reduced Black’s reconnaissance resources, but also pinned enemy attention to
the north and east of Midway.
Even before Hart’s raid,
Black was moving its forces
down from Alaskan waters,
while Lexington and surviving Midway-based aircraft
supplemented
submarine
patrols in trying to locate
White. Black’s efforts came
to naught, since Hart’s attack
and subsequent operations
diverted their attention in
the wrong direction. Oddly,
late on the 18th, the Black
battle fleet coming down
from northern waters had
actually passed quite close to
Hart’s task force, but the two
groups failed to spot each
other. Meanwhile on the
19th, White, its destroyers refueled, had reached the longitude of Midway, about a thousand miles west of Oahu, putting it roughly 400
miles south of the atoll. Laning altered course directly northward. Soon after, on the
20th the White main body encountered a substantial group of Black submarines patrolling to the south of Midway. A series of Black submarine attacks were rule to
have sunk Chester (CA 27) and damaged three other cruisers. At this point, Admiral
Laning had to decide whether to attack Midway, or eliminate the Black Fleet. He disposed his forces for a fleet engagement, rightly seeing that once having defeated the
enemy fleet he would be able to capture Midway.15
Despite Black’s submarine contacts with White on the 20th, it was not until very
early on the 22nd that Black aerial reconnaissance detected the White Fleet, by
which time it was only about 200 miles south of Midway. Both fleets now bore down
on each other. Leading elements of the two fleets began encountering each other at
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about 1500. By 1700 the battlelines were exchanging fire, and destroyers were
making torpedo runs. One squadron of Black’s destroyers managed to locate
White’s constructive transports, proceeding separately, and inflicted serious
damage, sinking four. Meanwhile, Black undertook patrol bomber strikes against
White, which were ineffective due to increasing darkness. At this point the fleet
problem had to be interrupted when a Black flying boat went missing. All air assets
were diverted to search and rescue operations, as were some destroyers and light
cruisers. Once the search—which ultimately proved fruitless—was underway, the
remaining elements of the two fleets were permitted to resume their maneuvers,
though operating without observation aircraft.
The ensuing battleship engagement illustrated one of the hazards of using “constructive” assets. Although there were no aircraft available, the umpires ruled that
both fleets could assume they had observation planes available to help them spot
targets for the big guns. Through a staff error, however, word of this decision did not
reach Admiral Laning, commanding White. As a result Black opened fire at very
long range, taking advantage of the constructive spotting aircraft. While Laning believed Black was just “wasting ammunition,” as he put it, in fact, the umpires were
assessing hits against him. White’s Idaho (BB 42) already “damaged” earlier in the
action by several torpedo hits, was actually “sunk” in six minutes by the concentrated fire of six Black battleships at extreme long range, while her sister ships New
Mexico (BB 40) and Mississippi (BB 41) succumbed within a half hour. Laning does
not seem to have learned of the error in communications until after the fleet problem was concluded, at 1838, by which time he had been “soundly defeated.”16
Phase IV: Concentration at Pearl Harbor, May 23–29, 1935
Following the conclusion of Phase III, both sides reformed as a single fleet, designated “Blue” to proceed to Hawaii. Blue, consisting of a dozen battleships, four carriers, 21 cruisers, 59 destroyers, 20 submarines, and a large train, conducted a
routine movement back to Hawaii, with the patrol bombers from Midway flying in
separately. The first unit of the fleet, an oiler, entered Pearl Harbor on the 24th,
while the last, two aircraft tenders coming down from Midway, did not do so until
the 29th. While most of the fleet berthed at Pearl Harbor, with some difficulty due
to the relatively undeveloped state of he base, the carriers lay in Lahaina Roads. The
next few days were spent in replenishment, rest, and recreation, while staffs prepared for Phase V.
Phase V: Rapid Sortie and Strategic Advance, June 1–10, 1935
This phase was a test of the fleet’s ability to make a rapid sortie from Pearl Harbor
under combat conditions. This was accomplished more or less successfully, and the
fleet proceed back to the West Coast, en route engaging in various exercises, including harassment by notional Black submarines.17
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Assessment of the Fleet Problem
In his critique of Fleet Problem XVI, CINCUS Reeves noted particularly that for the
first time in any problem, opposing carriers had neither attacked nor even detected
each other, a surprising development, and one that would not recur.18 Oddly, despite
the fact that carriers had not engaged each other, the problem was extremely important in terms of the development of what would become the carrier task force. At
one point during Phase II, Lexington, having been operating at high speed for five
days, became critically low on fuel. This potentially disastrous development led to a
call for experiments in the underway refueling of carriers and other heavier ships, a
development that enabled carrier task forces to operate independently.19 The problem also helped develop procedures to conduct large-scale, coordinated operations
by patrol bombers. A series of unfortunate aircraft accidents, however, leading to
seven deaths, resulted in some limitations being imposed on the employment of aircraft in subsequent maneuvers.20 Recommendations were also made for more
joint exercises, as improvements were made to facilities at Pearl Harbor, in antisubmarine technologies, in mining capability, and the need to procure net tenders and develop the fleet’s skills in this aspect of naval operations. In addition,
of course, senior officers again made the almost traditional call for auxiliaries
able to keep up with the fleet, a matter that for the first time attracted some attention in the press.21
Interestingly, although both aircraft and submarines had played roles, often
spectacularly, in every fleet problem since the first, it was only in the aftermath of
Fleet Problem XVI that the customary brief remarks on the fleet problem by the
Secretary of the Navy in his Annual Report specifically mentioned the role of aircraft and submarines.22 This problem was also useful in pointing out the vulnerability to enemy attack of obscure places like Midway, French Frigate Shoals, Kure, the
Aleutians, and other remote islands and atolls, and their possible value as advanced
bases, by either friendly or hostile forces.23
The conduct of maneuvers in Alaska and the Aleutians, which had been announced months before the problem was actually carried out, may have influenced
the scheduling and operating area of the Imperial Navy’s 1936 summer fleet maneuvers. These were held in August in the Kuriles, using a scenario that presumed an enemy offensive from the Aleutians.24
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Games,” New York Times, Apr. 1, 1935, p. 22;
“Churches Oppose Navy Manoeuvres,” New York
Times, Mar. 11, 1935, p. 10; “U.S. Missionaries
Regret War Game,” New York Times, Apr. 21,
1935, p. 25; “Ministers Decry War Games,” Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1935, p. 4. For the
Navy’s response, “Our Fleet to Avoid Japan,” New
York Times, Feb. 7, 1935, p. 9; “Swanson Retorts
to Tokyo on Navy,” New York Times, May 16,
1935, p. 12. Japanese opinion concerning maneuvers in the Hawaii area was not uniformly negative; Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor:
The United States Navy and the Far East,
1921–1931 (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1968), pp. 36–37, dealing with the
1925 fleet maneuvers, and “Japan Calm Over Our
Tests,” New York Times, May 17, 1935.
4 As CINCUS Joseph M. Reeves tactfully put it,
“The cooperation of the Army was as effective as
its available force permitted,” M964-18, 1, Fleet
Problem XVI, Report of the Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet, [15 September 1935], p. 5.
5 Movement of some elements actually began on
April 22nd, so that they would be in position to
participate in Phase II. Two squadrons of patrol
bombers departed for Alaska that day, while
heavy cruiser Chester (CA 27), a unit of the Western Force, departed for Hawaii, where it would
serve as Flagship, Commander, Aircraft, Base
Force. See M964-18, 1, Fleet Problem XVI, Report
of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
[15 September 1935], p. 9; “Starts for Hawaii in
War Game Move,” New York Times, Apr. 23,
1935.
6 M964-18, 1, Fleet Problem XVI, Report of the
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, [15 September 1935], p. 9. This curious incident is not
clearly addressed in the fleet problem documents.
On December 16, 1934, during the final stages of
the planning for the problem, Reeves’ son William, an Army aviator, was killed in a plane crash,
and although the admiral immersed himself in
work, he may not have been as fully aware of
some of the details as would normally have been
the case. Alternatively, perhaps because Reeves
was to act as both Chief Umpire and Commander
of White during the problem, he had deliberately
chosen not to participate in some aspects of the
planning; Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 241–42.
7 For Phase II see, particularly, NWCA, Carton 63,
White Fleet, OpPlan No. 2-35.
8 James Leutze, A Different Kind of Victory: A Biography of Adm. Thomas C. Hart (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1981), p. 124; for a brief account
of the role of flying boat patrol bombers in this
operation see the entry for Avocet (AVP 4), in
DANFS.
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9 Thomas Hone, “The Evolution of the U.S. Fleet,”
p. 67; Hone and Hone, p. 11.
10 In practice, this meant that these ships were operating west of 180 Longitude, contrary to SecNav
Swanson’s stated restrictions, noted above, but
they were clearly in American territorial waters,
and legally still in the Western Hemisphere, since
they did not cross the International Date Line.
11 Laning, pp. 371–76, is particularly valuable for
Part III.
12 Laning, p. 373.
13 Between 1929 and 1934, 15 heavy cruisers (CA 24
through CA 38) were commissioned in the Navy.
Often termed “Treaty Cruisers” because they
were designed within the terms of the Naval Arms
Limitations agreements, these ships displaced
nearly 10,000 tons standard, were capable of over
30 knots for long periods, and were armed with
nine or ten 8-inch guns. Some of these cruisers
could carry as many as four floatplanes. See
DANFS.
14 Leutze, p. 124. For the improvised seaplane base
at Midway atoll, see the entry for Avocet (AVP 4)
in DANFS.
15 M964-18, 1, Fleet Problem XVI, Report of the
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, [15 September 1935], p. 25.
16 Trent Hone, “Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine,” pp. 1135–37. Laning does not mention this
incident in his memoirs.
17 In October, the fleet’s routine round of battle
practices and exercises was interrupted by a
mini–war game staged off San Francisco. Ostensibly intended to demonstrate the fleet’s abilities
for President Roosevelt, the scripted exercises culminated in a fleet review in San Francisco Bay,
and were an enormous public relations coup;
“Fleet Prepares for ‘War,’” New York Times, Sep.
30, 1935; “Roosevelt as ‘Foe’ Sees Navy ‘Fight,’”
New York Times, Oct. 3, 1935.
18 M964-18, 1, Fleet Problem XVI, Report of the
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, [15 September 1935], p. 32.
19 Wildenberg, Gray Steel, p. 129; Thomas
Wildenberg, “Chester Nimitz and the Development of Fueling at Sea,” p. 56, though he erroneously says Fleet Problem XV.
20 In addition to the flying boat lost with its crew of
six, four other aircraft were lost to accidents, in
one case also with a fatality; Grimes, p. 145.
21 M964-18, 1, Fleet Problem XVI, Report of the
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, [15 September 1935], pp. 33, 36; Hanson W. Baldwin,
“Navy to Request Fast Auxiliaries,” New York
Times, Jun. 9, 1935.
22 Annual Report, 1935, p. 11.
23 Laning, p. 372; Breuer, p. 8.
24 See Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 243; Denlinger
and Gary, War in the Pacific, p. 143; obviously
this is a subject requiring further research.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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1936

Fleet Problem XVII, April 27–June 7, 1936

A

s was the case in several other problems, the scenario for Fleet Problem XVII
was based on the possibility that not all of the fleet might be available at the
outbreak of a war, and was specifically intended “to demonstrate the danger
of dividing the fleet.”1 Set in Central American waters, the problem assumed that
tensions had been rising between Blue (United States) and White (Japan) for some
time. The apparent imminent threat of war in Europe, however, so occupied the attention of the Blue government and public as to obscure the possibility of a BlueWhite War.2 Against this background, Blue held its annual fleet maneuvers in
February 1936 in the Pacific, off Panama. At the conclusion of those maneuvers, the
Scouting Force, with two carriers, began a four-month tour of the East Coast, while
the Battle Force returned to its home base in the San Pedro–San Diego area. Upon
returning to base, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a destroyer squadron were all scheduled to begin overhauls at Puget Sound and Mare Island. Finally, a division of Scouting Force heavy cruisers was to make a series of port
calls along the Atlantic coast of South America. This set the stage for the fleet problem, with Blue having relatively slender resources in the Eastern Pacific.
The problem had five phases intended to test the fleet’s strategic, tactical, logistical, and communications abilities. Each phase was devoted to different aspects of a protracted naval campaign, with particular stress on submarine and
anti-submarine operations, air and surface scouting, communications, and extended air patrolling. Of the five phases, only one could be considered free play
opposed maneuvers.
This was the first fleet problem in which the press was barred from accompanying the fleet. Writing after the fact, New York Times military correspondent Hanson
W. Baldwin called the ban “an index of the growing care with which the navy is
guarding not only its technical secrets but even its operations, and it is furthermore
indicative of the growing tensions of the Pacific situation.”3 Among the technological secrets being protected were extensive trials of high-frequency direction-finding
equipment.4
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“Backstory”
Considering war inevitable, White decides that given the relative weakness of the
Blue Fleet, it should initiate hostilities, and secretly dispatches a major task force
eastward to capture Hawaii, using its own annual maneuvers to mask the movements of the fleet. By coincidence, a neutral merchant ship spots the White fleet,
and informs Blue on April 25th. The following day aerial reconnaissance from Hawaii confirms that the White task force is about 600 miles south of Oahu. Blue immediately orders its Battle Force to proceed from California to the Gulf of Panama,
to effect a junction with the Scouting Force and heavy cruisers coming from the Atlantic. Once reunited, the fleet will begin operations against White if war indeed
ensues.5
Phase I: Preliminary Movements, April 27–30, 1936
Acting on orders issued April 26th, Blue sortied from southern California on the
27th, bound for Panama. The division into Blue and White not yet having been effected, the fleet was under the overall command of Admiral William D. Leahy,
COMBATFOR. En route to taking up their stations for Phase II, the ships of the fleet
engaged in ten separate exercises, a number of which were actually “packets” of several loosely connected smaller exercises. These included fleet sortie from a base, the
launch and recovery of battleship and cruiser scout planes, fleet-, force-, and
type-tactical maneuvers, defensive cruising formations, anti-submarine escort, underway refueling, and night operations. On April 29th the fleet divided into White
and Blue.
Blue, commanded by Admiral William D. Leahy, COMBATFOR, consisted of the
Battle Force with ten battleships, Saratoga (CV 3) and Langley (CV 1), six aircraft
tenders, six light cruisers, and 30 destroyers, plus a small train. White, commanded
by Vice Admiral A. J. Hepburn, COMSCOFOR, had two battleships as surrogates
for six, plus three heavy cruisers acting as constructive battlecruisers, Lexington (CV
2) and Ranger (CV 4), plus ten heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 56 destroyers, and 18
submarines. The two air forces were distinctly different. White had 148 carrier aircraft and about 60 battleship and cruiser floatplanes, while Blue had 105 carrier aircraft, 60 patrol bombers (already deployed to Central America), and about 60
battleship and cruiser floatplanes. So White had a 40-percent superiority in carrier
aircraft, but was inferior in overall aircraft resources, considering Blue’s flying boat
patrol bombers. Likewise, although White had a slight edge in battleline speed, even
counting constructive forces it was somewhat weaker in battleline firepower, but
then it also had a considerable edge in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.
En route to reinforce Blue were its constructive Scouting Force and Submarine
Force, notionally a battleship, two aircraft carriers, 11 heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, 34
destroyers, and 17 submarines, plus the detached heavy cruiser division arriving from
South America. To reflect the relative disparity between the speed of American
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FLEET PROBLEM XVII, APRIL 27–JUNE 7, 1936

warships and Japanese vessels, Blue battleships were limited to 17 knots, while White
battleships were permitted to make 19 knots and its “battlecruisers” 25.6
Phase II: Operational Maneuvers, April 30–May 8, 1936
In an unusual development for a fleet problem, events for the first few days of Phase
II were scripted. Although Phase II began at 0000 on April 30th, with the Blue and
White fleets already at sea, and moving to their designated starting positions, “hostilities” had not yet begun.7 White submarines were, however, free to attack any Blue
vessels operating south of 21° North. Blue patrol bombers, operating from the Gulf
of Fonseca, were free to conduct reconnaissance on May 3rd.The script prescribed
that by 0600 on May 4th, the White Fleet was to be centered at 7° 10' North, 105°
West, proceeding eastward at 18 knots, and Blue at 16° North, 100° West, roughly
525 miles northeast of White, some 60 miles south of Acapulco, on course for Panama at 15 knots. Blue was thus slightly closer to the Gulf of Panama, which it would
reach in about 72 hours, around the time that its notional Scouting Force and Submarine Force would begin transiting the Canal.
White’s commander, Vice Admiral Hepburn, planned to use the bulk of his submarines, supplemented if necessary by cruisers, to locate and track Blue, while positioning the balance of his resources in the Gulf of Panama as a striking force. Once
having located Blue, he intended to use his destroyers to reduce Blue’s strength
through attrition by torpedo attacks, supplemented by cruiser gunfire. The preferred employment of both White carriers was offensive, but one was assigned to
support the cruiser–destroyer forces, and the other the battle force. Once the Blue
battleline had been reduced through attrition, White intended to bring about a battleship engagement.8
To accomplish his mission, Blue commander Admiral Leahy organized his fleet
into a Main Body comprising his battleships, some light cruisers, and several destroyer squadrons, and two autonomous carrier groups, Saratoga with two destroyers and Langley with two destroyers. The fleet was supported by patrol squadrons
and a constructive Submarine Force. Leahy planned to employ evasive maneuvers
to permit the Main Body to reach Panama without suffering serious loss to White.
To this end, the Langley Group was attached to the Main Body, to provide close support, while the patrol squadrons, operating from the Gulf of Fonseca, provided continuous reconnaissance to 300 miles offshore, with orders to attack any White
warships or submarines encountered. Meanwhile, the Saratoga Group was to provide more distant cover, and undertake offensive strikes in the event enemy aircraft
carriers or capital ships were encountered.9
In a number of ways, the plans developed by both Leahy and Hepburn were quite
similar. Although each acknowledged the offensive potential of his carriers, neither
officer thought to use them to secure air supremacy by sending his carriers to seek
out those of the enemy. Each assigned his carriers essentially supporting roles,
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providing security, conducting reconnaissance, and striking only at targets of
opportunity, rather than actively going after the enemy.
At 0400 on May 4th, Blue was informed of the location of White, and that an
oiler had been sunk in the Canal, blocking passage.10 Thus, a junction with the
Scouting Force was no longer possible, and, given White’s three-knot-higher fleet
speed, they could reach the Canal before Blue did.
Over the next few days, Blue strove to avoid contact with White, while White
tried to intercept Blue. The Blue Main Body adopted a circular cruising formation
10 miles across, and proceeded in zigzag fashion toward Panama. Unfortunately, no
narrative account or chronological outline of events between May 4th and May 7th
appears to have survived. Based on the standing orders for each side, White relied on
heavy cruisers operating in pairs to harass Blue’s screening light cruisers and destroyers, both to reduce their numbers through attrition and to keep them close to
the Blue Main Body, thus facilitating destroyer attacks on their battleships and carriers after dark.11
By May 7th, the fleets were sufficiently close to each other that a tactical engagement was certain, and CINCUS Reeves declared Phase II at an end. White’s successful interception of Blue set the stage for Phase III. While still at sea, both fleets
prepared for Phase III. This pause was imposed primarily to permit destroyers to refuel, so that they would be able to take part in the next day’s maneuvers and still
make Balboa at 20 knots afterward.
Phase III: Battleline Tactical Maneuvers, May 8–9, 1936
On the 8th, the fleets, retaining substantially the same organization as in Phase II
and still commanded by admirals Leahy and Hepburn, respectively Blue and White,
began a test of tactical doctrine.12 As in the case of Phase II, the lack of a detailed narrative makes it difficult to follow the course of events during the battleline maneuvers. On the 9th, however, as Blue’s nine battleships seemed about to overwhelm
White’s six, Rear Admiral Thomas C. Hart, COMCRUBATFOR, implementing
White’s standing tactical plans, led a “detached wing” of two heavy cruisers (representing three “battlecruisers”) in a high-speed crossing of the Blue “T.”13 This naturally put Blue’s battleline at a severe disadvantage. Worse, since Saratoga was
sheltering behind the Blue battleships in order to provide air support, Hart’s maneuver exposed her to attack and she was promptly “sunk” by the White “battle
cruisers.”
At that point Phase III was ended by decision of the Chief Observer. The fleets
dispersed to various berths in and around Balboa. Remaining in port for a week, the
fleet undertook routine maintenance and replenishment, while personnel were
granted liberty. Meanwhile, preparations for Phase IV proceeded, and toward the
end of the week, some elements of the fleet began going to sea to take up their starting positions.
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Phase IV: Special Tactical Exercises, May 17–22, 1936
Phase IV consisted of a series of small maneuvers between portions of the fleet, intended to exercise them in particular tactics. A unique feature of this phase was that
32 Army officers served as observers aboard various ships and with several air
squadrons.14
Advanced Light Forces Practices, May 17–18, 1936
On May 17th and 18th, two “advanced light forces practices” were held.15 These were
intended to exercise the fleet in conducting both surface and aerial torpedo attacks
and in defensive tactics against such, as might occur during a general engagement in
which the fleets deployed from cruising formation into battleline with light forces
on the flanks.
The scenario for both practices was the same, an engagement by more or less
“equal fleets with light forces deployed on both flanks,” each under orders to destroy
the opposing force. For both practices, the opposing fleets started out about 50
miles apart.
For each exercise Green (Japan) had two battleships as surrogates for six, plus a
heavy cruiser as a surrogate for three battlecruisers, plus Saratoga and Langley, and
six heavy and two light cruisers. Gray (United States) had nine battleships, plus
Ranger, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers. In both exercises, Green was superior in destroyers, with 36 in the first and 42 in the second, in contrast to Gray,
which had only 30 destroyers in the first and but 17 for the second.
During the “First Advanced Light Force Practice,” on the 17th, Green was commanded by Vice Admiral Hepburn and Gray by Admiral Leahy. For the second
practice, Gray was commanded by Vice Admiral Clarence S. Kempff, Commander,
Battleships, BATFOR, and Green by Rear Admiral Thomas Hart.
Despite the fact that different officers were in command, both practices were remarkably similar. In both the battleships “opened fire” at about 30,000 yards (14.8
nm), “extreme range,” in the words of Admiral Reeves. In both, each side used its
carriers as supports for the battleline, with aircraft attempting attacks on ships during the melee. In both, the principal work was done by torpedoes, which were ruled
very effective. During the first practice, which ran about 4.5 hours, 62 practice torpedoes were fired, mostly by destroyers, but two by cruisers and 12 from airplanes.
As a result, Green’s battleships suffered 73-percent and Gray’s 66-percent damage,
with other forces injured in proportion. The second practice ran its course in less
time, about 3.5 hours, but proved more decisive, with a clear victory for Green; 94
torpedoes were fired, including 11 by aircraft and five by cruisers, and all but two of
Gray’s battleships were sunk, with the remaining pair ruled heavily damaged, as
were all of Green’s battleships.
During both practices, Lexington, a light cruiser, and about a dozen destroyers
were assigned to the “Recovery Detachment,” with the mission of tracking, locating,
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and retrieving practice torpedoes. Although often viewed as an economy measure,
this was also necessary in order to figure out who fired at whom, by determining the
tracks of the torpedoes, to permit a more precise assessment of damage.
In his critique CINCUS Reeves observed that existing battleline tactics dictated
that when confronted by a torpedo attack, ships were to turn toward the attack and
“comb” the torpedoes, increasing risk, because doing so closed the distance between
the ships and the oncoming torpedoes. Reeves went on to note that the principal
flaw in the exercises was that there was “the absence of gunfire,” which presumably
would have inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers, or at least disrupted their attacks. Obviously this could not be done, and he ended his critique by saying, “In
view of the artificialities, conclusions should be drawn with caution.”16
Interlude: Line-Crossing Ceremonies, May 19–20, 1936
On May 19th, CINCUS Reeves took the fleet south of the Equator near the
Galapagos, so that its 29,751 pollywogs could be inducted into the Royal Order of
Shellbacks, before steaming northwards on May 20.17
Aircraft Carrier Maneuvers, May 21, 1936
In a test of fleet carrier tactics,18 the premise of these maneuvers was that Brown (Japan) intended to attack a Black (United States) base. Black’s mission was specifically
to destroy the attacking Brown force.
Black, commanded by Vice Admiral Kempff, had five battleships, Ranger and
Lexington, five heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and 35 destroyers. Brown, commanded by Admiral Leahy, had six battleships, Saratoga, eight heavy cruisers, four
light cruisers, and 36 destroyers. Brown was supported by patrol bombers.
The maneuvers took place south and west of Panama. The Black Fleet was centered 100–150 miles south of Balboa, while the outer edge of the Brown fleet was
about 170 miles almost directly to its west.
Black adopted what was by then a fairly standard circular disposition for the
fleet, with the battleships in the center. Destroyer detachments were positioned at
some distance from each flank, while a “Destroyer Striking Group” was well out in
front. Ranger with two destroyers, was about 60 miles south of the Main Body, with
two heavy cruisers between her and the left flank destroyers, and Lexington with two
destroyers was about the same distance north of the Main Body, with three heavy
cruisers between her and the right flank destroyers. Moving well ahead of the Main
Body was a “Tracking Group” of three light cruisers and nine destroyers. The mission of the Black carriers was to “locate and bomb BROWN battleline and carriers.
Time is of the essence.”19 The heavy cruisers were to support the carriers and the
tracking group. The destroyer Striking Group was to make a night torpedo attack on
the enemy battleships, and then join the right flank destroyers. In a general engagement, all elements were to support the battleline.
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Lack of documentation makes it difficult to determine Brown’s organization and
plans, but these appear to have been quite similar to those adopted by Black. With
two plane guard destroyers, Saratoga, commanded by Captain William Halsey, was
operating to the south of the Main Body, while Brown’s patrol bombers were operating out of the Gulf of Chiriqui, on the coast of Panama, northwest of the Canal.
Thus, Saratoga provided air coverage to the south of the Brown Main Body, while
the patrol bombers did so to the north.20
At the start of the maneuvers, both fleets were moving at moderately high speed,
about 18 knots, and the exercise unfolded rather rapidly. As no narrative was found,
the actual course of events is unclear. However, scouts off Black’s Ranger and
Brown’s Saratoga each spotted the opposing carrier. Although the weather was poor,
Halsey launched a strike. This failed to locate Ranger, due to meteorological conditions. In contrast, Ranger’s skipper, Captain Patrick Bellinger, acted with greater
caution. Launching a strike as the weather began to clear, Bellinger’s aircraft caught
Saratoga and were ruled to have inflicted devastating damage. Though normally, in
carrier operations, getting in the first blow was best, in this instance Halsey’s aggressiveness in risky circumstances had not paid off, while Bellinger’s caution had.21
Shortly afterward, Ranger was caught by a succession of attacks from a flight of
Brown patrol bombers, which were followed up by some torpedo bombers, and
then another group of flying boats, and was ruled 48 percent damaged.22
Phase V: Concluding Exercises, May 22–June 7, 1936
At the end of the carrier exercises,23 the fleet returned to Balboa, arriving on the
23rd. Following several days at Balboa, the entire fleet sortied as a unit, and proceeded to its home ports. As in Phase I, during this movement, the fleet conducted
15 exercises, in escort and screening, submarine tactics, night tactics, including destroyer torpedo attacks, and similar tactical training, until it arrived in the San
Pedro–San Diego area.
Assessment of the Fleet Problem
Lessons from Fleet Problem XVII were mixed. Although little new light was shed on
the employment of carriers, various types of flying boats were given extensive trials,
reflecting the Navy’s belief that they could compete with the Army’s B-17s in
long-range maritime patrol and reconnaissance, and as strike aircraft against warships.24 Blue’s tender-based patrol bombers were of particular value. The long-range
Douglas P2D1 seaplanes, Consolidated P2Y flying boats, and Martin PM and PM-2
seaplanes, some capable of keeping in the air for nearly 24 hours, performed well
during the exercises, particularly those equipped with experimental autopilots,
which permitted the crews to function more efficiently. However, not all of the aircraft were well suited to their mission. Only the P2Y was considered fully suited to
the conduct of long-range reconnaissance. As a result, the other aircraft were shortly
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disposed of. The success of the P2Y had a direct impact on the adoption of Consolidated’s follow-on patrol bomber, the PBY Catalina. The exercises also demonstrated
that the binoculars supplied to reconnaissance aircraft were inadequate, leading to
the procurement of better equipment. Perhaps most important, however, was that
this was the first fleet problem in which the navigational skills of the reconnaissance
pilots did not elicit critical comment.25
As was the case with all fleet problems, in addition to the major “lessons learned,”
individual ships had their own lessons as well. During the problem Ranger was
plagued by a number of landing accidents, which were eventually attributed, at least
in part, to the paint on her deck, which created glare at certain approach angles. This
was replaced after some experimentation.26
Fleet Problem XVII was of enormous importance in the development of underway refueling. Destroyers were routinely refueled from oilers and heavy ships during all phases of the problem. Oilers Brazos (AO 4) and Cuyama (AO 3) also refueled
destroyers in pairs on three occasions each, while Lexington and Ranger regularly refueled their plane guard destroyers, the first time this had been done from a carrier.
Refueling of destroyers was also practiced by two battleships and thirteen heavy
cruisers, demonstrating the ease with which the “riding abeam”—broadside—method could be used.27 In addition, during the aircraft carrier phase of the
exercises, Saratoga maintained such high rates of speed—25 knots was required to
operate aircraft—for such long periods that her fuel consumption soared to as
much as 10 percent of bunkerage per day.28 This underscored the similar experience
of Lexington in Fleet Problem XVI, and led, somewhat belatedly (in late 1938), to a
request from by-then CNO Leahy that CINCUS undertake to develop the means of
refueling carriers and other large warships while underway.29
Based on the loss of Saratoga to Hart’s “battlecruisers” during Phase III, a number of commanders yet again concluded that the enormous vulnerability of aircraft
carriers limited their effectiveness. But as the aviators pointed out, yet again, the
“loss” of Saratoga had been the result of tying the carrier too closely to the battleline.
Other critics called for additional heavy cruisers, and recognition of the fact that
aircraft were very useful in anti-submarine operations. In addition, CINCUS
Reeves expressed a preference for conducting the fleet problem in the Northeastern
Pacific, rather than off Panama.30
This was the last fleet problem in which Langley participated as a carrier. Later in
1936 she was taken in hand for conversion to an aircraft tender, in order to free up
tonnage for the construction of newer carriers.
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N O T E S 1 Despite a considerable amount of documentation
from Fleet Problem XVII, this writer has found
neither a detailed narrative nor an anecdotal
chronology. M964-21, 2, CINCUS to CNO, October 2, 1935, “Fleet Problem XVII, Concept of”;
M964-21, 2, CNO to CINCUS, October 25, 1935,
“Fleet Problem XVII, Concept of”: M964-21, 2,
CINCUS to CNO, November 26, 1935, “Fleet
Problem XVII,” with Enclosures; M964-21, 2,
CNO to CINCUS, December 23, 1935, “Fleet
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Problem XVII, Concept of”; M964-21, 6, United
States Fleet, Operation Plan No. 3-36, 20 January
1936, “Task Organization”; NWCA, Carton 64,
Fleet Problem Seventeen, Report of CINCUS, 6 June
1936; NWCA, Carton 64, “Critique, Phase II,
Fleet Problem Seventeen, United States Fleet,”
May 15, 1936. Grimes, pp. 151–56, has some useful observations; see, also, Cressman, pp. 52–56.
When the maneuver area was announced, in August of 1935, there was speculation in some circles
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that the selection of Central America for the 1936
fleet problem had been dictated by a desire not to
offend Japan; “Fleet to Stage 1936 Maneuvers in
Waters West of Canal Zone,” Washington Post,
Aug. 22, 1935; “Navy’s Plans for 1936,” New York
Times, Aug. 22, 1935.
2 When framing the problem, CNO Standley and
CINCUS Reeves were surely looking at how
American public interest had been focused on the
continuing crisis sparked by Italy’s invasion of
Ethiopia in mid-1935, which had led to fears of a
wider war if Britain and France chose to intervene
in support of League of Nations sanctions. Oddly,
the scenario also fits the strategic situation in late
1941, with Britain suffering under the “Blitz” and
Hitler’s armies at the gates of Moscow.
3 Hanson W. Baldwin, “Navy Sails Far South in Secret War Games,” New York Times, May 24, 1936,
which includes an account of the debate over the
ban among senior naval leaders. The ban was so
tight that even the line-crossing ceremonies held
during the problem were not reported for
months; see Windsor Booth, “Roosevelt’s Crossing of Equator Recalls Mass Polliwog Initiation at
Fleet Maneuvers,” Washington Post, Nov. 29,
1936.
4 Thomas C. Hone, “The Evolution of the U.S.
Fleet,” p. 68.
5 M964-21, 6, United States Fleet, Operation Order
No. 1-36, 31 March 1936; M964-21, 2, CINCUS to
CNO, November 26, 1935, “Fleet Problem XVII,”
Enclosure A, pp. 1–2.
6 NWCA, Carton 64, “Critique, Phase II, Fleet
Problem Seventeen, United States Fleet,” May 15,
1936.
7 M964-21, 6, United States Fleet, Operation Plan
No. 3-36, 20 January 1936, “Task Organization,”
Annexes Baker and Cast.
8 M964-21, 6, Estimate of the Situation, White Fleet,
Fleet Problem XVII, Phase II.
9 M964-21, 6, Blue Fleet Operation Plan No. 1-36, 8
April 1936, and Blue Main Body, Operation Order
No. 1-36, 8 April 1936.
10 M964-21, 6, Estimate of the Situation, White Fleet,
Fleet Problem XVII, Phase II, p. 2. After this “tip”
as to White’s position, Blue had to rely on its own
resources in keeping track of the enemy. The
blocking of the Canal, announced by an inject
from the umpires, had no accompanying
explanation.
11 See particularly M964-21, 6, Annex Affirm to
White Fleet Operations Order, “Instructions for
Attacks of Attrition and Assignment of Operating
Areas Around Enemy Fleet,” Apr. 27, 1936.
12 The ships of the Fleet Base Force not required for
the tactical maneuvers were detached from their
respective sides and began arriving at Balboa on
the morning of the 8th; “Fleet’s Vanguard Arrives
at Balboa,” New York Times, May 8, 1936.
13 Leutze, pp. 128–29. For the White tactical plan
that Hart implemented, see M964-21, 6, Estimate
of the Situation, White Fleet, Fleet Problem XVII,
Phase II, pp. 5–6. Blue’s battle plan included
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tactics for coping with a “detached wing,” but in
the event they were either unsuccessful or not implemented; M964-21, 6, Blue Main Body, Operation Order No. 1-36, 8 April 1936, Annex Cast.
14 “Fleet Is Prepared for Secret Exercise,” New York
Times, May 14, 1936; “Fleet Leaves Balboa Today
for Exercises, New York Times, May 16, 1936.
15 M964-21, 6, United States Fleet, Operation Order
No. 6-36, 9 April 1936; M964-21, 6, CINCUS to
CNO, 9 June 1936, “First and Second Advanced
Light Force Practices,” Enclosures A-C; NWCA,
Carton 64, Green Fleet OpPlan 3-36 (11 May
1936), and Gray Fleet OpPlan 4-36 (13 May 1936).
16 M964-21, 6, CINCUS to CNO, 9 June 1936, “First
and Second Advanced Light Force Practices,” p. 1,
with Enclosures A and B.
17 There is an excellent account in Windsor Booth,
“Roosevelt’s Crossing of Equator Recalls Mass
Polliwog Initiation at Fleet Maneuvers,” Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1936, and see also Wildenberg,
All the Factors, pp. 251–52.
18 M964-21, 6, Black Fleet Operation Order No. 5-36,
13 May 1936; M964-21, 6, Black Fleet Carrier
Group OpOrd 2-36 (14 May 1936), which is also
to be found in NWCA, Carton 64. Unfortunately,
no similar document was found for Brown.
19 M964-21, 6, Black Fleet Operation Order No. 5-36,
13 May 1936, p. 2.
20 Not to be confused with Chiriqui Lagoon, which
is on the Caribbean coast of Panama, opposite the
Gulf of Chiriqui.
21 Paolo E. Coletta, Patrick N. L. Bellinger and U.S.
Naval Aviation (Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America, 1987), pp. 189–90.
22 Coletta, Bellinger, p. 193.
23 M964-21, 6, Annex Affirm to U.S. Fleet Operation
Order No. 7-36, Tactical and Gunnery Exercises.
24 M964-21, 4, Chief BuAer to CNO, etc., July 24,
1936, Forwarding of [Aviation] Comments on
Fleet Problem XVII.”; Miller, pp. 175–79, 241–48;
Campbell, p. 150.
25 Grimes, pp. 154–55.
26 On this, see Cressman, pp. 53–55. Fortunately, all
of the accidents were non-fatal.
27 NCWA, Carton 62 (Folder 2), A16-3/FPXVII
(C207), Annex Baker to White Fleet Order No.
1-36, Fueling Plan; Wildenberg, Gray Steel,
pp. 43–44.
28 Saratoga, which usually carried about 1.7 million
gallons of fuel, burned an average of 136,521 gallons a day for six days, despite maintaining an average speed of only 18 knots, a rate of
consumption that would have limited her to just
13 days of operations before she needed to refuel;
Thomas C. Hone, “The Fleet that Didn’t Deploy,”
p. 4.
29 Wildenberg, Gray Steel, p. 129; Wildenberg,
“Chester Nimitz,” p. 129, which erroneously
identifies the Fleet Problem as XVI.
30 NWCA, Carton 64, Fleet Problem Seventeen, Report of CINCUS, 6 June 1936, p. 36.
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A staunch proponent of aviation, Frederick J. Horne, shown here as a rear admiral in the mid-1930s, while
Commander, Aircraft Carriers, Battle Force. Following Fleet Problem XVIII in 1937, he reportedly issued a paper
calling for independent carrier operations that was ordered recalled by Adm. Claude Bloch.
(NH-49099, Naval Historical Foundation)
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XIX

1937

Fleet Problem XVIII, April 16–May 28, 1937

F

leet Problem XVIII was a major test of the fleet’s ability to conduct “advanced
base operations,” that is, the capture of forward bases. James O. Richardson,
who was Commander, Destroyers, Scouting Force during the problem, considered it “very well conceived and well played.”1 Although on paper the problem
ran only about a week, it was preceded by a series of movements to get the fleet to its
starting positions, which were included in fleet problem planning documents.
Set in the “North Pacific Triangle,” the scenario assumed a war between White, a
major maritime power with its homeland in the Aleutians, the Alaska Peninsula,
and Kodiak Island, and Black, with its homeland somewhere in the southwestern
Pacific.2 White controlled the entire Hawaiian chain and Johnston Island, while
Black held advanced bases at Guam and Wake, and had a major colony in a notional
land mass in the northeastern Pacific, an ill-defined territory roughly equidistant
from San Francisco, Oahu, and Anchorage, in which there was a major fortified base
at “Capitola.”3 In this rearranged Pacific Ocean it is easy to see that White represented Japan, with Kodiak Island, the Alaska Peninsula, and the Aleutians standing
in for the Home Islands, and Hawaii and Johnston Island as the outer fringe of the
Mandates, while Black was the United States, with Guam and Wake representing
themselves and the notional northeastern Pacific land mass representing the Philippines, in which “Capitola” stood in for Manila.
The scenario assumed that a White expeditionary force of 50,000 troops had
overrun all of Black’s northeast Pacific colony except the fortified base at Capitola,
held by a garrison of 20,000. Black’s mission was to relieve the besieged garrison
with an offensive that would first seize advanced bases at Midway, French Frigate
Shoals, and Hawaii, preparatory to a further advance.
In keeping with the practice first encountered during Fleet Problem XVI (1935),
press coverage was curtailed. Although reporters did cover the maneuvers, none of
their stories included much of substance; in one instance a detailed report was filed
about Sunday dinner aboard the Pennsylvania.4
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Period 1: Fleet Concentration and Movement, April 16–22, 1937
In preparation for the problem, on April 16th the entire fleet steamed for Hawaii
from its bases in Southern California. En route, the fleet conducted type, force, and
fleet exercises. On April 21st, New Mexico (BB 40), two light cruisers, and a destroyer
division parted from the main body for northern waters.
Although only peripherally connected to the fleet problem, the subsequent activity of New Mexico and her escorts is of some interest. The task force proceeded to
Puget Sound and thence on to Dutch Harbor, where it arrived by April 29th. Over
the following several weeks, the ships conducted various exercises to evaluate the
difficulties of operating in sub-arctic conditions. By mid-July the task force ships
had rejoined the fleet in southern California.5
Period 2: Minor Joint Army-Navy Exercise, April 23–25, 1937
This exercise was intended to test the defenses of Hawaii against a sudden attack by a
strong hostile fleet, and even included a test of the Army’s plans to provide support
to the civil authority in coping with disruptions caused by the attack. Major General
Hugh A. Drum, one of the most prominent Army officers between the world wars,
and a recent candidate for chief-of-staff, commanded not only the forces of his own
Hawaiian Department, supplemented by local reservists and National Guardsmen,
but also those of the 14th Naval District. Drum’s total force included about 20,000
troops, 200 aircraft from both services, and some 25 vessels, including submarines,
mine warfare ships, and patrol boats.6
The opening round of the joint maneuver took place on April 23rd. While the
main body of the fleet kept well off the islands, fleet aircraft conducted reconnaissance and attacks across Oahu and a strong task force undertook the reduction of
the big island of Hawaii. Eight ships and 35 aircraft from the fleet conducted a simulated bombardment that “destroyed” Hilo, as cover for the simulated landing by two
battalions which were ruled to have quickly overrun the island, defended only by a
small contingent of National Guardsmen. While Navy patrol bombers assigned to
the defense attempted to locate the main body of the fleet, the Army Air Corps responded vigorously to the air attacks, but neither was particularly effective; as usual,
no inter-service agreement had been made on a process for assessing casualties for
air combat.
On the 24th, defending reconnaissance aircraft located the fleet as it approached
Oahu. A series of air attacks on the fleet followed, during which Army airmen
claimed considerable success. But these did not prevent the fleet from undertaking
major air raids against Oahu beginning at 1415, including attacks not only by carrier aircraft but also by floatplanes from battleships and cruisers. These air attacks
provided cover for the approach of a simulated landing force and its supporting
battleships and cruisers. Shortly after 1700, as Army troops began concentrating on
the apparent landing beaches, the maneuvers were declared at an end.
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It appears that both Army and Navy commanders were quite satisfied with the
maneuvers. Rear Admiral Watt T. Cluverius, for example, said “the defenders gave
us a whale of a time. We watched with admiration the work of their airplanes.” General Drum also expressed satisfaction with the results, noting that programs already
in place would strengthen the defenses considerably. He did, however, express concern over the vulnerability of the islands to a blockade, since most food was imported, 85 percent in the case of Oahu.
Period 3: Rest and Replenishment, April 25–May 4, 1937
The fleet put in at Pearl Harbor, other Hawaiian ports, and Lahaina Roads, to replenish supplies, refuel, and reorganize in preparation for the fleet problem, after
which ships then began moving toward their starting positions.
Period 4: Fleet Problem XVIII, May 4–9, 1937
It will be recalled that the scenario for Fleet Problem XVIII required Black to capture the White bases at Midway, French Frigate Shoals, and Hawaii, as a preliminary
to a proposed advance to the relief of Capitola, in the northeastern Pacific colony,
under siege by White.7 The White Fleet, under COMSCOFOR Vice Admiral William T. Tarrant, had four battleships, one heavy cruiser as a constructive
battlecruiser, Ranger (CV 4), with 74 aircraft, ten cruisers, 19 destroyers, 14 submarines, and two seaplane tenders. The Black Fleet consisted of three battleships as
surrogates for six, Lexington (CV 2) and Saratoga (CV 3), with 162 aircraft between
them, plus three aircraft tenders, including the newly recommissioned Langley (AV
3/ex–CV 1), as well as six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 27 destroyers, seven submarines, and a fleet train.
Black was commanded by Admiral Claude C. Bloch, COMBATFOR. One of the
least imaginative of the Navy’s senior officers in the interwar period, Bloch was professionally conservative, secretive, and much aware of his prerogatives. A prominent
member of the “Gun Club” and a veteran bureaucratic in-fighter, he tended to be
dismissive of innovative ideas.8 Bloch seems to have viewed the problem largely as
an exercise in surface operations, with carriers playing a secondary role. During
Black’s planning for the fleet problem, Bloch’s air commander, Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne, COMAIRBATFOR, urged him to use Lexington and Saratoga to build
two fast task forces, to seek out the enemy’s carrier, arguing that “Once an enemy
carrier is within striking distance of our Fleet no security remains until it, its squadrons, or both, are destroyed, and our carriers, if with the main body, are at a tremendous initial disadvantage in conducting necessary operations.”9 Bloch, wishing to
provide air cover for his battleships and train and believing carriers to be excessively
vulnerable to air attack, disregarded this advice. He ordered the carriers to provide
aircraft for reconnaissance, screening, ASW patrols, harassment of the enemy fleet,
and spotting for the battleships. This tied the carriers very closely to the battleships,
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rather than giving them freedom to avoid the enemy.10 In contrast, Vice Admiral
Tarrant, although not an aviator, following the advice of his air chief, Rear Admiral
Ernest J. King, COMAIRSCOFOR, decided to operate Ranger autonomously.
The fleet problem began on May 4th at 1700 Greenwich Civil Time, 0700 in Hawaii and 0600 at Midway; because most of the operations during this problem occurred around Midway, that local time will be used in this discussion.
White forces were based all along the Hawaiian chain, from Midway to Hawaii
itself.
Black began the war about 100 miles southwest of Midway, close to the 180th
Meridian, simulating an advance from Wake Island. Bloch had formed two task
forces. The Main Body included the bulk of his ships. Meanwhile, Saratoga, two
heavy cruisers (surrogates for four), some destroyers, and a small convoy with a detachment of marines, were assigned to the capture of Midway.
Despite patrols by Lexington aircraft, about 2.5 hours into the maneuvers White
reconnaissance bombers detected the Black Main Body, by taking advantage of
some rain squalls, and correctly ascertained that it was approaching Hawaii at 14
knots on course 108°. By then, the Black Midway force had conducted air and naval
bombardments of Midway, and had “landed” marines. The atoll was quickly declared secured, and aircraft tender Pelican (AVP 6) began establishing a base for patrol bombers. By 1000, having left two destroyers behind to support the new
Midway base, Saratoga and her consorts were on their way to rejoin the Main
Body.11
All through the 5th, both sides conducted aerial reconnaissance, with Pelican
adding her patrol bombers to the efforts of Black’s carriers. This resulted in some
combat. Black fighters several times engaged White patrol bombers, claiming one
shot down, and Black aircraft also sank a White submarine.
On May 6th, at about 0300, shortly before dawn, Bloch dispatched Lexington
with aircraft tender Langley and a small force to capture French Frigate Shoals. Both
sides continued aggressive air patrolling all day. Black patrol bombers operating out
of Midway were able to spot elements of the White Fleet in Hawaiian waters, notably aircraft tender Wright at Lahaina Roads and some submarines and tenders at
Kauai. Although Saratoga aircraft managed to down a White patrol bomber, by
0743 that morning White had a clear picture of the location and strength of the
Black Main Body and began to make movements accordingly.
Meanwhile, Black’s Lexington task force was still proceeding to French Frigate
Shoals. At about noon, Lexington was “torpedoed” by a White submarine. Although
the submarine was promptly “sunk,” the carrier was assessed as 16 percent damaged, with her speed reduced to 27 knots. Around noon Lexington aircraft and
cruiser gunfire engaged a White oiler and two submarines that were stationed at
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French Frigate Shoals, sinking both. French Frigate Shoals were declared “taken” at
1327.
Covered by Lexington, Langley began establishing a patrol bomber base at
French Frigate Shoals. Around 1748, White light cruisers approached the shoals.
Langley and Lexington both came under fire. Umpires assessed Langley as suffering
65 percent damage, with her speed reduced to 5 knots, while Lexington’s damage
rose to 45 percent and speed fell to less than 19 knots, and one of their escorting destroyers was ruled sunk. About 75 minutes later some of the Black escorting destroyers sank a White light cruiser with torpedoes, though one of the attackers suffered
75 percent damage. By mid-morning on the 7th, as the Black Main Body and the
Lexington task force moved to rendezvous, reconnaissance contacts between elements of the two fleets became more frequent. This frequent contact continued
throughout the day. The Lexington task force rejoined the Black Main Body by 1000.
Only a few minutes later, aircraft from Black’s Saratoga spotted five White submarines just 16 miles from the fleet guide.12 Soon afterward, Black began zigzagging
and instituted a series of air patrols and attacks to keep hostile submarines down,
though one did get off a couple of torpedoes, with no effect. At 1234 Black aircraft
spotted White heavy cruisers about 35 miles east of the Black Main Body, and
shortly afterward began to identify the main elements of the White Fleet. A few
minutes later a White heavy cruiser spotted the Black Fleet.
At 1320, Black’s battleships opened fire on the lead White heavy cruiser at a range
of about 31,000 yards (1.3 nm). Over the next hour, Black’s battleships skirmished
with White’s heavy cruisers. Because Bloch had tied his carriers too closely to his
Main Body, some aircraft off White’s Ranger, operating autonomously in support of
the heavy cruisers, managed to heavily damage Saratoga. Other aircraft from Ranger
took on some of Black’s transports, which failed to maneuver in order to avoid being hit. This skirmishing continued into the evening.
During the night, White essayed several cruiser–destroyer attacks. These proved
to be very well executed, due at least partially to a confused response by Black, and,
despite the darkness, White patrol bombers also made several low-altitude attacks
on the Black fleet. These nocturnal attacks resulted in heavy losses to Black: Langley,
a light cruiser, and seven destroyers were “sunk,” while two battleships, both carriers, a heavy cruiser, a light cruiser, a destroyer, and a transport took varying degrees
of damage. White had suffered as well, for several heavy cruisers and a number of
destroyers had taken damage from gunfire, torpedoes, or bombs.
At 0441 on the 8th, the battleships of both fleets came into contact. A general
battleline action followed that lasted about an hour. During this engagement, while
the battleships exchanged fire, White patrol bombers attempted several attacks
against Black, but were badly handled by Black carrier fighters. About 0516, White
got lucky, as the concentrated fire of three battleships raised the damage to
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Lexington to 92 percent. Nevertheless, overall White did not do well. By 0540, with
two Black battleships out of action and one more seriously damaged, White had lost
three battleships sunk and the fourth out of action due to a heavy air attack. At this
point the fleets were less than 100 miles northwest of Lahaina. White broke contact
to fall back in order to concentrate its remaining forces to cover Lahaina, while conducting patrol bomber strikes against the new Black base at French Frigate Shoals.
Shortly after noon, the fleet problem was declared at an end.
Periods 5–6: Rest, Replenishment, Return to Base, May 9–21, 1937
The fleet spent a few days at Pearl Harbor for rest and replenishment, and then returned to its permanent stations on the West Coast, conducting type exercises en
route.
Although Black had “won” the maneuvers, there was much criticism by
carriermen about the improper handling of Black’s carriers. Because Bloch had tied
them too closely to his battleships, both had been damaged by surface forces.
White’s air commander, Ernest J. King commented that in terms of carrier aviation,
the fleet problem was “not a conspicuous success.”13
In his personal critique of the exercise, Admiral Bloch attempted to explain his
use of the carriers.14 He argued, “it is obvious that the decision to retain the carriers
with the Main Body was sound. Furthermore, it is felt that any other employment of
the carriers would have been fatal to the plans of the Black Admiralty. The carriers
were only another type [of warship] assigned the Black Fleet . . . to aid Commander
Black in the execution of his orders.”
Bloch went on to praise the carriers for the work their aircraft had done in scouting and against White patrol bombers and submarines, but made scant mention of
their offensive potential. He asserted that the carriers had to be present with the
Main Body for “Mutual Support.” Bloch made a point of noting, “75% of the damaged assessed on Lexington was due to gun and torpedo fire,” which hardly suggests
that the ship had benefited from “Mutual Support.” He did discuss Admiral Horne’s
proposal to use the carriers in an independent mode, drawing their security from
their high speed, the use of evasive tactics, and their offensive ability. But he dismissed Horne’s suggestion by asserting that “evasive tactics” would result “in a private war between the opposing air forces, often with complete disregard of the part
of the [sic] air forces were intended to play in the furtherance of the plans of the [Officer in Tactical Command].” He further claimed that “evasive tactics were fallacious
and untenable” against tender-based or shore-based long-range aircraft. This would
seem an odd assertion, given that he had just praised the performance of his carrier
aircraft for their role in the defense of the fleet against those very threats. However,
Bloch may have been focusing on the fact that the White’s patrol bomber attacks
had been defeated by a combination of aircraft and fleet defensive fire, and assumed
that without the sustained anti-aircraft fire of the fleet the attacks might well have
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succeeded against the carriers. While Bloch was right about the vulnerability of carriers to air attack, he completely failed to recognize that the best way to secure the
fleet from air attack and avoid loss of one’s own carriers was to ensure the loss of the
enemy’s carriers.
In contrast to Bloch’s comments, Vice Admiral Horne made some solid recommendations, pointing out the need for all-weather carrier aircraft, for increased
training of air units in night operations, for improved availability of aviation fuel,
and, naturally, for greater autonomy for carriers.15 Other observers noted that the
performance of the new PBY patrol bombers had been less effective than expected
in essaying long-range mass attacks.16
Although White’s nocturnal destroyer attacks had been well executed, the
Black response had demonstrated that the fleet was still poorly prepared for night
actions. Bloch seems to have been somewhat sensitive about the poor defensive
performance of his destroyers in night action, writing,17 “the difficulties in attempting to judge the effectiveness of night destroyer attacks upon a fleet disposition are well known. The destroyers are always confident they were successful, and
the screen equally certain the attack was smothered before it started. . . . The result
of night destroyer attacks can only be determined when guns and torpedoes are
actually fired—namely, in war.” In contrast, James O. Richardson, who commanded the Scouting Force desrons, would later comment, “the considerable
amount of night work showed me how great our Navy’s deficiencies were in this
area of capabilities.”18
The offensive use of heavy cruisers came in for some criticism, as it put them at
great risk for relatively little return, given their high vulnerability to battleship
fire. Their role, however, as part of the screen for the battle fleet was considered
valuable.19
In addition to the overall critique of the fleet problem, a special one was held to
examine the state of the fleet’s communications, which resulted in a separate
122-page report, and led to the introduction of a “Communications Mobilization”
phase to the last three fleet problems.20
Fleet Problem XVIII is the only one for which there exists possible evidence of
direct command interference in a dissenting opinion. Aviation officers later claimed
that “After the exercise, when Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne, Commander, Aircraft Carriers, Battle Force, circulated a paper calling for independent carrier operations, Admiral Bloch had him recall all copies.” This assertion cannot be proven, but
does suggest a very high degree of dissatisfaction over Bloch’s handling of the critique.21 And certainly, Bloch’s appointment as CINCUS in January of 1938 probably
came as a shock to naval aviators.
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N O T E S 1 Richardson, Treadmill, p. 117.
2 There is some evidence to suggest that the initial
planning for FP XVIII may have been changed as
a result of an espionage case that erupted in
mid-1936; “Ex-Officer Is Held as Naval Spy Paid
by Japanese Agent,” New York Times, Jul. 14,
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3 Capitola was supposedly located at 42° North,
149° West, in the middle of the North Pacific,
about 1,500 miles NNW of Oahu, 1,400 west of
San Francisco, and 1,300 miles SSW of Anchorage.
4 See, for example, “Divine Services Held as Fleets
Keep Vigil,” New York Times, May 3, 1937; “2 Naval Fliers Die in Pacific War Game,” New York
Times, May 9, 1937; “Fleet at Pearl Harbor,” New
York Times, May 10, 1937; and, for the May 23rd
Sunday menu aboard Pennsylvania, “U.S. Fleet
Headed Home,” New York Times, May 24, 1937.
5 “Movements of Naval Vessels,” New York Times,
Apr. 23, 1937, Apr. 29, 1937, May 2, 1937, May 4,
1937, Jul. 29, 1937. In addition to New Mexico,
the task force consisted of light cruisers
Cincinnati (CL 6) and Concord (CL 10), and the
new destroyers Dewey (DD 349), Hull (DD 35),
MacDonough (DD 351), and Worden DD-352), all
completed in 1934.
6 NWCA, Carton 65, U.S. Fleet OpOrd 5-37 (5
March 1937). “Fleet Is ‘Fighting’ Its Way to Hawaii, New York Times, Apr. 18, 1937; “U.S. Battle
Fleet Moves on Hawaii,” Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 21, 1937; “Floating Forts Move on Hawaii,” New York Times, Apr. 21, 1937; “Hilo
‘Destroyed’ in Navy War Game,” New York
Times, Apr. 24, 1937; “Air and Sea Drive Besets
Honolulu,” New York Times, Apr. 25, 1937; “Fleet
Attacking Oahu in Pacific War Game,” Washington Post, Apr. 26, 1937; “Fleet ‘Attack’ Ends, Ships
at Honolulu, New York Times, Apr. 26, 1937;
“Food Termed Vital in Hawaii Defense,” New
York Times, Aug. 31, 1937.
7 NWCA, Carton 64, CINCUS to Fleet, U.S. Fleet
OpOrd No. 7-37 (1 May 1937); M964-22, 3, Commander Battle Force (Commander Black Fleet) to
CINCUS, 11 May 1937, “FPXVIII—Narrative of
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Adm. Claude C. Bloch, CINCUS, April 1938, about the time of Fleet Problem XIX. One of the least
imaginative of the Navy’s senior officers in the interwar period, Bloch was professionally conservative,
secretive, and much aware of his prerogatives. A veteran bureaucratic in-fighter, he tended to be
dismissive of innovative ideas.
(NH-79466, Naval Historical Foundation, courtesy G. E. Forman)
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1938

Fleet Problem XIX, March 9–April 30, 1938

T

he “North Pacific Triangle” once again became the setting for a fleet problem
in 1938. It was a vast theater of operations, sprawling across about five million square miles of ocean from Hawaii to the Aleutians to the West Coast, reflecting a growing understanding of the complex strategic implications of a war
with Japan.1 Oddly, however, despite this enormous geographic theater, Fleet Problem XIX does not seem have had a single, overarching strategic framework, though
its individual parts reflected various aspects of a protracted naval campaign. Including the mobilization and dispersal phases, the problem comprised twelve parts, involving fleet scouting, submarine and ASW operations, fleet dispositions and
evolutions, carrier and PBY operations, operations in arctic waters, and general fleet
engagements. The fleet was configured somewhat differently for each of the parts.
The Japanese government charged that the scale of the maneuvers, and the fact
that operations would take place in the Aleutians, “close to” the Japanese-owned
Kurile Islands, was “provocative” and even “aggressive.”2 Despite this, the fleet problem drew considerably less public criticism from peace groups, clergymen, and isolationists than had been the case in earlier years, possibly because of Japanese
aggression in China, which had sparked a nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods.3
In addition, the unprovoked Japanese air attack on the USS Panay (PR 5) and several American merchant ships in the Yangtze that occurred on December 12th, just
two days after the final plans for the problem had been announced, probably also
dampened criticism.4 Reflecting increasing international tensions and a growing
concern over the need to keep innovative tactics and technologies as secret as possible, the press was again banned from accompanying the fleet.5
Part I: Communications Mobilization and Fleet Sortie, March 9–15, 1938
The problem began with a “Communications Mobilization.” All ships, organizations, and installations taking part in the problem were alerted for the operations by
radio. They then began their preparations and began moving to their starting positions from Southern California.
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Part II: Concentration of a Divided Fleet, March 15–20, 1938
For this part of the fleet problem, Black (United States) had to unite two parts of a
superior but divided fleet, while opposed by the weaker defending White (Japan).
Black consisted of the Battle Force, under Vice Adm. Edward C. Kalbfus,
COMBATFOR, with six battleships, Lexington (CV 2) and Saratoga (CV 3), three
heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, 21 destroyers, 8 submarines, and some auxiliary
vessels. These forces began the maneuvers in two separate bodies about 600 miles
apart. The Northern Force, the Black Main Body, directly under Kalbfus, with three
of the battleships, plus Saratoga, one light cruiser, a dozen destroyers, and a small
train, began about 200 miles slightly northwest of San Francisco. The Southern
Force, under Vice Admiral John W. Greenslade, Commander, Battleships, BATFOR,
with three battleships, Lexington, one light and three heavy cruisers, nine destroyers,
eight submarines, and a small train, started out some 225 nautical miles southwest
of San Diego, near Guadalupe Island. These forces had to proceed toward Hawaii,
effecting a juncture if possible.
The defending White Fleet, under Vice Admiral William T. Tarrant,
COMSCOFOR, was based at San Diego and San Pedro. It consisted of the Scouting
Force, with four battleships, Ranger (CV 4), ten heavy cruisers, 26 destroyers, and 54
PBYs operating out of San Diego and San Pedro. Since White’s mission was to impede the movement of the Black Fleet westward, it sortied from its bases on March
15th, in order to gain maneuvering room, while Black was not permitted to commence operations until the following day.
Over the objections of his close friend Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander,
Carriers, Kalbfus tied his carriers to the battleships, thus repeating Adm. Bloch’s error of the previous year, a decision perhaps influenced by the fact that Bloch was
currently serving as CINCUS. In contrast, as he had done the previous year during
Fleet Problem XVIII, White commander Tarrant gave his carriermen a freer hand.
Tarrant decided to strike the Black North Force first, and sent the Ranger task force
to the northwest, following with his slower battleships. Contact was quickly established. On the 17th, aircraft from Ranger attacked Lexington. This was followed up
by an attack with 36 White PBYs, which put the Black carrier out of action by horizontal bombing, possible given the existing adjudication guidelines though in practice highly unlikely. Soon afterward, White’s battleships caught Saratoga and,
despite her much greater speed promptly sank her.
This marked the end of Part II. By this time, with everyone well into the Pacific,
the fleet continued on toward Hawaii, where the subsequent parts of the problem
were to be held.
Parts III & IV: Destroyer Operations & Fleet Reorganization, March 20–25, 1938
En route to Hawaii, a series of exercises were conducted on the 20th and 21st, involving the underway refueling of destroyers and destroyer evolutions and tactics.
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Then, as the fleet began reaching Hawaiian waters, individual ships dispersed to
various anchorages and harbors in the Hawaiian Islands, in preparation for the
phase of the maneuvers.
Part V: Defense of Hawaii March 25–30, 1938
This part was based on the premise that the Red Fleet (United States) had suffered a
major defeat in a general engagement with the Blue Fleet (Japan). The remnants of
the Red Fleet were now trying to prevent Blue from capturing French Frigate Shoals
and Lahaina Roads, which were considered “suitable advanced bases for a fleet.”6
Blue, which began the maneuvers westward of Hawaii, was commanded by
Kalbfus. It consisted of most of the Battle Force and the Scouting Force, totaling
nine battleships, Saratoga, Lexington, and Ranger plus aircraft tender Langley (AV
3), 13 heavy cruisers and 30 destroyers; Saratoga was commanded by Captain John
Towers , who had earned his wings in 1911, and was the first of the Navy’s pioneer
airmen to command a fleet carrier. Red had only one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, 26 destroyers, 14 submarines, and about 72 PBYs, plus the resources of the 14th
Naval District and, on paper, those of the Army’s Hawaiian Division.
Having learned a great deal from the disastrous outcome of Part II, Kalbfus now
gave Rear Admiral King the freedom he wanted. King decided to effect a surprise air
raid on Pearl Harbor. He directed Saratoga to the northwest of Hawaii.7 Using a convenient weather front, at 0450 on March 29th King launched an attack from 100
miles that hit the Army’s Hickam and Wheeler air fields and the Pearl Harbor Naval
Air Station with devastating effect.8 While the air attacks were under way, Saratoga
ran in closer to shore, to facilitate recovery of the aircraft. All of the attackers were
back aboard by 0835. Quickly refueling and rearming his fighters, King managed to
have enough of them airborne in time to beat off a counterattack by PBYs operating
from Oahu, many of which were “shot down.” Although heightened security resulted in King’s “surprise attack” on Pearl Harbor receiving no press coverage at the
time, word soon leaked out; in January of 1939 an article on the operation even appeared in the Saturday Evening Post.9
On the 30th, simulated landings were effected at Lahaina, on Maui, covered by
Saratoga and Ranger, which managed to beat off attacks by land-based aircraft with
some “damage” to the latter. The maneuvers were cancelled later that day when a patrol plane went missing, necessitating the employment of all available ships and aircraft for search and rescue operations.
Part VI: Replenishment and Reorganization, March 30–April 4, 1938
The fleet again dispersed to various anchorages and harbors in the Hawaiian Islands, to prepare for the next series of exercises. While the ships were so engaged, a
major critique of Parts II and V was held, which led to modifications in the plans for
the balance of the fleet problem.10
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Part VII: Fleet Tactical Exercises, April 4–8, 1938
The various elements of the fleet engaged in type-tactical exercises, including submarine torpedo practice, fleet anti-aircraft defense, battleline formations, and so
forth. These were intended to test various offensive and defensive tactics and
formations.
Exercise 74: Air Attack on the Fleet, April 5, 1938
This was intended “to exercise the Carrier Air
Groups and Patrol Wing Two in making coordinated attacks on a Fleet Disposition and at the
same time to exercise the Fleet in repelling air attacks.”11 The disposition plan to be tested was
“Tentative Fleet Disposition 4-V,” which was designed to maximize fleet defense against air attack. The 22-mile diameter formation placed the
train at the center, with the battleships further
forward, and the carriers positioned to the rear.
Although for this exercise the carriers were not
actually part of the formation, in practice they
were still tied to the battleline, leaving them limited maneuvering room, which was necessary to
help them evade air attack and also to operation
aircraft efficiently. From approximately 1000 to
about 1200 the fleet was subject to a series of attacks by aircraft from Lexington, Saratoga, Ranger, and Patrol Wing Two, for a total
of 15 waves. The summary conclusion by CINCUS Claude Bloch was that the attacks “were well delivered and skillfully coordinated,” but he added, “The withdrawal of individual squadrons was not as well done as were the attacks.”Comments
on the effectiveness of the fleet’s anti-aircraft fire ranged from enthusiastic to a suggestion from CINCUS that more practice was needed.
Exercise 77: Submarine Torpedo Attack on the Fleet, April 6, 1938
Exercise 77 involved a series of attacks against the fleet by Submarine Squadron
Four.12 There were 13 submarines, a light cruiser, and two aircraft tenders (without
aircraft) in the attack force, designated Black. Each submarine was assigned a patrol
lane four miles wide, with the surface ships assigned as scouts in the expected direction of the enemy. White was in Cruising Disposition 4-H, on a course that varied
between 345° and 000°, zigzagging at 15 knots. This course took the fleet across
eleven of the submarine patrol lanes. Although Black began taking its positions at
0500 and White at 0600, the exercise actually began at about 0700 and lasted until
about 1030.
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The extremely fine weather greatly favored White until late in the exercise, when
the seas began to grow rougher. Aircraft were able to detect submarines even when
submerged, and periscopes were spotted from surface ships at distances of up to
seven miles. Twelve of the submarines fired a total of 12 practice and 36 constructive
torpedoes. Of the practice torpedoes fired, six scored hits, two of which struck ships
other than those at which they were aimed. Eight—possibly nine—of the submarines were detected by the defenders and ruled destroyed, which probably did not
encourage aggressiveness in submariner skippers.
Although the results of the exercise were not favorable to submarines, there was
some recognition of the mitigating circumstances. The weather was unfavorable to
the attackers. In addition, as the Commander Submarine Force observed, “This was
the first or second time that many of the submarine commanding officers ever saw
battleships through a periscope, or at least attempted attacks on so large a formation
of heavy ships with such a numerous screen.” He recommended that similar exercises be made a regular feature of the fleet problems.13 CINCUS Bloch noted that the
exercise had provided excellent training, but was merely “an elementary training exercise rather than a test of Advanced Submarine Tactics,” and also recommended
more training.14 These were well reasoned comments, but the conclusion drawn by
Captain Robert A. Theobald, commanding the Nevada (BB 36), who later rose to
rear admiral, and had no background in submarine operations, seems to have had a
greater impression, “The attacks demonstrated once again the absolute necessity for
submarines in smooth water to conduct their attacks from deep submergence using
sound equipment only.” This comment drew considerable attention among senior
submariners, who were already committed to sonar attack tactics.15
Exercise 77 was actually biased against the Black submarines. Conducted in daylight, the submarines had no choice but to attempt attacks from “deep submergence
using sound equipment only” or risk being destroyed on the surface by the White air
screen long before they could get into position to fire from periscope depth.16 The
reliance on so-called “sonar attacks” proved one of several handicaps to the operations of American submarines during the early part of World War II.17
Exercise 78: Battleline Formations and Tactics, April 7, 1938
Purely tactical in nature, Exercise 78 saw a “Western Fleet” of four battleships, seven
heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and about 33 destroyers, plus Saratoga and Ranger,
engaged against an “Eastern Fleet” of five battleships, seven heavy cruisers, and
about 33 destroyers, plus Lexington.18 For these maneuvers, the Western Fleet was
assumed to have no spotter aircraft on its battleships and cruisers, relying on
Ranger, assigned as a “battle line carrier,” for scouting and spotting aircraft.
For purposes of the exercises, the geography of the Hawaiian Islands was radically altered, so that Oahu was considered the eastern edge of a considerable landmass extending to the west, while Hawaii proper was the northern end of a similar
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landmass extending to the south. Thus the action was canalized in the area east of
Oahu and west of Hawaii. The Western Fleet was under orders to approach this relatively narrow opening from the southwest and force its way through by nightfall,
opposed by the Eastern Fleet, initially northeast of Molokai.19
The exercise began at 0600, under poor weather conditions, a low ceiling, strong
winds, rough seas, and rain squalls. Although the Western Fleet maintained only
14.5 knots, many of its destroyers were old “four pipers” and had trouble keeping
up. The Western Fleet failed to put aircraft aloft, while the Eastern Fleet launched a
number of scouts from its heavy cruisers. One of these scouts spotted the Western
Fleet at 0740, and from then on the Eastern Fleet never lost track of its opponent,
despite worsening weather conditions that caused periodic cancellation of flight
operations over the course of the day.
As the fleets approached, they shifted their cruising dispositions several times,
testing various formations.
Tentative surface contact began at 1112, when Eastern heavy cruisers spotted
some Western battleships, briefly coming under fire before fleeing under cover of
smoke. Thereafter, sporadic contact and exchanges of gunfire occurred until 1240,
when the battleships of both sides came into contact. The result was a complex surface action some 45 miles southwest of Lanai. The battleships engaged at ranges decreasing from about 30,000 yards to about 15,000 (c. 14.7–7.4 nm), supported by
cruisers and destroyers. At about 1300, the Western Fleet attempted a series of destroyer attacks on both ends of the Eastern battleline. These were frustrated by defensive fire and heavy weather, with serious loses. A few minutes later, at 1313,
Exercise 78 was declared over.
In the course of the “fighting” the Western Fleet had suffered heavily, with one
battleship, a light cruiser, and numerous destroyers ruled sunk, and with heavy
damage to its remaining vessels; the three surviving battleships had an average of
over 70 percent damage, Saratoga 65 percent, and Ranger over 31. White had taken
damage as well, but had lost only three destroyers.
Comments on Exercise 78 included the observation that the Western Fleet’s
right flank destroyer divisions, attacking without heavy cruiser support had suffered particularly heavily, all being sunk, while those on the left flank, with the benefit of cruiser support had survived with varying degrees of damage, suggesting that
cruiser firepower had proven valuable in protecting the attacking ships.
Part VIII: Port Visit, Pearl Harbor, April 8–18, 1938
The entire U.S. Fleet spent ten days in port for replenishment, rest, and liberty.
Parts IX–X: Rapid Sortie and Reorganization, April 18–25, 1938
Opposed by a small force of submarines the fleet undertook a rapid exit from Pearl
Harbor, in cooperation with local Army forces, and then dispersed to starting
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positions preparatory to Part XI, with many elements returning to the West Coast in
order to reach their assigned positions.

Adm. Edward C. Kalbfus,
COMBATFOR, Staff, aboard his
flagship California (BB 44),
March 13, 1938 during Fleet
Problem XIX. Kalbfus mishandled
his aircraft carriers during Part II
of the problem but did better later,
demonstrating the extent to which
most “battleship admirals” were
open to the potential of naval
aviation.
(NH-91827, Naval Historical
Foundation, courtesy U.S. Naval
Institute)

Part XI: Defense of the West Coast, April 25–28, 1938
Part XI postulated an offensive by Purple (Japan) operating from Hawaii against the
Green (United States) West Coast, at a time when the main body of the Green fleet
was otherwise occupied.20 The Purple Fleet consisted of nine battleships plus three
heavy cruisers as surrogates for battlecruisers, with Saratoga,
Lexington, and Ranger, one light and four heavy cruisers, and
25 destroyers. Green had one battleship and five auxiliaries as
surrogates for ten battleships, plus 11 heavy and two light
cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 8 submarines, based primarily at
San Pedro and Mare Island, plus tender-based naval aircraft
(54 flying boats on the West Coast, 72 in Hawaii). Green also
had a constructive battle fleet en route from Panama that was
assumed to be off the southern end of Baja California.
Kalbfus, the Purple commander, again released his carriers
for independent operations. As a result, Rear Admiral King
“raided” Mare Island before dawn on April 28th with the carriers under Rear Adm. William Halsey.21 Green destroyers based
in San Francisco Bay sortied in pursuit of the fleeing carriers.
Although they caught and damaged Ranger, King was able to
divert further pursuit by lighting Pensacola (CA 24) to resemble a liner, which caused the “enemy” to break off the action.22
This raid drew the Green main body northward from San
Pedro, and it was ambushed by Purple’s surface forces aided by
the carriers, which moved southward at high speed. The exercise was ended at this point, and a full surface battle did not actually develop.
Although the attacking fleet was larger, the scenario was similar to that of Fleet
Problem XIV, with decidedly different results.
Part XII: Return to Home Port, April 28–30, 1938
The various elements of the fleet returned to their home ports to resume normal
activities.
Aftermath of the Fleet Problem
During Fleet Problem XIX, small forces staged some operations in the Aleutians, as
part of the continuing trials of the ability of the fleet to operate in such high
latitudes, and, not incidentally, to continue seeking suitable locations for air and
naval bases.23 As part of these exercises, several submarines were equipped to supply
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aviation fuel to patrol bombers, an experiment that seems to have worked fairly
well, but was not routinely used during wartime.24
In keeping with the practice of using the fleet problems to test experimental
technologies, a fighter squadron, VF 4 off Ranger, tested the effectiveness of a secret
radio homing system, which apparently did not work as well as expected.25
Fleet Problem XIX saw fast carrier task forces twice executing surprise raids on
major bases, Pearl Harbor and Mare Island. Commenting on the problem, James E.
Grimes would later write, “Excellent experience was provided in planning and executing a fast carrier task force attack against shore objective. The problem of defending a coast line, or even an isolated portion thereof, against fast enemy raiding
forces equipped with large carriers and protected by powerful surface ships was seen
to be one difficult of solution.”26 It was experience that would be reflected in the operations of the Fast Carrier Task Force in 1944 and 1945.
There was another interesting development during Fleet Problem XIX. Each side
in a problem was issued special code books for its exclusive use. At one point during
the this problem, Rear Admiral Ernest J. King came to believe that the security of the
codes assigned to Black had been compromised, and that the “enemy” was decoding
his messages. As a result, he improvised a code of his own, which, although it slowed
communications because the operators lacked familiarity with it, was quite
satisfactory.27
In the aftermath of Fleet Problem XIX, King suggested transferring the carriers
to the Scouting Force, thus fully freeing them from the Battle Force, a proposal that
was endorsed by several other senior commanders. Although an airman himself,
Rear Adm. Adolphus Andrews, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, opposed this, citing the need to provide carriers protection from the battleline’s anti-aircraft defenses.28 As a result, the carriers remained part of the Battle Force until after
December 7, 1941.29
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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Fleet Problem XX, February 20–27, 1939

D

espite frequent claims by some pacifists, politicians, and pundits that the
scenario of a particular fleet problem was intended to send a “signal” to
someone, usually the Japanese,1 Fleet Problem XX was the only one in the
series that can be seen to have been intended to send a message to a potential adversary.2 In secret documents proposing the scenario for the fleet problem, CNO William D. Leahy flatly identified Germany and Italy as threats to the security of Latin
America. For several years American diplomatic and military leaders had become
increasingly concerned about Axis influence in Latin America, where there were
many recent immigrants from Germany and Italy, extensive investments by German and Italian businesses, and what appeared to be widespread popular interest in
Fascism. The leaders of some countries, such as Gaetulio Vargas of Brazil and Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, were openly sympathetic to Fascism, and the
armed forces of several states, such as Argentina and Chile, deliberately emulated
German and Italian models.3 Although not stated, the scenario for the fleet problem
seems to have been modeled on the events surrounding the outbreak of the Spanish
Civil War in 1936, which began as an abortive coup d’etat into which Germany, Italy,
and the Soviet Union soon intruded for their own purposes, internationalizing
what was essentially a domestic conflict and raising the level of tension in Europe.4
As fully developed, the scenario presumed that while an uneasy peace reigned in
Europe, a fascistic coup in Green (a greatly expanded Brazil) had led to a civil war.
The loyalist faction was generally successful, and the rebels were soon limited to
control of the Lesser Antilles, holding a major port at Trinidad. While Black (the
U.S. and some allied Latin American powers) attempted to rally support for the legitimate government without actually intervening, the rebels called upon White
(officially “a major European power”), for assistance. In response, White dispatched
a fleet to the Caribbean escorting a large convoy. This touched off a confrontation
with Black.
When the outline of the scenario was published, in the Spring of 1938, the “message” could hardly be missed, sparking public discussion and considerable press
coverage; Time flatly stated that the fleet problem was intended to “remind Europe’s
fascists that the U. S. is still a major power in the Atlantic.”5 Almost certainly in order
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to hammer home this point, President Roosevelt put in a very well-publicized appearance at the maneuvers. He arrived aboard Houston (CA 30), which served as
flagship of CINCUS Bloch during the problem. The President then transferred to
Pennsylvania (BB 38), fleet flagship for White, to observe the first part of the problem, before returning to the cruiser for the last two days of the maneuvers. His presence, and the fact that press controls were liberalized, resulted in what one reporter
called “the navy’s most publicized secret manoeuvres.”6
For the purposes of this problem a good deal of “geographic rearrangement” was
done in the Caribbean.7 Green was assumed to include Brazil, the Guianas, and
roughly half of Venezuela, and, in rebel hands, Trinidad and the Lesser Antilles.
Black included the U.S., the Canal Zone, eastern Cuba, with Guantanamo, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. White was assumed to have a major base at
28° N, 30° W, roughly 600 nautical miles south of the Azores, and nearly that west of
the Canaries.
The problem was intended to practice the fleet’s abilities in long range reconnaissance, convoy escort, advanced base operations, and major battle in the event of
war in the Atlantic, while still leaving sufficient force to protect American interests
in the Pacific. Carrier operations were stressed, with particular interest in the role of
carriers as convoy escorts and carrier-versus-carrier action. The fleet was also to
conduct exercises in ASW, underway refueling, including that of battleships and aircraft carriers, and defense against aircraft and submarine attack, as well as PBY operations. In addition, secret high frequency direction finding and radar trials were
conducted.8
The Pacific Fleet began concentrating in the Caribbean on February 1st. Although some anti-submarine exercises were conducted during the movement of the
fleet to the Caribbean, in contrast to the practice in all problems conducted in 1934,
this movement was not considered part of the actual fleet problem, a reversion to
earlier practice.9
During the movement of the Pacific Fleet, an extra measure of realism was injected into this movement by rumors that Japanese submarines had been spotted
off San Pedro, the first of several false alarms during the long voyage to Panama, and
a very real encounter with Japanese fishing vessels in the Caribbean.10 The deteriorating situation in the Far East was a factor in determining the length of the problem, which was the shortest since 1933. The Sino-Japanese War, in its second year,
had resulted in increased international tensions in East Asia, which led to a decision
to leave a portion of the fleet on the West Coast. Commanded by Rear Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz, “Task Force Seven” consisted of Arizona (BB 39), Saratoga (CV
3), one cruiser, and several destroyers. This force maintained a degree of American
“presence” in the Pacific while refining underway refueling techniques and supporting an amphibious exercise at San Clemente Island.11
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Although Saratoga was not present, Fleet Problem XX saw the largest concentration of aircraft carriers ever to participate in a fleet problem, four—Lexington (CV
2), Ranger (CV 4), Yorktown (CV 5), and Enterprise (CV 6)—albeit that the latter
two, and particularly Enterprise, were so new they were limited to operating aircraft
in good weather during daylight hours only.12 Taking advantage of this opportunity,
while the fleet was in the Caribbean, CARDIV 1, Lexington and Ranger, joined
CARDIV 2, Enterprise and Yorktown, for special maneuvers under the direction of
Vice Admiral Ernest J. King, using instructions that the latter had drawn up.13 Not
until October of 1943 would there be a larger concentration of U.S. carriers operating together.14
For the actual fleet problem, Black was given six battleships, Ranger, eight heavy
and six light cruisers, 32 destroyers, 15 auxiliaries, and five aircraft tenders, plus a
contingent of marines and several auxiliary vessels. White was given six battleships,
Lexington, Yorktown, and Enterprise (72–74 aircraft each), six heavy and six light
cruisers, 29 destroyers, 12 submarines, and the target ship Utah (AG 16) as a surrogate for three large troop ships. The two fleets were thus roughly equal in terms of
surface combatants. White was stronger in submarines, however, and the two sides
had distinctly different air forces. Black, with 72 carrier aircraft, nearly 60
floatplanes operating from battleships and cruisers, 102 PBY patrol bombers supported by aircraft tenders operating from safe harbors, and 62 land-based Marine
Corps aircraft, was stronger in reconnaissance and scouting aircraft, while White,
with about 220 carrier aircraft plus some 48 floatplanes on battleships and cruisers,
was stronger in strike aircraft. In addition to these forces, White also had a large constructive “Second Fleet” presumed concentrating at its advanced base south of the
Azores.
Although the shortest problem since 1933, Fleet Problem XX had two parts, and
overlapped Fleet Landing Exercise Number 5, conducted by a provisional Marine
Brigade and the Atlantic Squadron.
Part I: Strategic Operations, February 20–26, 1939
Black, under Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, COMSCOFOR, was based at San
Juan, with the mission of preventing White from effecting landings in Puerto Rico
and reinforcing the insurgent Green government, based at Trinidad. White, under
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, COMBATFOR, was based at Guantanamo, but was
presumed to be operating out of the notional base south of the Azores, and thus began the problem in the Atlantic northeast of Puerto Rico.
Presciently, both admirals made air power the central focus of their plans, each
in his own way. Vice Admiral Andrews considered his proper objective the destruction of White’s fleet rather than its convoy. Although this was correct Mahanian
thinking, it overlooked the political fallout if the White convoy reached Green,
thereby strengthening the pro-fascist insurgents. Despite his valuable PBY flying
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boats, able to operate from sheltered waters, the lack of airbases on the southern littoral of the Caribbean limited Andrews’ ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance
and attacks. He kept the bulk of his fleet southwest of Puerto Rico, under the umbrella of his tender-based patrol bombers operating from there, from Haiti, and
from the Virgin Islands. He then formed a scouting line of cruisers, backed up by
Ranger, to probe for White, with the object of bringing about a day surface action
within range of his patrol bombers.
Entering the Caribbean from the north, east of Puerto Rico, Admiral Kalbfus
planned to keep well beyond the reach of Black’s air force, and focus on getting the
convoy through. He was, however, willing to use the convoy as “bait” in the hope of
enticing Black to take offensive action. To this end, he placed the convoy and
Lexington ahead of his battle fleet, with a second carrier situated between the battleships and the bait, and his third carrier covering the exposed right flank of the fleet.
Kalbfus reasoned that if Black committed its air forces against the convoy, his carriers would be able to protect it, while usefully reducing enemy air resources. Moreover, if Black intervened with its surface forces, his air forces would be able to punish
the enemy while he brought his battleships to the convoy’s support. These dispositions elicited objections from Vice Admiral Ernest J. King, overall carrier commander, who preferred to use his ships to go in search of the enemy.15
On the first day of the maneuvers, February 20th, both fleets began feeling for
each other, but no contact was made despite considerable aerial reconnaissance.
Things began to happen on the 21st. Despite rough seas and occasional rain
squalls, Black’s scout cruisers managed to launch aircraft. Proceeding eastward, several of these spotted the White convoy, and managed to report the contact before
being shot down by Lexington’s fighters. The Black cruisers immediately attempted
to intercept.
Meanwhile, aircraft off the White carriers Yorktown and Enterprise flew reconnaissance missions. Although they spotted the Black cruisers, King had instructed
them that Ranger was their primary target, and they obediently refrained from attacking the cruisers. As a result, three of the scouting Black heavy cruisers made
contact with the White convoy. A long-range gunnery duel ensued as three White
heavy cruisers opened fire. This went on for a short time, as the ships dodged in and
out of rain squalls, with one Black vessel taking light “damage.” Then, quite fortuitously, Yorktown’s air group, having failed to locate Ranger, arrived over the scene en
route home. All 72 aircraft promptly attacked and sank two of the Black heavy cruisers. The surviving ship, Salt Lake City (CA 25), initially escaped destruction, but was
caught and sunk by gunfire while attempting to evade the White cruisers. Worse was
in store for the remaining Black scout cruisers. Aircraft off Enterprise and Lexington
spotted them, sinking two light cruisers and damaging two more. In one afternoon
Black had lost half its cruisers sunk or damaged. White’s losses were 39 aircraft ruled
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shot down, plus damage to three heavy cruisers. Despite a heavy price, Black had
failed to block the White convoy.
Having attained his principal objective, protecting the convoy (though he had
risked it by using it as “bait”), Kalbfus now decided he was free to concentrate on the
destruction of the Black Fleet. Since enemy reconnaissance aircraft, including PBYs,
were believed to pose the greatest threat to the safety of White, neutralizing them
had a high priority. During the planning phase for the problem, one of Kalbfus’s
staff officers had come up with a two-step plan to eliminate Black’s tender-based air
power, involving night destroyer raids on the harbors at San Juan, Culebra, and St.
Thomas, to be followed up if necessary by carrier air strikes at dawn. On February
22nd reconnaissance by White submarines, one of which actually landed a small
party on the coast of Puerto Rico, revealed that the aircraft tenders supporting the
Black flying boats were virtually unprotected.
At 0256 on February 23rd, White destroyers Flusser (DD 368) and Drayton (DD
366) slipped past Black’s picketing four piper Hopkins (DD 249), to enter Culebra
harbor. They were ruled to have sunk seaplane tenders Sandpiper (AVP 9) and Lapwing (AVP 1), shot up a number of PBYs moored nearby, and then accounted for
Hopkins on their way out. The attack at San Juan was less successful. In a foolish
economy, the mission was assigned to the same ships that had just raided Culebra,
which meant they arrived at San Juan about dawn. By a ruse Flusser slipped between
two picketing destroyers, but was then spotted by marine aircraft on a routine patrol. Attempting to escape, Flusser was ruled to have struck a mine and sank.
Drayton was caught by one of the picket destroyers and sunk by a combination of
gunfire and air attack. Meanwhile, the destroyers assigned to St. Thomas had found
no tenders, and on their own initiative steamed for San Juan. Arriving off San Juan
after the base was fully alert, they were both sunk by a combination of air and surface attack. So the job of eliminating Black’s patrol bomber force was incomplete
and had cost White four destroyers.
On the morning of the 23rd, reserving Yorktown to provide air cover for the
main body, Kalbfus released King with Lexington and Enterprise plus three heavy
cruisers and nearly a dozen destroyers to finish the job of eliminating Black’s Patrol
bombers. While taking his task force on a long run around the eastern end of Puerto
Rico, to approach his objectives from the north, King sent two destroyers to make
one more attempt to penetrate San Juan, Culebra, and St. Thomas in the small
hours of the 24th. Both destroyers were ruled sunk. Meanwhile, White submarines
patrolling off Puerto Rico managed to sink a Black destroyer, but in general were
badly handled by Black aircraft on ASW patrol.
On the morning of the 24th, King decided to assign Enterprise to conduct strikes
on the Black air bases and aircraft tenders, and Lexington to search for Ranger. To
improve the carriers’ chances of accomplishing their missions, King ordered that
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Lexington’s scout bomber squadron switch places with Enterprise’s fighter squadron,
thereby giving each carrier a rather specialized air group.16 But later that morning,
before the carriers could undertake their missions, Black PBYs operating out of
Culebra spotted King’s task force. Shortly afterward PBYs operating out of San Juan
and Samana Bay, in the Dominican Republic, began a series of attacks against Enterprise and Lexington; as the attacking pilots chattered away in the clear, the ships easily managed to avoid damage. At about 1700 two more squadrons of PBYs attacked.
Captain Marc Mitscher, who would later lead Task Force 38/58 with great success in
1944–45, commanded the attacking PBYs and claimed great success—nearly 50
hits—but the umpires ruled that Lexington had taken only light damage, while the
attackers had lost heavily to anti-aircraft fire, defensive fighter aircraft being too few
in number to affect the outcome.
At 0630 on February 25th, Enterprise, operating about 120 miles north of San
Juan, launched her aircraft against Black’s air bases and aircraft tenders. Wright (AV
1) and an oiler were “sunk” in San Juan, while Langley (AV 3) and another oiler were
sunk in Samana Bay and air strips and other targets were struck in various other
places.17 This meant that White had accounted for four of Black’s five aircraft tenders. In addition, during its flight to Samana Bay, Torpedo 6, off Enterprise, had located the Black main body, hitherto undetected. The squadron was immediately
ordered to search for Ranger, then operating undetected about a hundred miles
north of the Black main body. Using an experimental high-frequency directionfinding system, Ranger had by this time located Enterprise to the northwest of
Puerto Rico. Between 0845 and 1040 Ranger aircraft subjected Enterprise to a series
of bomb and torpedo attacks that overwhelmed her meager fighter defenses, “sinking” her. Shortly after this Ranger was finally spotted by White reconnaissance aircraft, but by then it was too late, as White had lost one carrier and seen another
damaged. Of course Black had suffered four aircraft tenders and two oilers sunk,
plus at least 14 PBYs destroyed and a further 47 damaged with little possibility of
repair.18
Although White had paid a heavy price to destroy Black’s tender-based air forces,
Kalbfus now planned to come to grips with the Black fleet. But on the afternoon of
the 25th Black PBYs operating out of San Juan—where the elusive fifth Black
aircraft tender had just arrived—made contact with the White main body,
northeast of Puerto Rico. This began a series of desultory PBY attacks against White
over the next two days. Meanwhile, a White submarine lightly damaged Ranger
before being sunk. Shortly after this, Part I was declared over, a day earlier than
planned. Apparently this was the result of the enormous “loss” of aircraft over the
preceding few days. When Part I ended Black had only 40 PBYs operational, with no
facilities to repair or maintain them, plus 57 aircraft on Ranger, while White had 86
operational aircraft on its two remaining carriers, Yorktown and Lexington, the latter
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still technically “damaged.” Further operations would have had to be decided by the
surface ships, which would not have been able to effect a conclusion for several days,
so the maneuvers were ended in order to stage a battleline exercise on the 27th.
Officially no “winner” was declared, but there was widespread opinion to the effect
that White had done very well.19
Part II: Battlefleet Exercise, February 27, 1939
The second part of Fleet Problem XX was a set-piece tactical exercise staged for
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the press, and the public.20 Accompanied by CNO
William D. Leahy, FDR transferred from fleet flagship Pennsylvania on February
26th to rejoin heavy cruiser Houston, which was acting as part of the Black Fleet.21
The resulting highly scripted demonstration of the fleet’s ability to engage in a traditional surface engagement, with carriers limited to lending “air support,” lasted
about 6½ hours on the morning of February 27th (0600–1236). Despite the high artificiality of the situation, a few useful lessons were learned. During this maneuver,
Black PBYs attempting to make a torpedo attack on the White battleline during the
surface action suffered 67 percent casualties from anti-aircraft fire and defending
fighters. In contrast, a coordinated air-surface attack left New York (BB 34) with 33
percent damage from dive bombers, and the old battlewagon was then finished off
by enemy battleships, which inflicted another 50 percent.22 Submarine and ASW exercises proved less satisfactory. The submarines were unable to take effective action
against high speed warships, and attempts at making attacks on the slower battleships using sound ranging alone proved fruitless. On the other hand, destroyermen
found that hunting submarines while operating at high speeds was impractical, and
that their training in the use of sonar needed improvement.23
Part III: Fleet Landing Exercise 5, January 13–March 19, 1939
Planned for over a year, FLEX 5 was originally intended to be a joint Army-Navy
landing exercises, with a brigade of the Regular Army defending Culebra supported
by the Puerto Rico National Guard and the local garrison.24 But the Army had pulled
out in mid-1938, citing excessive costs, the lack of a joint staff, and jurisdictional
problems regarding air forces.25 As a result, the exercises, which began well before
Fleet Problem XX and continued for a while afterward, were a purely Navy–Marine
Corps undertaking, conducted by a provisional Brigade of Marines built around the
1st Battalion, 5th Marines, with elements of the Atlantic Squadron, comprising the
battleships New York (BB 34) and Texas (BB 35), plus the gunnery training ship Wyoming (AG 17), four light cruisers, and ten destroyers of DESRON 10, all of which
also took part in Fleet Problem XX.
There were several sets of exercises spread over two months, involving three separate battalion landings at Culebra and Vieques. The first of these was notionally integrated into the fleet problem as a White attempt to secure an advanced base in
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Puerto Rico. In each exercise a rump battalion of marines with supporting aircraft
stood in for the Army defenders.
During the maneuvers, battleships engaged in practicing preliminary bombardment, an exercise that the marines considered singularly ineffective. There was also
reconnaissance by marine aircraft and landing parties, the latter experiments ultimately becoming part of the development of naval special warfare forces.26
The principal landings took place on March 10th and 11th. The marines debarked from the old battleships New York, Texas, and Wyoming which proved highly
unsuitable as assault transports. The assault had taken place in rising seas, and landing craft had proved unsuitable to their task. Further hampering the landing was
that that reconnaissance had failed to detect shoals off the beaches and strafing attacks by defending aircraft led to “appalling losses” among the assault troops. Nevertheless, despite “fierce resistance,” a beachhead was quickly established as the
out-numbered defenders pulled back into the interior on the 11th. Although some
follow-up exercises continued until March 19th, the Marines had secured their
objective.
FLEX 5 led to calls for better landing craft. The maneuvers also proved the value
of the specially fitted cargo ship Capella (AK 13), which had been provided with
machinery designed to help her quickly off-load heavy equipment and bulk supplies into landing craft, making her the “most useful vessel in the expedition.”
Afterward
Following Fleet Problem XX, the entire fleet remained in the Caribbean for a while,
conducting gunnery exercises. The fleet then dispersed to various East Coast ports.
The intention was to reconcentrate the fleet at New York for a review on April 29th,
to mark the opening of the World’s Fair, following which all hands were to be given
liberty, before departing for the Pacific around June 1st. Nevertheless, on April 15th,
the President ordered the fleet to return to the Pacific. As a result, the bulk of West
Coast elements of the fleet began returning to its home bases, so that only about 35
ships visited New York, mostly from the Atlantic Squadron, plus a handful of Pacific
Fleet vessels.27
Although short, Fleet Problem XX demonstrated a high degree of sophistication
in the development of the American “naval force.” The Navy’s use of air power had
clearly matured. Both commanders, Kalbfus and Andrews, had handled their air
forces rather well, each concentrating his efforts at destroying his enemy’s air power
before attempting to go after his battle fleet. Each had made carriers the center-piece
of independent task forces. Indeed, even Kalbfus’ initial disposition, which tied two
of his carriers to his convoy, can be seen as reflecting a focus on air operations, since
he hoped that Black would rise to the “bait” and commit Ranger against them,
thereby permitting him to take out the enemy’s only carrier.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:35 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

FLEET PROBLEM XX, FEBRUARY 20–27, 1939

Fleet Problem XX resulted in many recommendations regarding aviation. Perhaps the most important, albeit most neglected, was that carrier air wings lacked
sufficient fighters to both defend the ship and escort strike forces. This led to a proposal to increase the proportion of fighters from the current 18 in a 72-aircraft
group, the rest being dive bombers, scout bombers, or torpedo bombers. Although a
very accurate assessment, the recommendation was not adopted. This may have reflected an overly aggressive attitude on the part of naval airmen, but would have serious consequences early World War II. U.S. carrier air groups entered the with just
18 fighters, and not until mid-1942 did the number of fighters begin to increase.28
Other air power lessons from the fleet problem included further confirmation that
horizontal bombers were ineffective against maneuvering warships, in contrast to
dive bombers and torpedo bombers, which proved quite potent. The PBY won
widespread praise for its effectiveness at long-endurance reconnaissance and patrol,
though its use as an attack bomber received mixed reviews.
The problem also demonstrated the need for more bases in the Caribbean, with
Vice Admiral Andrews proposing that facilities be secured at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, and other places, a matter that would be resolved in the “Destroyers-for-Bases”
deal between the U.S. and Britain little more than a year later.
The Marine Corps was highly critical of the incorporation of parts of FLEX 5
into the fleet problem. In an official document published some months after the
conclusion of Fleet Problem XX, Lieutenant Colonel B. W. Gully wrote, “The injection of Fleet Problem XX into the midst of the landing exercise caused such a congestion that a compromise had to be made between the tactical training of the
Atlantic Squadron and the Landing Force training.”29
This was certainly correct. But there were other lessons to be learned from this
FLEX, including the need to improve fire support techniques, procure special landing craft, develop improved ship-to-shore communications, and provide air defense over the beachhead.
Fleet Problem XX was important also in the development of underway refueling.
By early 1939 underway refueling of destroyers by the riding abeam method,
whether from oilers, carriers, battleships, or even heavy cruisers, had become fairly
routine, “almost a standard part of each Fleet Problem.”30 Nevertheless, despite a
recommendation by Admiral William V. Pratt after Fleet Problem IX (1929) that
“battleships and aircraft carriers . . . be equipped and trained for oiling at sea from
tankers,” little progress had been made until the late 1930s. At the insistence of CNO
Leahy, Fleet Problem XX was the first in which refueling of battleships and carriers
was attempted on a large scale under operational conditions, despite the objection
of CINCUS Bloch.31 As had been the case for many years, the fleet problem, and
FLEX 5, once again underscored the need for faster auxiliaries.
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Radar trials conducted during Fleet Problem XX were of particular interest and
importance. Different models of experimental 200-megacycle radar sets had been
installed in two battleships. New York (BB 34) received an XAF set and Texas (BB 35)
a CXZ “equipment.” The CXZ system proved useless in an operational environment, but the XAF performed extremely well. Not only did it detect aircraft at considerable distance, but it was able to spot the fall of 14-inch shell at 24,000 yards
(11.8 nm). Better still, during the tactical exercises, New York’s XAF radar detected a
nocturnal torpedo attack by a desron, which led the ship to turn on her searchlights
when the attackers were at about 5,000 yards (c. 2.5 nm), whereupon the battleline
opened fire, dispersing them.32 The battleship’s commanding officer, Captain Robert M. Griffin, “recommended the XAF be installed immediately on all Navy aircraft
carriers,” a remarkably insightful suggestion coming from a “Gun Club” officer, suggesting the extent to which many senior naval personnel had come to appreciate the
role of aviation.33 Although the experiment was a success, it also led to the neglect of
night tactical exercises, on the theory that “the Fleet would have radar before the
Fleet would have to fight at night.”34
Reflecting rising tensions in Europe, after Fleet Problem XX, substantial forces
were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Ranger, four heavy cruisers, and
four new destroyers became the first modern ships to be assigned to the Atlantic
Squadron, which was also reinforced by two wings of PBYs. This movement initiated a steady drain of resources from the Pacific to the Atlantic.35

N O T E S 1 For FP XX see, particularly, M964-25, 1, CNO to
CINCUS, undated, “Fleet Problem XX—Concept
of,” and especially Enclosure “A”; NWCA, Carton
65, U.S. Fleet OpOrd No. 13-38 (4 November
1938), Task Organization; M964-25, 4, U.S. Fleet
Operation Order 3 November 1938; E. C.
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Kalbfus, “Fleet Problem XX: White Fleet Estimate
of the Situation”; Black Fleet, “Fleet Problem XX
Estimate of the Situation,” 18 January 1939;
Commander Battle Force to CINCUS, 20 March
1939, Critique Fleet Problem XX—Remarks of
Commander WHITE Fleet; Commander, Black
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Fleet (Commander, Scouting Force) to CINCUS,
Fleet Problem XX—Comment and Recommendation. Abbazia’s third chapter, “A Mirror to
War: Fleet Problem XX,” pp. 33–50, has a comprehensive narrative treatment. See also Buell,
Master, pp. 103–106.
2 See, for example, “Japanese See War Threat By
America in Fleet Maneuver,” Washington Post,
Nov 30, 1924; “Tokio Papers Call War Game a
Menace,” New York Times, May 3, 1925; “U.S.
Fleet Displeases Japan,” Washington Post, Feb 13,
1927; “Churches Oppose Navy Manoeuvers,”
New York Times, Mar 11, 1935; “U.S. Missionaries
Regret War Game,” New York Times, Apr. 21,
1935; “Ministers Decry War Games,” Christian
Science Monitor, May 3, 1935; “Japan Sees Aggressive Aim,” New York Times, Mar 25, 1938. Numerous other examples could be cited.
3 Although the extent of Axis influence and ambition in Latin America at the time was exaggerated,
it did exist; see Robert A. Humphreys, Latin
America and the Second World War, two volumes
(London: Athlone, 1981–82); David Rock, “War
and Postwar Intersections: Latin America and the
United States,” in David Rock, editor, Latin
America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994),
pp. 15–36; Maria Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security,
and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World
War II (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), particularly pp. 25–46; and
Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel, editors,
Latin America During World War II (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
4 The Army, also concerned about the threat of
Fascist influence in Latin America, had developed
“Plan Purple” in 1938 and 1939, to cope with the
possibility of an openly pro-Fascist regime coming to power in the region through a coup. Although it is unclear the extent to which the
scenario for FP XX may have been inspired by
Plan Purple, the basic assumptions were quite
similar; see Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow:
Army Planning for Global War (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2003), pp. 92–92, 101–103; Watson, pp. 94–95, 106, 188; Richardson, Treadmill,
pp. 375–76: Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild,
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, The United
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center
of Military History, 1989), pp. 5–7, 68–81.
5 See, for example, “Fleet Transfer East Held Slap
At Dictators,” by Barry Sullivan, Washington Post,
May 27, 1938; “Navies Turn Again to the Atlantic,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
Dec 25, 1938; “Roosevelt, Answering Defense
Critics, Visions Attack by Dictatorships,” Washington Post, Feb 3, 1939; “Continental Defense
Revealed As Aim of Fleet’s War Game,” Washington Post, Feb 22, 1939; “Fleet Problem XX,” Time,
Jan. 9, 1939; etc.
6 “Enemy Gain Seen as War Game Ends,” by Harwood Bull, New York Times, Feb 28, 1939. There
were over 60 articles on the problem just in the
New York Times, the Washington Post, and the
Christian Science Monitor. The President’s
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presence attracted particular attention, see, for
example, “Roosevelt Sails To War Games Next
Week,” Washington Post, Feb 5, 1939; “President
Plans Vacation Viewing ‘Attack’ on Canal,”
Christian Science Monitor, Feb 11, 1939; “Roosevelt Enters Zone of War Game,” by Felix Belair,
Jr., New York Times, Feb 21, 1939; “Roosevelt
Leads War Game Survey,” by Felix Belair, Jr., New
York Times, Feb 28, 1939; “President Returns, Explains War Game,” by Felix Belair, Jr., New York
Times, Mar 4, 1939; etc.
7 FP XX required extensive support from the State
Department, which secured permission for port
calls and fleet operations in Cuban, Dominican,
Dutch, Haitian, and British territories and waters.
Samples of some of the diplomatic correspondence can be found in M964-25, 2, Fleet Problem
XX, “Correspondence regarding the preparations
for and conduct of the problem.” There was also
some comment in the press on the diplomatic aspects, see, for example, “Dominicans Open Port
to U.S. Navy,” Washington Post, Feb 7, 1939; “Dominican Haven Granted to Fleet,” New York
Times, Feb 7, 1939.
8 On the direction finding trials, see Thomas C.
Hone, “The Evolution of the U.S. Fleet,”
pp. 67–68; on the radar trials, see below.
9 While the Pacific Fleet was passing into the Caribbean, the Atlantic Squadron engaged in a gunnery
training exercise, and then conducted Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5 (FLEX 5), on which see Part III
of this chapter.
10 Buell, Quiet Warrior, p. 80; King and Whitehall,
p. 282; Richardson, p. 237. As this was the first
occasion on which Japanese fishing vessels operated in the Caribbean, there was considerable
speculation about their purpose, though no information can be found to confirm espionage; see,
“Japanese in Caribbean, Fishing Vessels Sighted
There as Fleet Gathers for Manoeuvres,” New
York Times, Feb. 15, 1939.
11 Potter, Nimitz, p. 168.
12 Yorktown had been commissioned in September
1937 and Enterprise in May 1938. As it took about
18 months for a new carrier and air group to become fully operational, neither was considered
completely effective. In fact King, who never tolerated excuses, attributed Enterprise’s extremely
poor performance to the inexperience of her air
group. Campbell, pp. 141–42; Buell, Master,
p. 103.
13 Apparently it was watching a newsreel of the four
carriers operating together during these maneuvers that inspired Commander Minoru Genda to
propose creation of the “First Air Fleet,” which
opened the Pacific War for Japan in spectacular
fashion; see Minoru Genda, “Evolution of Aircraft Carrier Tactics in the Imperial Japanese
Navy,” in Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a
Day of Infamy, edited by Paul Stillwell
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 24.
14 On October 5–6, 1943, “Task Force 14,” comprising three fleet carriers and three light carriers,
conducted a series of raids on Wake Island;
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Samuel Eliot Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts, and
Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944 (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1951), pp. 92–93.
15 King and Whitehill, p. 288; Potter, Halsey, p. 142.
16 This was similar to the juggling of air squadrons
between Lexington and Saratoga during GJE No.
4, in 1932, on which see Chapter 14.
17 “Navy Repels Mock Air Raid On Puerto Rico,”
Washington Post, Feb 26, 1939.
18 Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, p. 135; Thomas
C. Hone, “The Evolution of the U.S. Fleet,” pp.
67–68; Hone and Hone, p. 11; Abbazia, p. 40–41.
19 For the “official” assessment, see, “Says Navy Can
Bar Any Single Enemy,” New York Times, May 29,
1939, and “President Returns, Explains War
Game,” by Felix Belair, Jr., New York Times, Mar
4, 1939, but see also “Enemy Gain Seen as War
Game Ends,” by Harwood Bull, New York Times,
Feb 28, 1939.
20 For some detail on the battle practice, Abbazia,
pp. 42–43.
21 Buell, Quiet, p. 90; USS Houston (CA 30),
www.wiretap.area.com/Gopher/Gov/USHistory/Naval/bb07.txt. Shortly before the battleline exercise was to begin a White submarine prematurely “sank” Houston, an act ruled invalid by
the umpires, but which made for good press,
“Roosevelt and Leahy Admit They Were ‘Sunk’
Before They Knew They Were Under ‘Fire,’” New
York Times, Mar 8, 1939.
22 Campbell, pp. 123 (with some critical remarks
about the artificiality of the day’s undertakings),
151; Trent Hone, “Evolution of Fleet Tactical
Doctrine,” pp. 1128–39.
23 Aboard Houston on February 28 FDR met with
some two dozen flag officers, to discuss the selection of a successor to Adm. Leahy as CNO and assignments for other senior posts in the Navy;
Richardson, pp. 6–7.
24 See M964-25, 1, “Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5,
Fleet Problem XX, and other Navy and Marine
Corps Operations in the Caribbean, 1939,” 8 Apr
1939; NWCA, Carton 57, B. W. Gully, Lt. Col.,
USMC, “A History of U.S. Fleet Landing Exercises: Taken from the Files of the Atlantic Squadron” (3 July 1939); Abbazia, pp. 43–44; “2,000
Marines Nearing Puerto Rico Base,” New York
Times, Jan 16, 1939; “Atlantic Naval Unit Ends it
War Game,” New York Times, Feb 8, 1939; “Atlantic Squadron Off,” New York Times, Mar 15,
1939.
25 “Army Quits War Game With Navy; Landing Exercise ‘Not Worth Cost,’” New York Times,
Jan 1, 1939. While these objections were all legitimate, they also reflect an unwillingness to address
the issues. The Army only began to become interested in amphibious operations in 1940, and it
was not until 1942 that it began serious efforts to
develop a doctrine, the following year formally
adopting the Marine Corps’ 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations. For a good survey of
the development of American amphibious doctrine, see Allan R. Millett, “Assault from the Sea,”
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Chapter 2 of Williamson Murray and Allan R.
Millett, editors, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), particularly pp. 70–90.
26 Updegraph, p. 1.
27 There was considerable speculation about the reason for the sudden change in the fleet’s schedule.
Given Japan’s aggressive actions in China and rising tensions in Europe, the State Department was
concerned about the temporary imbalance of
power in the Pacific caused by the absence of the
fleet. Japan had seized the Spratly Islands, disputed between France and China, two weeks earlier, and there were always rumors about a
possible Japanese attack on the Panama Canal,
which may have been given greater credence as a
European war was clearly becoming more likely.
See, “Japanese Menace in Pacific is Seen,” New
York Times, Apr 1, 1939; “7 French Islands Annexed by Japan,” New York Times, Apr 1, 1939;
“Japanese Seizure Forestalled Paris,” by Hugh
Bays, New York Times, Apr 5, 1939; “Tokyo Rejects Protest, Turns Down French Complaint,”
Apr 7, 1939 “Navy Aim Mystery; Sudden Order
for Fleet to Leave,” by Frank L. Kluckhohn, New
York Times, Apr 16, 1939; “Our Good Gray
Ships,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
Apr 23, 1939; “Pride of Navy Here,” New York
Times, Apr 30, 1939.
28 Abbazia, p. 40. By Midway the number of fighters
in a carrier air group had risen from 18 to 24, and
by late summer of 1942 to 36, while the number
of bombers had remained steady at 54. By
mid-1944 fleet carriers had 54 fighters and only
42 bombers, whether scout, dive, or torpedo; see
Dunnigan and Nofi, Encyclopedia, “Air Groups,
Aircraft Carriers.”
29 Gully, p. 12.
30 Richardson, pp. 207–10.
31 Wildenberg, Gray Steel, pp. 130–31; Wildenberg,
“Chester Nimitz,” pp. 56–58. It will be recalled
that Richardson (p. 208) noted that Bloch took a
“dim view” of experiments in refueling battleships.
32 Howeth, Chap XXXVIII, Part 7; Henry E.
Guerlac, Radar in World War II, Vol. VIII of The
History of Modern Physics, 1800–1950 (n.p.:
Tomash/American Institute of Physics, 1987),
pp. 86–88.
33 Howeth, loc. cit.; Guerlac, p. 87. The XAF system
was shortly redesignated the CXAM, and rendered yeoman service during the early days of
World War II.
34 Richardson, Treadmill, p. 223. Regarding FP
XVIII (1937), Richardson wrote (p. 117), “the
considerable amount of night work showed me
how great our Navy’s deficiencies were in this
area of capabilities.” Despite this, he never suggests that during his tenure as CINCUS he bore
any responsibility for the failure to address the
fleet’s deficiencies in night tactics.
35 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, p. 50.
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CINCUS Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (center), discussing plans for Fleet Problem XXI with Admiral Charles P. Snyder, Commander, Battle
Force, U.S. Fleet, on his right, and Vice Admiral William S. Pye, Commander Battleships, Battle Force, aboard flagship USS Pennsylvania (BB 38).
During the problem Snyder and Pye, though confirmed “Gun Club” members, would operate independent carrier task forces to good effect, particularly
the latter, but Richardson would draw the wrong conclusions.
(NH-54893, Naval Historical Foundation)
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1940

Fleet Problem XXI, April 1–May 17, 1940

eld in the Pacific, Fleet Problem XXI1 was the first since 1928 that did not include virtually all the active major units of the fleet. The European War that
had broken out in September of 1939 led President Roosevelt to establish
“Neutrality Patrol” in the Atlantic. By the Spring of 1940, carrier Ranger (CV 4), the
three oldest battleships, Arkansas (BB 33), New York (BB 34), and Texas (BB 35),
eight heavy cruisers, a dozen new light cruisers of the Brooklyn Class, and nearly 50
destroyers were on duty with what would soon become the Atlantic Fleet, and were
thus were unavailable for the fleet problem.2 The worsening international situation
was also cause for the reimposition of stringent press controls, which resulted in
very little information about the problem appearing in the press.3
The objectives of this problem included the training of commanders in estimating the situation and planning, scouting and screening, convoy escort, communications, advanced base operations, and coordination of various types of platforms, as
well as to study various fleet and carrier task force defensive formations, including
ASW defense, fleet tactics against air attack from carrier and land-based aircraft,
PBY swarm attack tactics, and offensive and defensive night destroyer tactics, as well
as underway refueling of all types of ships.
As with the two previous problems, Fleet Problem XXI began with a “Communication Mobilization” in late March, to simulate actual communications conditions during a period of rising tension, during which secret orders were distributed,
personnel recalled from leave or transferred, and so forth, although this exercise was
not counted as one of the six parts of the problem.
In practical terms, there were two different operational questions examined in
Fleet Problem XXI. Part II focused on the operations of a concentrated fleet (Japan)
seeking to disrupt the preparations of a dispersed one (United States) during the
opening days of a Pacific War, while Part VI involved a weaker fleet (United States)
trying to counter a stronger one (Japan) attempting to capture its main advanced
base.

H
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Part I: Fleet Movement and Organization, April 1–3, 1940
Participating fleet units dispersed to their starting positions so that the White and
Black teams could be formed. During these movements various tactical exercises
were conducted.
Part II: Pursuit of a Raiding Force, April 3–5, 1940
Officially forming “Fleet Tactical Exercise 2,”4 Part II of the problem used a scenario
postulating a good deal of geographic rearrangement. As in Fleet Problem II (1924)
and a number of others, the West Coast was constructively taken to be a chain of
atolls. Black (Japan), a large country to the northeast of this chain, had an advanced
base at “San Francisco Atoll” (standing in for the Marshall Islands). White (United
States) had its homeland off Central America, with control of Hawaii and “San
Diego Atoll” (Guam). Black’s strategic objective was to effect a rendezvous between
a Raiding Force that had supposedly just struck Hawaii, and a Covering Force that
had sortied from San Francisco to protect its retirement. White, under Vice Adm.
William Satterlee Pye, COM Battleships, Battle Force, was given five battleships
(each a constructive pair), Lexington (CV 2) and Saratoga (CV 3), four heavy and six
light cruisers, and 37 destroyers. Black, commanded by Adm. Charles P. Snyder,
COMBATFOR, had a total of six battleships, Yorktown (CV 5) and a constructive
carrier, eight heavy and three light cruisers, plus 27 destroyers.
Black had two task forces. The “Raiding Force” (Task Group 11) had eight heavy
cruisers, a light cruiser, and 14 destroyers, which was presumed to have just executed a successful raid on Hawaii, though in the process having lost its constructive
carrier to an equally constructive submarine. The “Covering Force” (Task Group
12) consisted of six battleships, Yorktown, two light cruisers, and 13 destroyers.
White commander Pye decided that he could make use of White’s superiority in
carrier- and land-based aircraft, as well as more numerous cruisers and destroyers,
to defeat the Black Covering Force before it could rendezvous with the Raiding
Force. The White Fleet, which started the problem at 30° 13' North, 123° 38' West,
about 350 nm miles southwest of San Diego, was organized in three task forces:
• Strike Force: Lexington and Saratoga, four heavy cruisers, and four
destroyers.
• Attack Force: three Omaha Class light cruisers and 23 destroyers.
• Main Body: five battleships (representing ten), three Brooklyn Class light
cruisers, and eight destroyers.
Pye planned to use his Strike Force carriers to hit Black’s Covering Force, with
the intention of inflicting damage on at least two enemy battleships, which would
slow down the entire force. This would delay the rendezvous of Black’s Covering
Force with its Raiding Force. Pye would then be able to catch up with the enemy
Covering Force using his Attack Force, which would undertake a series of nocturnal
cruiser-destroyer attacks, further harassing and damaging the enemy, thus gaining
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time for his Main Body to come up and finish off Black’s Covering Force in a surface
action.
In contrast, Black’s Adm. Snyder, calculating that seasonably foul weather would
impede White’s air operations, decided to avoid action as long as possible, to increase the chances of effecting a rendezvous between the Covering Force and the
Raiding Force. To carry out this plan, the Raiding Force would return from its purported attack on Hawaii from a starting point roughly east of Oahu and north of
Hawaii, by steaming at high speed (23 knots) to the northeast. Meanwhile, the Covering Force, having sortied earlier from San Francisco, to “lose” itself at sea, initially
steamed northwest, and then turned southwest, so that at the time the maneuvers
began it was about 300 miles almost directly west of San Francisco. At the start of
the maneuvers, both Black forces proceed to a rendezvous scheduled for noon on
April 5th at 33° North, 135° 33' West, roughly 700 miles southwest from San Francisco. During his movement, Snyder planned to keep his carrier 50–75 miles on the
“safe” side of his battleships, using it offensively by means of “in and out tactics,”
that is, approaching the main body to launch air strikes over it, and then heading
back a safe distance upon recovery of her aircraft.
The maneuvers began on April 3rd, at 0700 Hawaii time, about half an hour after
sunrise.5 Shortly after the problem began, an inject from the umpires informed
White that it had successfully broken the Black code, and thus had become privy to
enemy communications. Worse was in store for Black, for the weather turned out to
be unseasonably good, thus favoring White. Due to these two strokes of good fortune, White’s plans unfolded more or less as expected. White aircraft spotted Black’s
Covering Force at 1035 on April 4th at 35° 48' North, 130° 30' West, distant about
200 miles slightly east-of-north of the White Main Body. At 1300 Lexington’s aircraft began a series of air attacks against Black, shortly joined by aircraft off
Saratoga. The initial strikes were beaten off by Black combat air patrol. But between
1350 and 1458 Black took a pounding. Yorktown suffered 40 percent damage and
saw her speed reduced to 16 knots, while the Black battleships suffered an average of
9 percent damage, with fleet speed cut to 14 knots. White’s losses in aircraft were
heavy, however, with 20 of the 46 attacking aircraft ruled shot down, which led
White to protest “unrealistically optimistic assessments of AA fire effectiveness” in
its after action report.6 Meanwhile, at 1420, as the carriers were recovering aircraft,
the Black Raiding Force came within long range sighting distance of White’s Strike
Force. The Strike Force hastened to recover aircraft, but some fire was exchanged
between cruisers before the two groups lost track of each other due to poor visibility
and gathering darkness.
During the night, from about 1942 on the 4th until shortly after dawn on the 5th,
White’s destroyers conducted a series of torpedo attacks on the Black Covering
Force. The 23 destroyers involved fired 193 torpedoes—pretty much all they
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had—and were ruled to have inflicted an average of 30 percent damage on the Black
battleships, reducing their collective speed to just nine knots. White loses were
heavy, with 15 of the attacking destroyers sunk, over 60 percent. Shortly after daybreak, a White destroyer came close enough to fire on Yorktown, but inflicted no
damage and was promptly sunk by the latter’s aircraft. A bit after that, Yorktown
managed to get off her only air strike of the maneuvers. Unfortunately for Black, its
streak of bad luck continued, and only one of Yorktown’s squadrons managed to locate the White Main Body, inflicting little harm despite dropping 18 simulated
1000-pound bombs. During the morning of the 5th, White conducted two more
airstrikes on the Black Covering Force, inflicting some damage, though losing 34 of
the nearly 100 attacking aircraft.
Amid worsening weather, White managed to interpose itself between the Black
Covering Force and the Raiding Force. This made a rendezvous between the two
Black task forces impossible. At 0719 on the 5th the Chief Umpire declared this
phase of the fleet problem at an end, a full day early. Although Black had managed
some effective signals intelligence, getting radio fixes on White’s forces, it had not
been able to turn this information to its advantage, particularly since White was
reading its signals.
Part III: Special Fleet Exercises, April 7–10, 1940
Upon conclusion of Part II, the entire fleet proceeded to Lahaina Roads, off Maui.
During this period the fleet operated as a single tactical unit under CINCUS and
conducted exercises against attacks by small numbers of ships and aircraft, including PBYs and Army aircraft. The attackers acted as surrogates for larger numbers of
enemy units, and were constructively taken to have the capabilities of equivalent
Japanese platforms.7 There were actually four specific sets of exercises.8
Fleet Exercises, April 7–10, 1940
Exercise
No. 111
No. 112
No. 113
No. 114

Date
Apr. 7
Apr. 8
Apr. 9
Apr. 10

Component.
Destroyer Underway Refueling
Cruiser/Destroyer Tactics
Cruiser/Destroyer Tactics
Anti-Air & ASW/PBY-Submarine Joint Attack Exercises

Parts IV–V: Replenishment, and Reorganization, April 11–18, 1940
The fleet resupplied and refueled at Lahaina Roads (11–14 April). Then, with the
sides reorganized, ships began putting to sea to reach their starting positions for
Part VI (15–18 April 1940). On the 18th, on the eve of Part VI, the destroyers were
refueled.
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Part VI: Advanced Base Operations, April 19–25, 1940
The problem addressed during Part VI (Fleet Tactical Exercise 6)9 was specifically
intended to reflect the current version of War Plan Orange. It presumed that Maroon (United States) controlled Hawaii, Johnston Island, Midway, the Aleutians,
Wake, and some other areas, including Balboa, in Panama. Maroon was at war with
Purple (Japan), a western Pacific power that had established an advanced base at
Guam.
Purple, commanded by Adm. Snyder, had already captured Wake and Samoa
from Maroon, and was preparing to take Hawaii by landings at Lahaina Roads, in
anticipation of eventually carrying the war to the West Coast. This effort was opposed by the weaker Maroon (United States), under Vice Adm. Adolphus Andrews.
The Purple fleet was organized as follows:
• Main Body (Task Group 41): three battleships, Saratoga, three heavy and
three light cruisers, and about 32 destroyers, with four auxiliaries as
surrogates for a convoy carrying a landing force.
• Raiding Force (Task Group 42): two battleships, Lexington, three heavy and
two light cruisers, and 16 destroyers.
• Patrol Force: 24 PBYs and two aircraft tenders, under the orders of the
Raiding Force.
Maroon also formed three task forces:
• Northern Detachment (Task Group 32): two battleships, two light cruisers,
and seven destroyers.
• Southern Detachment (Task Group 31): three battleships, Yorktown, six
heavy and one light cruiser, and eleven destroyers.
• Island Force (Task Group 33): one light cruiser, one destroyer, 19
submarines, and eight mine layers, with 38 PBYs operating from three
aircraft tenders, plus an oiler.
Maroon was assumed to have superior mine warfare capability, with fields already in place at French Frigate Shoals, Lahaina Roads, and elsewhere. The resources of the large Army garrison on Oahu were also available to Maroon.
Although actual operational movements did not commence until April 19th, the
scenario presumed that the fleets had been underway since April 13th, when Purple
supposedly sortied from its bases in the Mandates. On the 15th the Purple Raiding
Force was assumed to have seized Samoa, and then proceeded northward to rendezvous with the Main Body, so that the combined fleet could seize Wake on the 16th.
When the problem actually began, on the 19th Admiral Snyder planned to establish
a PBY base at French Frigate Shoals, while using carrier air strikes to deny Maroon
the use of Johnston Island for its own flying boats.
Purple began the exercise widely dispersed. The Main Body was about 300 miles
south of Midway, with the Raiding Force some 700 miles to the south-by-southwest,
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roughly 360 miles south of Johnston Island, and the Patrol Force aircraft tenders
about 50 miles southwest of French Frigate Shoals.10
Maroon’s forces were also widely dispersed, with its two principal components,
the Northern Detachment and the Southern Detachment, nearly 800 miles apart.
The Northern Detachment was operating several hundred miles north of Hawaii, as
if coming down from Dutch Harbor, and the Southern was about 350 miles directly
south of Hawaii. The Island Force had an aircraft tender with some patrol bombers
and several submarines stationed at Johnston Island and French Frigate Shoals, and
the balance of its forces in Hawaiian waters.
The maneuvers began on April 19th at 0700 Hawaiian time. For Purple, westward of Hawaii roughly between Midway and Johnston Island, this was about an
hour after sunrise, and for Maroon, in the latitude of Hawaii, it was about two hours
after sunrise. The weather across most of the region was poor, with overcast skies,
periodic rain squalls, and heavy swells, though the Purple Raiding Force, far to the
southwest, found conditions somewhat better. As the Purple Main Body proceeded
generally eastward at 13.5 knots, dictated by the speed of the accompanying transports, two detachments were dispatched, one each to operate against French Frigate
Shoals and Johnston Island. The French Frigate Shoals force consisted of three
heavy cruisers and five destroyers proceeding at 25 knots, followed by a transport
and three destroyers at 13 knots, while the Johnston Island force comprised two
light cruisers and two destroyers.
From the start of the exercise, Maroon patrol bombers from French Frigate
Shoals and Johnston Island were active conducting reconnaissance, but the Purple
Main Body was unable to put Saratoga’s scout aircraft into the air until about 1240,
when the weather began to clear. In contrast, the Purple Raiding Force, hundreds of
miles away, found more favorable weather, and Lexington aircraft conducted routine reconnaissance. Through the 19th and into the 20th, Purple’s Main Body proceeded in a generally eastward direction, while its Raiding Force proceeded
north-by-northeast, and the Johnston Island and French Frigate Shoals forces proceeded independently.
Maroon, meanwhile, had ordered its Northern Detachment to proceed south,
while probing for Purple with the Southern Detachment. To facilitate this mission,
the Southern Detachment formed a scouting force with Yorktown, several heavy
cruisers, and some destroyers, demonstrating considerable organizational flexibility. Maroon patrol bombers operating out of French Frigate Shoals appear to have
spotted the Purple Main Body at 0915 on the 20th. Quickly notified of this information, Maroon’s Southern Detachment, still rather far off, altered course to intercept.
The cruisers of Purple’s Johnston Island detachment, commanded by Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, reached their objective at 0513 on the 20th, about 40 minutes before sunrise, and well ahead of their accompanying destroyers, which had

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:36 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

FLEET PROBLEM XXI, APRIL 1–MAY 17, 1940

been forced to reduce speed due to heavy seas. Soon after sunrise Maroon’s cruiser
floatplanes and 8-inch gunfire worked over Maroon ships, patrol bombers, and
shore installations on the island, “destroying” them. The cruisers lingered in the
area for several hours, until joined by the destroyers in the evening. Then, the entire
detachment was ordered to rejoin the Main Body, leaving a destroyer on guard. At
no cost to itself, Purple had destroyed a Maroon aircraft tender, two submarines,
and several patrol bombers, eliminating Johnston Island as an enemy reconnaissance base; Rear Admiral Fletcher would report that the operation had “worked out
almost exactly as planned.”11
Purple’s French Frigate Shoals detachment was not so successful. Reaching its
objective at 1343 on the 20th, the detachment promptly attacked Maroon ships, aircraft, and constructive installations with scout aircraft and gunfire. The destruction
was considerable, but Maroon submarines were present in the area, and over the
next few hours managed to torpedo a heavy cruiser, scored at a low 10 percent damage. In addition, Maroon mines were ruled to have accounted for three Purple destroyers. Reduced by nearly half, the Purple cruiser-destroyer detachment was
ordered to rejoin the Main Body, at 0138 (1138 GCT) on the 21st, while the transport unit was left behind, to attempt the capture of French Frigate Shoals. Without
the support of the cruisers and destroyers, lacking minesweepers, and confronted by
aggressive action on the part of Maroon submarines, this force proved singularly ineffective in its attempt to capture the atoll. Maroon had lost one aircraft tender and a
large contingent of patrol bombers, plus several submarines, but had prevented the
enemy from establishing a patrol bomber base at French Frigate Shoals, while inflicting serious damage on the Purple fleet.
Meanwhile, on the evening of the 20th, the Purple Raiding Force was dissolved.
While the bulk of the force was ordered to rejoin the Main Body, an “Advance Detachment” consisting of Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and some destroyers was
ordered to scout to 125 miles ahead of the Main Body, seeking out Maroon, in a further demonstration of organizational flexibility.
On the 21st and 22nd, this Advance Detachment had many contacts with Maroon submarines, which lost several of their number to air patrols, while inflicting
no harm in return. On the 22nd, Lexington’s aggressive air patrols paid off when, at
0742 (1742 GCT), about 90 minutes after sunrise, they ran into some enemy carrier
scouts. Eleven minutes later, Lexington’s scouts spotted Maroon’s Yorktown task
group. Lexington launched a series of large strikes (while trying to coordinate support from Saratoga, closing rapidly with the rest of the Main Body). The carrier’s
aircraft worked over Yorktown, inflicting 100 percent damage.12 But Yorktown aircraft had managed to get into the air, and in turn inflicted 26 percent damage on
Lexington, reducing her speed to 20 knots. With her flight deck ruled damaged beyond repair, Lexington “lost” most of her aircraft as well, ruled to have ditched in the
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ocean for lack of fuel. At 1735 (0335 GCT) on the 23rd, the Purple Main Body, by
then reinforced by the balance of the Raiding Force and the Johnston Island and
French Frigate Shoals detachments, came up to support the Advance Force. Meanwhile, Maroon’s Scouting Group, having lost Yorktown, broke off contact and retired eastward at high speed, later changing course northward. By this time, Purple
was less than 300 miles south-southwest of Lahaina Roads.
During the 23rd, as the last miscellaneous units rejoined the Purple Main Body,
Saratoga’s scouts reported repeated contacts with Maroon patrol bombers and submarines. One Purple destroyer was heavily damaged by submarine attack, but the
fleet otherwise was able to avoid injury, and at least one Maroon submarine was
ruled out of action. Purple aerial reconnaissance was extremely aggressive, using
both carrier and cruiser aircraft. Saratoga’s scouts were able to hit Maroon patrol
bombers at anchor in Pearl Harbor and elsewhere. At 1830 on the 23rd, Purple was
close enough to Hawaii to reorganize into an Attack Force, responsible for effecting
landings at Lahaina, and a Covering Force, to protect the Attack Force. One destroyer squadron was dispatched to reconnoiter the landing area, and the assault
was set for 0600, just about dawn, on the 24th. Around dusk 1859 on the 24th Maroon patrol bombers from Pearl Harbor conducted an airstrike against Purple, inflicting some damage on a heavy cruiser (which they erroneously reported as
Saratoga). This did not impeded Purple’s movements, and by 0230 on the 25th, the
Covering Force had interposed itself between the Attack Force and the Maroon
fleet, which was concentrated to the southeast. Surface contact between the fleets
occurred just two minutes later.
At 0232 destroyers screening the Purple Covering Force spotted Maroon searchlights about ten miles to their east, and Maroon shortly spotted Purple as well. Soon
afterward, Maroon battleships opened fire on the Purple destroyers, and Maroon
destroyers began a series of torpedo attacks against the Covering Force. By 0250 a
general night surface action was well under way, with the battleships on both sides
exchanging fire. Termed by Admiral Richardson a “confused affair, with some near
collisions, undesired illuminations, and missed gunnery and torpedo opportunities,” the fight demonstrated that the fleet had a lot to learn about night operations.
This was the final act of the fleet problem, which was declared over by CINCUS
Richardson at 0330.13
Parts VII–VIII: Replenishment, Rest, Recreation, and Return, April 26–May 17,
1940
The formal critique of Fleet Problem XXI was held over two days in Hawaii, and involved some 550 officers. Written reports were also required. Although the focus
was on Parts II and VI, there was some criticism of Part III as well.14
Based on the loss of Yorktown, CINCUS James O. Richardson concluded that the
exercise demonstrated “the folly of stationing a carrier where it would not receive
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maximum protection from the antiaircraft gun resources of the task force of which
it was part.”15 While a case can be made that carriers did benefit from the antiaircraft capacity of battleships, Richardson overlooked the fact that the instrument
of Yorktown’s loss was Lexington, which had taken advantage of her very high speed
to operate independently of her own battle line. In short, the experience gained
since Fleet Problem IX in the operation of autonomous carrier task forces had still
not been firmly established. Not until the advent of the relatively fast battleships of
the North Carolina and South Dakota classes, and the very fast Iowa class ships,
would carriers be able to benefit from the enormous anti-aircraft capability of the
battlewagon, while retaining the advantage of their own very high speed.
The fleet’s shortcomings in night operations were cited by a number of critics,
including Richardson, who wrote: “This encounter raised many interesting questions in regard to the conduct and possibilities of night actions. Our Fleet has had
little experience in the necessary maneuvers as well as in solving the communications and gunnery problems presented. . . . It is understood that at least one naval
power [i.e., Japan] attaches great importance to night operations and conducts extensive training of its fleet for night action.”16
Richardson’s very accurate observation did result in some changes to the fleet
training schedule to reflect this need, but “the desire to take immediate radical
training action was tempered by an appreciation of the fact that ‘radar was just
around the corner.’” While this was technically true, the primitive radars available
proved of little help in the fleet’s early nocturnal engagements with the Imperial
Navy.17
One very valuable recommendation was that the fleet needed a uniform system
for designating positions relative to a common point. As William F. Halsey, commanding CARDIV 1, observed, four different ways of designating patrol sectors
were in use during Part VI, concluding “A single system of sector report is urgently
recommended.”18
A number of other lessons were learned. PBYs had proven vulnerable when
making attacks on surface ships, but were valuable for high altitude tracking. There
continued to be a demonstrable need for greater Army-Navy cooperation in the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. The very low effectiveness of horizontal bombing attacks against ships was once again noted, an observation that seems to have done
little to discourage some Navy airmen, as well as most Army airmen, from continuing to support such tactics.
One aspect of the fleet’s performance that does not seem to have elicited any
comment in the critique was the remarkable ease with which the commanders on
both sides were able to reorganize their forces. On at least three occasions during
Part VI one or the other of the two opposing fleet commanders undertook major reorganizations to create mission-oriented task forces, demonstrating great flexibility
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not only in organization, but also in command and control, communications, planning, and staff work.
In his critique of the “communications mobilization,” Admiral Richardson
noted that it had been of immense value, because it revealed “major deficiencies in
the current communication mobilization plans.”19 During the problem a variety of
camouflage paint schemes were tried out, leading to the adoption of dark gray for
destroyers.20
In view of the worsening political situation in the Far East, following Fleet Problem XXI President Roosevelt ordered the fleet to remain in Hawaiian waters, in the
hope of sending a message to Japan. This proved to be a controversial decision, leading to the relief of Admiral Richardson as CINCUS, which is beyond the scope of
this discussion.
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N O T E S 1 M964-32, 1, United States Fleet, 16 February
1940, Change No. 1 to U.S. Fleet Operation Order No. 2-40; NWCA, Carton 66, U.S. Fleet
OpOrd 2-40, Task Organization, 15 January 1940,
with Annex B, “General Plan for Fleet Problem
XXI and Annual Fleet Exercises, 1 April—17 May
1940.” Of particular interest is Richardson’s account, in Treadmill, pp. 236–50, apparently the
only published critique of a fleet problem by a
CINCUS. See, also, John F. Wukovits, Devotion to
Duty: A Biography of Admiral Clifton A. F.
Sprague (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995),
pp. 49–56.
2 From the institution of Neutrality Patrol in September of 1939, shortly after the outbreak of
World War II in Europe, naval forces in the Atlantic eventually grew to include nearly a third of
the fleet by late 1941. The principal treatment is
Abbazia’s Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy. See also, William
E. Scarborough, “The Neutrality Patrol: To Keep
Us Out of World War II?” Naval Historical Center, www.history.navy.mil/download/ww2-4.pdf
and www.history.navy.mil/download/ww2-5.pdf.
3 News reports provided only background information on the fleet problem, with no stories actually
covering events during it. See, for example,
“Army and Navy Map Record War Games,” by
Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, Feb 25,
1940; “Edison to See War Games in Mid-Pacific,”
Washington Post, Mar 20, 1940; “130 U.S. Warships to be Used in ‘War,’” New York Times, Mar
31, 1940; “Navy’s Pacific War Game Is Much Like
Real Thing,” Christian Science Monitor, Apr 1,
1940; “U.S. Fleet Sails Today for Big War Maneuvers in Pacific,” Washington Post, Apr 1, 1940;
“Great Fleet Moves to Pacific Objective,” New
York Times, Apr 3, 1940; “The ‘War’ Is On! U.S.
Throws 130 Warships And 110,000 Men Into
Greatest Maneuver,” by John G. Norris, Washington Post, Apr 14, 1940; “Pacific Fleet Ends Problem 21 Games,” New York Times, Apr 27, 1940;
“Fleet Will Stay Near Hawaii Indefinitely,” New
York Times, May 8, 1940; “Fleet in Pacific Bars
Personnel Transfer,” New York Times, May 10,
1940; “More Naval Games Enlist Hawaii Fleet,”
New York Times, May 14, 1940.
4 M964-32, 2, COMBATFOR to CINCUS, May 15,
1940, “Part II, Fleet Problem XXI—Report of
Commander Black Fleet”; M964-32, 2, Commander Battleships, Battle Force (Commander
While Fleet) to CINCUS, 29 April 1940, “Fleet
Problem XXI, Part II—Comments and
Recommendations.”
5 Once again, Greenwich Civil Time was used during the problem, which has been converted to
Hawaii Civil Time here.
6 Campbell, p. 220.
7 Richardson, pp. 238–39; MacDonald, “The Last
of the Fleet Problems,” p. 8.
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8 The exercises on April 7–9 were also designated as
Fleet Tactical Exercises 11, 14, and 21. Those held
on April 10th were designated as No. 114A for the
defensive side and 114B for the offensive.
9 M964-33, 4, COMSCOFOR (Commander Maroon Fleet), to CINCUS, “Maroon Report of Part
VI, Fleet Problem XXI,” with COMSCOFOR to
CINCUS, April 26, 1940, “Fleet Problem XXI,
Part VI, Narrative,” attached; M964-35, 1,
COMBATFOR to CINCUS, May 15, 1940, “Part
VI, Fleet Problem XXI—Report of Commander
Purple Fleet.”
10 The patrol bombers assigned to the Patrol Force
were actually at Pearl Harbor, preparing to fly up
to French Frigate Shoals once Maroon had secured control—an artificiality of the exercise.
11 John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral:
Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and
Guadalcanal (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2006), p. 5.
12 Lundstrom, Black Shoe, p. 181, compares the circumstances of the “loss” of Yorktown during this
phase of Fleet Problem XXI with some aspects of
operations during the Battle of the Coral Sea on
May 7–8, 1942.
13 Richardson, pp. 222–23, 249; on the night action,
see Lundstrom, Black Shoe, p. 5.
14 NWCA, CINCUS to Fleet, “Critique of Fleet
Problem XXI”; M964-33, 4, COMSCOFOR
(Commander Maroon Fleet), to CINCUS, “Maroon Report of Part VI, Fleet Problem XXI”;
M964-35, 1, COMBATFOR to CINCUS, May 15,
1940, “Part VI, Fleet Problem XXI—Report of
Commander Purple Fleet.”
15 Richardson, p. 246. When the fleet was in cruising
formation, Richardson favored placing carriers in
the middle of the battleships, to offer them the
maximum degree of protection. In an odd way,
this demonstrated the increasing value of carriers
to the fleet, since this made the formation of
battleline more difficult, but it reduced carrier
maneuvering speed by nearly a third; Campbell,
pp. 177–79.
16 M964-35, 1, COMBATFOR to CINCUS, May 15,
1940, “Part VI, Fleet Problem XXI—Report of
Commander Purple Fleet,” p. 23. See also, Richardson, pp. 222–23, 249, quoted above.
17 Richardson, p. 223.
18 M964-35, 1, COMBATFOR to CINCUS, May 15,
1940, “Part VI, Fleet Problem XXI—Report of
Commander Purple Fleet,” p. 42.
19 Richardson, p. 241.
20 MacDonald, “Last of the Fleet Problems,” p. 8;
COMDESBATFOR, Conf. Ltr. to BuShips, 25 October 1940, S19-Ser. 4888, “Camouflage of Destroyers—Low Visibility Paint.”
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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Fleet Problem XXII, 1941

1941

O

riginally scheduled for January of 1941, Fleet Problem XXII presented some
planning difficulties. In Europe, Germany had overrun Poland, Denmark,
Norway, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France and had initiated unrestricted submarine warfare in an effort to starve Britain, while Italian
forces were engaged against the British in northern and eastern Africa and across
the Mediterranean. As a result of the European war, about a quarter of the U.S. Fleet
was committed to Neutrality Patrol in the Atlantic and would thus be unable to participate in a fleet problem held in the Pacific. Meanwhile, since Japan, already at war
with China, had taken advantage of the fall of France to occupy much of
Indo-China, and seemed primed for further expansion, any problem would have to
be held in the Pacific, to keep the main body of the U.S. Fleet ready to respond in the
event of war in the Far East. Several scenarios were examined.
Proposal 1: The “Midway Version”
The first proposed scenario for Fleet Problem XXII postulated that Blue (United
States) and Black (Japan) were close to war, and already making preliminary movements.1 Blue possessed all American territory in the Pacific, including the Philippines, with major bases at Midway and Hawaii, and important oil fields presumed
to be on Christmas Island. Black, with its homeland in New Zealand and a major
colony in Samoa, controlled the Mandates. By using maneuvers in the Marshall Islands as cover, Black intended to dispatch an expeditionary force from its homeland
with the intention of raiding Blue commerce and seizing Christmas Island.
Blue’s forces in the Pacific were few, and scattered among a number of bases or
widely dispersed at sea, but with a large constructive Main Body en route from the
East Coast. The Main Body was to rendezvous with a Marine Expeditionary Force at
San Diego, and the combined force would then proceed to Hawaii, reaching it about
a month after hostilities began. Although only about the same size as the Blue Pacific fleet, the Black fleet was to begin the war concentrated and ready for
operations.
This scenario was quite similar to that used in Part II of Fleet Problem XXI, and
in several earlier ones as well. Since both the CNO and CINCUS seem to have
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wanted to do something different, in order to vary the nature of the training and the
region in which it was to be conducted, the proposal proved unsatisfactory. As a result, on August 24, 1940, the CNO specifically requested alternatives to this proposal.2 When offering some new proposals in September, CINCUS Richardson
observed that “There are few situations in and around the Hawaiian Islands that
have not been explored already.”3
Proposal 2: The Magdalena Bay Plan
The Magdalena Bay Plan was one of two alternative scenarios for the fleet problem
issued on September 3, 1940.4 It was to be a three-phase problem, including a series
of tactical exercises, refueling exercises, and the actual fleet problem, to extend over
about three weeks.
For purposes of the fleet problem the West Coast of the United States was assumed to be considerably further east, with some islands at San Pedro and San
Diego, plus the actual Catalina Islands. A large mass of neutral territory was assumed to lie south of 33° North to 27° North, between 129° West and 120° West.
White (Japan), a strong Pacific power, was assumed to have a major base in Hawaii and a claim on Magdalena Bay, some 500 miles down the coast of Mexico from
San Diego. Black (United States) controlled the San Diego–San Pedro–Catalina archipelago, but had its primary bases much further east.
The fleet problem was to begin with both fleets concentrated, White at Hawaii,
and Black at San Pedro–San Diego. White was to attempt to establish an advanced
base at Magdalena Bay, which Black naturally had to prevent.
Proposal 3: The Panama–Central America–Caribbean Plan
The second of the two plans proposed on September 3, 1940, differed from most
previous fleet problems set in the Panama area, in that it was not focused on the defense of the canal.5 Gray (United States) was assumed to have control of Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, and Panama, plus some territories in the West Indies, and the east coast
of the United States. At the start of the problem, Brown (Japan), a major Pacific
power, was assumed to have an advanced base at Pearl Harbor. In a recent offensive
Brown had seized the Galapagos Islands and begun basing its main fleet there. In the
Atlantic, Brown’s ally Indigo (Germany) had seized Guantanamo, and was conducting offensive operations against Gray in the Antilles, though with slender forces.
Central American and Caribbean waters were considered vital to Gray’s national
survival, and it had moved a substantial portion of its fleet into the Gulf of Fonseca,
on the west coast of Central America, to counter Brown. Brown’s objective was to
interrupt commerce in the area, and tie down the Gray fleet, so that it could not divert resources to deal with Indigo. This fleet problem would have been linked with
Fleet Landing Exercise No. 7, which was held in Puerto Rican waters in February
1941.
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Proposal 4: The Northeastern Pacific Option6
The final proposal for Fleet Problem XXII was issued in late September. It called for
maneuvers in the northeastern Pacific. This was an area that former CINCUS
Reeves had thought superior to the Panama area, since it was a region with which
the fleet was not familiar, it having been the scene of only small parts of the fleet maneuvers of 1935 and 1938.7 Observing that “all Fleet Problems in recent years have
been held in tropical or semi-tropical regions,” CINCUS Richardson welcomed the
opportunity for the fleet to “become familiar with Alaskan and Northern Waters
and the inclement weather found there.”8 Unlike the three earlier proposals for Fleet
Problem XXII, which were all scheduled for January of 1941, this scenario was to begin about April 21st, due to climatic conditions in the northeastern Pacific.
In this scenario, Gray (United States) controlled all American territories in the
Pacific, though apparently not the Philippines. Black (Japan) dominated the Far
East, and had strong forces in the Carolines and Marshalls. Brown (Canada) was
neutral at the start.
The problem assumed that at the start of hostilities the Black Fleet was in the vicinity of Petropavlovsk, in Kamchatka, and the Gray Pacific Fleet was in the Hawaiian Islands.
Outlying Gray territories, including Alaska, were lightly held, as were Brown’s
territories.
Black’s objectives were to capture Kodiak Island and Sitka in Alaska, and Port
Simpson and Prince Rupert, in Canada. The Black Fleet was stronger than the Gray
(e.g., six battleships to four, two carriers to one, etc.), and was accompanied by a constructive brigade of Marines, but Gray had a large contingent of land- and tenderbased aircraft.
While the particular themes to be explored varied depending upon the suggested
plan, in general the objectives of the several proposals for Fleet Problem XXII all involved the concentration of a strategically dispersed force, the establishment and
defense of advanced bases, cooperation between patrol aircraft and surface vessels
in the protection of shipping and anti-submarine operations, blockade procedures,
carrier–cruiser task force tactics, and so forth.
Fleet Problem XXII was never held. On December 3, 1940, CNO Harold R. Stark
wrote to Army Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall, saying, “In view of the international situation, plans for Fleet Problem XXII have been cancelled.”9 So visible had
the fleet problems been that the cancellation made the front page of the New York
Times.10
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N O T E S 1 M964-36, 3, Memorandum to the Chief of Naval
Operations, “Fleet Problem XXII.” Across the top
of this document someone has printed “Midway
Version” in pencil.
2 M964-36, 3, Chief of Naval Operations to
CINCUS, August 24, 1940.
3 M964-6, 3, CINCUS to Chief of Naval Operations,
September 29, 1940, “Outline of Alternative Fleet
Problem XXII to be Held in the Northern Pacific
Area.”
4 M964-36, 3, Chief of Naval Operations to
CINCUS, August 2, 1940, “Fleet Problem XXII
and Army-Navy Joint Minor Exercise, January,
1941”; M964-36, 3, CINCUS to the Chief of Naval
Operations, September 3, 1940, “Fleet Problem
XXII—Outline of,” pp. 1–3.
5 M964-36, 3, CINCUS to the Chief of Naval Operations, September 3, 1940, “Fleet Problem
XXII—Outline of,” pp. 4–6; M964-36, 3, Chief of
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“Fleet Problem XXII—Outline of.”
6 M964-36, 3, CINCUS to Chief of Naval Operations, September 29, 1940, “Outline of Alternative
Fleet Problem XXII to be Held in the Northern
Pacific Area.”
7 On Reeves’ views, see NWCA, Carton 64, Fleet
Problem Seventeen, Report of CINCUS, 6 June
1936, p. 36.
8 M964-36, 3, CINCUS to Chief of Naval Operations, September 29, 1940, “Outline of Alternative
Fleet Problem XXII to be Held in the Northern
Pacific Area,” p. 1.
9 M964-36, Range 3, CNO to Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army, December 3, 1940, “Training of U.S. Army
Officers with the U.S. Fleet.”
10 Leland C. Speers, “All Navy ‘Games’ Off for This
Year,” New York Times, Jan. 1, 1941.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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XXIV

Afterward

L

ittle more than 18 months separated the end of Fleet Problem XXI, in May of
1940, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. With
America’s battlefleet largely disabled, the burden of carrying on the war
against Japan fell to autonomous aircraft carrier task forces, a task they performed
in spectacular fashion. In many ways the operations of the American naval force unfolded during the early months of World War II are hardly distinguishable from its
operations during the later fleet problems. Between 1923 and 1941 the fleet had
evolved from one which was essentially preparing to refight Jutland to one that had
adopted numerous highly innovative technologies that enabled it to develop and
implement a number of revolutionary war fighting concepts, through the fleet
problems, which were essentially a repetitive series of systematic free play battle experiments rigorously criticized.
Following World War II the Navy did not resume maneuvers on the scale and
model of the fleet problems. There were a variety of reasons for this. By the end of
the war, the Navy had reached enormous size. At the time of Fleet Problem XXI in
the Spring of 1940, the fleet had just six aircraft carriers, 15 battleships and about
210 other major surface warships, and some 60 submarines, plus about 175 other
commissioned vessels. Despite the need to maintain substantial forces in the Atlantic, half the carriers, most of the battleships, nearly half the rest of the major surface
warships, and a third of the submarines were able to take part in the problem. By the
surrender of Japan in August of 1945, there were nearly 100 aircraft carriers of various types, 23 battleships, over 800 other major surface warships, and more than 200
submarines, as well as nearly 5,500 other vessels in commission, including many
small combatants. Naturally, demobilization began almost immediately, and by
mid-1947 the fleet again fell to approximately its pre-war strength, albeit somewhat
differently composed, 22 carriers, four battleships, about 200 other major surface
warships, 80 submarines, and over 500 other commissioned vessels, many of the latter new types such as command ships and amphibious warfare vessels.
During the early postwar period, the Navy relied upon a strategy that involved
some forward presence, but with most of the fleet at home, grouped in two operational fleets prepared to surge forward in the event of a crisis. This seemed an ideal
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peacetime deployment strategy, and it also permitted some relatively large maneuvers, though none approached the scale of the fleet problems.1
The first major maneuvers following World War II war were held in April and
May of 1946, when Admiral Marc Mitscher conducted fleet air defense exercises off
the Virginia Capes and later land attack maneuvers in the Caribbean. Mitscher
commanded a task force of about 30 ships built around three fleet carriers, an escort
carrier, and a battleship, plus three cruisers, some destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries. These maneuvers, purely tactical, were a test of the proposed model for
peacetime fleet organization, which envisioned several similar task forces operating
in each ocean.2
During 1947 several relatively large maneuvers were held. Two were conducted
in February and March, one each in the Pacific and the Caribbean. The Pacific maneuvers unfolded in several phases between February 27 and March 10, with a scenario somewhat resembling that of Fleet Problem XIV (1933), in which an “enemy”
task force of two carriers attempted to raid the West Coast, defended by the main
body of the Pacific Fleet, which turned out badly for the attackers, partially due to
the employment of anti-ship missiles by the defenders. Following these exercises,
the two forces combined, refueled, and undertook an “attack” on Johnston Island.
The combined force then engaged in a major underway replenishment exercise, before concluding the maneuvers with a major “air attack” on Hawaii.3
The Caribbean maneuvers, involving over 70 ships, presupposed that a foreign
enemy had captured Culebra, and that a strong fleet had been dispatched to escort a
division of Marines to recover the island. In addition to more or less routine tests of
fleet air defense and air attack tactics, and operations against opposing warships, the
fleet for the first time practiced defensive formations and tactics against nuclear
weapons, applying some ideas developed following the atomic bomb tests at Bikini
Atoll in 1946. The maneuvers ended with the “recapture” of Culebra by some 5,000
Marines on March 10th.4
The following October and November joint Army–Navy–Air Force maneuvers
were held in the Gulf of Mexico, during which a fleet based in Texas conducted an
“invasion” of Florida.5 Almost simultaneously, joint Navy–Air Force maneuver were
held in the Atlantic, involving test firings of V-2 rockets, massed attacks by B-29s
against a fleet conducting landings on Bermuda, and culminating in operations
against Newfoundland, where a brigade of marines landed.6
The only postwar maneuvers approaching the scale of the fleet problems were
held in November of 1948. Earlier in the year, the Navy had joined the Army and Air
Force in maneuvers off the Virginia Capes and Florida, and a Navy–Marine Corps
amphibious exercise was held in California. While strong task forces were committed to each of these maneuvers—the amphibious maneuvers included some 60 vessels—they by no means involved a majority of the major combatants in the fleet.7
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AFTERWARD

For the November maneuvers, the Navy committed about 100 ships, including
three fleet carriers, three escort carriers, the only battleship in commission, several
dozen cruisers and destroyers, 16 submarines, and a number of auxiliaries and amphibious vessels, out a fleet that was down to 20 carriers, one battleship, about 180
other major surface warships, 74 submarines, and some 460 other commissioned
vessels. A test of the fleet’s ability to conduct transoceanic operations in high latitudes, ships maneuvered in the Labrador Sea and Marines conducted landings in
Newfoundland, while being harassed by “enemy” submarines. A great deal was
learned about the limitations of Navy equipment for operations in high latitudes,
but the most important lesson seems to have been the vulnerability of the fleet to
snorkel-fitted submarines.8
By then, tensions between the Soviet Union and its erstwhile Western allies had
developed into the “Cold War.” For the Navy, this led to a deployment strategy
termed “permanent combat-credible forward presence.” For nearly 55 years during
and after the Cold War major portions of the fleet were stationed forward, initially
in two “hubs,” the Mediterranean and Western Pacific, with a third, the Indian
Ocean, added later.9 Since even when elements of the fleet were not engaged in combat operations or responding to crises, ships had to rotate to and from these hubs,
this strategy tied up most of the fleet; to maintain one ship on station forward for six
months required at least two ships back home, one of which was either returning
from deployment, preparing for deployment, undergoing training, or in overhaul
or modernization. And, of course, when there were combat operations, as in Korea
in 1950–53, Vietnam, 1964–72, the Persian Gulf, 1990–91, Bosnia, 1995, and Serbia,
1999, or major crises, available ships at home were required to surge in support of
those forward.
So with the onset of the Cold War, the number of active ships that weren’t forward deployed were insufficient to conduct maneuvers on the scale of the fleet
problems. Of course smaller scale maneuvers continued to be stages, as were exercises, battle practices, and such, but the Navy no longer had the ability to literally
commit a majority of its operational resources to maneuvers that could match the
fleet problems in scale and complexity.10
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N O T E S 1 On the “Two Surge Fleets” strategy, see Swartz,
Sea Changes, pp. 46–47, 71–72.
2 “8th Fleet to Train in Caribbean,” New York
Times, Apr. 9, 1946; “Navy to Use 29 Warships in
Maneuvers,” Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1946;
“President To See Navy War Games,” by Edward
T. Folliard, Washington Post, Apr. 19, 1946; “Truman, on Carrier, Views Navy With ‘Green’
Crews, Play at War,” by Felix Belair, Jr., New York
Times, Apr. 23, 1946; “Eighth Fleet Ends Maneuvers,” New York Times, May 19, 1946.
3 “Fleet Maneuvers Begin In 2 Oceans in February,” New York Times, Jan 22, 1947; “Navy Sets
Timetable in Pacific Maneuvers,” New York
Times, Feb. 28, 1947; “Iowa ‘Torpedoed’ in Mock
Pacific War,” New York Times, Mar. 2, 1947;
“‘Aggressor’s’ Planes Win in Pacific Test,” New
York Times, Mar. 4, 1947; “Pacific Fleet Maneuvers Show Need of Trained Men,” by Dean Tyler
Jenks, Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 17, 1947.
4 “New Battleship on Way,” New York Times, Jan
29, 1947; “Truman Schedules Cruise with Fleet,”
by Felix Belair, Jr., New York Times, Jan 30, 1947;
“Marines’ Landing Tests Atomic War,” New York
Times, Mar. 10, 1947.
5 “Atlantic Fleet to Open Maneuvers Next Week,”
New York Times, Oct. 25, 1947; “Atlantic War
Games to Start this Week,” New York Times, Oct.
27, 1947; “Navy Force Gathers to ‘Invade”
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Florida,” New York Times, Oct. 29, 1947; “‘Enemy’ Hits Florida as War Games Begin,” New
York Times, Nov. 3, 1947.
6 “Atlantic Fleet to Open Maneuvers Next Week,”
New York Times, Oct. 25, 1947; “Atlantic War
Games to Start This Week,” New York Times, Oct.
27, 1947; “B-29s to ‘Strike’ Fleet,” New York
Times, Nov. 2, 1947.
7 “All Forces Plan War Games Near Norfolk Aug.
9–21,” Washington Post, Jul 27, 1948; “War Game
Opens on Florida Coast,” New York Times, Oct. 5,
1948; “Coast Navy Game Begun,” New York
Times, Oct. 5, 1948.
8 “‘Big Mo’ to Greet Navy Day Visitors,” New York
Times, Oct. 27, 1948; “Submarines off to Arctic,”
New York Times, Oct. 31, 1948; “New U.S. Subs
Get Test in Huge Fleet Maneuvers,” by John
Bunker, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 1, 1948;
“Flotilla of Navy Sails for Arctic,” New York
Times, Nov. 2, 1948; “8 Snorkel Subs ‘Sink,
Wreck’ War Game Fleet of 100 Ships,” Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1948; “Navy Games Show Arctic
Garb Fails,” New York Times, Nov. 10, 1948.
9 On deployment patterns during and immediately
following the Cold War, see Swartz, Sea Changes,
pp. 47–57, 72–75.
10 Chapter 27 discusses some of the problems of
postwar maneuvers.
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Part 3: Conclusions

By providing the service with an “instrument” that permitted maneuvers to unfold
in as realistic and unrestricted a way as was possible short of actual war, the fleet
problems served not only as a test of the Navy’s skills, but also as a laboratory in
which to test existing and new warfighting ideas and technologies. The fleet problems helped the Navy not only to improve its mastery of the tools of sea power, but
also to sort out what worked and what did not from a plethora of new ideas, technologies, and capabilities, while giving commanders maximum opportunity to formulate creative solutions to realistic situations. This process created the naval force
that secured for the United States command of the seas in the Second World War
and the Cold War—and into a new century.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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XXV

1923–1941

Patterns, 1923–1941

A

lthough the twenty-one fleet problems, conducted over nearly two decades,
were often quite different from each other, a number of patterns can be discerned.

Basic Strategic Problems
Though at times it was not readily apparent, there really was only one strategic scenario studied in the fleet problems, war with Japan. This was true even of problems
set in the Caribbean postulating an attack by a European power, such as XV (1934)
or XX (1939), as well as those that had no particular “enemy” indicated, such as VI
(1926), VII (1927), and VIII (1928), which focused on convoy operations, scouting
and evasion, underway refueling, and opposed entry into a friendly port, general
operational and tactical questions. Although the fleet problems could be seen as
training and experimentation necessary for the development of the fleet’s skills under any circumstances, from the onset the only enemy that anyone realistically assumed the U.S. Navy would have to fight was Japan. Thus, all of the problems dealt
with various aspects of the strategy, operations, and tactics necessary for a war as
outlined in Plan Orange, and particularly with the thorny problem of the fleet’s
ability to drive across the Central Pacific within six months of the outbreak of war in
order to relieve a besieged Manila.1

Length
The earlier fleet problems were decidedly shorter than later ones. The length of the
problems changed markedly in the early 1930s, reflecting a growing understanding
of the complexities of a transoceanic naval campaign:
• I–XIV ranged from 3 to 16 days, for an average of a little over seven days.
• XV–XXI lasted 24–53 days (save XX, which was only 8), for an average of
36 days.
The early problems essentially involved the resolution of tactical and operational
questions, while the latter ones stressed operational and even strategic issues. As a
result, despite the significant increase in the length of the later fleet problems, the
amount of time devoted to tactical maneuvers did not notably increase. For example, while Fleet Problem XV (1934) lasted 24 days, only about 8½ of them involved
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direct tactical maneuvers, about as many as in Fleet Problem V (1925), the longest
problem held in the 1920s, which lasted just 16 days. What did change was that there
were usually more parts in the later fleet problems, to reflect different aspects of a
protracted naval campaign. For example, Fleet Problem XXI (1940), the last in the
series, ran 47 days and had eight parts.
Fleet Problem XXI
Part
I
II
III
IV–V
VI
VII–VIII

Activity
Days
Fleet Movement and Organization
2
Carrier Raid on Hawaii
4
Special Fleet Exercises
4
Replenishment, and Reorganization
8
Advanced Base Operations
7
Replenishment, Rest & Recreation, and Return to Base
22

Of the 47 days in Fleet
Problem XXI, 32 were taken up
by matters which the earlier
fleet problems had tended to
neglect, movement of the fleet
to the appropriate starting positions, organization and reorganization for the various
phases of the problem, replenishment, movement into and
out of port, and the return to
home base. These were all essential elements of a major campaign, and their inclusion in the later fleet problems
reflects an increasing understanding of the complexities of a trans-oceanic war and
the maturation of War Plan Orange. By Fleet Problem XV (1934), the battle between those who believed a war with Japan could be won quickly by a massive drive
across the Pacific—the “Thrusters”—and those who believed a Pacific war would
be long and arduous—the “Cautionaries”—had largely been won by the latter.2 The
individual parts of most of the later fleet problems were effectively as long and complex as the whole of some of the earlier problems, but they were not necessarily focused on tactical matters.3
Although when looking at the principal naval operations of the Second World
War attention tends to focus on the pivotal battles, in fact most of the campaigns
were fairly long. The Battle of the Coral Sea may have been fought on May 7th and
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8th, 1942, but the fleet movements that led up to the battle began in mid-April, and
operations continued after the battle until May 11th. Similarly, although Midway
was primarily fought on June 3rd and 4th, 1942, the campaign itself can be seen as
having begun around May 10th and to have run through June 11th, when Adm.
Chester W. Nimitz ordered an end to the pursuit.4 So while the earlier fleet problems
had concentrated on tactical issues, it was fortunate that the later ones had a more
operational focus.
An additional factor to be considered in terms of the tendency for the fleet problems to increase in length is that somewhat more money began to became available
to the Navy beginning with the first Roosevelt budget, in Fiscal Year 1934, a matter
to which will be discussed at more length below.
Theaters
Although oddly, no problem was actually held in the Atlantic, the locations of the
fleet problems were rather widely distributed across the Western Hemisphere from
equatorial to sub-arctic waters. In some cases, even without considering joint maneuvers with the Army that were associated with a fleet problem, the fleet often conducted portions of a problem in several theaters, reflecting different phases of an
unfolding naval campaign, as can be seen here.
• Panama: Fleet Problems I (1923), II (1924), III (1924), IV (1924), IX
(1929), XII (1931), XV (1934).5
• Pacific off Central America: Fleet Problems II (1924), VI (1926), XV (1934),
XVII (1936).
• Pacific off Mexico: V (1925).
• Caribbean: Fleet Problems III (1924), VII (1927), X (1930), XI (1930), XV
(1934), XX (1939).
• Eastern Pacific (California to Hawaii): Fleet Problems VIII (1928), XIII
(1932), XIV (1933), XXI (1940).
• North Pacific Triangle: Fleet Problems XVI (1935), XIX (1938).
• Central Pacific (Midway–Hawaii-Johnston): Fleet Problems VIII (1928),
XIII (1932), XIV (1933), XVI (1935), XVIII (1937), XIX (1938), XXI
(1940).
The absence of the Atlantic from the list reflects the Navy’s Pacific-centric view
of where war was mostly likely to occur.
Scale
The fleet problems were large. Until 1940, virtually the entire operational resources
of the navy were regularly committed to them. While the actual numbers of ships
and aircraft taking part varied, most of the problems involved a third or more of the
fleet, including most of the heavier units. In fact, over the years the proportion of
the fleet committed to the fleet problems tended to rise.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:40 AM

279

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

280

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

The seemingly dramatic rise in the participation of aircraft carriers is a construct
of the fact that the fleet began with one in 1923 and had six by 1940. The similar increase for cruisers reflects the acquisition of large numbers of heavy and light cruisers during the 1930s. The slight decline in battleship participation reflects the
decommissioning of three ships following the London Conference of 1930.
Virtually every one of the fleet problems involved a majority of the battleships,
carriers, and destroyers in commission, and, as they came into service, of the new
heavy and light cruisers
as well. In fact, the figures are even higher than
they appear, since ships
unavailable due to repairs, refit, or reconstruction were still
considered “in commission.” Fleet Problem XI
(1930) involved the fewest ships, only about 24
percent of the fleet, but
came only a month after
Fleet Problem X, which
had involved nearly a
third of the fleet; as some
ships did not take part in both problems, the actual overall rate of participation was
more than a third of vessels officially in commission. During the 1930s, Fleet Problems XIII (1932) through XX (1939) all involved about half or more of the fleet,
peaking at 69 percent in Fleet Problem XVII (1936). The decline thereafter was
modest, and partially reflected the rising tempo of additions to the fleet and the increased demands on it as international tensions grew and many units were assigned
to the Atlantic Squadron, then to Neutrality Patrol, and finally to the new Atlantic
Fleet; by Fleet Problem XXI (1940) about a third of the fleet was in the Atlantic.
The fleet problems were also large in a territorial sense. They often sprawled
across enormous areas. With Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 2, Fleet Problem
V (1925) extended from the Caribbean to the Gulf of Panama to the Hawaiian Islands,6 while Fleet Problem XIX (1938) stretched from San Diego to Midway to the
Aleutians. And since elements of the fleet serving in the Atlantic often steamed great
distances to take part in fleet problems, the nearly global scale of the maneuvers becomes readily evident.
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Cost
Although there are repeated references in both primary and secondary sources regarding the cost of the fleet problems, and particularly the cost of the fuel needed to
carry them out, there do not seem to be any actual figures available.7
During the early 1920s defense spending was slashed dramatically by three successive administrations that were largely “disinterested in war plans or preparations.”8 Their attitude was
certainly shared by the public
at large, and was partially due
to the prevailing belief that
global disarmament was imminent. Further, there was a
widespread belief that reducing government spending
would help fuel the booming
economy. Even when, in 1927,
President Calvin Coolidge, arguing the necessity of maintaining the fleet at treaty
levels, proposed building 71
new warships over the next
nine years, to include five aircraft carriers and 25 cruisers,
the proposal was cut by Congress to but one carrier and 15 cruisers, for which insufficient funds were provided.9
Adjusted for inflation, the Fiscal Year 1923 budget for the Navy Department, $333.2
million, was slightly less than half that of 1921, $650.4 million. Thereafter, budgets
through Fiscal Year 1930 remained fairly stable. The Crash of 1929 led to very drastic cuts in defense outlays, successively of 15 percent, 10 percent, and 8 percent in
Fiscal Years 1931, 1932, and 1933.10 Nevertheless, these cuts do not seem to have affected the length of the fleet problems. The nine problems held 1923–29 averaged
about seven days in length, which was about the same as that of the five held
1930–33.
At first appearance, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first budget was a decided disappointment for the Navy. The Department of the Navy budget for Fiscal Year 1934,
$296.9 million, was actually 15 percent below that of FY 1933. In fact, it was the lowest budget, however measured, since before World War I. The budget was, however,
not the only source of funds for the Navy that year. The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, provided an additional $238 million of Works Progress Administration funds to build new warships over the next few years, a sum equal to 80
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percent of the official budget.11 Over the following three years this money permitted
32 new ships to be laid down; two aircraft carriers, Yorktown (CV 5) and Enterprise
(CV 6), four light cruisers of the Brooklyn Class (authorized in 1928), twenty destroyers, two gunboats, and four other vessels. This was almost as many surface warships as had been ordered during the previous dozen fiscal years. The following year
the Vinson-Trammel Act authorized sufficient new construction to bring the fleet
up to the tonnage levels established by the Washington and London Naval Limitation Treaties of 1922 and 1930.12 Thereafter, the budget began to rise steadily; some
50 percent in FY 1935 and nearly 25 percent more the following year, making the
Fiscal 1936 budget the largest since 1921.
These increases were due primarily to the president’s efforts to fight the Depression by stimulating business,13 but also at least partially to a recognition of the rising
level of international tension.14 The overall increase in money available to the Navy
that began in FY 1934 seems to have been a contributory factor in the increasing
length of the fleet problems. Although at 23 days Fleet Problem XV (1934) was already the longest by far in the series, five of the next six fleet problems would be
nearly double that length; the average length of those held 1934–40 was about 36
days, even including the anomalous Fleet Problem XX (1939), which was only eight
days long. Despite the additional funds, however, there still did not seem to be
enough money to do everything that the Navy wanted to do. Nevertheless, although
the budgets for most of the interwar years were considered very austere, cost does
not seem to have been so important a handicap to the fleet problems as is often
claimed in the contemporary literature. Indeed, an argument can be made that the
constrained budgetary situation forced the Navy to become more efficient. Moreover, had more money been available during the “austere years” from 1922 through
the mid-1930s, much of what those funds would have bought would have been obsolete or obsolescent by the late ’30s, particularly in the case of aircraft.15 Nevertheless, budgetary constraints did have an important influence in shaping the scenarios
for the fleet problems during Fiscal Years 1930–33, in the interest of fuel economy
and to reduce wear and tear on equipment.16
Jointness
Although specifically naval maneuvers, and thus often including Marine Corps
components and occasionally the Coast Guard, many of the fleet problems also
involved Army participation at some level. For the most part these were
“inter-service” undertakings, however, rather than genuinely “joint” efforts.17
With one or two exceptions, no actual joint command was established, and there
was minimal jointness on staffs, usually one or two officers from the sister service
attached to the staff of the “joint” commander. And even when there was some attempt to integrate staffs, the services lacked uniform procedures and in many
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cases terminology and standard operating procedures were totally different.18
Nevertheless, there were some interesting developments.
Fleet Problem III (1924) was essentially the naval side of GJE No. 2,19 while GJE
No. 3, followed immediately after Fleet Problem V (1925), thus providing some experience in inter-service operations. For Fleet Problem IX (1929), Maj. Gen. Malin
Craig, then Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Army, served as the chief umpire for Blue.
Similarly, for GJE No. 4, held in the Hawaii area in February of 1932, a few weeks before Fleet Problem XIII, Craig, by then Commander, Hawaiian Division, was both
the army commander and the chief umpire, with CINCUS Frank H. Schofield serving as chief naval umpire and Maj. Carl Spaatz as chief umpire for air.20 These major
inter-service undertakings aside, many of the fleet problems involved some degree
of Army-Navy cooperation. For example, Period 2 of Fleet Problem XVIII (1937),
incorporated a minor joint Army-Navy exercise, while an exercise on the eve of
Fleet Problem VII (1927) and Exercise L of Fleet Problem XV (1934) both involved
maneuvers between the Battle Force and the Army’s coast defense forces in Panama.
Army cooperation in these exercises was often at the highest levels. The
Chief-of-Staff of the Army personally took part in Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise
No. 3, in 1925, which was essentially an extension of Fleet Problem V, and as noted,
the Assistant Chief-of-Staff commanded the Blue forces during Fleet Problem IX
(1929). One result of this was that senior naval officers clearly understood the need
for more such inter-service maneuvers to establish a smoother working relationship
with the Army.21 The Army also seems to have come to the same conclusion, and
regularly requested permission to assign observers to temporary duty with the fleet,
“because of the practical benefits to both services.”22 Often, the observers were officers of some status or high visibility. For example, during Fleet Problem IX, Charles
A. Lindbergh, a colonel in the Army Air Corps Reserve, served as an observer aboard
Saratoga (CV 3).23 During Phase IV of Fleet Problem XVII (1936), 32 Army officers
were assigned as observers aboard various ships or with various air squadrons.24
Thus, although not truly “joint,” these inter-service aspects of the fleet problems
and related exercises were an initial step toward the greater integration that characterized operations during World War II.
Staff Work
The fleet problems generated an enormous amount of staff work. Scores of planning documents had to be prepared, often running literally to hundreds of pages,
including diagrams, maps, anchorage plans, and so forth. Consider the staff work
generated during the planning for Fleet Problem XX (1939), by far the shortest
problem after 1934.25
• Communications between the CNO and CINCUS, discussing ideas and
proposals for the problem, as well as correspondence with the bureaus and
other offices of the Navy to provide or secure information.
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• Movement orders to the Caribbean for the fleet, including instructions on
transit of the Panama Canal for the Battle Force, coming from the West
Coast.
• Correspondence on behalf of the CNO by the Navy Department, with the
State Department, regarding permission from foreign governments to use
certain ports, with resultant responses.
• Logistical planning.
• Communications planning, including assignment of frequencies, call signs,
and shore-based resources, and preparations for signals intelligence
operations.
• Cryptographic planning, including assignment of codes, cryptographic
resources, security guidelines.
• Correspondence and plans regarding linkage of the Fleet Problem with
Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5.
• CINCUS’s operational orders for the Fleet Problem, including geographical
constraints, general situation, special restrictions, and assignment of forces,
as well as specific orders for White and Black, umpiring instructions,
communications plan, and final anchorage arrangements.
• White Commander’s statement of the problem, estimate of the situation,
plans, orders, instructions, and organization.
• Black Commander’s statement of the problem, estimate of the situation,
plans, orders, instructions, and organization.
All of these documents were produced before the first day of the fleet problem.
The earliest were dated in May of 1938, fully nine months before the problem was to
begin, and the last, White’s estimate of the situation, was dated February 3, 1939,
over two weeks before the opening date of the problem.
A fleet problem would also require production of cruising disposition plans, zigzag plans, battleline fire distribution plans, postal routing notification plans, orders
temporarily assigning personnel from shore stations or reserve status, and more.
There was also considerable variation in the type of paperwork required, depending
upon the details of the particular problem. For example, for Fleet Problem XX
(1939) staffs had to develop transit plans for the Panama Canal, and then make arrangements for a series of port calls on the East Coast after the problem was over,
followed by plans to return to the West Coast.26
In addition, even before the actual beginning of the fleet problem the force,
squadron, and division commanders of the two sides had to make their own plans
and issue their own instructions. During a problem, further staff work was required
to maintain command, control, and communications. The critique of the problem
required still more staff work to prepare, process, and analyze final reports. Finally,
with the problem over, a good deal of staff work was required to get the fleet back to
its home ports.
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The volume of staff work required and the great detail involved was certainly of
importance in developing the skills of the officers on Navy staffs. This proved of
enormous value during World War II, when superior staff work provided the U.S.
Navy with a decided advantage over the Imperial Navy. In fact, a good case could be
made that on the strategic level none of the operations planned by the Imperial
Navy during the war proved successful; the great Japanese victories of the six
months between December 1941 and May 1942 had all been planned before the war,
in some cases requiring as much as a year from gestation to execution.27
Secrecy
Initially there does not seem to have been much concern about preserving secrecy
during the fleet problems. During Fleet Problem I (1923) no effort was made to
conceal any information from the press, and even some vulnerabilities in the defenses of the Panama Canal were publicly discussed.28 As time went by, however, the
Navy became increasingly concerned about secrecy, as innovative tactics were being
developed, new equipment adopted, and experimental technologies tested. By the
early 1930s restrictions began to be imposed on press coverage, not without some
debate over the loss of favorable publicity that this would entail.29
Fleet Problem XVII (1936), was the first in which the press was not permitted to
report from aboard ship during the maneuvers; the ban was so strict that even the
line crossing ceremonies were not mentioned in the press until months later.30 The
following year reporters were allowed aboard ship, and covered the fleet’s movement to Hawaii and the preliminary joint Army-Navy maneuvers held there, but
were apparently only permitted to file innocuous reports during Fleet Problem
XVIII proper.31 The next year the press was barred totally. Although once again allowed considerable access for Fleet Problem XX (1939), which was clearly intended
to send a “message” to the European dictatorships, a complete ban on coverage was
once again imposed for Fleet Problem XXI (1940), the last in the series.32
Safety
Safety considerations necessarily imposed a certain degree of artificiality on the
fleet problems, which led to some concern about the reliability of the lessons to be
learned from them. As former CINCUS James O. Richardson observed in his memoirs,” “the strict applications of peacetime safety rules, always contained the real
hazard of sometimes arriving at erroneous conclusions.”33 Certainly on a number of
occasions during the fleet problems safety concerns dictated the adoption of
courses of action that would have differed from those which would have been taken
during actual war. For example, during Exercise L of Fleet Problem XV (1934), a
heavy cruiser was caught and “sunk” by enemy cruisers while trying to recover her
floatplanes; as noted in the subsequent critique of the problem, “in actual war [the
ship’s captain] would have withdrawn without fighting, abandoning his planes if
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necessary.”34 Safety concerns necessarily led to the curtailment or cancellation of activities due to foul weather. Aircraft operations were of particular concern, since
they were extremely risky, and accidents generated very bad publicity.35 In this regard, it’s worth recalling that when, during the work-up for Fleet Problem IX in
1929, Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves proposed what became the famous Saratoga
“raid” on the Panama Canal, CINCUS William V. Pratt’s only reservation was the
matter of pilot safety.36 So safety certainly put some limits on the willingness of
commanders to take risks in developing plans and conducting operations.37
Despite the concern for safety, there were always accidents and incidents. For example, on May 12, 1935, during Fleet Problem XVI, while maneuvering off Diamond Head, Oahu, the destroyer Sicard (DD 346) was rammed by Lea (DD 118),
and had to be towed into Pearl Harbor.38 Accidents often had great influence on the
outcome of some of the fleet problems. Part III of Fleet Problem XVI (1935), had to
be interrupted when a flying boat went missing, requiring the diversion of all air assets with the fleet to help search for the aircraft; although the battleline maneuvers
were resumed without aircraft, the results were confused and misleading.39
A particularly interesting case occurred during Fleet Problem XV (1934).
Shortly after noon on May 8th, the Umpires ruled that as a result of serious damage
from torpedo and air attack Blue flagship California had lost all communication
ability, flashing light as well as radio. As the fleet was steaming on a 15-mile front
from the open sea toward narrower waters off Culebra, this soon caused some tense
moments. Blue Commander Joseph M. Reeves had to threaten to use the emergency
communications circuit to order a change of course before the Umpires relented
and allowed “normal” communications, at 1530.40
Major Experimental Threads
Although most references to the fleet problems focus on their importance in the
evolution of carrier aviation, they were in fact critical to developments in every
warfighting area and in every aspect of technology and the operation and management of ships, aircraft, and personnel.41 There were always several experimental
threads running through a fleet problem. These threads usually recurred year after
year, each time being examined in a different way, due to increasing experience,
better technology, new ideas, and changing plans.
As doctrinal ideas were refined they were published in the Fleet Tactical Publications, or disseminated by means of lectures at the Naval War College and the annual
reports of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet.42 This kept the fleet
current on changes in doctrine. Developments in the major experimental threads
can be readily summarized.
Command Estimates and Planning
Perhaps the most consistent theme of the fleet problems was the importance of
training commanders to make accurate estimates of the situation and develop
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appropriate plans. The senior leadership in the Navy stressed tactical flexibility, and
appears to have eschewed the notion of a “school solution.” Addressing the officers
of the fleet after Fleet Problem XII (1931), CNO William V. Pratt said,43 “never attempt to draw out of the plans a canned solution. The purpose of this problem was
to teach you to act quickly and to form a clear and concise decision. From this decision evolves a clear and definite plan.”
Battlefleet and Battleline
Despite all the experimentation with aircraft and aircraft carriers, submarines, amphibious operations, and underway refueling, from first to last the main concern of
the fleet problems was the battleship and how best to employ it.44 The result was often a “tendency to force fleet actions to occur in the proper Mahanian mold.”45 Despite this degree of artificiality, many valuable lessons were learned from the fleet
problems with regard to the employment of battleships.
With its battleline already marginally faster by 2.5 knots than the U.S. Navy’s
20.5 knots, Japan also possessed three active battlecruisers of the Kongo Class, able
to make 27.5 knots, 30 percent faster than the fastest American battleship.46 The
threat from well-employed battle cruisers was several times demonstrated, most
notably when Thomas Hart capped the Blue “T” during Fleet Problem XVII (1936),
using heavy cruisers as “constructive” battlecruisers. Tactics had to be devised to
permit America’s slower battleline to cope effectively with a faster enemy. The initial
experiments occurred during Fleet Problems X and XI (both 1930). Further experiments over the next few years led to the adoption of “reverse action” tactics. This innovative approach required that the enemy deploy his battleships first. This would
tend to mean that his fastest ships were at the head of the formation. The U.S. Fleet
could then deploy on the opposite course. “The enemy would be forced to either accept an action on opposite courses, with his battlecruisers chasing the rear of the
[U.S.] Navy’s formation, or turn around and have his battlecruisers positioned at
the rear of his line.”47
The fleet problems also demonstrated “the relative immunity of battleships to
air attack.” In fact, battleships were to have much higher survivability under air attack in the coming war than any other type of vessel. This may seem contradicted by
the experience of World War II, nevertheless despite the loss of a number of
battlewagons in often spectacular fashion during the war, they proved much less
vulnerable to air attack than any other type of warship, particularly when maneuvering in open waters, a consequence of both their superior structural strength and
their enormous anti-aircraft capabilities. Although 16 battleships or battlecruisers
were sunk by aircraft during the war, twelve of those lost were moored or at anchor
at the time they were attacked; in contrast, nine battleships were sunk in surface
gunnery and torpedo actions, only two of which were moored at the time.48 The lessons of the fleet problems were applied in the design of the new battleships that the
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Navy began to lay down in 1937 (the North Carolina, South Dakota, and Iowa
classes), which were provided with enormous anti-aircraft batteries and proved virtually invulnerable to air attack. From the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (August
24, 1942) on the U.S. Navy consistently attempted to put battleships between its carriers and the probable direction of enemy air attacks, knowing that they were not
only more capable of resisting air attack but would prove an irresistible target for
Japanese airmen.49
The extensive experiments during the fleet problems also demonstrated that although heavy cruisers were valuable as scouts, escorts, and protection for carrier
task forces, they were only marginally useful against battleships in a conventional
gunnery exchange.
Aviation and Aircraft Carrier Operations
James M. Grimes neatly summarized the importance of the fleet problems and related major maneuvers to the evolution of naval air power by noting that “it was in
the War Games and Exercises of the 1920s and 1930s that Naval Aviation got its
practical training and experience through which it developed to a point where it
was enabled to prove its worth and to take its place as an integral part of the fleet.”50
The fleet problems affected the development of naval aviation in numerous
ways. The simple need to operate aircraft under more or less wartime conditions
provided invaluable experience to the aviators, and the senior leadership of the fleet.
Perhaps equally important, however, was the careful management of aviation’s role
in the problem by the more air-minded officers so that they were able to instill
across the Navy an appreciation and understanding of the capabilities and limitations of air power as an implement in the fleet’s tool box.
The fleet problems provided numerous “lessons learned” about aviation
• The aircraft carrier was a partner of the battleship as an arbiter of sea
power.
• High speed autonomous task forces built around aircraft carriers, heavy
cruisers, and destroyers possessed enormous ability to project naval air
power over large areas of sea and land.
• Carriers are extraordinarily vulnerable to air attack, mandating a “carrier
first” strike doctrine.
• Carriers were extremely vulnerable when operating in proximity to enemy
surface forces.
• Carrier operations require extensive logistical support, consuming fuel,
aircraft, spare parts, and munitions in enormous quantities.
• Aircraft were immensely valuable in spotting for long range shooting by
surface ships.
• Patrol bombers were relatively ineffective as attack aircraft, but excellent for
long-range reconnaissance.
• Air search was superior to surface search.
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• Dive bombing was far superior to horizontal bombing for attacking ships.
• Airships were ineffective as fleet scouts.
• Ship-borne floatplanes were of limited value for attack or reconnaissance
purposes, being difficult to launch and recover, and offering a point of
vulnerability when aboard ship, but highly useful for gunnery spotting.
The fleet problems helped naval aviators and aviation personnel acquire much
needed practical experience. Apparently, during a fleet problem it was not unusual
for aviators’ to double their monthly flight time, from a normal 20–25 hours to 50
or more. During Fleet Problem XIII, which ran only ten days (March 8–18, 1932),
Lexington generated 310 sorties for a total of 748 flying hours, while Saratoga did
423 sorties for 1,035 hours, both air groups averaging about 2.4 hours per sortie.
This high rate of sorties not only provided airmen and plane crews with invaluable
experience, but also resulted in a more realistic understanding of the maintenance
and logistical requirements demanded by a high operating tempo. While the increase in flight time was not nearly as much as it would prove to be when war actually came, the lessons were certainly of immense value.51
Of course, the critical lessons were those related to carrier aviation. In his analysis of the development of the influence of air power on the evolution of Navy battle
doctrine between the wars, Mark Allen Campbell observes that the participation of
carriers in the fleet problems can be seen as having unfolded in four phases:52
• Fleet Problems I–II (1923–24). Surrogates were used to provide some
preliminary ideas about the potential of carrier operations.
• Fleet Problems III–VIII (1924–28). Langley became available, permitting
more realistic experimentation, while gaining experience in the practical
problems of operating carriers, despite the ship’s limitations as an
improvised experimental vessel. Surrogate carriers were still often
employed.
• Fleet Problems IX–XV (1929–34). Lexington and Saratoga joined the fleet,
permitting much more extensive experimentation, which led to exploration
of the idea of autonomous carrier operations; surrogate carriers were still
occasionally employed.
• Fleet Problems XVI–XXI (1935–40). Additional carriers became available
(Ranger, followed by Yorktown and Enterprise), permitting large scale
experimentation with as many as four operational carriers.
In addition, several of the fleet problems—XII (1931), XIV (1933), and XVI
(1935)—were very definite tests of the capabilities of aircraft-heavy forces against
those of more traditional battle fleets.53 Although the results were sometimes mixed,
in general most of the fleet problems involved experimentation in naval aviation.
This was most obvious with regard to the aircraft carrier. In addition, considerable
attention was paid to the use of battleship and cruiser floatplanes for reconnaissance, spotting fire, and even attack, with flying boats and land-based aircraft for
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patrol and attack, and with airships for reconnaissance and patrol. Not all of the
ideas tested proved successful.54
Perhaps the most critical of the fleet problems for naval aviation were IX (1929),
in which Joseph M. Reeves demonstrated the potential of an autonomous carrier
task force, and Fleet Problems XIII, XIV, and XV (1932, 1933, 1934). Indeed, in his
analysis of these three problems, Francis Lovell Keith correctly observes that they
were of great value in convincing senior admirals of the effectiveness of autonomous naval air power.55
As a result of the fleet problems, by about 1937 the argument in the U.S. Navy
wasn’t so much as to whether naval aviation—specifically carrier aviation—would
surpass gunnery, and notably the battleship, as the principal arbiter of sea power as
about when that transition was likely to take place. More conservative thinkers
tended to believe it was still somewhat in the future, while more air-minded ones
thought that it was about to happen or had already happened. Certainly carrier operations during the fleet problems in 1938–1940 came very close to resembling what
actually happened in the Pacific in 1942. And in historical terms, the transition occurred about as early as it could have, in mid- or late-1941.
Submarine and Anti-Submarine Operations
From the onset the fleet problems included submarine and anti-submarine operations. Submarine scouting and attack tactics were explored, as were anti-submarine
tactics. It is, however, important to understand that these exercises and experiments
were conducted wholly within the framework of fleet operations. This focus was
based on the rather optimistic assumption that unrestricted submarine warfare as
practiced by Germany during the Great War was an aberration that would not occur
again, having been declared against the law of war in 1922, a restriction embodied
verbatim in naval regulations. Thus, the possibility of unrestricted use of submarines against merchant shipping was not practiced, nor the defense of merchant
convoys against such attacks.56
Although offensive submarine operations against military targets were included
in all of the fleet problems, and in many instances seemed highly successful, the results were consistently based on theoretical models, rather than practical experimentation, which was considered to be both too dangerous and too expensive.
Initially, rules for scoring submarine torpedo hits were very imprecise, and focused
on the amount of damage to be assessed. No guidance was offered for determining
the percentage of hits. Umpires often assumed an accuracy of 50 percent. The introduction of dummy torpedoes during the late 1930s led to greater realism in scoring
torpedo hits.57 Nevertheless, the submarine service continued to prescribe the “sonar attack” into the early part of World War II. The dubious value of this tactic had
been commented upon after several of the fleet problems, but the submarine service’s leadership remained wedded to the “sonar attack”58 In combination with the
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seriously flawed Mark XIV torpedo, “sonar attack” resulted in the U.S. submarine
service being relatively ineffective until 1943.59
Safety concerns also eventually led to the introduction of another artificiality
into the fleet problems with regard to submarines. During the earlier fleet problems,
submarines were usually assigned to both sides. Beginning with Fleet Problem XII
(1931), submarines were normally assigned to only one side, a rule broken only for
Fleet Problem XVI (1935). This seems to have been the result of fears that there
might be collisions between submarines of opposing sides during some of the tactical portions of the fleet problems.
A great deal of good work was done in anti-submarine tactics. This too was,
however, entirely within the framework of fleet defense, again on the assumption
that unrestricted submarine warfare would not recur. The fleet developed effective
destroyer screening techniques and learned how to use aircraft in support of ASW
efforts. Little work, however, was done with regard to trade protection, nor did the
events of the first two years of World War II seem to waken the Navy to the need to
develop effective commerce protection techniques. Thus, despite more than two
yeas of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic “the United States Navy was
woefully unprepared, materially and mentally, for the U-boat blitz on the Atlantic
Coast that began in January 1942,” leading to what German submariners would call
“The Happy Time,” as they inflicted extraordinary losses—380,000 gross registered
tons in March of 1942 alone—on Allied merchant shipping in American waters until the mess was resolved.60
Mine Warfare
All the fleet problems included some attention to mine warfare, and in many cases
exercise in mine laying and minesweeping were included among the motives for a
problem.61 Scenarios for various problems often indicate the existence of minefields
in certain areas, and narratives of the maneuvers frequently refer to the laying or
sweeping of mines.62 So there certainly was an awareness of the potential value of
and threat from mines, and there are regular references to ships being damaged or
sunk by mines.63 Nevertheless, mine warfare has been a perennial orphan in the service. During the fleet problems minelayers and minesweepers were often assigned
missions that did not include mine operations, such as scouting, patrolling, or bolstering the fleet screen.64
That mine warfare was formally considered important, was underscored when
Vice-Admiral Newton A. McCully, who commanded Black during Fleet Problem
III/GJE No. 2 (1924), openly admitted that he “forgot to order additional mines,
and our mining operations were very limited on this account” during the public critique of the problem.65 And some recommendations regarding mine operations
were made, the most notable of which came early, following Fleet Problem V
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(1925), when CINCUS Robert E. Coontz called for the procurement of fast
minesweepers.66
Fleet Sustainment
The perfection of underway refueling by the “riding abeam” or “broadside”
method, first developed during World War I and still in use today, was the most notable innovation in fleet sustainment to emerge during the fleet problems. This
method of refueling of smaller warships introduced during Fleet Problem II (1924)
became “almost a standard part of each fleet problem during the late 1920s and
early 1930s.” By Fleet Problem XIII (1932), experiments in the simultaneous refueling of two vessels from a single oiler were undertaken, and this practice also shortly
became routine, as did the refueling of destroyers from larger warships. Nevertheless, despite proposals as early as Fleet Problem II to attempt refueling of heavier
ships by this method, more than a decade was required to overcome technical and
cultural barriers, ultimately requiring the intervention of the CNO. Despite these
obstacles, the refueling of battleships and carriers by the riding abeam method was
successfully demonstrated during Fleet Problem XX (1939), and also shortly became a matter of routine.67
The fleet problems also helped convince naval leaders of the importance of procuring high speed auxiliaries, oilers, troop transports, and cargo vessels. Recommendations to procure auxiliaries able to sustain 12 knots or more were made in the
final report for every fleet problem from the very first, in 1923. Moreover, the development of War Plan Orange indicated the need for literally hundreds of auxiliaries,
oilers, troop transports, and cargo vessels, as well as many specialized vessels. During the 1920s and the early years of the Depression, however, neither the public nor
the Congress were inclined to spend any money on the navy. Even when funds began to become available during the Roosevelt administration, the focus was on
building the fleet up to allowable treaty limits.68 Given that it took longer to build
warships than auxiliaries, this was probably a good decision, particularly given that
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 began an important reorganization, standardization, and expansion of the country’s merchant fleet. Nevertheless, on the eve of
Pearl Harbor the Navy did not have enough modern fleet auxiliaries.69 The resulting
shortage of high speed auxiliaries, and notably fast oilers, hampered operations
during the first two years of World War II.70
Communications
Communications were one of the most common exercise threads. The poor management of communications in Fleet Problem I (1923) led CINCUS to request that
communications efficiency be made a part of fleet efficiency reports. This was done,
and the fleet’s skill at communications steadily improved, so that the process of
sending and receiving commands, reports, and other information becoming almost
invisible.71 Nevertheless, fleet problem tasking always included mention of the need
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to exercise communications, and in most of the critiques of the fleet problems there
are repeated references to communications and ways to improve them, as well as to
problems with communications security. The critique of Fleet Problem XVIII
(1937) included a separate 122-page document devoted exclusively to a critique of
and recommendations about communications.72 Fleet Problems XIX (1938), XX
(1939), and XXI (1940) all began with a “Communications Mobilization,” in which
the ability of the Navy’s communications system to effect a rapid activation of the
fleet’s resources was tested, for which separate tasking and critiques were prepared.73
This long-term effect of the fleet problems on the development of the Navy’s
skill at communications was of enormous value in preparing the fleet for the Second World War, in which its facility with communications surpassed that of both its
enemies and its allies.
Cryptology and Communications Security
In 1924 the Navy established a working group under the Director of Naval Communications to collect intelligence from foreign military, commercial, and diplomatic
communications. Headed by Lt. Laurence F. Safford, OP-20-G naturally became involved in cryptological exercises, and shortly was assigned the task of developing
cryptographic systems for the fleet problems, to provide the opposing sides with
distinct codes and ciphers, and to help train fleet personnel in cryptological operations.74 As a result of notable failures in communications security during Fleet Problems IX (1929), X (1930), and XI (1930), more secure procedures were introduced
and tougher ciphers developed. This helped exercise the skills and enhance the experience of American cryptographers, laying the foundation for the enormously
successful U.S. Navy cryptological efforts against Japan during World War II. In addition, the fleet problems fostered strong understanding in the fleet of the importance of cryptanalysis, communications intelligence, and communications
security.75
Intelligence and Special Operations
Although often overlooked in the tasking, intelligence activities were always an important element in the fleet problems. Critiques of many commanders’ “Estimate of
the Situation” were essentially critiques of their intelligence staffs’ analytical ability.
During the actual execution of a problem the collection and processing of intelligence, from reconnaissance, radio intercepts, spies, and other sources, was a matter
of routine.
In addition, espionage was perfectly within the rules. The intelligence officers of
each side were permitted to have agents in ports or on merchant vessels where opposing fleets were likely to pass. They were, however, barred from “planting” agents
in the opposing fleet prior to the start of a problem.76
Intelligence officers also seem to have been responsible for what are today called
“special operations.” Evidence for special operations during the fleet problems is
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sparse. The only clear examples found among the documents examined were the
operations in Panama by Fleet Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Hamilton Bryan and
Ensign Thomas H. Hederman during Fleet Problem III/GJE No. 2, in January of
1924.77 But there are indications here and there of similar operations. In a small
joint exercise following Fleet Problem VI, for example, in February of 1926, raiders
landed from submarines demolished the Gatun Locks and adjacent facilities.78
There are other hints as well, such as the landing of small reconnaissance parties to
reconnoiter possible landing beaches.79 This suggests that documents relating to
special operations may not have been included in the final reports of the fleet
problems.
Technological Experimentation
The fleet problems enabled the Navy to test a variety of new ideas and equipment
under realistic operational conditions. It was during various fleet problems that a
number of innovative doctrinal concepts were first tested under “wartime” conditions, such as the carrier task force, underway replenishment, combat air patrol, and
circular cruising formations. Technological experimentation was also common, including tests of underwater acoustic communications systems, radar, aircraft autopilot, sonar, high-frequency direction finding, radio homing devices, and even a
system that used ultraviolet and infrared lights to help ships keep station. Needless
to say, not all of these experiments bore fruit, but those that did—aircraft homing
devices, high frequency direction finding, radar, autopilot—proved of immense
value to the fleet. The success of some of the experiments was, however, detrimental
to the overall effectiveness of the Navy. The stunning effectiveness of the XAF radar
during Fleet Problem XX (1939) seems to have made the Fleet complacent about its
ability to engage in night combat, because it “would have radar before the Fleet
would have to fight at night.”80
Cheating
Some “corner cutting” might be expected from good officers, willing to take chances
or think “out of the box” in order to fulfill their mission. Nevertheless, there is firm
evidence that outright cheating was by no means unknown during the fleet
problems.
• Fleet Problem VII (1927): Kidder (DD 319) refused to accept an umpire’s
ruling that she had been damaged and had to be chased down by a light
cruiser.81
• Fleet Problem IX (1929): Having been ruled “sunk,” the Blue light cruiser
Detroit (CL 8) was assigned as plane guard to Black’s carrier Saratoga (CV
3), but continued to broadcast the carrier’s position to Blue.82
• Fleet Problem XI (1930): The failure to communicate promptly to the Chief
Observer the devastating results of a “friendly fire” attack on the carrier
Saratoga (CV 3) permitted the ship to continue flight operations for nearly
5.5 hours and may have been deliberate.83
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• Fleet Problem XV (1934): During night operations a submarine surfaced in
the midst of some “enemy” ships. When challenged, the boat identified
herself as a yacht. Wishing to avoid collision with the “yacht,” the “enemy”
ships turned on their lights, whereupon the submarine “torpedoed” one of
them.84
• Fleet Problem XIX (1938): In the aftermath of an “air raid” on Mare Island
on the night of April 28, Rear Admiral King diverted the pursuit of a Green
desron coming out of San Francisco Bay by lighting Pensacola (CA 24) to
resemble a liner, which caused the “enemy” to break off.85
• Fleet Problem XIX (1938): Rear Admiral Ernest J. King became convinced
that the “enemy” had illegally secured copies of a code that was restricted to
his forces, so he improvised one of his own. 86
The incidents during Fleet Problems VII (1927) and IX (1929) were clearly
cheating. The commanding officers of Kidder and Detroit took advantage of the
artificialities of wargaming to continue in play, a situation that would not have been
possible in actual war. The incident involving the Saratoga during Fleet Problem XI
(1930) may have been a mere error in staff work, but might have been deliberate.
Arguably, one could claim that the “yacht” and “liner” incidents during Fleet Problems XV (1934) and XIX (1938) were legitimate ruses of war; “false colors” have a
long tradition in naval warfare. Given the totality of the expected Pacific War, it
seems highly improbable, however, that anyone would have expected either trick to
work in wartime.87 King’s conclusion, during Fleet Problem XIX, that his codes had
been compromised cannot be proven, but his suspicions about the matter should be
considered legitimate, and his solution was wholly reasonable and completely in
keeping with legitimate wartime practice.
To remind officers of their responsibility to prevent cheating, the tasking for fleet
problems often contained provisions warning against inappropriate activity. For
example, instructions to Blue and Black for Fleet Problem XIV (1933), included reminders that “BLUE forces in Hawaii are not to track BLACK upon latter’s departure from Hawaii nor to endeavor to locate BLACK until the beginning of the
problem,” because Black had been allocated four days (February 6–10) to lose itself
in the Central Pacific before the onset of the problem.88
Determining the consequences of cheating is not easy, as there does not seem to
be much of a paper trail. In the most egregious instance, that of Detroit during Fleet
Problem IX (1929), the ship’s captain, Richard Drace White, does not seem to have
suffered any negative consequences; he retired as a rear admiral several years later.
Even when there was no deliberate intent to cheat, maintaining security of information was often difficult. Although some problems essentially found the Battle
Force opposed to the Scouting Force, for many problems, these major components
of the fleet were broken up to form the contending fleets required by the scenario.
This began early, with Fleet Problem I (1923), when a battleship division was
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transferred from the Battle Fleet to the Scouting Fleet, and it became almost a commonplace feature beginning with Fleet Problem IX (1929). There were also instances in which the sides were reorganized for different phases of a problem;
during Fleet Problem XV (1934) the fleet was organized differently for each of the
three major parts. In such cases, care had to be taken to insure that during preparations for a problem, a side’s plans were not inadvertently revealed to officers who
might be on the opposing side during all or part of the problem. While there do not
appear to have been any major breaches of security resulting from this, it was considered sufficiently important to prompt some fleet commanders to remind their
subordinates of the possibilities. For example, the “Blue Estimate of the Situation”
for Fleet Problem VIII (1928) included an admonition to maintain tight security
during the planning process, “All personnel of the Blue Fleet will take extraordinary
precautions to prevent the Blue Solution, Blue Estimate of the Situation, and the
Blue Secret Communications Instructions from falling into the hands of personnel
attached to Orange forces and will refrain from discussing the problem with Orange
personnel.”89
On occasion, the routine transfer of officers seems to have caused some concern
over the security of fleet problem plans, the Bureau of Navigation “grinding out its
grist in the usual way” without regard for current fleet activities. For example, just as
the fleet was leaving San Pedro to take part in Fleet Problem IX (1929), the navigator
of one of the Black destroyers, fully cognizant of the Black plans, was transferred to
one of the Blue carriers. The transfer prompted a radio message from the Black
commander reminding the officer of his professional obligation to forget everything he knew about Black’s plans.90
There do not seem to have been any systematic attempts at cheating. Still, it is
important to keep in mind that some people will succumb to the temptation in order to “win.”
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N O T E S 1 Miller, pp. 35, 153–54, 204–205, etc.
2 This would seem to coincide with the increasing
influence of the “cautionaries” on the development of War Plan Orange; see Miller, pp. 35,
86–99.
3 Campbell, p. 124.
4 Morison, Coral Sea, Midway, pp. 7–64, 69–159.
5 That is, problems that involved direct attacks on
the Canal Zone, whether on the Caribbean or Pacific sides.
6 NWCA, Carton 60, CINCUS to COMBATFOR,
20 October 1924, p. 3, notes that the fleet problem involved participation not only by the U.S.
Fleet, but also by the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and
15th Naval Districts.
7 M964-7, 1, CINCUS to CNO, “U.S. Fleet Problem No. 6—Report on,” p. 1; Annual Report,
1922, p. 39; Richardson, pp. 236, 238–39, 248; etc.
8 Miller, p. 10.
9 On Republican parsimony regarding defense
budgeting, with particular reference to the Depression years, Walker, “The Navy Department
and the Campaign for Expanded Appropriations,” pp. 17–34; Wheeler, Prelude, p. 117–19.
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10 For budgetary figures that follow, see Historical
Statistics, Vol. II, p. 1114, with adjustment for inflation based on the Consumer Price Index. Nevertheless, despite academic and bureaucratic
support, the methodology for tracking inflation
across eight decades leaves much to be desired in
terms of getting a handle on the actual relative
value of the dollar.
11 On the intricacies of the budgeting process for FY
1934, Walker, “The Navy Department and the
Campaign for Expanded Appropriations,”
pp. 35–79.
12 Under the terms of the two naval arms limitation
treaties, the Japanese Navy was authorized a total
tonnage of not more than 60 percent that allowed
to the U.S. Since the Japanese built to their tonnage limit, while the U.S. did not, by 1936 the
tonnage of the Imperial Navy was nearly 80 percent that of the U.S. Navy, 784,000 tons to
1,078,000. For a contemporary observation on the
failure of the U.S. to maintain its fleet at treaty
levels see Coontz, From the Mississippi, p. 414. See
also Historical Statistics, Vol. II, p. 1114;
Dunnigan and Nofi, Encyclopedia, “Disarmament
Treaties, Pre-War” and “Rearmament.”
13 For an extended treatment of New Deal “public
works” and “emergency” funding for the Navy,
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see Robert H. Levine, “The Politics of American
Naval Rearmament, 1930–1938” (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation., Harvard University, 1972)
and Walker, “The Navy Department and the
Campaign for Expanded Appropriations.”
14 By way of example, the several Sino-Japanese “Incidents” (1931, 1932, 1935, 1937–41); the
Italo-Ethiopian War (1935–36), the Spanish Civil
War (1936–39), not to mention the rise of Hitler
and the militarization of Japan.
15 As noted in Chapter 2, between 1922 and 1935,
the Navy procured twelve new models of fighter
aircraft, totaling 880 machines, with the largest
lot numbering only 188, all of which were obsolete by 1939.
16 Campbell, pp. 172–73, 181; Richardson,
pp. 216–17.
17 This important distinction was noted by Peter
Swartz of CNA, email, July 1, 2002.
18 A typical example, and a potentially dangerous
one, was that when monitoring the fall of artillery
rounds Navy and Marine Corps procedure called
for reporting the correction to be made, while
Army procedure called for reporting the error
that had been made, a difference that apparently
was not finally resolved until joint amphibious
maneuvers in 1942, according to Adm. H. Kent
Hewitt, Memoirs, pp. 128–29.
19 Annual Report, 1924, p. 6; McFarland, p. 65.
20 Gole, p. 191, n. 16. Among the recommendations
following GJE No. 4, was the need to explore the
question of unified command.
21 NWCA, Carton 61, CINCUS, Report of U.S. Fleet
Problem Seven (4 May 1927), pp. 3–4.
22 For an example connected with the planned Fleet
Problem XXII, see M964-36, 3, Office of the Chief
of Staff to Chief of Naval Operations, Aug 12,
1940, “Training of Army Officers with the U.S.
Fleet.”
23 “Commander’s Story of Saratoga’s Raid,” by
Lewis Freeman, New York Times, February 19,
1929, p. 14.
24 “Fleet Is Prepared for Secret Exercise,” New York
Times, May 14, 1936; “Fleet Leaves Balboa Today
for Exercises, New York Times, May 16, 1936.
25 It does not appear that all of the documentation
has survived for any specific problem. With regard to planning, the most extensive documentary evidence is available for FPs XV (1934), XX
(1939) and XXI (1940). Planning documents for
each fill an entire reel of microfilm, M964-16,
-25, and -31. Even in these cases, based on internal evidence (e.g., documents available from one
side that are not to be found for the other, or
types of documents found among the records of
one problem but not among those for another), it
is clear that despite the volume of materials in
these collections, they are by no means complete.
What follows is a summary of the contents of
M964-25.
26 M964-21, 6, Blue Main Body, Operation Order
No. 1-36, 8 April 1936), Annex Affirm, Annex
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Baker, Annex Cast; M964-23, 7, Destroyers Battle
Force to Postmaster . . . , 8 March 1938.
27 According to Minoru Genda, tentative planning
for the Pearl Harbor attack began early in February 1941, based on an informal tasking from Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, with more detailed
planning beginning in September; Goldstein and
Dillon, pp.13–14, 17–18.
28 See, for example, “Admiral Sums Up Canal Manoeuvres,” New York Times, Apr 8, 1923, in which
a “weak spot” in the defenses of the Panama Canal is noted.
29 Hanson W. Baldwin, “Navy Sails Far South in Secret War Games,” New York Times, May 24, 1936,
discusses the debate. The introduction of a new
type of arresting gear prompted the excision of
some footage from the 1931 film Hell Divers, in
which Wallace Beery, Clark Gable, and Robert
Young played naval aviators aboard the Saratoga;
Norman Polmar, Historic Naval Aircraft: From the
Pages of Naval History Magazine (Washington:
Potomac Books, 2004), p. 43.
30 “Roosevelt’s Crossing of Equator Recalls Mass
Polliwog Initiation at Fleet Maneuvers,” by
Windsor Booth, Washington Post, Nov 29, 1936.
31 For example, “U.S. Fleet Headed Home,” New
York Times, May 24, 1937, dealt with divine services held on Sunday, May 23rd, and the day’s
menu, with only a casual reference to the recently
concluded “Battle of Hawaii.”
32 “Navy Orders Secrecy on Games in Pacific,” New
York Times, Feb 24, 1938; “U.S. War Games To
Be Carried Out in Secret,” Washington Post, Feb
24, 1938; “War Game Secrecy Tightened by
Navy,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
Mar 13, 1938; “U.S. Fleet Invokes Strictest Secrecy,” Washington Post, Mar 14, 1938.
33 Richardson, p. 220.
34 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV,
CINCUS, 1 June 1934, p. 3.
35 See, for example, “Big Bombers Hit, 11 Killed, in
Night Naval War Game,” New York Times, Feb 4,
1938; “Death Toll 11 in Midair Crash Of Navy
Planes,” Washington Post, Feb 4, 1938.
36 Wilson, “The Navy’s First Carrier Task Force,”
p. 165.
37 Hammond, pp. 226–27.
38 Sicard rejoined the fleet in August; see, DANFS,
Sicard (DD 346).
39 See the account of Fleet Problem XVI, Part III,
above.
40 See Wildenberg, All the Factors, pp. 232–33.
41 Apparently even the introduction of garbage
grinders to the fleet may have been influenced by
the fleet problems; in his critique of Exercise L of
FP XV (1934), CINCUS David Foote Sellers singled out carelessness in the disposal of ships’ trash
as posing a threat to the fleet’s security; M964-16,
1, Report of Fleet Problem XV, CINCUS, 1 June
1934, p. 1.
42 Trent Hone, “Building a Doctrine,” p. 2.
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43 Cited in Trent Hone, “Evolution of Fleet Tactical
Doctrine,” pp. 1128–29.
44 Trent Hone, “Building a Doctrine,” passim, has
an extensive treatment of the relationship between the fleet problems and the development of
tactical doctrine.
45 Campbell, p. 181.
46 A fourth unit of the Kongo Class, “demilitarized”
to serve as a training ship in 1930, was by the
mid-1930s secretly refitted for first line service. In
addition, Japan had the two Nagato Class battleships, which could make 26.5 knots, although until late 1936 the U.S. Navy believed them capable
of only 23.5 knots; see Friedman, Battleships, pp.
186, 285. The Royal Navy also possessed three
battlecruisers, two units of the Repulse Class, able
to make 29 knots, and Hood, rated at 31, but the
prospects of war with the United Kingdom, never
great, were non-existent by 1935, despite the continued inclusion of the Royal Navy in occasional
Fleet Problems. For details on ships, see the
Garzke-Dulin and the Friedman volumes, and
“World Battleship Lists,” www.hazegray.org/
navhist/battleships/.
47 Trent Hone, “Building a Doctrine,” p. 18; Trent
Hone, “Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine,”
pp. 1120–21.
48 These figures include ships sunk, but later raised
and restored to service, all of which were moored
at the time of their sinking; the American California and West Virginia, sunk by Japanese air attack
at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and the
French Provence, sunk by British gunfire at
Mirs-el-Kebir in July 1940.
49 Dunnigan and Nofi, Encycloppedia, “Carrier Task
Forces, Tactical Formations, U.S.”, which diagrams the formation used by Fifth Fleet during
the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in June of 1944.
50 Grimes, p. 1.
51 M964-14, 1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of
the Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H.
Schofield,” pp. 16, 32. The higher operating
tempo was particularly important during the
years of the Depression budgets (FYs 1930–33),
when flying hours appear to have fallen as low as
15 a month; for some comment, see Ewing, Thach
Weave, p. 15, etc.
52 Campbell, pp. 126, 147–79 has a detailed analysis
of lessons learned in carrier aviation.
53 Campbell, pp. 139–40.
54 Grimes, p. 231.
55 Keith, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution,” pp. 2881ff.
56 “The Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and
Noxious Gases in Warfare,” Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), Vol. I,
pp. 267–70. This was incorporated as Part IV, Article 22 of the London Naval Limitation Treaty of
1931. Unlike other provisions of the treaty, this article specifically excluded an expiration date. It was
quoted verbatim in “Tentative Instructions for the
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Navy of the United States Covering Maritime and
Aerial Warfare—May 1941” (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 14, 184, “submarines must conform to the rules of International
Law to which surface vessels are subject.”
57 NHC, Box 270, Change # 3, USF 10, 5 October
1934, p. 23, and CINCUS to Holders of USF 10,
Change #12, USF 10, 24 January, 1938, p. 22;
M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV,
CINCUS, 1 June 1934, p. 14; Richardson, p. 235.
58 See, for example, M964-23, CINCUS to CNO,
“Submarine Torpedo Attack the Fleet—Exercise
No. 77, Week 4–8 April, Fleet Problem XIX,”
April 22, 1938.
59 For a short account of the problems of the Mark
XIV Torpedo, see David E. Cohen, “The Mk. XIV
Torpedo: Lessons for Today”, Naval History, Vol.
6, No. 4, Winter 1992, pp. 34–36.
60 On the “Happy Time” see Morison, The Battle of
the Atlantic, pp. 200, 114–57, 410–413; Gannon,
passim; Cohen and Gooch, pp. 59–94.
61 This was particularly true during the late 1920s
into the early 1930s, see the motives for FP VII
(1927), M964-8, 1, CINCUS to CNO, May 4,
1927, “U.S. Fleet Problem Seven—Report on”;
FPVIII (1928), M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO,
“Fleet Problem VIII—Report of Commander in
Chief, United States Fleet,” p. 2; FP IX (1929)
M964-12, 1, “United States Fleet Problem IX,
1929, Report of the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, Admiral H. A. Wiley, U.S.N.”; etc.
62 For example, the scenario for GJE No. 2/FP III
(1924), indicated there might be mines covering
the approaches to the Panama Canal, leading
Black to conduct sweeping operations, M964-2, 1,
“Talk on Operations of Black Forces Delivered by
Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on
Problem No. 3, 21 January 1924”; the Golden
Gate was swept when the fleet sortied from San
Francisco to participate in GJE No. 3, which followed FP V (1925), “Fleet Holds Drill on Way to
Hawaii,” New York Times, Apr 18, 1925;
Guacanayabo and Guantanamo were declared
“mined” in the scenario for FP VII (1927),
M964-8, 1, CINCUS to CNO, May 4, 1927, “U.S.
Fleet Problem Seven—Report on”; during FP XIII
(1934), Black mined several of the atolls northwest of Hawaii, to secure them as bases; M964-14,
1, “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, Report of the
Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Frederick H.
Schofield”; etc.
63 For example, the “sinking” of Flusser (DD 368),
mined while conducting a raid into San Juan harbor, during FP XX (1939), or of three destroyers
near French Frigate Shoals during FP XXI, discussed in Chapters 21 and 22.
64 FP VIII (1938), Orange assigned its mine warfare
vessels a patrol line some 800 miles east of Hawaii, M964-11, 2 “U.S. Fleet Problem VIII” [Orange Estimate of the Situation], p. 9, while in FP
XXI (1940), MineDiv 1 was tasked with patrolling
Kaiwi Channel, in Hawaii, M964-32,1, Commander Scouting Force to CINCUS, Narrative,”
p. 33; although in both cases the ships were
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ordered to make mine attacks should they encounter the enemy, this still seems a misuse of resources. In FP XIV (1933), Blue assigned its mine
sweepers to patrol sectors off the West Coast to
help intercept raiding Black carriers, resulting in
the loss of several to “enemy” action, M964-15, 1
“Narrative of Fleet Problem XIV,” p. 15. During
FP IX (1929), Black destroyer minelayers were assigned to bolster the screen of the Main Body,
M964-12, 1, “United States Fleet Problem IX,
1929, Report of the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, Admiral H. A. Wiley, U.S.N., p. 6.
65 M964-2, 1, “Talk on Operations of Black Forces
Delivered by Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on Problem No. 3, 21 January 1924,” p. 1.
66 M964-3, 2, Report on Fleet Problem No. V, by
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, p. 6.
67 Wildenberg, Gray Steel, pp. 41, 43; Wildenberg,
“Chester Nimitz,” pp. 55–56; Richardson,
pp. 207–10.
68 Early in 1933, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee calculated that the Navy required an estimated
316,530 tons of new construction (three aircraft
carriers, 9 cruisers, 89 destroyers, and 39 submarines) by the end of 1936 to reach its permitted
treaty levels, while Japan required only 10,400;
“135 Ships Needed by Navy,” New York Times,
Jan 28, 1933.
69 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number 1”; Richardson, pp.
58–59, 120, 124; Miller, p. 146; Thomas
Wildenberg, “Preparing for War: Admiral William H. Standley and the Struggle to Build Auxiliaries for the Navy,” New Interpretations in Naval
History: Selected Papers from the Eleventh Naval
History Symposium, edited by Robert W. Love, Jr.
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp.
250–66; Wildenberg, “Chester Nimitz,” pp.
58–60. The 32 auxiliaries authorized in 1938 and
1939 represented a 40 percent increase in the vessels available to the Base Force; Wildenberg, “Preparing for War,” pp. 260–61.
70 By way of example, not a single oiler had been
added to fleet between 1922 and 1939, when the
18-knot Cimarron (AO 22) was commissioned.
See Wildenberg, “Chester Nimitz,” pp. 58–60, for
a discussion, including some observations on the
effects of the shortage of modern oilers on operations through the Battle of Midway. Not until the
Tarawa–Makin Operation in November 1943,
were there sufficient oilers available to permit a
substantial fleet to remain at sea indefinitely;
Thomas C. Hone, “The Fleet that Didn’t Deploy,”
p. 5.
71 Howeth, XXXII, 4.
72 NWCA, Carton 65, Reports and Comment, U.S.
Fleet Communications, Fleet Problem XVIII, 29
April – 8 May 1937.
73 CINCUS, “Comment on Communications during Mobilization of Communications,” attached
to NWCA, Carton 65, U.S. Fleet OpOrd No.
13-38 (4 November 1938), Task Organization.
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74 Frederick D. Parker, pp 1, 7.
75 Frederick D. Parker, pp. 7–9ff.
76 Lewis R. Friedman, “War Games Found to be of
Great Use,” New York Times, Feb 14, 1929, has
some useful comment on this.
77 M964-2, 1, Lt. Hamilton Bryan to Commander
Scouting Fleet, 19 January 1924, “Report of activities in connection with expedition within enemy
territory dating from 13 to 19 January” and Ens.
T. H. Hederman to Lt. Hamilton Bryan, 19 January 1924, “Operations as a spy in Canal Zone; report on.”
78 “Canal Defense Need Shown by War Game,” New
York Times, Feb 21, 1926.
79 See, for example, “The Annual Fleet Exercises of
the late 1930’s had pointed to the need for reconnaissance and raiding parties, landed by rubber
boat from high speed transports” during amphibious operations, in Charles L. Updegraph, U.S.
Marine Corps Special Units of World War II
(Washington: Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1972), p. 1.
80 Richardson, p. 223. Regarding FP XVIII (1937),
Richardson wrote (p. 117), “the considerable
amount of night work showed me how great our
Navy’s deficiencies were in this area of
capabilities.”
81 Campbell, pp. 129–30.
82 Grimes, p. 42; Campbell, p. 158; Wildenberg,
Destined, pp. 58–59.
83 M964-13, 7, United State Fleet Problem XI, 1930,
Report of the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., pp. 48–49, 54,
57.
84 Felker, “Simulations and Sea Power,” pp. 139–40;
Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, p. 171.
85 King and Whitehill, p. 283.
86 Buell, Master, p. 101.
87 During the Pacific War the only neutral shipping
in most of the war zone was Soviet, whether merchantmen carrying Lend Lease supplies from
Canada and the U.S. to Vladivostok or
Petropavlovsk, or cargo to and from ports under
Japanese control, and fishing vessels operating in
the North Pacific. It appears that American submarines sank five Soviet vessels, four of them in
Japanese waters, and one in the North Pacific.
Sinkings of neutral vessels by the Japanese are uncertain, but at least three seem to have occurred.
See, Dunnigan and Nofi, Encyclopedia, “Ship
Sinkings, Accidental.”
88 M964-15, 1, United States Fleet, Problem XIV,
Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United
States Fleet, Admiral R. H. Leigh, 20 April 1933,
p. 8.
89 M964-11, 2, Note attached to CinC Blue Naval
Forces, “United States Fleet Problem VIII, Blue
Estimate of the Situation.”
90 Lewis R. Friedman, “War Games Found to Be of
Great Use,” New York Times, Feb 14, 1929.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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XXVI

Some Enduring Lessons of the Fleet Problems

I

t is hard to argue with the conclusion drawn by Admiral James O. Richardson
that the fleet problems “were expensive in time, money, and effort, but they led
to great advances in strategic and tactical thinking which marked our naval development during” the interwar period.1 As Secretary of the Navy Claude A.
Swanson had observed in 1939, the fleet problems were “of the utmost value in
training the personnel of the fleet.”2
Aside from training the officers who performed so brilliantly during World War
II, from the likes of Ernest J. King, Thomas C. Hart, Wilson Brown, and William
Halsey, on down, the most notable results of the fleet problems were the development of an integrated “naval force” characterized particularly by:
• The carrier battle group and carrier air doctrine
• Underway replenishment
• Amphibious capability
In short, the Navy certainly learned a lot from the fleet problems in the past. But
are there any lessons that can still be learned from the fleet problems? Perhaps.
Innovations Require Time to Mature
In several instances, the “lessons learned” from the fleet problems by some of the senior officers would seem to have been based on erroneous reading of the evidence.
For example, as late as 1940 Admiral Richardson concluded that the fleet problems
demonstrated carriers needed to stay close to the battleline, in order to be protected
by its heavier firepower. Concern about the potential value of the autonomous carrier task force was not necessarily the result of blind unwillingness to see the obvious. Carriers had been “sunk” or “damaged” by surface ships during Fleet Problems
IX (1929), X (1930), XII (1931), XIV (1933), XV (1934), and XVIII (1937), and had
come under “gunfire” on numerous other occasions.3 It was not until almost literally the end of 1941 that the Navy had dive bombers and torpedo bombers capable
of harming heavy ships in long range operations or fighters with the “legs” to escort
and protect them. Until then carriers had to take great risks in order to be effective.
The possibility that a carrier might be caught by surface forces was very much on the
minds of senior naval officers during the 1920s and 1930s, as can be seen by the
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8-inch guns carried by Lexington and Saratoga. It was not until 1937, with the introduction of the Curtiss SBC-4 Helldiver, which could carry a 500 pound bomb to an
operational range (i.e., one-leg of a round trip) of 300 nautical miles at a cruising
speed of 127 miles per hour, and the Douglas TBD Devastator, able to carry a thousand pound torpedo at 128 miles per hour with an operational range of 300 nm,
that carriers began to have a longer reach. Even then, the Navy’s standard fighter until 1938 was the Boeing F4B4, a 188 mph biplane with an operational range of only
300 nm. In 1938 the F4B4 was replaced by the Grumman F3F3, a 264 mph biplane
with a range of about 400 nm. The F3F3 was followed in mid-1939 by the F2A
Brewster Buffalo, about 20 mph faster, but with range of about 500 nm, and it was in
turn replaced beginning in late-1941 with the famous Grumman F4F Wildcat,
which had a speed of 330 mph and a slightly lower operational range of about 400
miles. By then, however, the Japanese already had aircraft that were better than the
new American ones: In 1938 the Imperial Navy had introduced the Nakajima B5N
Type 97 “Kate” torpedo bomber (229 mph and 600 nm), and in 1940 the Aichi D3A
Type 99 “Val” dive bomber (242 mph and 400 nm) and the Mitsubishi A6M Type 00
“Zeke/Zero” fighter (c. 330 mph and 800 nm). As a result, the Imperial Navy had
carrier strike aircraft with the bomb or torpedo capacity and range to conduct distant strikes , and a fighter capable of escorting them about a year earlier than did the
U.S. Navy.4 Before then carriers had to operate relatively close to their targets, which
put them at risk of becoming victims of enemy surface ships.
Even after longer-ranged aircraft became available, there were several occasions
during World War II when carriers were intercepted, or could have been intercepted, by surface warships.
The Loss of HMS Glorious
On June 8, 1940, the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two escorting destroyers
were intercepted and sunk in the Norwegian Sea by the German battleships
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.5
The Bismarck Chase
Twice during the pursuit of the Bismarck by the Royal Navy in the North Atlantic in
May of 1941, carriers were within easy steaming range of the German battleship,
which could make 30 knots.6
• c. 2400 May 24th, shortly after the British lost track of the German
battleship, HMS Victorious was only about 40 nautical miles from Bismarck.
• c. 1115 on May 26th, roughly the time that Bismarck was relocated by
British aerial reconnaissance, on May 26th, she was within 50 miles of HMS
Ark Royal.
On neither occasion was the commanding officer of the German ship aware of
her proximity to the British carriers, which were only lightly escorted and thus
highly vulnerable to surface attack.
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SOME ENDURING LESSONS OF THE FLEET PROBLEMS

The Battle of the Coral Sea
On two occasions during the battle, the Japanese and American task forces were
within easy steaming distance of each other:
• c. 2300 May 6, 1942, c. 60–70 nautical miles apart.
• c. 2200 May 7, 1942, c. 90–95 nautical miles apart.
On both occasions the distances were so short, and the sea states so good, that
Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher’s staff suggested sending his heavy cruisers after
the enemy. The Japanese may not have been aware of the proximity on the first occasion, but on the second, Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi’s staff made the same recommendation. Each time, the admirals decided that the threat from enemy surface
forces precluded sending off the heavy cruisers.7
The Battle of Midway
Several times during June 4th carriers were within a short steaming time of enemy
surface warships, a situation known to the respective commanders, who preferred
not to attempt a surface interception.8
From at least 1100 to about 1440 , the most critical period of the battle, the distance between the Japanese “First Mobile Force” and the U.S. task forces was less
than 100 nautical miles, relatively easy steaming distance for a fast major surface
combatant, such as Japan’s Kongo class ships, or some of the heavy cruisers present
on either side.
At 1100, shortly after the devastating American attacks that wrecked three of Japan’s carriers, the “First Mobile Force,” with carrier Hiryu, two battleships, two
heavy cruisers, and a desron, was only 95 miles southwest of Task Force 17, with
Yorktown (CV 5), two heavy cruisers, and six destroyers, and only 91 miles from
Task Force 16, with Hornet (CV 8), Enterprise (CV 6), six heavy cruisers, and eight
destroyers, with both sides about to undertake additional airstrikes against each
other.
By about 1240, shortly after Yorktown had suffered serious damage from the first
Japanese air strikes against her, the “First Mobile Force” was about 90 nautical miles
southwest of Task Force 17, and a bit further from Task Force 16.
At about 1440 the remnants of the “First Mobile Force,” now bereft of Hiryu,
were about 93 miles almost due west of Task Force 16, and perhaps 110 miles from
Task Force 17, now bereft of Yorktown.
Thereafter the fleets were on diverging courses. Obviously, since these “opportunities” occurred during daylight hours, the chance of a surface interception would
have been seriously limited by the presence of substantial air forces.
At approximately 1900, having recovered his last air strike, Rear Admiral
Spruance ordered Task Force 16 to steam eastward—away from the enemy—for the
night, a decision that has been widely criticized. Nevertheless, had he proceeded in
the opposite direction, a little after midnight the task force would have run into the
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remnants of the Japanese “First Mobile Force,” which, though lacking carriers, still
had its battleships, heavy cruisers, and destroyers, and was shortly to be reinforced
by additional warships.
The Battle off Samar
On October 25, 1944, a Japanese squadron consisting of four battleships, six cruisers, and a dozen destroyers debouched from San Bernardino Straits to shoot up a
clutch of six escort carriers supported by seven destroyers and destroyer escorts,
which only avoided annihilation by some very desperate fighting and a case of
faint-heartedness on the part of Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, though at the cost of
two jeep carriers and three destroyer-type ships sunk by gunfire and varying degrees
of damage most of the other ships.9
So concern for the potential vulnerability of carriers to surface ships was by no
means displaced. That this sort of thing did not occur with greater frequency, can be
attributed to a number of factors. Notable among these was the combination of longer ranged aircraft, which permitted the carriers to keep well away from the enemy,
and the introduction of radar, but caution on the part of commanders should not
be discounted, such as Spruance’s decision to put some sea room between his carriers and the remnants of the Japanese First Mobile Force on the evening of June 4,
1942. This caution echoed U.S. Fleet Tactical Publication No. 143, War Instructions
(1934), which stated, “Aircraft carriers should endeavor to avoid night action with
all types of enemy vessels and should employ every means, speed, guns, and smoke,
to assist them in this endeavor.”
Don’t Confuse Exercises with Reality
While no fleet problem was scripted from start to finish, some portions of each were
usually set-up in order to play out certain ideas or test particular tactics. After all,
the actual playing out of a scenario might not have resulted in a particular type of
action developing, such as a battleline clash. So the stage was often set for these, in
order to test ideas, new or old. Unfortunately, pre-planned portions of the fleet
problems seem to have led to many officers to draw the wrong conclusions about
the future of naval warfare. As Mark Allen Campbell observed, “The dramatic images of battle lines engaged in long-range gunnery duels with one another may very
well have persisted longer in the memories of the officers present than the remembrance of the artificial conditions necessary to get the dreadnoughts into firing
range of each other.”10
Likewise, unrealistic rules might be employed, particularly when testing innovative ideas or unusual technologies. Consider the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of air attack. Despite the claims of unfairness by many aviation officers, in fact
the rules used were generally too optimistic, and in some cases notably so. Even the
most pessimistic estimates of the effectiveness of horizontal bombing from 12,000
feet were wildly optimistic. In 1934 horizontal bombing was assessed an accuracy of
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20 percent, which was reduced to 8 percent in 1938, over the objections of the airmen.11 In practice, however, the tactic was wholly ineffective, having an accuracy approaching zero even under the most favorable circumstances.12 Unrealistic rules
readily led to unrealistic expectations. Of course, crafting rules that are realistic can
be an extremely difficult task.
Another area in which the necessary limitations of exercises had a negative effect
on the Fleet was in submarine and anti-submarine operations. Excessive concern
for safety, plus the widespread assumption that unrestricted submarine warfare was
an aberration of World War I, led to a highly constrained view of the role of the submarine during the fleet problems. This, coupled with very optimistic guidelines
governing their employment (basically, submarine torpedo attacks were assumed to
have a 50-percent effectiveness) severely limited the Navy efforts in both submarine
offensive operations and in anti-submarine operations in the early part of World
War II.
It is worth restating Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus’ 1936 cautionary comment cited
earlier, when speaking of wargames conducted at the Naval War College, “We can
make any type of vessel work up here, provided we draw up the rules to fit.”13
Surrogates Are Surrogates
One might consider this an extension of the preceding lesson, but it merits separate
treatment. The extensive employment of “constructive” and “surrogate” forces during the fleet problems was of great value, permitting the exercises to involve “more”
ships and aircraft than were actually available, and enabling experiments to be conducted with types of equipment and systems that did not yet exist. In the final report for Fleet Problem I (1923), CINCUS Hilary P. Jones observed that the value of
constructive forces was demonstrated in “the use made of them in the Estimates of
the Situation, the Operation Orders, the actual maneuvers, and the reports made by
the Commanders of the two fleets and their subordinates.”14 Nevertheless, there
were also some drawbacks to the use of notional forces. For example, several problems used too many constructive forces. This occurred in Fleet Problem IV (1924),
during which nearly 80 of the approximately 210 ships supposedly taking part, and
an even higher percentage of the aircraft, were surrogates (i.e., represented by
stand-ins) or wholly notional. Thereafter constructive forces were usually much less
numerous, suggesting some dissatisfaction with their use. Aberrations continued to
occur, however.
The principal problem with the use of surrogates is that while they may represent something else, they are not that thing, and over reliance on their use can have a
deleterious effect on experimentation. Sorting out “real” from “constructive” platforms was clearly not always easy. During Fleet Problem IX (1929), Saratoga’s raid
on the Pacific locks of the Panama Canal was complemented by a raid on the Atlantic locks, conducted by a single amphibian airplane operating from the tender
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Aroostook (CM 3), representing two dozen attack aircraft off Langley (CV 1). Army
personnel charged with defending the Canal actually detected the incoming “raid.”
However, they had not been informed that a surrogate had been substituted for
Langley. As a result, detecting only a single airplane rather than a dozen or more,
they took no action to intercept it.15
A further problem with the use of surrogates, particularly surrogates for systems
that are untested, is that the capabilities attributed to them may not reflect the actual characteristics of the system being simulated. The interminable debates over
bombing effectiveness were a reflection of this problem; no one actually knew how
effective bombing would be under various conditions, despite often strident assertions to the contrary.
In this regard, it’s worth recalling the unfortunate incident during Fleet Problem
XVI (1935), when Admiral Harris Laning was not informed that he had available
“constructive” aerial spotting assets, which led to the White battle fleet being
“soundly defeated” in a long-range gunnery exchange with Black.16
It is interesting that after 1928, when Lexington and Saratoga, became available,
surrogate or constructive aircraft carriers were used less frequently in the fleet
problems.17
Although he was specifically referring to the use of notional aircraft in the fleet
problems, in 1927 CINCUS Charles F. Hughes wrote that when drawing conclusions from exercises involving constructive forces, “great care must be taken to prevent them from being erroneous.”18 It is a caution that would seem to have
application in the present as well.
Pay Attention
Despite the considerable experience garnered during the fleet problems, several lessons do not seem to have been clearly understood in some circles.
Certainly excessive concern for the defense of aircraft carriers from air attack led
many senior officers to persist in keeping them too closely tied to the battleline,
which offered “protection” from its enormous anti-aircraft capability. As a result,
some senior naval officers missed the real lesson, that carriers were best used to
form autonomous task forces, free to roam and thus get in the first blow against enemy carriers, which posed the greatest threat to them.
The failure to pay attention to an important lesson is perhaps even more clearly
illustrated by the fact that the fleet largely ignored the need for improved training in
night actions, despite its poor performances during Fleet Problems XVIII (1937)
and XXI (1940). The was clearly because of excessive reliance on an innovative technology that was extremely immature, radar, which had performed spectacularly
during Fleet Problem XX (1939). Although both James O. Richardson and Husband
Kimmel, his successor as CINCUS, concluded that there was a need for more practice in night operations, neither acted on the matter. Writing well after the Pacific
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War, Richardson made a convoluted comment on their failure to undertake increased training in night operations; “If this principle . . . [i.e., the need for comprehensive preparations in night fighting] . . . had been recognized as the key principle
which would open or close the door to success during the first major United States
naval offensive in World War II (Solomons Campaign), I am sure it would have received greater corrective attention from myself and from my successor.”19
Likewise, although the use of the PBY Catalina as an attack aircraft was effective
in Fleet Problem XIX (1938), overall experience with the PBY in Fleet Problems
XVIII (1937), XX (1939), and XXI (1940) suggested that it was highly vulnerable in
this role. Nevertheless, perhaps because of the increasing difficulty of providing detailed analysis and evaluation of the results of the fleet problems, some senior commanders failed to absorb the lesson. This was a factor in the lack of continuous air
reconnaissance around Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, 1941;
although CINCUS Husband Kimmel had five squadrons of PBYs under his command, following the precedent established by his predecessor, Admiral Richardson,
he wished to reserve them to support the fleet in offensive operations against the
Japanese, as prescribed in War Plan Pac46.20
The vulnerabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities of new technologies
should neither be underestimated nor overestimated. Obviously, this is not easy to
do.
Some People Will Always Behave Badly
Given that the fleet problems were competitive in a number of ways, that is the maneuvers could be “won” or “lost” and during them opposing ideas were often under
scrutiny, winning or being right could sometimes become more important than
getting things right.
After an extremely poor performance in Fleet Problem VIII (1928), the Orange
commander attempted to challenge some of the basic parameters of the exercise, to
which CINCUS Henry A. Wiley responded, “Commander, ORANGE is fighting the
problem.”21
The argument over the rules governing the effectiveness of various types of air
attack against ships during 1932–33 often came down to a matter of being right
rather than getting it right. During the debate over the effectiveness of air attacks in
1932, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, Jr., the head of BuAer, not only argued that
proposed new rules “penalized” aviation, but many of his colleagues in aviation
claimed that the rules would have an adverse effect on the morale of naval aviators,
despite evidence derived from bombing trials with the target ship Utah.22
Perhaps the most serious instance of bad behavior occurred in the aftermath of
Fleet Problem XVIII (1937), when Admiral Claude Bloch appears to have ordered
Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne to withdraw a paper calling for independent carrier
operations.23
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That there were relatively few known instances of bad behavior (apart from occasional cheating, discussed elsewhere) is a testimony to the integrity of the officers
who conducted the fleet problems.
Foster Openness, Flexibility, and Frankness
The high degree of open-mindedness and flexibility displayed by many senior officers during the fleet problems was quite remarkable. Perhaps the best example occurred during Fleet Problem IX (1929), when Rear Admiral Reeves convinced
Admiral Pratt to alter the Black operational plans to permit the now famous raid by
Saratoga on the Panama Canal, but there were certainly other examples as well, such
as the repeated reorganizations of the opposing forces that characterized Fleet
Problem XXI (1940), as the respective commanders tailored their fleets to address
the changing demands of the situation.
There were a number of instances in which the creative use of injects radically altered carefully laid plans, adding a considerable degree of verisimilitude to the exercises. The case of Exercise M of Fleet Problem XV (1934) was particularly notable in
this regard. The original Blue plans included laying over for several days at Balboa.
An inject from CINCUS directed Blue to make an immediate transit of the Canal,
which was accomplished in the remarkably short time of 32 hours. This inject was
highly disruptive. The Blue command had to move quickly to revise its plans. The
concurrence of the Governor of the Canal Zone and the Commander of the Army’s
Panama Division had to be secured, and delicate apologies had to be extended to the
Panamanian government, which had planned elaborate arrangements to entertain
the fleet. Nevertheless, the inject certainly reflected the sort of sudden changes in
plans that might readily occur in wartime.24
It also is clear that the critiques of the fleet problems were quite open. A good
deal of dissenting opinion can be found in the final reports, demonstrating that
there was little command interference. This makes even more notable the claim advanced by some airmen that Admiral Claude Bloch had forced Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne to withdraw a paper to which he objected.
The critiques attained a high degree of frankness, with public comment extending even to the actions of senior officers. In his critique of Fleet Problem I (1923)
CNO Robert E. Coontz concluded that the Blue estimate of the situation was good,
but “not so complete”as Black’s, and that this had been an important factor contributing to Black’s success.25 In 1924, Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully, openly
criticized his own planning errors while commanding Black in Fleet Problem III,
and for the poor wording of his orders regarding the employment of submarines
while commanding Blue during Fleet Problem IV.26 CINCUS Henry A. Wiley’s
critique of the performance of Orange during Fleet Problem VIII (1928) was quite
severe.27 Similarly, in his review of Fleet Problem XV (1934), CINCUS David Foote
Sellers was very critical of the task organization adopted by Blue commander
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Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, COMBATFOR, and for some of his operational
decisions as well.28 Despite what today would likely be career-ending public
criticism, Reeves became Sellers’ successor as CINCUS.
The high degree of flexibility and frankness found in the planning and critiques
of the fleet problems certainly contributed to the great flexibility and pragmatism
that characterized U.S. Navy planning and execution of operations during the Pacific War, in contrast to the Imperial Navy, which often developed wholly unrealistic
plans with disastrous consequences.
Familiarity Breeds Internalization
Many of the innovations developed during the fleet problems might be said to have
“sneaked” their way into the Navy’s culture. That is, they slowly integrated themselves into the routine of the fleet, often with little fanfare. As Trent Hone has observed, “The Fleet Problems were also an effective tool for familiarizing officers with
the ideas contained in the tactical publications; as they were relatively infrequent,
the opportunity presented was not to be missed.”29 This was an idea with which the
Navy’s senior officers were quite familiar: “It is especially during Fleet Problems and
tactical exercises that opportunities arise for familiarizing officers with ‘War Instructions,’ ‘General Tactical Instructions,’ and the various publications of the Fleet
and type tactical orders and doctrine. Schools should be held on board each vessel
as practicable for instructing officers in these important publications.”30
The evolution of underway refueling presents a good example of how an innovative technology worked its way into the Navy’s tool box. During the early fleet problems underway refueling by the riding abeam method clearly was a highly
experimental procedure.
Within a few years underway refueling became “almost a standard part of each
Fleet Problem.”31 By the later fleet problems it was becoming common for larger
warships to be refueled in this way as well, despite some trepidation on the part of a
few senior officers.32
Aviation is, of course, the best better example of how a new technology worked
its way into the “subconscious” routine of the fleet. It progressed from a useful adjunct for reconnaissance and gunfire spotting in the early fleet problems, to become
the centerpiece of planning and operations by Fleet Problem XX, in 1939, despite
the continuing assumption that the battleship remained the instrument of decision.
One way to see the rising importance of aviation in terms of the integration of the
carrier into the fleet.
During Fleet Problem I (1923), the Battle Fleet had experimented with a new circular cruising formation intended to enhance fleet defense against submarines,
light forces, and aircraft, and to provide greater flexibility when deploying for a surface engagement.33 In Fleet Problem VI (1926), the aircraft carrier Langley was integrated into the formation, positioned at the rear of the innermost of the three
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defensive circles, tied to but behind the battleships.34 Over the next decade and
more, as the value of carriers increased, their integration into the formation became
increasingly more important, so that by the late 1930s they were considered so valuable that were placed at the core of the formation, where it was believed they would
benefit from the maximum protection of the antiaircraft resources of the battleships and their escorts. While this was, in fact, not the best place for the carriers,
which needed the freedom to seek out opposing carriers, it does point up the growing awareness of their value.35
Perhaps an even more dramatic demonstration of how the long years of experience gained in the fleet problems helped the Navy assimilate innovative technologies was the increasing importance that the fleet placed on the value of the aircraft
carrier as an autonomous operational arm of sea power. As late as 1938 the Bureau
of Navigation officially rejected a proposal to detach the fleet’s carriers from the
Battle Force and transfer them to the Scouting Force, a move vigorously advocated
by many carriermen, such as Ernest J. King. Despite the opinion of the bureau, upon
becoming CINCUS in February of 1941, Adm. Husband Kimmel, hardly the most
air-minded officer in the fleet, detached Lexington from CARDIV 1, an element of
the Battle Force, and assigned her to the Commander, Scouting Force.36 Months
later, Pearl Harbor led to almost total reliance on the aircraft carrier. To be sure, carriers were pretty much all the Navy had with which to carry the war to the enemy.
Nevertheless, the speed with which the carrier became the principal offensive arm
of the fleet is impressive. By mid-January 1942, Hornet and Yorktown had reached
the Pacific, giving the fleet five carriers, albeit that Saratoga was under repair from
damage by an enemy torpedo. Over the next few months, these ships conducted a
series of offensive raids, as had been envisioned for the opening phase of hostilities
under the terms of War Plan Pac46.37 The Gilbert and Marshall Islands were attacked, as were Wake, Marcus, and Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea, culminating,
of course, in the great raid on Tokyo and several other cities in Japan in cooperation
with the Army Air Forces on April 18, 1942.38 These raids helped set the stage for the
battles of the Coral Sea (May 7–8) and Midway (June 3–7).
What is important about these operations is not so much that they occurred, as
who it was who commanded them. Chester W. Nimitz, who had made his career in
submarines and surface warships, assumed command in the Pacific at the end of
1941, and oversaw all subsequent operations. While William F. Halsey who commanded the Enterprise Task Force until the eve of Midway, and Aubrey W. Fitch,
who commanded the Saratoga Task Force early in the war, and later the Lexington
Task Force at Coral Sea, were aviation officers, several men who successfully commanded carrier task forces where not aviators. Non-aviator Frank J. Fletcher commanded the Yorktown Task Force from late 1941, and was in overall command
during the carrier battles of Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942), Midway (June 4–6, 1942),
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and the Eastern Solomons (August 24, 1942), doing well in difficult and dangerous
circumstances; no one ever commanded in more carrier-to-carrier battles than did
Fletcher, and, despite unwarranted criticism from many aviators, he won all his
battles.
Wilson Brown was also not an aviator, yet as Commander, Scouting Force, he
successfully fought the fleet’s first air-sea battle when Lexington beat off a major attacked by Japanese land-based aircraft near Bougainville on February 20, 1942, and
then, with Fletcher’s Yorktown Task Force added to his command, executed a daring
raid against Japanese shipping off Lae and Salamaua, in Papua, on March 20, 1942.
Raymond Spruance, another surface warrior, was recommended for command of
the Enterprise Task Force by aviator Halsey shortly before Midway. During that battle he assumed tactical control after Fletcher was unable to carry on, and went on to
command Fifth Fleet. Although surface warriors, Fletcher, Brown, and Spruance
had grown up in a Navy that had seen the carrier assume increasing importance, a
consequence of the long years of experience derived from the fleet problems. They
had internalized the capabilities of carrier aviation, and, aided by capable aviation
qualified subordinates, proved effective commanders of carrier task forces.
Think Ideas, Not Technology
The technological developments during the fleet problems, especially the evolution
of the aircraft carrier, have received the most attention. Nevertheless, the primary
purpose of the fleet problems was to develop concepts and explore capabilities. Out
of these came the autonomous carrier task force, the perfection of underway refueling, and more.
When technologies were tested, the fleet problems sometimes proved counterproductive. Certainly this was the case with regard to night fighting. The limited,
but highly successful experiments with radar during Fleet Problem XX (1939) convinced senior commanders that special training for night operations was unnecessary. As James O. Richardson observed in his memoirs, it was assumed “the Fleet
would have radar before the Fleet would have to fight at night.”39 This was a conclusion that had unpleasant consequences during 1942.40
Experimentation, Readiness, and Operations Do Not Mix Well
Writing after World War II, James O. Richardson observed that preparing the fleet for
possible war was incompatible with conducting extensive experiments. During the
last years of peace the rapid expansion of the navy and operational requirements
detracted from the fleet problems, while the fleet problems arguably detracted from
readiness. Moreover, there was little time after a fleet problem for effective reflection
upon and analysis of the lessons learned. The institution of Neutrality Patrol in late
1939 resulted in the enormous growth of the Atlantic Squadron, which soon became
the Atlantic Fleet. As a result, by early 1940 nearly a quarter of the fleet, including
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carriers Yorktown and Ranger, several older battleships, many cruisers, over 40
destroyers, and many other forces, could not participate in Fleet Problem XXI.
Arguably, this limited the training benefits and operational lessons that might have
been derived from the fleet problem.41 As Richardson put it, there were “enormous
tensions created as a result of the dichotomy between training and readiness.”42 Fleet
Problem XXI was but one of several—among them II (1924), VII (1927), and XVI
(1935)—in which the need to divert resources to undertake “real world” missions
imposed limitations on the fleet’s flexibility during the maneuvers.43
A particularly good example of the conflict between operations and experimentation can be seen in the absence of significant Marine Corps participation in the
fleet problems between 1926 and 1934. In late 1925, with one regiment of marines
already on duty in Haiti and another in China, domestic disorders in the latter
country required the dispatch of three additional regiments. Then, in 1927 two
more regiments were deployed to Nicaragua. These deployments severely strained
the resources of the Marine Corps, which had only about 19,000 officers and men.
The resulting manpower pinch, exacerbated by further cuts in the wake of the Crash
of 1929, made it impossible for the Marine Corps to participate in any significant
way in major maneuvers. Although most of the marines left China in 1929, one regiment remained, and the regiments in Nicaragua and Haiti were not withdrawn until 1933–34. Thus it was not until 1934 that the Marine Corps had sufficient
manpower available to once more take part in the fleet problems.
Nevertheless, while operational demands may sometimes have limited the value
of the fleet problems, the experience of the Imperial Navy was perhaps worse. Beginning in mid-1937, with the outbreak of full-scale war against China, the Imperial
Navy seems to have found little time for grand fleet maneuvers. While many useful
lessons were undoubtedly learned during active naval operations against China,
these operations were all largely in support of ground forces. The net effect was that,
although the Imperial Navy’s officers and men gained valuable tactical and administrative experience, they were no longer practicing for operational and strategic
missions.
Exercise the Commanders
The fleet problems provided the Navy’s senior leadership with the opportunity to test
existing doctrine and tactics in a realistic environment, stimulating thinking on
operational problems. The problems helped “grow” the fleet’s officers, as men who
were relatively junior during the early 1920s, moved up the promotion ladder, in the
process providing them with a deep understanding of the tools of sea power, exposing
them to the evolutionary development of the Navy’s new warfighting ideas. The high
degree of involvement of senior personnel in the formulation of the scenarios and the
shaping of the rules for the fleet problems, as well as in the conduct of the maneuvers
and in the follow-up analysis, helped them develop their skills at estimating the
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situation, crafting realistic, detailed operational plans, and making operational
decisions under pressure.44 Perhaps of equal importance is that the fleet problems
involved real and capable opponents who were free to conduct themselves as they
judged best. Thus the events of the fleet problems often unfolded much as they
would in an actual war, providing an extraordinary degree of verisimilitude.
The fleet problems also required a great deal of effort by commanders’ staffs.
“Solving” the fleet problems provided the Navy’s officers with excellent training in
analysis and planning under pressure, in managing paperwork, and in communications. This may have been a major factor in the superiority the U.S. Navy’s staff work
during the war compared with that of the Imperial Navy.
Do the Critique Now
The critique and analysis of each fleet problem was usually done shortly after its
conclusion, often even before the ships of the fleet had returned to their home ports.
As Admiral Richardson observed, “The battles of the Fleet Problems were vigorously refought from the speaker’s platforms.”45 Normally, a few days after the problem literally hundreds of the officers who had taken part gathered for the critique.
Each senior officer was allocated some time to review what had happened, make
critical comments, and offer suggestions. In addition, these officers—and many
others—provided written critiques and recommendations, all of which were then
reviewed by CINCUS, who shortly published the final report. Thus, the “reconstruction” was done by the operators at a time when the operation was still very
fresh in their minds. This is a far cry from modern practice, in which the critique,
analysis, and recommendations are often done weeks—sometimes months—later,
frequently by personnel who had no part in the exercises, and all while the fleet has
already moved on to other business.
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then CNO Harold R. Stark, Richardson (pp. 365,
469) ended routine PBY patrols around Hawaii
on December 5, 1940, because of wear and tear
on aircraft and personnel, which interfered with
training and readiness. Richardson’s successor,
Husband Kimmel, did not reinstitute the patrols.
In Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Regnery,
1955), Kimmel dissembled about the availability
of patrol bombers at the time of the Pearl Harbor
attack, writing (p. 16), “On December 7, 1941 . . .
the Commander of the 14th Naval District had
not received a single [PBY] patrol plane” of the
100 planned. While technically true, this statement ignores the presence in Hawaii of PatWing
2, with over 60 PBYs, under Kimmel’s direct
command as CINCUS, rather than that of Rear
Admiral Claude Bloch, COM 14.
21 M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem
VIII—Report of Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet,” p. 3, item 9.
22 NWCA, Carton 56, L. McNamee, U.S. Fleet Umpire Instructions, 1932: Suggested Changes;
NWCA, Carton 56, William A. Moffett, Chief,
BuAir, p. 2
23 Reynolds, John H. Towers, p. 272; Krepinevich,
“Transforming.”
24 Annual Report, 1936, pp. 10–11; Laning, pp.
363–64.
25 NWCA, Carton 60, “Report on United States
Fleet Problem Number 1,” p. 71.
26 M964-2, 1, “Talk on Operations of Black Forces
Delivered by Vice Admiral McCully, before Conference on Problem No. 3, 21 January 1924,” p. 1;
3, 1, COMSCOFOR to CINCUS, “Fleet Problem
No. 4—History of Operations,” p. 7.
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27 M964-11, 2, CINCUS to CNO, “Fleet Problem
VIII—Report of Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet,” pp. 3–5.
28 M964-16, 1, Report of Fleet Problem XV,
CINCUS, 1 June 1934, pp. 1–8.
29 Trent Hone, “Building a Doctrine,” p. 14.
30 Trent Hone, “Building a Doctrine,” p. 15, citing
General Instructions for Aircraft, Battle Force,
During Fleet Problem XVI, Commander Aircraft
Battle Force, 27 April, 1935 (Fleet Problem XVI,
CINCUS Report, Sept. 15, 1935 (Enclosures A I),
Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, RG38,
NA), p. 2.
31 Richardson, p. 207.
32 Richardson, p. 208.
33 Annual Report, 1923, p. 5.
34 Trent Hone, “Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine,” pp. 1109–10; Reynolds, John H. Towers,
pp. 200–201.
35 Richardson, p. 246.
36 Buell, Master, pp. 98–99; “Report of Admiral H.
Kent Hewitt . . . ,” p. 371.
37 Miller, pp. 286ff.
38 On the raids and related operations, see Morison,
Rising Sun, pp. 209–68, 287–98.
39 Richardson, p. 223.
40 Air search radar matured much more rapidly
than surface search radar. As a result, radar
proved useful at Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942) and
Midway (June 4–6, 1942) and was of immense
value at the Eastern Solomons (August 24, 1942)
and Santa Cruz Islands (October 25, 1942), all
carrier battles. But a lack of experience with and
understanding of the capabilities and limitations
of surface search radar by many senior commanders helped contribute to the disaster in the
nocturnal surface engagement at Savo Island
(April 9, 1942) and hampered the fleet during the
night surface actions of Cape Esperance (October
11–12, 1942), Guadalcanal (November 12–13 and
14–15, 1942), and Tassafaronga (November 30,
1942), against an enemy who lacked radar, but
had worked hard to perfect his night combat
skills. See Morison, Coral Sea, Midway, pp. 44,
52–53, 83, n. 25; Morison, Guadalcanal, pp.
29–30, 36, 92, 95, 152–53, 216, 237, 276, 298–300.
41 Abbazia, passim; Scarborough.
42 Richardson, pp. 219–20; Campbell, p. 145, n. 92
43 During Fleet Problem II, diversion of the Special
Service Squadron to Mexican waters (M964-3, 1,
CINCUS to CNO, April 20, 1924, “United States
Fleet Problem, Number Four—Report on,” p. 2),
in Fleet Problem VII, the diversion of six light
cruisers to duty in China and Nicaragua, and of a
desron to search for a missing steamer (M964-8,
1, CINCUS to CNO, May 4, 1927, U.S. Fleet
Problem Seven—Report on,” p. 2), etc.
44 Richardson, p. 241.
45 Richardson, p. 46.
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Lexington (CV 2), off Diamond Head, on February 3, 1933,
during Fleet Problem XIV.
(USN Photo 80-G-416531, Naval Historical Foundation)
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XXVII

The Fleet Problems and the Future of the Navy

I

t required nearly twenty years of fleet problems to develop the organization, tactics, and technologies that enabled the Navy to win World War II.1 The Navy is
presently entering upon a new era. The role of the fleet in the new global environment must change, as new threats and new technologies arise. Capabilities, operational concepts, and organizations will be changing in ways that are perhaps as
far reaching as were those that occurred during the interwar period. The full development of the Navy’s capabilities will require an experimental process equal in rigor
and duration.
It is important to realize that there were a number of unique factors that influenced the success of the interwar fleet problems and other maneuvers and exercises,
many of which have already been touched upon.
The bulk of the Navy was organized into a single command, the “United States
Fleet,” based in CONUS, which permitted almost total commitment of resources to
the fleet maneuvers. This concentration of the fleet under one command may have
been the single most important factor in the effectiveness of the fleet problems as a
tool for exploring the limits of sea power, for it put the entire fleet on “the same
sheet of music.”
• Mahanian “Command of the Seas” was essentially the Navy’s only mission.
• The fleet did not engage in any real-world operations, and could devote all
of its time to training.
• Facing no immediate “threat,” the service had the leisure to conduct
extensive maneuvers and experiments, as these did not interfere with
readiness.
• Since the only significant probable enemy was Japan, the Navy was able to
focus on the problems of conducting a war across the Pacific.
• Although they were experimenting with new tactics and technologies, it was
within a familiar force-on-force industrial-age model of warfare.
• Virtually all naval officers were Academy graduates, and the fleet essentially
had only one “community,” the big gun navy, with everyone—even
aviators and submariners—sharing a common understanding of
operational and tactical procedures, materiel, and “culture.”
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• Senior officers were deeply involved in planning, executing, and critiquing

the problems.2
• Personnel turbulence was extremely low and longevity was high; this
resulted in very professional, highly experienced personnel.
• Most personnel served afloat.
• Money was severely constrained, forcing the use of surrogates and
improvisation.3
• The exercises were largely unscripted, giving commanders enormous
latitude in conducting operations.
• The fleet problems were conducted over 18 years, and thus were essentially
an iterative series of experiments, each building upon the last.
• The public was interested, without being highly critical.4
Many of these conditions were unique to the times, and cannot be brought back.
But this does not necessarily mean that nothing can be learned from the fleet problems that can be of any use today. First, however, we must rethink the way we conduct exercises and experiments. Certainly the Navy has lost the knack of conducting
genuine free play maneuvers in the style of the fleet problems, and the other services
are doing no better. Indeed, exercises and experiments by the U.S. Armed Forces in
general have become rather notorious for their lack of rigor.5
Nevertheless, given the will, we are far better able to conduct serious experiments and maneuvers today than they were during the interwar period, given our
superior knowledge of weapons’ effects and the power of computers to collect and
process data. Free maneuvers should be supplemented by wargaming and the technically sophisticated Modeling and Simulations tools now available. But, as defense
analyst James F. Dunnigan has observed, “better M&S tools don’t make up for a lack
of nerve to use them.”6
A number of the procedures used in the fleet problems should also be revived.
Maneuvers and wargames should involve senior officers, those who will command
during actual operations, not some mid-ranking subordinate. Moreover, as was
done during the fleet problems, the President of the Naval War College and senior
members of the college staff, as well as the senior personnel from the Navy Warfare
Development Command, should be brought into the process of designing, conducting, and analyzing maneuvers, experiments, and exercises, tightening the relationship between those charged with thinking about how the navy should operate
in time of war and those charged with carrying out those operations.7
Even the basic themes of the fleet problems have applicability today. One of the
principal motives was “to train commanders in making quick estimates and
decisions and in writing and transmitting orders and plans.”8 How will future
commanders, operating in dispersed, collaborative fashion, with decision-making
authority distributed more widely, in highly complex “three block” environments,
make estimates of situations and plans, and exercise command and control,
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however modified, particularly given the increased tempo of operations that will
apparently be the norm? Maneuvers and wargames can be designed to help develop
the process necessary for commanders to better understand and operate under such
conditions.
The fleet problems addressed particular strategic questions identified by the
CNO, often drawing upon experience gained from wargames at the Naval War College or to test plans developed by the War Plans Division. The Navy’s new capabilities and doctrines need to be tested in the same fashion, with even more stress on
jointness, and with inter-agency and coalition partners.
Even some of the experimental experience from the fleet problems may have
possible value to the modern navy. For example, experiments with unmanned air
vehicles, for both reconnaissance and combat, might benefit from an examination
of the work done during the fleet problems in the use of battleship and cruiser
floatplanes for essentially similar missions.
Although the world, the nation, and the service have changed dramatically in the
decades since 1940, a look at the twenty-one fleet problems conducted by the Navy
between 1923 and 1940 is likely to reveal some useful lessons for anyone thinking
about the future of the sea services.
Working in a financially constrained environment, with a mix of old systems,
upgraded systems, and new systems, the Navy managed to solve virtually all of the
problems inherent in conducting a major maritime war on a global scale, while exploring and developing the basic principles of such fundamental tools of naval warfare as carrier task force operations, amphibious landings, underway refueling, and
more, while conducting experiments with new technologies in communications,
radar, camouflage, and so forth, thereby creating the fleet that not only won the Second World War, but contributed significantly to victory in the Cold War, and continues to dominate the world’s oceans and to project power deep inland.
The fleet problems were the way the U.S. Navy learned to fight World War II, and
are an outstanding example of how a military service can educate itself.9
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N O T E S 1 I would like to thank Thomas Choinski for his
advice and suggestions in the development of this
section.
2 See, for example, NWCA, Carton 56, L.
McNamee, U.S. Fleet Umpire Instructions, 1932:
Suggested Changes.
3 So constrained were funds that the exercises for
1922, which would have been Fleet Problem I,
had to be cancelled due to a shortage of fuel (Annual Report, 1922, p. 39), and the initial plans for
Black in FP IX (1929) had to be scrapped to conserve funds (Campbell, pp. 172–73).
4 Correspondents often accompanied the fleet, and
journalistic coverage of the problems was extensive and generally friendly, though accidents often
were given considerable play; Buell, Master, p. 93;
Coontz, From the Mississippi, pp. 424–29, and
Laning, p. 362.
5 The way maneuvers and exercises are conducted,
by all the services, began to come under serious
criticism more than two decades ago, with articles
such as Frederick Thompson’s “Did We Learn
Anything From that Exercise? Could We?” Naval
War College Review, Jul.–Aug. 1982, pp. 25–37;
Andrew Krepinevich, “Military Experimentation:
Time to Get Serious,” Naval War College Review,
Winter 2001; and so on. The most notorious
“maneuvers” of recent years, “Millennium Challenge ’02,” has received extensive coverage in
both public media and the military journals; see,
for example, “War Games Rigged? General says

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:46 AM

Millennium Challenge ’02 ‘was almost entirely
scripted,’” by Sean D. Naylor, Army Times, August 16, 2002; “Ex-General: War Game Rigged,”
Washington Post, Saturday, August 17, 2002;
Julian Borger, “War Game Was Fixed to Ensure
American Victory, Claims General,” Guardian,
August 21, 2002; Nicholas D. Kristof, “How We
Won the War,” New York Times, September 6,
2002; “Military Overkill Defeats Virtual War: And
Real-World Soldiers Are the Losers,” by Michael
Schrage, Washington Post, September 22, 2002;
Paul K. Van Riper, “Preparing for War Takes
Study and Open Debate,” Proceedings, November
2002, p. 2; Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of
Thinking Without Thinking (New York: Little,
Brown, 2005) pp. 99ff; “Iran Encounter Grimly
Echoes ’02 War Game,” by Thom Shanker, New
York Times, January 27, 2008. Roger Thompson’s
Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy’s Status Quo
Culture (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007)
offers a valuable critique of the problems with recent Navy maneuvers, but lacks a deep analysis of
the causes of these problems and offers no suggestions for improvement.
6 James F. Dunnigan, email, February 12, 2003.
7 I am grateful to Tom Hone for reminding me of
this important characteristic of many of the fleet
problems, email August 3, 2008.
8 Nenninger, p. 9.
9 I owe this quote to the late Prof. David Syrett,
email September 14, 2002.
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APPENDIX 1: THE NAVY, 1923–1940
FY
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941

Budget
$476.8
$333.2
$332.2
$346.1
$312.9
$318.9
$331.3
$364.6
$374.2
$353.8
$357.5
$349.4
$296.9
$436.3
$528.9
$556.7
$596.1
$672.7
$891.5
$2,313.1

Base Adjusted
0.98
$467.3
1.00
$333.2
1.00
$332.2
1.03
$356.5
1.04
$325.4
1.02
$325.3
1.00
$331.3
1.00
$364.6
0.98
$366.7
0.89
$314.9
0.80
$286.0
0.76
$265.5
0.78
$231.6
0.80
$349.0
0.81
$428.4
0.84
$467.6
0.83
$494.8
0.81
$544.9
0.82
$731.0
0.86 $1,989.3

Change Per 1923
68.4% 140.2%
71.3% 100.0%
99.7%
99.7%
107.3% 107.0%
91.3%
97.7%
100.0%
97.6%
101.9%
99.4%
110.1% 109.4%
100.6% 110.1%
85.9%
94.5%
90.8%
85.8%
92.8%
79.7%
87.2%
69.5%
150.7% 104.8%
122.7% 128.6%
109.2% 140.3%
105.8% 148.5%
110.1% 163.5%
134.2% 219.4%
272.1% 597.0%

Pers Ships
97.4 379
91.1 365
95.9 376
93.0 370
91.2 368
93.0 357
93.7 360
94.8 356
94.5 357
90.9 308
91.1 313
89.2 311
90.4 320
93.1 320
103.5 322
110.7 335
115.9 380
122.5 394
209.9 478
370.9 790

Source: Naval Historical Center, online resources, at www.history.navy.mil/faqs/
faq65-1.htm. Alternative figures can be found in other references, but the differences are not significant
Key:
FY, fiscal year, from July 1 through June 30.
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Budget, in millions of contemporary dollars, omitting funds available under the
National Industrial Recovery Act.
Base, value of the dollar using 1923 as the baseline figure.
Adjusted, the budget in millions of 1923 dollars.
Change, budget as a percentage of the preceding year’s, in 1923 dollars.
Per 1923, the budget as a percentage of that of 1923, in 1923 dollars.
Pers, Personnel on full time active duty, omitting the Navy Nurse Corps, about
400 women ranking as officers, and midshipmen, 1,500–2,500. Also excluded are
most Naval Reservist and Naval Militiamen on temporary active duty. Included are
active and reserve personnel—mostly officers—assigned to the Civilian Conservation Corps. For most of 1922–36 there were about 5,500 line officers, plus some
3,000 other officers in the Navy.
Ships, in commission, including “reduced commission,” but excluding those assigned to reserve components, as of the end of the fiscal year.
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APPENDIX 2: PRINCIPAL COMBATANT PARTICIPATION IN THE FLEET
PROBLEMS, 1923–1940
Battleships
Problem

COM FP

Carriers

% COM FP

I (1923)

18

14

78%

0

0

Cruisers
% COM FP

Destroyers
% COM FP

Submarines

% COM FP

%

—

13

2

15% 103

63

61%

69

16

23%

0%

13%

II (1924)

18

12

67%

1

0

16

10

63% 103

40

39%

80

10

III (1924)

18

15

83%

1

1

100% 16

3

19% 103

58

56%

80

19

24%

IV (1924)

18

13

72%

1

1

100% 16

7

44% 103

60

58%

80

35

44%

V (1925)

18

12

67%

1

1

100% 18

11

61% 106

60

57%

79

20

25%

VI (1926)

18

12

67%

1

1

100% 18

10

56% 106

63

59%

80

32

40%

VII (1927)

18

13

72%

1

1

100% 16

4

25% 106

48

45%

77

6

8%

VIII (1928)

18

10

56%

3

1

33%

16

9

56% 106

36

34%

77

32

42%

IX (1929)

18

13

72%

3

2

67%

16

6

38% 103

65

63%

80

32

40%

X (1930)

18

14

78%

3

3

100% 20

9

45% 103

19

18%

81

23

28%
16%

XI (1930)

18

11

61%

3

3

100% 20

4

20% 103

23

22%

81

13

XII (1931)

15

10

67%

3

3

100% 20

13

65%

87

49

56%

56

4

7%

XIII (1932)

15

9

60%

3

3

100% 19

15

79% 102

62

61%

55

21

38%

XIV (1933)

15

10

67%

3

3

100% 20

16

80% 101

58

57%

55

20

36%

XV (1934)

15

12

80%

4

3

75%

17

71% 102

55

54%

54

12

22%

24

XVI (1935)

15

12

80%

4

4

100% 25

21

84% 104

59

57%

52

25

48%

XVII (1936)

15

11

73%

4

4

100% 26

19

73% 106

86

81%

49

18

37%

XVIII (1937)

15

7

47%

3

3

100% 27

21

78% 111

46

41%

52

21

40%

XIX (1938)

15

10

67%

5

3

60%

32

21

66% 112

55

49%

54

14

26%

XX (1939)

15

12

80%

5

4

80%

36

26

72% 127

61

48%

58

12

21%

XXI (1940)

15

11

73%

6

3

50%

37

21

57% 185

67

36%

64

19

30%

Source: Naval Historical Center, www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4c.htm. A
graphic version of this table may be found in Chapter 25.
Key:
COM indicates ships officially in commission as of July 1 (May 31 for 1935).
FP, the number of ships taking part in the fleet problem; in problems with multiple phases; this figure is for the maximum number of ships involved, excluding surrogates or constructive vessels.
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%, percentage of ships of this type taking part in the problem.
Note: COM figure includes ships in reduced commission, that is with maintenance crews only. It also includes ships undergoing repair, refit, or reconstruction,
but not those assigned to reserve components. Thus the figures overstate the actual
number ships available for service. For example, during 1931–33, four battleships
were undergoing reconstruction—New Mexico (BB 40), Mississippi (BB 41), Idaho
(BB 42), and Tennessee (BB 43). So rather than 15 battleships potentially available to
take part in the fleet problems during these years, there were actually only 11. Figures for cruisers exclude obsolete armored cruisers still in official commission.
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APPENDIX 3: THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. FLEET (CINCUS), 1922–1942
The post of “Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet” (CINCUS) was created by Navy Department General Order No. 94, dated December 8, 1922, which established the
unified “U.S. Fleet,” abolishing independent Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.1 CINCUS
held the temporary rank of admiral and was in direct command of the principal operational elements of the fleet. Normally appointed on the recommendation of the
CNO, CINCUS usually served from a year to 18 months, though there was no set
term.2
CINCUS
Hilary P. Jones
Robert E. Coontz
Samuel S. Robison
Charles F. Hughes
Henry A. Wiley
William V. Pratt
Jehu V. Chase
Frank H. Schofield
Richard Henry Leigh
David Foote Sellers
Joseph M. Reeves
Arthur J. Hepburn
Claude C. Bloch
James O. Richardson
Husband Kimmel
Ernest J. King

Appointed
December 1922
August 1923
August 1925
September 1926
November 1927
May 1929
September 1930
September 1931
August 1932
June 1933
June 1934
June 1936
January 1938
January 1940
February 1941
December 1941

From 1922 CINCUS was the commander of the entire U.S. Fleet. By 1940, however, the likelihood of a two-ocean war was becoming very real. This put CINCUS in
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an awkward position; in such a war he would have two hats, overall command of
fleet operations world-wide, and operational command of the principal maritime
theater, presumably the Pacific. Then came the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on
December 7, 1941. Ten days after the attack, Husband Kimmel was replaced by Ernest J. King as CINCUS, and Chester W. Nimitz was immediately appointed
CINCPAC. King, who replaced the unfortunate-sounding acronym “CINCUS”
with “COMINCH,” became the strategic director of naval operations in a
multi-ocean war. In March of 1942 King was also appointed CNO, although the two
posts still remained legally separate. In an October 1945 reorganization the independent post of “Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet” was abolished and its duties assigned to the CNO.

N O T E S 1 Between January and June of 1919, Adm. Henry
T. Mayo held the title “Commander in Chief, U.S.
Fleet,” with authority over the Atlantic Fleet, the
Pacific Fleet, and the Asiatic Fleet. This unified
command was abolished in 1919, and the three
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fleets operated directly under the authority of the
CNO until Navy Department General Order
No. 94.
2 Richardson, p. 423.
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APPENDIX 4: PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT
Virtually all of the principal officers of the Navy between the wars are today largely
forgotten. Most, including some of the most important, such as Frederick J. Horne,
Harris Laning, Claude Bloch, James O. Richardson, and Husband Kimmel, lack a biography. Even Joseph Mason Reeves, arguably the most important actor in the development of carrier aviation, had to wait until 2003 for a biography. Many of the
officers who served between the wars are not mentioned in standard biographical
references such as Clark G. Reynolds’ Famous American Admirals or, for those still
on duty after Pearl Harbor, in E. Manning Ancell’s and Christine M. Miller’s very inadequate Biographical Dictionary of World War II Generals and Flag Officers, though
information about them can usually be gleaned from the Navy List, Who’s Who in
America, and newspaper articles.1 Although often incomplete, the entries here are
intended to provide some idea of the background, experience, and career patterns
of officers in the interwar navy.
Andrews, Adolphus (USNA 1901) served variously in surface ships and on staffs
until the end of World War I, during which he commanded the pre-dreadnought
Massachusetts (BB 2). Then NWC, aide to Presidents Harding and Coolidge, various
staff and line assignments. Earned his wings by the early 1930s. C/S, BATFOR, 1933,
and C/S U.S. Fleet, 1933–34, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 1935–38, including a short tour as Acting Secretary of the Navy in 1936. COMSCOFOR,
1938–41; COM, Eastern Sea Frontier, 1941–43, first mismanaging, then helping resolve the ASW disaster off the East Coast. Retired as a vice admiral in 1943. Recalled
to serve with Edward C. Kalbfus and a third officer on the Naval Court of Inquiry
into the Pearl Harbor attack.
Austin, Charles M. (USNA, 1905), Commander, Bailey (TB-21), 1915. Assigned,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1915, COM Broome (DD 210), 1919–20,
COM DESDIV 37, 1920–21. Assigned, Office of the JAG, 1923, Milwaukee (CL 5),
1926–27. U.S. delegate, SOLAS Conference, London, 1929. Captain, 1930, Commander, presidential yacht Mayflower (PY 1), 1930–31. Staff, COMSCOFLT,
1931–32. No record thereafter.
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Baker, Wilder D. (USNA, 1914) served in submarines during World War I, commanding successively S-11 (SS 116), T-2 (SS 60), and S-13 (SS 118); later an innovative destroyerman, commanding, among others, Kidder (DD 319). Commander,
DESRON 31 in 1941, and in 1942 was appointed by COMINCH King to coordinate
ASW operations, and prompted the creation of what became the “Operations Evaluation Group.” Later commanded North Carolina (BB 55), 1942–43, rose to rear admiral during World War II, and retired as a vice admiral.2
Bellinger, Patrick (USNA, 1907) one of the first seven naval aviators, conducted
some of the Navy’s first operational air reconnaissance missions, at Vera Cruz, 1914;
commanded an air training station during World War I, the NC-4 expedition, and
more, rising to carrier command and then rear admiral by late 1941. On December
7, 1941, he was in command of PatWing 2 at Pearl Harbor, and issued the famous
message “Air raid Pearl Harbor—this is no drill.” Later chief-of-staff to COMINCH
King, he retired as a vice admiral in 1947.3
Bloch, Claude C. (USNA, 1899) served in the Philippine Insurrection and Boxer
Rebellion, held various staff appointments, commanded transport Plattsburgh in
1918, receiving the Navy Cross. Assistant Chief, then Chief, BuOrd, 1918–21,
1923–27; Com California (BB 44), 1927–29; Com Training Squadron, 1932–33; Director, Navy Budget Office, 1933–34; Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 1934–36;
COM Battleships, BATFOR, 1936–37; COMBATFOR, 1937–38; CINCUS, 1938–40;
COM 14th Naval District, 1940–42. Retired in 1942, recalled for General Board during World War II. Not a very innovative officer, generally believed hostile to aviation, and apparently not well regarded by many of his subordinates.4
Bostwick, Lucius Allyn (USNA, 1890) served in Oregon (BB 3) during the
Spanish-American War, earned a Navy Cross as COM South Dakota (ACR 9) during
World War I. COM New Mexico (BB 40), 1918–19; office of the CNO, 1920; C/S U.S.
Fleet, 1925–27; COM Battleships, BATFLT, 1929–31; retired as a rear admiral in
1933.
Brown, Preston (Yale, 1892) enlisted in the Army 1894, commissioned in the infantry 1897. World War I, C/S 2nd Division 1917–18; COM 3rd Division,
Meuse-Argonne, 1918; Asst C/S of the AEF on occupation duty in Germany, 1919.
Acting Commandant, then Commandant, Army War College, 1919–21 (while
earning a Master’s from Yale). Commanded several divisions, then I Corps Area,
1926–30; Deputy C/S of the Army, 1930; Commander, Panama Department,
1930–33; II Corps Area, 1933–34, when he retired.
Brown, Wilson (USNA, 1902) served variously ashore and afloat. World War I,
staff of Admiral William S. Sims in Europe. Later commanded Parker (DD 48); attended the NWC, 1920–21; XO, Colorado (BB 45), successively naval aide to Presidents Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt; COM, Submarine Base, Groton; California
(BB 44); C/S, NWC; COM Training Squadron, 1937–38; Superintendent, Naval
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Academy, 1938–41. COMSCOFOR in February 1941, took Lexington task force into
action early in the war, doing well in an air–sea battle off Bougainville on February
20, 1942, and then with both Lexington (CV 2) and Yorktown (CV 6) executed a daring raid over Papua’s Owen Stanley Mountains against Japanese shipping off Lae
and Salamaua, New Guinea on March 10th. From April 1942, COM 1st Naval District, then aide to President Roosevelt. Retired December 1944, remained on active
duty until the end of World War II.
Brumby, Frank H. (USNA, 1895) served in New York (ACR 2) at Santiago; COM
Cincinnati (CL 6), 1917–18; COM Kansas (BB 21), 1919–20; COM New Mexico (BB
40), 1924–26; NWC 1926–27; COM Control Force, 1927–28; Board of Inspection
and Survey, 1928–29; COMCRUDIV 2, 1929–30; COM Norfolk Naval Shipyard,
1930–32; COMSCOFOR; COM 5th Naval District, 1935–36; retired, 1936.5
Bryan, Hamilton V. (USNA, 1913). Wyoming (BB 32), 1922–23; Fleet Intelligence
Officer, 1923–24; Florida (BB 30), 1927; Pittsburgh (CA 4), 1931–32; HQ, USN,
1933–34. Retired as a captain in 1941. Designed experimental transport Sea Otter,
1942, which proved unsuitable for Atlantic waters. Died, 1944.6
Clark, Frank H. (USNA, 1893). Aide to COM Pacific Fleet, 1910–12; commanded a battleship; Member, Shenandoah Board of Inquiry, 1925;
COMDESRONSSCOFLEET, 1927–29, then a batdiv; COMSCOFOR, 1932–33;
General Board, 1933–36, when he retired.
Clark, J. J. “Jocko” (USNA, 1918—the first Native American graduate). Commanded VF 2, 1932–33; Suwanee (CVE 27), then Yorktown (CV 10), 1943–44; Task
Force 58.1/38.1, 1944–45, earning the Navy Cross; Seventh Fleet, 1952–53, when he
retired as an admiral. He left a memoir, J. J. Clark, with Clark G. Reynolds, Carrier
Admiral (New York: McKay, 1967).7
Cluverius, Watt Tyler (USNA, 1896) survived the Maine disaster; gunboat command during the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars. From 1914, commanded
a naval battalion at Vera Cruz, then Dubuque (PG 17), Shawmut (CM 11), and Baltimore (CM 1) during World War I. Rear admiral, 1928, after which COM Norfolk
Navy Yard; BATDIV 2; 9th Naval District; Base Force; 4th Naval District. Retired in
1939, recalled after Pearl Harbor and served in the Office of the Secretary of the
Navy.
Cole, Cyrus W. (USNA, 1899). In Indiana (BB 1) at Santiago, 1898; gunboat duty
in the Philippine War, later in Brooklyn (CA 3). By 1930 COM West Virginia (BB 48),
1930–32; Member, General Board, 1932–34; COMSUBFOR, 1934–36, COM
Portsmouth Navy Yard, 1937–39, directed Squalus (SS 192) rescue. Retired 1939.
Reportedly an accomplished amateur sculptor.8
Cole, Eli K. (USNA, 1888). USMC, pioneer in advanced base operations, commanded marines in Panama, Cuba, and Haiti for much of 1904–16, rising to brigadier general. Between assignments abroad served in garrison, in schools, and on
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staffs, and attended the Army War College. Commanded the Parris Island training
establishment, 1915–18; 5th Marine Brigade in France; the Army’s 41st Division,
from October 1918 until after the Armistice. Commander, Parris Island, 1919–24,
with time out as Commander, Marine Expeditionary Force, in Fleet Problems III
and IV. Died on active duty in 1929.9
Cole, William C. (USNA, 1889). Held various line and staff assignments, specializing in hydrography and engineering. NWC, 1915–16; COM Frederick (ACR 8),
1916–17; Nevada (BB 36), 1917–19, with the Grand Fleet, earning a Navy Cross. Assistant CNO, 1921–22; COM Special Service Squadron, 1922–23; C/S CINCUS,
1923–25; COM BATDIV 4, 1928–29; COMSCOUTFLT, 1929–30; COM 12th Naval
District. Retired 1932.
Conner, Fox (USMA, 1898—a classmate of Craig). Cuban Campaign, 1898;
Army Staff College, 1905–06; Army War College, 1907–1908. Exchange officer with
the French Army, 1911–13, between tours of staff duty. In World War I, G-3 AEF as a
temporary brigadier. After the war Conner supported mechanization, commanded
an infantry brigade, 1921–24; Assistant, then Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Army,
1924–26 and 1927–28; COM Hawaiian Department, 1928–30; COM I Corps Area,
1937–38, retired. A serious student of military history, he was widely respected, and
mentored George S. Patton, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and many notable other
officers.10
Coontz, Robert E. (USNA, 1885) had a varied career, from fighting Indians and
Russian poachers in Alaska to CNO, 1919–23, and CINCUS, 1923–25, retiring in
1930. In addition to his memoirs, From the Mississippi to the Sea (Philadelphia:
Dorrance, 1930), he wrote True Anecdotes of an Admiral (Philadelphia: Dorrance,
1934), an amusing book.11
Craig, Malin (USMA, 1898—a classmate of Conner) served in the Spanish-American
and Philippine Wars, China Relief Expedition. Subsequently on the Army general
staff, attended the Army War College, and alternated line and staff assignments. In
World War I successively C/S of a division, a corps, and an army. Afterward, president, Army War College; Commandant of the Cavalry School; Chief of Cavalry; Assistant C/S of the Army, 1926–30; COM IX Corps Area, 1931–35; C/S of the Army,
1935–39, when he retired. Recalled to active duty shortly before Pearl Harbor, he
served in a variety of administrative posts during World War II, until his death in
1945. One of the most influential army officers in the interwar period.12
Day, George C. (USNA, 1892), Spanish-American War; commander, Preston (DD
19), 1909–10, TORPDIV 7, 1910–11; Brooklyn (ACR 3), 1915–16; Head Department of Compasses, Nautical Instruments, and Time Service, Naval Observatory,
1917; COM, transport America (ex-Hamburg-America liner Amerika), 1917–1919;
Pennsylvania (BB 38), 1920–21; COMSUBPAC, 1923–25; COMCRUDIV 2,
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1927–28; President, Board of Inspection and Survey, 1929, 1931–35, when he retired as a rear admiral.
de Steiguer, Louis R. (USNA, 1889). Spanish-American War; COM Kearsarge (BB
5), 1915–16; Naval War College; Chief, Hydrographic Office, 1921; COM 1st Naval
District, 1923; COMBATDIVS, BATFLEET, 1926–27; COMBATFLEET, 1927; COM
3rd Naval District, 1927–31; chaired Board of Inquiry into the Colorado (BB 45)
fire, 1930; retired in 1931.
Denby, Edwin C. (Michigan, 1896) was variously a lawyer, customs official, and
businessman, and served in the House of Representatives from Michigan,
1905–1911. When the United States entered World War I, enlisted in the Marine
Corps as a 37-year-old private, rose to major by 1919. Harding’s Secretary of the
Navy, 1921–24. An undistinguished secretary, he was tied to the “Teapot Dome”
Scandal, and forced to resign.
Dinger, Henry C. (USNA, 1898). Marietta (PG 15), 1902–1903; COM Maumee
(AO 2), 1916–18, instrumental in developing underway refueling; Bureau of Steam
Engineering, 1921. U.S. Delegate, Second International Power Conference, Berlin,
1930. Shortly retired.13
Doyle, Austin K. (USNA, 1919), COM Saratoga air group, 1939–40; COM Nassau
(CVE 16), 1942–43 and the second Hornet (CV 12), 1944–45. Rear admiral postwar,
Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training and later Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier/10th Naval District; Commander, US Taiwan Defense Command; and finally
Chief of Air Training. Retired as an admiral, 1958.
Drum, Hugh (Boston College, 1898) enlisted in the Army for the Spanish-American
War, later commissioned. Served in a variety of staff and line assignments; C/S AEF,
1917, of First Army, 1918, as a temporary brigadier general. Among the most prominent Army officers between the world wars, he was Assistant C/S of the Army,
1923–26; IG of the Army, 1930–31; Deputy C/S of the Army, 1933–35; COM Hawaiian Department, 1935–37. Later COM, II Corps Area, Eastern Defense Command,
1939–43. Three times in the running for C/S of the Army (1930, 1935, 1939), retired
as a lieutenant general in 1943, and became commander of the New York Guard.14
Dyer, Thomas (USNA, 1924) spent virtually his entire career in communications
intelligence and cryptanalysis. He learned Japanese, developed mechanical analytical tools, and from 1936 served at Station HYPO, Hawaii, and later the Communications Intelligence Unit, at Pearl Harbor. Chief cryptanalyst under Commander
Rochefort from 1941, he was part of the team that broke the Imperial Navy’s JN-25
code to facilitate victory at Coral Sea and Midway. Postwar, transferred to the NSA,
where he served until 1955, retiring as a captain.
Eberle, Edward W. (USNA, 1885). Turret commander in Oregon (BB 3), 1896–99;
compiled the Manual of Gun and Torpedo Drills; Flag Lieutenant to COM Atlantic
Fleet, 1899–1901 and 1903–1905; COM Wheeling (PG 14), 1910–12;
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Superintendent, USNA, 1915–18; commanded elements Atlantic Fleet, 1918–22;
the first COMBATFLEET, 1922–23; CNO, 1923–27; General Board, 1927–28;
retired. Technologically inclined, he did experimental work in weaponry, tactics,
and radio communications.15
Eltinge, LeRoy (USMA, 1896). Philippine Campaign, then Philippine Insurrection, 1898–1902; Cuba Occupation, 1906–1908; attended various Army schools;
Punitive Expedition in Mexico, 1916–17. During World War I, G-3 and later deputy
C/S of the AEF. Later staff of the Philippine Department; Chief of War Plans,
1924–25; COM Operations and Training Division (G3), HQ, U. S. Army. Died 1931
while commanding a brigade in the organized reserve.16
Fitch, Aubrey (USNA, 1906). Gunnery Officer, Wyoming (BB 32), 1917–19, with
the Grand Fleet; COM Luce (DD 99), Mahan (DD 102), 1921–27; XO, Nevada (BB
36), 1927. Earned his wings in 1930. Thereafter attended the Naval War College;
COM PatWing 2; CarDiv One, 1940–41. COM Lexington TF under Wilson Brown,
and then under classmate Frank J. Fletcher, in the Mandates and at Coral Sea, 1942.
COM Air Forces, Solomons, under Halsey as Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
Deputy CNO for Air, December 1943 to the end of the war, and then Superintendent USNA, retiring in 1947.
Fletcher, Frank J. (USNA, 1906). Medal of Honor, Vera Cruz, 1914; COM
Benham (DD 49) on Atlantic convoy duty, earning a Navy Cross; attended NWC
and Army War College; COMCRUDIV3 on Neutrality Patrol, 1939–41; then the
Yorktown Task Force. In 1942 he was in overall command in three of history’s five
carrier battles, Coral Sea, Midway, and Eastern Solomons (the others were Santa
Cruz, also in 1942, and Philippine Sea, in 1944). Later CINCNORPAC, and chairman of the General Board after the war, retiring in 1947. Although all Fletcher’s operations had favorable outcomes, he was often charged with excessive caution, and
was for long denied his proper credit in the history of the Pacific War.17
Greenslade, John W. (USNA, 1899). Cadet serving afloat during the
Spanish-American and Philippine Wars. Career included unusually extensive
service in mine warfare; during World War I commanding mine vessel Housatonic,
which laid 9,000 mines as part of the North Sea Mine Barrage. COM MINERON 1
early 1920s; NWC student, then instructor; COM Pennsylvania (BB 38), 1928–29.
After various staff and administrative assignments, was COMSUBFOR, 1932–36
(though he had no prior experience in submarines); COM Battleships, BATFOR,
1938–39; COM 12th Naval District, 1941–44. Retired as a vice admiral in 1944.
Griffin, Robert M. (USNA, 1911). Navy Cross on convoy duty during World War
I. By 1939 he commanded, New York (BB 34). During World War II he commanded
battleship and cruiser forces in shore bombardments and as escort across the Pacific; Kiska, July 1943, Makin, November 1943, New Ireland, March 1944. Retired as
a vice admiral in 1951.
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Gully, B. W. Aside from the fact that he was a marine and a lieutenant colonel in
1939, nothing could be found out about this officer.18
Halsey, William F. (USNA,1904). Great White Fleet; then command of several
destroyers punctuated by a tour on the staff of the Naval Academy, 1911–21, earning
a Navy Cross for action in the North Atlantic. ONI, 1921–24, as naval attaché in
Germany and several other European countries. Trained as a submariner; held several academic posts and school assignments. Earned his wings in 1935, at 52. During
World War II he had an active, varied, and distinguished career; the raids on the
Mandates, the Tokyo Raid, the Guadalcanal Campaign, the Solomons Campaign,
and finally as commander, Third Fleet, in the Central Pacific. After the war he retired as a Fleet Admiral, and entered business. Author, with Joseph Bryan, of Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947).19
Hart, Thomas C. (USNA, 1897). In Massachusetts (BB 2) at Santiago, later became a submariner, commanding a submarine squadron in Ireland during World
War I. NWC and Army War College; COMCRUBATFOR, 1935–36; COM Asiatic
Fleet, 1939–42, doing a creditable job in the opening weeks of World War II. Overage for sea duty, he shortly retired. Recalled to active duty as a member of the General Board, 1942–45. In 1945 he was appointed to fill a vacancy in the Senate from
Connecticut, and served 1945–46, declining to run for re-election.20
Hederman, Thomas H. (USNA, 1923). Staff of the Fleet Intelligence Officer,
1923–24; performed routine duties ashore and afloat, including a tour in Arkansas
(BB 33) during the mid-1930s, but largely made his career in destroyers, rising to
command of Downes (DD 375), 1938–40, and DESRON 61 from March 1943, in
which capacity he took part in the last surface action of the Pacific War, in Sagami
Bay, July 22–23, 1945, earning a commendation. Retired as a rear admiral in 1953
and died in 1960.
Heintzelman, Stuart (USMA, 1899). Philippine War and Boxer Rebellion; Army
Command and General Staff College; held various staff, line, and teaching assignments. In World War I served as a general staff officer and liaison officer at the highest levels. After the war commanded an infantry brigade and served as Assistant C/S
of the Army for War Plans in the mid-1920s. Commandant of ACGSC, 1929, reorganizing and revitalizing the institution. Major general in 1931, later served as
Commanding General of the VII Corps Area, and died on active duty in 1935.
Hepburn, Arthur J. (USNA, 1897). At Santiago, 1898, then survey duty, line, and
staff assignments until 1917. COM transport Agamemnon (North German Lloyd
liner Kaiser Wilhelm II), 1917–18; commanded a submarine, 1919; Assistant Chief,
Bureau of Steam Engineering, 1919–22; U.S. Naval Detachment, Turkey; West Virginia (BB 48), 1925–26; Director, ONI, 1926–27. Between 1927 and 1930, was successively C/S to COM Battleships BATFOR, COMBATFOR, and CINCUS. Attended
NWC, 1930–31; COMSUBFOR, 1931–32; delegate, arms limitation talks, 1932–33;
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COMSCOFOR, 1935–36; CINCUS, 1936–38; Chairman, “Hepburn Board” to determine future basing needs, 1938; COM 12th Naval District, 1939–40; and then retired. Recalled to active duty as an admiral, served as Chairman, General Board,
1942–45.21
Hewitt, H. Kent (USNA, 1906). Great White Fleet; instructor, Naval Academy;
various fleet assignments. COM yacht Eagle, Cuban and Haitian interventions,
1916–17; destroyer Cummings (DD 44), 1917–18. Various fleet assignments and
Naval War College through 1935, when he assumed command of Indianapolis (CA
35). During World War II served on Neutrality Patrol, then COM, Amphibious
Force, Atlantic Fleet, in April 1942, and directed the landings in northwest Africa,
Sicily, Anzio, and southern France. Postwar, chaired a Pearl Harbor investigation
commission; COM Naval Forces Europe; U.S. Navy representative to the United Nations. Retired as a full admiral, 1949. His The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt,
edited by Evelyn M. Cherpak (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), are informative and often amusing.
Hines, John F. (USNA, 1892). Spanish-American War; Cincinnati (C 7),
1905–1907; Instructor, USNA, 1907–1910; attended Naval War College, 1910. XO,
North Carolina (ACR 12), 1910–12; Instructor, USNA, 1913–17, temporarily commanding Idaho (BB 24), 1914. From 1916 to 1918, commanded successively four
cruisers, including convoy duty, earning a Navy Cross & DSM. COM Louisiana (BB
19), 1919–20; Great Lakes Navy Training Station; Pennsylvania (BB 38), 1923–24.
Retired, 1927. Superintendent, Pennsylvania Nautical School, 1927–37. Died,
1941.22
Hines, John L. (USMA 1891) served on the frontier, in Cuba and the Philippines,
and on the Mexican Punitive Expedition. In World War I commanded successively
the 16th Infantry, the 1st Infantry Brigade (1st Division), the 4th Division, and II
Corps. Deputy C/S of the Army, 1922–24, under John J. Pershing; C/S of the Army
(1924–26), and retired in 1932. He died in 1974, at 105, the longest-lived West Point
graduate.23
Holmes, Ralston S. (USNA 1905). ADC, Commander, 2nd Division, Pacific Fleet,
1907–1909; BuOrd, 1912–13; Tacoma (C 18), 1914–15; Director, Armor & Projectile
Division, BuOrd, 1916–17; Idaho (BB 42), 1919; U.S. Naval Mission to Brazil, 1922;
Commander, presidential yacht Mayflower (PY 1), 1924–28; Naval Attaché, Rome,
1928–30; Commandant of Midshipmen, USNA, 1932–35; C/S COMBATFOR,
1935–37; Chief, ONI, 1937–38; COM Destroyer Flotilla 1, BATFOR, 1939; desrons,
BATFOR, 1939–40. General Board, 1940–41; COM 11th Naval District, 1941–42.
Retired as a rear admiral, 1942. Navy Department Liaison Officer, National Defense
Research Committee, 1943–45
Horne, Frederick J. (USNA, 1899) served primarily afloat, through World War I,
earning a Navy Cross. NWC and Army War College, 1923–24. Qualified as an
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aviator in 1926, and served as commander of Saratoga; COM Aircraft, Scouting
Force, Battle Force; Assistant CNO, and later Vice CNO, 1941–45. Retired as an
admiral in 1946. A forward thinker who deserves a biography.
Hughes, Charles F. (USNA 1888). Manila Bay, 1898. Had extensive technical experience, Bureau of Equipment, 1904–1906 & Board of Inspection and Survey,
1909–1911, between tours at sea; COM Birmingham (CL 2), 1911–12, helped conduct the Navy’s first experiments with shipboard aircraft. C/S, Atlantic Fleet,
1913–14, Vera Cruz operation; General Board, 1914–16; COM New York (BB 34),
1916–18, in the British Grand Fleet; COM BATRON 2, 1920–21; President, NWC.
COM Battle Fleet, 1925–26; CINCUS, 1926–27; CNO, 1927–30.24
Irwin, Noble E. (USNA, 1891). Wounded at Manila Bay while in Baltimore (C 3).
Later held various staff and line assignments. Director of Naval Aviation during
World War I; COM Oklahoma (BB 37); DESRONSSCOFLT; Chief of the Naval Mission to Brazil, 1927–31; COM 15th Naval District, 1931–33; retired.
Jackson, Edward S. (USNA, 1900). Protected cruiser Atlanta, 1902–1903; BuOrd,
1916–17; Commander, Tacoma (CL 20), 1919; wings, 1926; COM Langley (CV 1),
1925–26; Lakehurst Naval Air Station, 1926–27; New York (BB 34), 1930–31; General Board, 1931–32.
Jackson, Richard H. (USNA, 1887). Screw sloop Trenton, decorated for the Samoa
typhoon of 1889; Yangtze gunboat commands; Spanish-American War, married
Admiral Sampson’s daughter. COM Virginia (BB 13), 1916. World War I, on Admiral Sims’ staff, then with the French Ministry of Marine. Assistant CNO, 1922–23;
COMBATFLT, 1926–27; General Board, 1927–30. Retired to live in Pearl City, Oahu.
In December 1941, wrote a report on the Japanese attack for CINCUS. Died in 1974,
at the age of 105, the longest-lived USNA alumnus.
Kalbfus, Edward C. “Dutch” (USNA, 1899), in Oregon (BB 3) as a cadet during
the Spanish-American War; Cincinnati (C 7); USNA, 1904–1906; Kansas (BB 21),
1907–1910; Great White Fleet; BuNav, 1910–13; Arkansas (BB 33), Wyoming (BB
32), 1913–15; COM, transport Pocahontas, 1917–18, Navy Cross; COM Iowa (BB 4),
1918–19; Trenton (CL 11), 1924–26; NWC student, 1926–27; COM California (BB
44), 1929–30. COM, Battleships, BATFOR, 1931–34 and 1936–38, and BATFOR,
1938–39; President, Naval War College, 1934–36 and 1939–42, when he retired. Remained on the General Board until 1946. Member, Naval Court of Inquiry into the
Pearl Harbor attack, with Adolphus Andrews and third officer, 1944; Director of
Naval History, 1944–45; Member, American Battle Monuments Commission,
1947–52. Co-author of A Review of the Naval History of the Eighteenth Century
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1941). An important officer in need of a
biography.
Keith, Robert Taylor Scott (USNA, 1928), in Utah (BB 31), 1928–30, and other
ships almost continuously until 1941. Instructor, USNA, 1941–43. COM Nicholas
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(DD 449) 1943–45; DESDIVS 17, then 32, 1945–46; Missouri (BB 63), 1954. Assistant CNO, 1959–61; COM, First Fleet, 1962–63. Retired as a vice admiral, 1964.
Kempff, Clarence S. (USNA 1897—with Leahy, Hart, and Yarnell), Oregon (BB 3)
in 1898; research ship Albatross, 1902; ADC to his father, Rear Admiral Louis
Kempff; Raleigh (C 8), 1906. COM Jupiter (AC 3), 1916–17; transport Aeolus
(Norddeutscher Lloyd liner Grosser Kurfürst), 1917–18, earning a Navy Cross. Acting COM, Norfolk Navy Yard, 1925; COM Nevada (BB 36), 1926–27; Hydrographer
of the Navy, 1927–30; US Delegate, SOLAS Convention, 1929; COM Battleships,
BATFOR, 1936. Retired 1938.
Kimmel, Husband (USNA, 1904), Great White Fleet; wounded at Vera Cruz,
1914; ADC to Assistant SecNav Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1915–16. Gunnery specialist,
World War I served with the 6th Battle Squadron and as a technical advisor to the
Royal Navy. Generally a progressive officer, rose rapidly during the interwar period,
commanding desdivs twice, a desron, New York (BB 34), CRUDIV 7, then
CRUBATFOR. In February of 1941 FDR jumped him over numerous other officers
to make him CINCUS. Kimmel instituted a number of notable reforms, particularly in fleet organization, but failed to recognize the possibility of a Japanese threat
to Pearl Harbor. Although he undertook some excellent measures after the attack on
December 7, 1941, he was removed from command on the 17th. Kimmel saw no
further active duty. His Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Regnery, 1955), attempts
to justify his actions prior to December of 1941 by placing the blame elsewhere, but
is highly inaccurate and at times mendacious.
King, Ernest J. (USNA, 1901). Arguably needs no profile, but it’s worth noting
that he served as chief engineer of New Hampshire (BB 25), for a time edited Proceedings, commanded Terry (DD 25) and Cassin (DD 43), was Chairman, Postgraduate Department, USNA, 1919–21, served on the Pye-Knox-King board reviewing
naval professional education, 1921. Submarine School, 1922; COM SUBDIV 1,
1923–26, directed salvage of S-51 (SS 162) in 1926 and S-4 (SS 109) in 1928. Won his
wings, 1927; COM Lexington (CV 2) 1930–32; COM Aircraft Scouting Force,
1936–37; COM Aircraft Battle Force, 1938–39, playing an important role in air operations during various fleet problems. As Chief, BuAer (1933–36), clashed several
times with CNO William H. Standley. COM Atlantic Fleet, 1941, then
CINCUS/COMINCH, and CNO. Left a pedestrian memoir, Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W.W. Norton,
1952).25
Krueger, Walter. Born in Germany, came to the United States at 8. Enlisted service
in the Army, the Spanish-American and the Philippine Wars, commissioned in
1901. Mexican Border service, 1916, staff duty during World War I, rising to C/S of
the Tank Corps, then occupation duty in Germany. Later attended the Army War
College, taught at the Infantry School, commanded an infantry regiment; the War
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Plans Division, 1922–25; attended the Naval War College, 1926, and taught there,
1928–32. In the 1930s commanded an infantry regiment, again served in the War
Plans Division, becoming Chief in 1936. Rose rapidly in the late 1930s, becoming a
major general by 1939. Commanded the Sixth Army in the southwest Pacific,
1943–45, conducting numerous amphibious landings, and later commanded occupation troops in Japan until retiring in 1946; Douglas MacArthur apart, Krueger
was the only pre-1939 American general to command troops in combat during
World War II. Author of From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the 6th Army in
World War II (Lawrence, Ks.: Zenger, 1979).26
Laning, Harris (USNA, 1895), “one of the most progressive of the interwar U.S.
naval leaders.” Philippine War; held various assignments ashore and afloat; Gold
Medal as Captain of the U.S. Olympic rifle team, 1912; COM Cassin (DD 43), 1914,
during the Vera Cruz operation. C/S to Commander Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet
by 1919, and supported the NC-4 transatlantic flight. Head of the Tactics Department, NWC. 1922–24, introducing systematic documentation of the games and
conducted the first wargames involving aircraft, later testifying to the General
Board that “aircraft can exert a decisive influence in all stages of a campaign.”27
COM Pennsylvania (BB 38), then a BATDIV. President, NWC (1930–33), formulated rules for the fleet problems and took part as an umpire. COMCRUSCOFOR,
COMBATFOR (1935–36), and then held a variety of shore assignments. Retired in
1937, to become Governor of the Philadelphia Naval Home until his death in 1941.
Author of a lively memoir, An Admiral’s Yarn, edited by Mark Russell Shulman et al.
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1999), he stands in need of a biography.28
Leahy, William D. (USNA, 1897), Spanish-American War, then a varied career
ashore and afloat, with a special interest in gunnery, serving as Director of Gunnery
Exercises, 1918–19, commanded a battleship, 1926–27, was head of BuOrd,
1927–31, then held a series of operational commands, culminating in
COMBATFOR, 1936–37, before becoming CNO, 1937–39, when he retired. Reforming Governor of Puerto Rico, 1939–40; Ambassador to Vichy France, 1940 until recalled to active duty in July 1942, to serve as President Roosevelt’s personal
chief-of-staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He was the first American officer
promoted to five stars.29
Leigh, Richard Henry (USNA, 1891), Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, and Boxer Rebellion; COM Galveston (C 17), 1913–15; Assistant Chief,
BuNav 1917–18; ASW Officer and later C/S to Admiral Sims in Europe, 1918–19.
COM Tennessee (BB 43), 1919–20; Assistant Chief, BuOrd, 1922–23; C/S Battle
Fleet, in the mid-20s; Chief, BuNav, 1930–31; COMBATFOR, 1931–32; CINCUS,
1932–33. Retired for disability in 1934, after serving as a delegate to the Second London Disarmament Conference.
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Lewis, Edward M. (USMA, 1886—with Pershing) served on the frontier, taught
tactics in several university cadet corps, served in the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars, took part in the Vera Cruz operation in 1914; commanded a provisional
division on the Mexican border, 1916. During World War I commanded various
brigades, then the 30th Division from mid-1918 to early 1919. After the war he held
several divisional and corps area commands, culminating in the Hawaiian Division,
1925–27, after which he retired.30
MacArthur, Arthur, III (USNA, 1896—a classmate of Leahy, Hart, and Standley),
elder brother of Douglas, served in the gunboat Vixen (PY 4) at the Battle of Santiago; Philippine Insurrection, Boxer Rebellion. COM Grampus (SS 4), 1902, later a
submarine division. ADC, Superintendent, USNA, 1906–1909, and later duty in
Louisiana (BB 19), COM McCall (DD 28), General Board, 1912–15. In 1915–18,
COM San Francisco (C 5), South Dakota (ACR 9), and Chattanooga (C 16), earning
a Navy Cross on convoy duty. Postwar, commanded San Diego Training Center,
1919–21, Henderson (AP 1), 1921–23. Died of appendicitis in December 1923 while
serving in BuNav.
MacFall, Roscoe C. (USNA, 1905). Bureau of Yards, 1913–14; Colorado (ACR 7),
1914–15; Pittsburgh (CA 4), 1916–17. At the NWC, 1922–23, devised the circular
cruising formation championed by classmate Nimitz. Later, Third Naval District,
1936; BuNav, 1937; Director, Fleet Training Division, 1938. Retired 1940 as a captain. Recalled, 1940–43, assigned to operation of the Port of New York, established
links to organized crime later useful during operations in Sicily.31
McCrary, Frank R. (USNA, 1901). Gunboat Don Juan de Austria, 1902–1903; Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, 1908–1909; Staff, COM Atlantic Fleet, 1913; assigned to Director, Naval Aviation, 1915; NAS Lakehurst, 1916–17; COM DN-1,
1917, the Navy’s first airship; Assistant Director, Naval Aviation, 1917–19; COM
Shenandoah (ZR 1), 1923–24; NAS San Diego, 1928–29; Saratoga, 1930–32, during
which he apparently rivaled King as an aggressive commander; NAS Alameda, 1940.
Retired as a captain.32
McCully, Newton A. (USNA,1887), assistant naval attaché at Port Arthur during
the Russo–Japanese War (1904); Great White Fleet, 1907–1909; naval attaché in
Petrograd during World War I; commanded U.S. naval forces in North Russia
(1918–19); State Department special agent assigned to the anti-Bolshevik governments of General A. I. Denikin and Baron Peter Wrangel in South Russia (1920).
COMSCOFLEET, 1923–24, retired in 1931.
McDonald, John D. (USNA, 1884), numerous line assignments; NWC; COM Virginia (BB 13), 1911–13; C/S, Atlantic Fleet, 1915–16; COM Arizona (BB 39),
1916–18; COM Battle Force, Atlantic Fleet, 1921–22; COMSCOFLEET, 1922–23;
COM 14th Naval District, 1923–27, when he retired.33
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McKean, Josiah S. (USNA, 1884), commissioned as an engineer, served in the
Spanish-American War, transferred to the line in 1899. NWC, held various of assignments in surface ships; COM Arizona (BB 39), 1918; Duty, HQ Navy, 1919.
COM BATDIV 7, 1921–23; SCOFLT, 1924–26; 11th Naval District, 1926–28, after
which he retired.
McNamee, Luke (USNA, 1892), Spanish-American War; COM Sacramento (PG
19), 1914–15; C/S PACFLEET, 1917–18; staff, Admiral Sims in Europe, 1918; NWC,
1918–19; COM Nevada (BB 36), 1920–21; Director of Naval Intelligence, 1921–23;
COMDESRONS, BATFOR, 1927–28, Battleships, BATFOR, 1931–32, BATFOR,
1932–33. President, NWC, 1933–34, before retiring.
Martin, Charles H. (USMA, 1887) served on the frontier, in the Philippines,
China Relief Expedition, and in various staff and line assignments; Mexican Border,
1915–17. Major general during World War I, commanded several divisions and a
corps in France, but not in combat. Later Assistant C/S of the Army; COM Panama
Department, 1925–27. Retiring, he represented Oregon in Congress and was later
governor.34
Metcalf, Martin Kellogg (USNA, 1903). COM Hull (DD 7), 1909–1910, then Lawrence (DD 8), 1910; instructor, USNA, 1910–12; COM 1st Division, Pacific Torpedo
Flotilla, 1912–15, then O’Brien (DD 60), 1918, Ludlow (DD 112), 1918–19, earning
a Navy Cross, transport Patricia, 1919. XO, Florida (BB 30), 1919–20; Secretary,
General Board, 1921–22. Subsequently served in submarines, then COM Chester
(CA 27), 1933–34; Director, Convoy and Routing, Tenth Fleet, 1942–45. Very
anglophobic, which often caused problems when dealing with British officers. Retired as a rear admiral. His wife, Louise Menefee Metcalf, was a prominent authority
on Siamese cats.35
Mitscher, Marc Andrew (USNA, 1910), pioneer naval aviator and important advocate of naval aviation. Began his career in surface warships, earning his wings in
1916. NC-4 trans-Atlantic flight in 1919. Numerous assignments in the interwar period, culminating in Assistant Chief, BuAer. COM Hornet (CV 8) in 1941, Tokyo
Raid and Midway. COM Fleet Air, Solomon Islands, 1943, and CARDIV 3, in January 1944. COM “Fast Carrier Task Force” (TF 58/38), 1944–45, during the Philippine Sea, Leyte, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa Campaigns. After the war, Commander,
Eighth and then Atlantic Fleet until his death in 1947.
Moffett, William A. (USNA, 1898), the “Father of Naval Aviation,” served at Manila Bay; COM Chester (CS 1), 1913–14, earned a Medal of Honor at Vera Cruz in
1914. COM Great Lakes Naval Training Center, 9th, 10th, and 11th Naval Districts
in succession, 1914–18. COM Mississippi (BB 41), 1919–21. Qualified as an Aviation
Observer, 1921, was successively Director of Naval Aviation and Chief, BuAer from
1921 until his death when the airship Akron (ZRS 4) went down in a storm off New
Jersey in 1933.36

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:48 AM

343

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

344

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Nimitz, Chester W. (USNA, 1905), a pioneer submariner, rose to command the
Atlantic Fleet submarine flotilla by 1912. World War I, C/S to COM Atlantic Fleet
submarines. NWC, served on various staffs, and rose steadily upward. By Pearl Harbor chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and became commander of the Pacific Fleet.
During World War II, Nimitz oversaw all U.S. operations in the Pacific outside of
the Southwest Pacific. Promoted to Fleet Admiral, after the war he was CNO until
his retirement in late 1947. Later special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy; director of the UN plebiscite in Kashmir. A technical innovator, he introduced the diesel
engine into the U.S. Navy, helped develop underway refueling by the broadside
method, and championed the introduction of Roscoe C. MacFall’s circular cruising
pattern to the fleet.37
Nulton, Louis McCoy (USNA, 1889), commissioned as an engineer, transferred
to the line in 1899. Active duty in the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars, in the
Boxer Rebellion, and at Vera Cruz, mostly afloat, but also played an important role
in promoting the adoption of the gyro-compass by the Navy. Three tours at USNA;
instructor (1905–1907), Commandant of Midshipmen (1918), Superintendent
(1925–29). Commanded several cruisers 1913–15; Pennsylvania (BB 38), 1918–20;
BATDIV 3, 1922–23; BATDIVS, BATFLEET, 1928–29; COMBATFLEET, 1930–31.
Pratt, William Veazie (USNA, 1889) had a long and varied career before serving
on Admiral Sims’ staff, 1913–15, becoming one of the “Band of Brothers” advocating change. Assistant CNO, 1917–19, COM New York (BB 34), 1919–22; COM
BATDIV 4, 1923–25; President, NWC, 1925–27; COMBATFLT, 1928–29; CINCUS,
1929–30; CNO, 1930–33, after which he retired. Recalled to active duty as an admiral, January–June 1941, as an advisor on anti-submarine and convoy operations, became a leading advocate of the escort aircraft carrier and blimps. Although a
staunch “Big Gun” sailor, Pratt was open to new ideas and supported aviation. He
was not well liked in the fleet, as many senior officers believed he had “sold out” the
Navy at the 1930 London Naval Arms Limitation Conference and over Hoover administration budget cuts; when Pratt assumed the post of CNO, outgoing Admiral
Charles F. Hughes refused to shake his hand.38
Pye, William Satterlee (USNA, 1901) had a varied career in destroyers, minelayers, naval education (a member of the Pye–Knox–King board in 1921), and battleships, was a pioneer thinker in joint operations, served for a time as Director of War
Plans, was COM Battleships, Battle Force, 1940–41; COMBATFOR, 1941–42. As
second-in-command to CINCUS, after Pearl Harbor, he was Acting CinCPAC in
the interval between the relief of Kimmel on December 17th and the arrival of
Nimitz on the 31st. President NWC, 1942–45, the last year as a retired admiral on
active duty.
Reeves, Joseph Mason (USNA, 1894) invented the football helmet while at the
academy. Served in cruisers and destroyers, and had a tour as an instructor at the
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Naval Academy, rising to fleet gunnery officer by 1912. COM collier Jupiter (AC 3),
St. Louis (C 20), Oregon (BB 3), 1913–16; Maine (BB 10), 1918, earning a Navy
Cross. NWC, 1923–24; earned “Flight Observer” status and became a major proponent of aviation. He served as COMAIR to the Battle Force for many years, and later
became CINCUS, 1934–36. Retired by 1941, was recalled to active duty during
World War II, and with William H. Standley was one of the two Naval representatives on the “Roberts Commission” investigating Pearl Harbor. A driving innovator,
Reeves was not well liked by many aviators, who often felt his ideas entailed unnecessary risk.39
Richardson, James O. (USNA, 1902) served variously in line and staff positions, to
become Assistant Chief, BurOrd, 1924–27, later commanded a destroyer division,
served in BuNav, commanded Augusta (CA 31), 1931–33, attended NWC, 1933–34,
and over the next three years was DON Budget Officer, COMCRUSCOUTFOR, C/S
to CINCUS, COMDESRONSSCOUTFOR, Assistant CNO, Chief, BuNav, and then
COMBATFOR, 1937–39. Appointed CINCUS, January 1940, he was relieved in February 1941, by his claim for opposition to President Roosevelt’s policies. Despite this
alleged presidential hostility, although officially retired as a full admiral in October
1942, he remained on active service until May 1946, serving in a variety of administrative posts; he was postwar a member of the armed services reorganization board
that ultimately resulted in the creation of the Department of Defense. His On the
Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, U.S.N. (Ret.),
as told to George C. Dyer (Washington: Naval History Division, 1973) is of considerable value, if contentious and contradictory.40
Robison, Samuel S. (USNA, 1888). Spanish-American War; COM Cincinnati
(C 7), 1911–12; Assistant Chief, Bureau of Steam Engineering, 1913–15; COM,
South Carolina (BB 26), 1915–17; COM Submarine Forces, Atlantic Fleet, 1917–18;
Military Governor of Santo Domingo, 1921–22; Member, Navy General Board,
1923; COMBATFLEET, 1923–25; CINCUS, 1925–26; Superintendent, USNA,
1928–31. Co-author with his wife Mary L. Robison of A History of Naval Tactics
from 1530–1930: The Evolution of Tactical Maxims (Annapolis: The United States
Naval Institute, 1942); the first American text on naval tactics in some 60 years, it
curiously makes no mention of the fleet problems.
Rochefort, Joseph J. (Stevens Institute, 1921) enlisted in the Navy, 1918, later commissioned, and volunteered for intelligence duties. During the 1920s and 1930
served in line or intelligence posts in the fleet and ashore, while acquiring increasing
skill at code breaking, communications intelligence, and Japanese, for which he attended Harvard. Chief of HYPO Station, the code-breaking node in Hawaii from
early 1941, he played an important role with Thomas Dyer in breaking the Imperial
Navy’s JN-25 code, facilitating the victories at Coral Sea and Midway. His career
thereafter suffered from personality clashes and bureaucratic infighting, and he was
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eventually relieved of code breaking duties, ending the war in an innocuous post.
He retired in 1953 as a captain.
Safford, Laurence F. (USNA, 1916). Sea duty during and following World War I,
rising to command of a minesweeper. In 1924 assigned a leadership role in the Code
& Signal Section of the Office of Naval Communications. Over the following years
recruited numerous talented personnel, helping to break several Japanese codes
while developing cryptanalytic techniques and tools. Following the successful work
of Joseph J. Rochefort during the spring of 1942, however, Safford ran afoul of internal navy politics and was sidelined to minor assignments. Retired as a captain in
1953.
Schofield, Frank H. (USNA 1890) served in the Spanish-American War, and in a
succession of cruisers and battleships, plus some tours with the Bureau of
Ordnance. COM Chester (CS 1), 1914–15; senior member of the CNO’s Submarine
Warfare Board, 1915–17; chairman, the “Schofield Board” conducting
oceanographic research; author of “Naval Strategy and Tactics with Special
Reference to Seacoast Fortifications,” 1923; COMDESRONS, BATFLEET, 1925–26;
COMBATFLEET, 1927–28; CINCUS, 1931–32, when he retired.
Sellers, David Foote (USNA, 1894) had by 1918 served variously in line and staff,
attended the NWC, and earned the Navy Cross commanding a transport. Was later
on the staff of the NWC, commanded successively Maryland (BB 46), the Special
Service Squadron, a battleship division, the Battleships, BATFOR, before serving as
CINCUS, 1933–34, and Superintendent, USNA, until he retired in 1938.41
Senn, Thomas J. (USNA, 1891) Deputy Chief, and for a time Acting Chief, Bureau of Navigation, 1916–18. First commander, West Virginia (BB 48), 1923–24.
Promoted rear admiral in 1924, he was Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force,
1928–30; COM 11th Naval District, 1930–33, and retired in 1936.
Sims, William S. (USNA, 1880) served afloat almost continuously until 1897. Naval attaché in Europe, by 1902 he became acquainted with Sir Percy Scott, and advocated the latter’s approach to gunnery accuracy, with a special brief from Theodore
Roosevelt as Inspector of Target Practice. President, NWC on the eve of World War
I, became Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. He was an early advocate of
convoys to protect merchant shipping from submarines. After the war he returned
as President NWC (1919–22), where he championed the airplane as an instrument
of naval warfare, “infecting” such officers as Reeves and Laning with his enthusiasm.
His memoir of service in World War I, The Victory at Sea (Garden City: Doubleday,
1920), won the Pulitzer Prize in history.42
Snyder, Charles P. (USNA, 1900) served largely in surface ships, but was Commandant of Midshipmen, 1928–31, held several staff and administrative assignments, including President, NWC, 1937–39. Commander, Battleships, then
BATFOR, 1939–40. Then served in a variety of administrative and technical posts,
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and became Inspector General of the Navy in 1942, remaining in the assignment
when he retired in 1943; left active duty in 1947.
Spaatz, Carl “Tooey” (USMA, 1914), one of the Army’s pioneer aviators, flying
during the Mexican Expedition of 1916 and in France in 1918. Conducted experiments with aerial refueling during the 1920s, while alternating between line, staff,
and school assignments. During World War II rose to command U.S. Strategic Air
Forces in Europe, and later in the Pacific. He became the first C/S of the Air Force in
1946.43
Spruance, Raymond A. (USNA, 1906). Before World War I had served afloat in
five different ships, cruised with the Great White Fleet, and studied electrical engineering. Engineering staff, during construction of Pennsylvania (BB 38) and until
1917 her Chief Electrical Engineer. Shortly after World War I commissioned the
new destroyer Aaron Ward (DD 132), the first of four destroyers he would command in the interwar period, while also serving on various staffs and as an instructor in Navy schools; attended the NWC; COM Mississippi (BB 41). After Pearl
Harbor COM CRUDIV 5, under Halsey, whom he replaced as task force commander, doing well at Midway, and later COM Fifth Fleet. Although not an aviator,
Spruance proved a capable commander of carrier task forces. Postwar, was President, NWC.44
Standley, William Harrison (USNA, 1895) served in the Spanish-American War
and World War I. Director of War Plans (1923–26), Assistant CNO (1928–30),
COMCRUSCOFOR (1932–33), CNO (1933–35), retiring in 1937. Recalled to active
duty during World War II, with Reeves was one of the two Naval representatives on
the “Roberts Commission” investigating Pearl Harbor, and later served with the
OSS. Extremely important in the development of the fleet train, he was not an enthusiast for naval aviation, and clashed often over policy with aviators, notably Ernest J. King, when the latter was Chief, BuAer.45
Swanson, Claude Augustus (Randolph-Macon College, 1885), a Virginia attorney, served in the House of Representatives, 1893–1907, as Governor of Virginia,
1907–10, and in the Senate, 1910–33, for most of the time as the ranking Democrat
on the Naval Affairs Committee. SecNav, 1933 until his death in 1939. Ill health and
a very navy-minded president limited Swanson’s role as Secretary.46
Tarrant, William T. (USNA, 1898). Spanish-American War and Philippine Wars,
Boxer Rebellion, and World War I. Then held various staff assignments, and was
later COM Arizona (BB 39), 1927–28. Promoted rear admiral 1930, C/S to CINCUS,
1930–32, COMCRUDIV 4, 1932–33, COMSCOFOR, 1936–38, and retired as a vice
admiral in 1942.
Taylor, Montgomery Meigs (USNA, 1890) served at Manila Bay in 1898, held various line and staff positions, 1900–1915, including command of a destroyer and a
torpedo boat flotilla, 1903–06, and auxiliary cruiser Buffalo, 1913–15. Attended
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NWC, 1915–16; COM Maine (BB 10), Florida (BB 30) 1916–19; COM Control
Force, 1923–25; COMSCOFLEET, 1926–27; Director of War Plans and of Fleet
Training, retiring in 1936.47
Theobald, Robert A. (USNA, 1907), Great White Fleet; commanded a destroyer,
1915–16, gunnery officer in New York (BB 34) during World War I, successively
commanded two destroyers during the early 1920s. NWC, and then on staffs until
1937, when he commanded Nevada (BB 36). C/S to CINCUS, 1939–40. Rear Admiral, 1940, commanded a CRUDIV and then a destroyer flotilla, before becoming
Commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, 1940–43. COM 1st Naval District, 1943–45,
when he retired.
Towers, John H. (USNA, 1906), a critical player in the development of naval aviation, began his career in battleships. Became Naval Aviator No. 3 in 1911. Thereafter
he served primarily in aviation. Commanded the first operationally deployed aviation unit, Vera Cruz, 1914; naval attaché for air in London, 1915–16; command,
NC-4 trans-Atlantic flight, though he did not complete the mission. After two tours
in destroyers, one as XO and one as commander, he spent most of the 1920s and
1930s commanding a succession of naval air stations and aircraft tenders, did another tour as an attaché, and commanded Saratoga, alternating with service on various staffs. Assistant, then Chief of BuAer, 1939–42, when he became Commander,
Air Force, Pacific Fleet, a post he held until the last weeks of the war. He retired in
1947.48
Turner, Richmond Kelly (USNA, 1908) served variously ashore and afloat, commanded two destroyers, and attained some distinction as an ordnance specialist, before qualifying as a naval aviator in 1927. He held various aviation assignments,
including command of a seaplane tender and Air Squadrons, Asiatic Fleet, and then
attended NWC. In 1938, as a career move, he took command of a heavy cruiser and
never returned to aviation, serving thereafter as Director of War Plans, and later as
the Navy’s premier master of amphibious operations during World War II.49
Wells, Briant Harris (USMA, 1894) served in the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars, on various staffs, including the Allied Supreme War Council, 1918–19.
After World War I was a member of the Joint Army & Navy Planning Committee,
Assistant Army Chief of Staff for War Plans, Commandant of the Infantry School,
Assistant Army C/S for Supply, Deputy Army C/S, 1927–30. Commanding General,
Hawaiian Division/Department, 1930–35, when he retired to become the Secretary
of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association.
White, Richard Drace (USNA, 1899). Early duty in battleships; Assistant Inspector of Target Practice, 1908; ONI, 1912–15, as attaché in Rome; XO, Seattle (CA 11),
1917; COM transport Orizaba (AP 24), 1918, inventing a depth charge–throwing
device, one of several inventions for which he held patents; COM Prometheus
(AR 3), 1920. Captain, Whitney (AD 4), 1924–26; attaché to France, Spain, and
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Portugal, 1927–28, Captain, Detroit (CL 8), 1928–29. Supervisor of New York Harbor, 1930, becoming an advocate of pollution control, testifying before Congress in
1934. Retired as a rear admiral and entered industry.
Wiley, Henry A. (USNA, 1888) served in the Spanish-American War, in the Coast
Survey, and as an instructor at USNA. COM Wyoming (BB 32) in the Grand Fleet,
1917–19; COM Battleships, BATFLT, 1923–25; Chairman of the General Board,
1925–27; CINCUS, 1927–29, when he retired. In 1938 named the first
Commissioner of Training for the U.S. Maritime Commission, serving until 1940;
generally considered the “Father of the Merchant Marine Academy.” His
autobiography, An Admiral From Texas (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1934), is
interesting and at times amusing.
Willard, Arthur L. (USNA, 1891) served in the Spanish-American War (allegedly
raising the first American flag in Cuba); Maine (BB 10), 1903–1906; Naval Gun Factory, 1910; COM Washington Navy Yard, 1917–18; COM Idaho (BB 42), 1919; Rear
Admiral, 1924. COM, Washington Navy Yard, 1927–30; COMSCOFOR, 1931–32;
COM 5th Naval District, 1932–35, when he retired.
Wilson, Eugene E. (USNA, 1908) was C/S, AIRONS, Battle Fleet, 1927–29, under
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, before resigning to begin a highly successful career
in the aviation industry. His memoirs, Slipstream: The Autobiography of an Aircraftsman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950) and The Gift of Foresight (New York: Columbia University Oral History Research Office, 1964), are of some value.
Yarnell, Harry (USNA, 1897), in Oregon (BB 3) during the Spanish-American
War, went on to a varied career, surface ships and then submarines, before earning
his wings as a captain in 1922. Thereafter held various aviation-related assignments;
first captain of Saratoga (CV 3), which he commanded with notable effect during
Fleet Problem IX (1929). Later Chief of the Bureau of Engineering, and still later
COM Asiatic Fleet (1936–39), he retired in 1939, but returned to active duty,
1941–44. A quiet man, Yarnell “seldom raised his voice” but “could be hard as steel,”
and deserves a proper biography.50
Zogbaum, Rufus Fairchild (USNA, 1901, a classmate of King) served largely in
destroyers and battleships, but early became connected with aviation; supervised
construction of the platform aboard Pennsylvania (ACR 4) on which Eugene Ely
made the first airplane landing on a ship, 1911. During World War I was an enthusiastic supporter of destroyers and convoys as a solution to the submarine problem. He
then performed diplomatic missions in the Adriatic and Aegean, and took flight
training as a 49-year-old captain in 1928. COM Wright (AV 1), 1930–31, then
Saratoga (CV 3), Dec. 31,1932 – Jun. 12, 1934. Retired 1936 as a rear admiral, ostensibly for reasons of health, though he survived for another 25 years. His memoirs,
From Sail to Saratoga: A Naval Autobiography (Grottaferrato, Rome: Italo-Orientale,
[1961?]), are interesting and often lively, but were written from memory, and are thus
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not always reliable. He was the son of the noted artist and journalist Rufus Fairchild
Zogbaum, and the father of the modernist artist and photographer Wilfred
Zogbaum. A forgotten pioneer of naval aviation.

N O T E S 1 Clark G. Reynolds, Famous American Admirals
(New York: Van Nostrand, 1978/Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002); E. Manning Ancell and
Christine M. Miller, Biographical Dictionary of
World War II Generals and Flag Officers
(Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1996).
2 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 100, 122,
205–206, 222ff.
3 Paolo E. Coletta, Patrick N. L. Bellinger and U.S.
Naval Aviation (Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America, 1987).
4 See occasional comments in Richardson, notably
p. 467. On his personality, see Urwin, Facing
Fearful Odds, pp. 111, 133, 209, and email December 4, 2002; hostility to aviation, Reynolds,
John H. Towers, p. 272.
5 “Admiral Brumby Dies,” New York Times, Jul. 17,
1950.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

6 “Little Stinker,” Time, Apr. 20, 1942; Morison,
Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 290–91.
7 Reynolds, On the Warpath; Reynolds, Famous,
pp. 74–75.
8 Peter Maas, The Terrible Hours: The Man Behind
the Greatest Submarine Rescue in History (New
York: Harper’s, 2000).
9 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Division, Who’s
Who in Marine Corps History, hqinet001.hqmc
.usmc.mil/HD/Historical/Whos_Who/Cole_EK
.htm.
10 Henry Blaine Davis, Jr., Generals in Khaki (Raleigh, N.C.: Pentland Press, 1998), pp. 81–82.
11 Lawrence H. Douglas, “Robert Edward Coontz,”
in The Chiefs of Naval Operations, edited by Robert William Love, Jr. (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1980), pp. 23–35; William B. Cogar,

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT

Dictionary of Admirals of the U.S. Navy, Vol. II,
1901–18 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991),
pp. 55–57; Reynolds, Famous, pp. 79–81.
12 Davis, Khaki, pp. 85–86.
13 Nimitz, “The Little-known Tale,” pp. 9–12; Potter, Nimitz, pp. 27–29.
14 Davis, Khaki, pp 112–14.
15 Richard W. Turk, “Edward Walter Eberle,” in
Love, Chiefs, pp. 37–46.
16 Davis, Khaki, pp. 118–19.
17 Lundstrom, Black Shoe; Stephen D. Reagan, In
Bitter Tempest: The Biography of Admiral Frank
Jack Fletcher (Ames: Iowa State University Press,
1994).
18 Gully could not be found in any Navy List
through 1931, nor in the published 1945 edition.
Even a National Archives research request (No.
RR1-37140841, Sep. 2, 2008) yielded nothing
about this officer.
19 E. P. Potter, Bull Halsey (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985).
20 James Leutze, A Different Kind of Victory: A Biography of Adm. Thomas C. Hart (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1981).
21 On the Hepburn Board, see Morison, Rising Sun,
pp. 32–34.
22 “John F. Hines,” New York Times, Oct. 21, 1941.
23 Davis, Khaki, p. 181.
24 William R. Braisted, “Charles Frederick Hughes,”
in Love, Chiefs, pp. 48–66; Reynolds, Famous, pp.
156–58.
25 Buell, Master; Reynolds, Famous, pp. 177–79; Levine, p. 74, n. 30.
26 Kevin C. Holzimmer, General Walter Krueger:
Unsung Hero of the Pacific War (Lawrence, Ks.:
University Press of Kansas, 2007).
27 Campbell, p. 95; Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers,
p. 33.
28 Laning was the father of Caleb Barrett Laning II
(USNA, 1929), who had a distinguished career in
destroyers during World War II, playing an important role in the development and installation
of Combat Information Centers in destroyers.
The younger Laning was promoted to rear admiral upon retirement in 1959. An early service advocate of space flight, he wrote, with Robert A.
Heinlein, “Flight into the Future,” Collier’s,
Aug. 30, 1947.
29 Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: The Life of
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1985); John Major, “William Daniel Leahy,” in Love, Chiefs, pp. 101–17; Reynolds,
Famous, pp. 188–90.
30 Davis, Khaki, pp. 228–29.
31 Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, White
Out: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press (New York:
Verso, 1998), pp. 199ff.
32 Kite Balloons to Airships: The Navy’s
Lighter-than-Air Experience (Washington: Naval
Air Systems Command, n.d.), pp. 3–4; Arthur W.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

Radford, “Aircraft Battle Force,” in Air Raid:
Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy, edited by Paul Stillwell (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1981), p. 18; “Naval Air Pioneer Dies, Capt.
Frank R. McCrary,” New York Times, Jun. 14,
1952.
33 Cogar, pp. 182–83.
34 Davis, Khaki, pp. 244–45.
35 On his anglophobia, see Patrick Beesly, A Very
Special Intelligence: The Admiralty’s Operational
Intelligence Centre, 1939–1945 (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2006), p. 110, and Lewis M. Andrews, Tempest, Fire, and Foe (Victoria, BC:
Trafford Publishing, 2004), p. 16.
36 Trimble, Arpee; Reynolds, Famous, pp. 221–23.
37 Potter, Nimitz; Reynolds, Famous, pp. 238–40.
38 Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt; also Gerald E. Wheeler, “William Veazie Pratt, U.S.
Navy,” Naval War College Review, May 1969, pp.
36–61. On opinions about him, Wheeler, Admiral, pp. 359–61; Levine, p. 5, and fn. 3; Felker,
Testing American Sea Power, p. 171, note 30. On
his views regarding naval arms limitation, see his
“Some Considerations Affecting Naval Policy,”
Proceedings, Nov. 1922, pp. 1845–62, and “The
Case for the Naval Treaty,” Current History, Apr.
1923, pp. 1–5.
39 Wildenberg, All the Factors of Victory; John D.
Hayes, “Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, USN
(1872–1948).”
40 Reynolds, Famous, pp. 276–77.
41 “U.S.S. Sellers DDG-11,”
navysite.de/dd/ddg11.htm.
42 Elting E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern
American Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1942).
43 David R. Mets, Master of Airpower: General Carl
A. Spaatz (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1988).
44 Buell, Quiet Warrior.
45 Wildenberg, “Preparing for War,” pp. 250–66;
Reynolds, Famous, pp. 320–31; Levine, p. 74,
n. 30.
46 Allison Saville, “Claude Augustus Swanson,” in
American Secretaries of the Navy, Vol. II,
1913–1972, edited by Paolo E. Coletta (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 654–67.
47 The admiral was the grandson of Bvt. Maj. Gen.
Montgomery C. Meigs, Union Quartermaster
General. There is no biography, but see
www.arlingtoncemetery.net/mtaylor.htm.
48 Reynolds, John H. Towers; Reynolds, Famous,
pp. 355–57.
49 George Carroll Dyer, The Amphibians Came to
Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly
Turner (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).
50 Radford, “Aircraft Battle Force,” p. 18, from
which the quotes are taken. For biographical information, Young, “The Real Architect of Pearl
Harbor”; Reynolds, Famous, pp. 389–91.

351

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archival Materials
“Commander-in-Chief, High Sea Fleet, July 23, 1918, Tactical Order No. 11, Aircraft
Division,” available online, www.gwpda.org/naval/gnto1100.htm, visited 14 July
2004.
Gully, Lt. Col. B. W., USMC, “A History of U.S. Fleet Landing Exercises: Taken from
the Files of the Atlantic Squadron” (3 July 1939), NWCA, Carton 57.
National Archives and Records Administration, Microfilm Series M964, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXI, 1923–1940 (Washington: National Archives and Records Service, 1975), 36 rolls, with descriptive handbook,
Timothy K. Nenninger, Pamphlet Describing M964, Records Relating to United
States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXI, 1923–1940.
Naval Historical Center, World War Two Command File, Box 270.
Naval War College Archives, Records Group 8, Intelligence and Technological Archives, Cartons 56–57, 60–66; Records Group 25, General Subjects.
Visit of the United States Fleet to New York, May 31 – June 17, 1934 (New York: New
York Public Library, 1934).
Government Documents and Official Publications
The AAF in Northwest Africa: An Account of the Twelfth Air Force in the Northwest African Landings and the Battle for Tunisia (Washington: Center for Air Force History, 1992).
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1922–1941 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1922–1941).
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States to 1970 (Washington:
Department of Commerce, 1976).
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1959–1991).
Furer, Julius, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington:
United States Navy, 1959).

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

354

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

General Services Administration, Federal Records of World War II, Vol. II, Military
Agencies (Washington: National Archives, 1951).
Grimes, James M., Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, 1911–1939, U.S. Naval Administrative Histories of World War II, Vol. 16 (Washington: United States Navy, n.d.).
Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans, Japanese Monograph
No. 97 (Washington: Office of the Chief, Military History, 1953).
“Navassa Island,” C.I.A. World Fact Book, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/bq.html.
“Report of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to Secretary of Navy, dated July 12, 1945,” in
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Reports, Findings, and Conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy
Court of Inquiry, with Endorsements (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1946).
“Statement of Admiral Robert E. Coontz, Chief of Naval Operations, February 18,
1921,” Naval Appropriations Bill for 1922, Hearing Before Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921).
“Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and
Japan, Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922,” in Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States: 1922, Vol. 1, pp. 247–66.
“Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare,” Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), Vol. I, pp. 267–70.
U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920).
Unpublished Research and Academic Papers
Atwater, William Felix, “United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations, 1898–1942” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1986).
Campbell, Mark Allen, “The Influence of Air Power Upon the Evolution of Battle
Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922–1941” (Master’s thesis, University of Massachusetts at Boston, 1992).
Cole, Bernard D., “The Interwar Forward Intervention Forces: The Asiatic Fleet, the
Banana Fleet, and the European Squadron: The Battlefleet Trains While the
Gunboats Fight,” paper read at the U.S. Navy Forward Presence Bicentennial
Symposium, June 21, 2001.
Costello, Daniel Joseph, “Planning for War: A History of the General Board of the
Navy, 1900–1914” (Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
1968).
Felker, Craig C., “Simulation and Sea Power: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems,
1923–1940” (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 2004).

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Goldman, Emily Oppenheimer, “The Washington Treaty System: Arms Racing and
Arms Control in the Inter-War Period” (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University,
1987).
Hone, Thomas C., “The Fleet That Didn’t Deploy: The U.S. Navy Battlefleet between the Wars” (Paper read at the U.S. Navy Forward Presence Bicentennial
Symposium, June 21, 2001).
Johnson, Alfred W., “The Naval Bombing Experiments off the Virginia Capes, June
and July 1921” (Naval Historical Center, 1959).
Keith, Francis Lovell, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution: An Analysis of
United States Fleet Problems, 1931–1934” (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 1974).
Kuehn, John Trost, “The Influence of Naval Arms Limitation on U.S. Naval Innovation During the Interwar Period, 1921–1937” (Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas State
University, 2007).
Leopold, Richard W., “Fleet Organization, 1919–1941” (Ms., Navy Department,
Washington, D.C., 1945).
Levine, Robert H., “The Politics of American Naval Rearmament, 1930–1938”
(Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1972).
Swartz, Peter M., Sea Changes: Transforming U.S. Navy Deployment Strategy,
1775–2002 (Alexandria, Va.: The CNA Corporation, unpublished draft, 2002).
Wadle, Ryan David, “Unites States Fleet Problems and the Development of Carrier
Aviation, 1929–1933” (Master’s thesis, Texas A&M University, 2005).
Walker, John C., “The Navy Department and the Campaign for Expanded Appropriations, 1933–1938” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maine at Orono, 1972).
Memoirs and Oral Reminiscences
Allen, George W., Sails to Atoms (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1975).
Coontz, Robert E., From the Mississippi to the Sea (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1930).
Coontz, Robert E., True Anecdotes of an Admiral (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1934).
Cunningham, Andrew Browne, A Sailor’s Odyssey (London: Hutchinson, 1951).
Hewitt, H. Kent, The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, ed. Evelyn M. Cherpak
(Newport: Naval War College Press, 2004).
Keith, Robert Taylor Scott, Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Robert Taylor Scott Keith,
U.S.N. (Ret.), interviewed by Paul Stillwell (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1990).
Kimmel, Husband, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Regnery, 1955).
King, Ernest J., and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1952).
Laning, Harris, An Admiral’s Yarn, ed. Mark Russell Shulman et al. (Newport: Naval
War College Press, 1999).

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

355

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

356

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Richardson, James O., On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral
James O. Richardson, U.S.N. (Ret.), as told to George C. Dyer (Washington: Naval
History Division, 1973).
Riley, Herbert D., Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, U.S.N. (Ret), interviewed by John T. Mason (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1972/1994).
Stirling, Yates, Sea Duty: Memoirs of a Fighting Admiral (New York: G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1939).
Wiley, Henry A., An Admiral from Texas (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1934).
Wilson, Eugene E., Slipstream: The Autobiography of an Aircraftsman (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1950).
Wilson, Eugene E., The Gift of Foresight (New York: Columbia University Oral History Research Office, 1964).
Zogbaum, Rufus Fairchild, From Sail to Saratoga: A Naval Autobiography
(Grottaferrato, Rome: Italo-Orientale, [1961?]).
Newspapers and News Magazines
Army Times.
Christian Science Monitor.
Guardian.
New York Times.
Saturday Evening Post.
Washington Post.
Time.
“2 Naval Fliers Die in Pacific War Game,” New York Times, May 9, 1937.
“4 Caribbean Bases Await Fleet War,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, May
5, 1934.
“7 French Islands Annexed by Japan,” New York Times, April 1, 1939.
“8 Navies Honored at Brilliant Ball,” New York Times, June 2, 1934.
“8 Snorkel Subs ‘Sink, Wreck’ War Game Fleet of 100 Ships,” Washington Post, November 9, 1948.
“14 New Warships Urged by Standley,” New York Times, April 4, 1936.
“48 Navy Planes Fly 3,000 Miles, Land at Canal,”Washington Post, January 12, 1939.
“60 ‘Enemy’ Planes Raid San Francisco,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 18, 1933.
“60 U.S. Warships Go to Maneuvers,” Washington Post, January 5, 1930.
“79 Ships Go Through Canal in 42 Hours In United States Battle Fleet Manoeuvres,”
New York Times, Oct. 25, 1934.
“100 Planes Concentrate to Defend Hawaii in Manoeuvres,” New York Times, May
16, 1928.
“102 Navy Vessels Open ‘30-Day War,’” New York Times, April 11, 1934.
“113 Naval Vessels to Leave Pacific,” New York Times, April 8, 1934.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

“130 U.S. Warships to Be Used in ‘War,’” New York Times, March 31, 1940.
“135 Ships Needed by Navy,” New York Times, January 28, 1933.
“156 Planes Will Accompany Fleet,” by Andrew R. Broome, New York Times, February 9, 1930.
“227 Planes to Fight in Caribbean ‘War,’” New York Times, March 22, 1931.
“500 Natives Dance for Fleet at Samoa,” New York Times, July 14, 1925.
“500 on the Lexington out with Tonsillitis,” New York Times, March 30, 1938.
“800 Officers Study Hawaii ‘War’ Data,” New York Times, May 2, 1925.
“800 Sailors of Fleet Hear Manning Preach, New York Times, May 12, 1930.
“2,000 Marines Nearing Puerto Rico Base,” New York Times, January 16, 1939.
“5,881 Men, 21 Ships in Our China Force,” New York Times, March 25, 1927.
“10,000 Sailors Land; Crowds Visit Fleet, New York Times, May 9, 1930.
“20,000 to Quit California,” New York Times, Apr. 3, 1934.
“44,000 Men Guard Canal from ‘Enemy,’” New York Times, January 23, 1929.
“50,000 Afloat See Fleet Sail Up Bay,” New York Times, June 1, 1934.
“300,000 See Arrival at Sydney,” New York Times, July 23, 1925.
“Action Off California in March,” by Charles M. Austin, New York Times, February
16, 1932.
“Adams Will Attend Assembly of Fleet,” Washington Post, January 4, 1931.
“Admiral Brumby Dies” New York Times, July 17, 1950.
“Admiral Sums Up Canal Manoeuvres,” New York Times, April 8, 1923.
“Admirals Play Their Game of War,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
March 13, 1932.
“Advance on Canal in Mimic War,” New York Times, March 5, 1927.
“Aerial War Game Reported on Way to Wider Effort,” Christian Science Monitor,
May 11, 1935.
“‘Aggressor’s’ Planes Win in Pacific Test,” New York Times, March 4, 1947.
“Air Assault Opens Hawaii War Game,” Washington Post, February 1, 1933.
“Aircraft and Ships Country’s Big Need,” by Vern Hinkley, New York Times, June 10,
1928.
“Airplanes Active in Canal ‘Defense,’” New York Times, March 10, 1927.
“Air and Sea Drive Besets Honolulu,” New York Times, April 25, 1937.
“Airship Building Will Come to Halt,” New York Times, February 14, 1935.
“Airship’s Value Defended,” New York Times, February 26, 1931.
“All Forces Plan War Games Near Norfolk Aug. 9–21,” Washington Post, July 27,
1948.
“All Navy ‘Games” Off for This Year,” by Leland C. Speers, New York Times,
January 1, 1941.
“Allies Permit the Navy to Use the Los Angeles in War Game,” New York Times, January 8, 1931.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

357

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

358

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

“America Urged to Reconsider Japan Question,” by Frederic William Wile, Christian
Science Monitor, December 1, 1924.
“American Fleet Had No War Aim, Japanese Admit,” Christian Science Monitor, July
3, 1925.
“American Fleet Maneuvers,” by Hector C. Bywater, Washington Post, January 5,
1925.
“American Fleet to Add to Gayety of Puerto Rico Carnival,” by Diana Rice, New York
Times, January 29, 1939.
“American Fleets Fight ‘Deadly’ Battle,” New York Times, March 16, 1930.
“Army and Navy Map Record War Games,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 25, 1940.
“Army and Navy War Games Date Advanced,” Washington Post, June 6, 1926.
“Army-Navy War Game to Have Huge Air Force,” Washington Post, November 14,
1926.
“Army ‘Defending’ City Rehearses War Game,” New York Times, June 10, 1928.
“Army Quits War Game With Navy; Landing Exercise ‘Not Worth Cost,’” New York
Times.
“Army Seeks Funds for Joint War Game,” Washington Post, December 11, 1926.
“Army Vies with Navy in Recess Junketing,” Christian Science Monitor, March 6,
1923.
“Artillery Assigned to War Game Duties,” New York Times, June 3, 1928.
“Atlantic Fleet to Open Maneuvers Next Week,”New York Times, October 25, 1947.
“Atlantic Naval Unit Ends it War Game,” New York Times, February 8, 1939.
“Atlantic Squadron Off,” New York Times, March 15, 1939.
“Atlantic War Games to Start this Week,” New York Times, October 27, 1947.
“‘Attackers’ Subdue Oahu in War Games,” New York Times, May 18, 1928.
“Attacks Canal in War Game,” New York Times, March 4, 1927.
“Aviation Triumphant in Naval War Games,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York
Times, March 27, 1932.
“B-29s to ‘Strike’ Fleet,” New York Times, November 2, 1947.
“Ball Serves As Farewell At Quantico,” Washington Post, January 9, 1938.
“Battle Fleet Sees ‘Enemy,’” New York Times, May 20, 1925.
“Battle Fleet Tests Jutland Problems,” New York Times, March 17, 1923.
“Battle Fleet Wins Athletic Trophy,” New York Times, March 1, 1931.
“Battle for Canal results in a Draw,” New York Times, April 20, 1934.
“‘Battle’ for Hawaii to Test War Plans,” New York Times, 1925.
“‘Battle of Caribbean’ Near with Fleets Out,” New York Times, March 11, 1930.
“Battle of Oahu,” New York Times, April 30, 1925.
“Big ‘Battle’ Draws Near,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, May 16, 1935.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Big Bombers Hit, 11 Killed, in Night Naval War Game,” New York Times,
February 4, 1938.
“Big Fleet Will Sail Today in War Game,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
April 29, 1935.
“Big Gains in Shansi Claimed by Japan,” New York Times, Nov. 4, 1937.
“‘Big Mo’ to Greet Navy Day Visitors,” New York Times, October 27, 1948.
“Big Work for Navy for Year Planned if Funds are Given,” Washington Post, January
24, 1926.
“Black Fleet Will Raid Base at New Haven, New York Times, June 12, 1928.
“Black Planes ‘Sink’ Carrier Saratoga,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
March 18, 1932.
“‘Black’ Ships Shell New London,” New York Times, May 29, 1930.
“‘Blacks’ Put Force on Fishers Island,” New York Times, May 28, 1930.
“Blue Forces Seize Hawaii in Darkness,” Washington Post, February 14, 1932.
“‘Blues’ Quickly Locate Hostile ‘Black’ Fleet,” New York Times, June 14, 1928.
“Boycott Is an Aid to Peace,” New York Times, November 11, 1937.
“Bruce Hails Unbreakable Link,” New York Times, August 6, 1925.
“Canal Defended from Naval Raid,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1934.
“Canal Defense Need Shown by War Game,” New York Times, February 21, 1926.
“Canal Defenses Trained on Fleet,” New York Times, April 20, 1934.
“Canal ‘Destroyed’ by ‘Foe’ in Pacific,” by Lewis R. Freeman, New York Times, January 28, 1929.
“Canal ‘Invaders’ Captured,” New York Times, March 6, 1927.
“Canal Is Menaced in Panama War Game, New York Times, March 1, 1926.
“Canal Zone Keeps Armistice Night,” New York Times, January 20, 1924.
“Canal Zone Rings to Navy’s Hymns,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
April 30, 1934.
“Coast Navy Game Begun,” New York Times, October 5, 1948.
“Chile Hears Fleet Quit After Fliers Bombed It,” New York Times, Sep. 7, 1931.
“Churches Oppose Navy Manoeuvres,” New York Times, March 11, 1935.
“City Awaits Sea Pageant,” New York Times, May 31, 1934.
“City to See Fleets of Air and Ocean, New York Times, May 4, 1930.
“Clergy Hail Fleet as Force for Peace,” New York Times, June 4, 1934.
“Cockfighting Abides Among Panama People,” New York Times, March 27, 1927.
“Commander’s Story of Saratoga’s Raid,” by Lewis Freeman, New York Times, February 19, 1929.
“Committee Cuts Navy to 86,000 Men,” New York Times, March 23, 1922.
“Congress Party Sails for Navy Manoeuvres,” New York Times, March 6, 1923.
“Congressmen Seized, Dressed as Sailors,” New York Times, March 21, 1923.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

359

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

360

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

“Continental Defense Revealed As Aim of Fleet’s War Game,” Washington Post, February 22, 1939.
“Convoy Battles Sub Pack in Biggest Navy War Game,” Washington Post, October 22,
1948.
“Coolidge Sends More Ships and Marines to Nicaragua,” New York Times, January 7,
1927.
“Cruise Emphasizes Navy’s Weak Points,” New York Times, June 10, 1934.
“Cruise to Hawaiian Waters Will Not Be Abandoned by Navy, Washington Post, August 31, 1924.
“Cruisers in Collision,” New York Times, February 3, 1926.
“Curb on Shore Leave Eased,” New York Times, February 12, 1932.
“Davy Jones Accosts Fleet,” New York Times, July 7, 1925.
“Death Toll 11 in Midair Crash Of Navy Planes,”Washington Post, February 4, 1938.
“Defends Our Navy Men: Foreign Minister of Panama Objects to Newspaper Criticism, “ New York Times, June 15, 1930.
“Defense of Hawaii Inadequate to Meet the Strain of War,” New York Times, May 7,
1925.
“Denby Reaches Colon for Navy Maneuvers,” Washington Post, March 13, 1923.
“Denunciation Is Today,” New York Times, Dec. 29, 1934.
“Details Left to Reeves,” New York Times, Dec. 30, 1934.
“Divine Services Held as Fleets Keep Vigil,” New York Times, May 3, 1937.
“‘Dodo’s’ Price,” Time, August 24, 1936.
“Dominican Haven Granted to Fleet,” New York Times, February 7, 1939.
“Dominicans Open Port to U.S. Navy,” Washington Post, February 7, 1939.
“Edison to See War Games in Mid-Pacific,” Washington Post, March 20, 1940.
“Eighth Fleet Ends Maneuvers,” New York Times, May 19, 1946.
“8th Fleet to Train in Caribbean,” New York Times, April 9, 1946.
“‘Enemy Gain Seen as War Game Ends,” by Harwood Bull, New York Times, February 28, 1939.
“‘Enemy’ Hits Florida as War Games Begin,” New York Times, November 3, 1947.
“‘Enemy’ Warships Now in Mid-Pacific,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 8, 1933.
“Entire Tokyo Navy to Maneuver Near American Islands,” Washington Post, January
29, 1933.
“Erring Gob Wakens Denby at Midnight for Watch on Bridge,” Washington Post,
March 12, 1923.
“Ex-General: War Game Rigged,” Washington Post, Saturday, August 17, 2002.
“Ex-Officer is Held as Naval Spy Paid by Japanese Agent,” New York Times, July 14,
1936.
“Farnsworth Yields to Mercy of Court, New York Times, February 16, 1937.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:49 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Final ‘Battle’ Ends Fleet Manoeuvres,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
May 18, 1934.
“Final Blow to China Now Poised by Japan,” New York Times, Nov. 21, 1937.
“Fish Poisons Navy Mess,” New York Times, March 10, 1938.
“Fleet at Pearl Harbor,” New York Times, May 10, 1937.
“Fleet ‘Attack’ Ends, Ships at Honolulu, New York Times, April 26, 1937.
“Fleet Attacking Oahu In Pacific War Game,” Washington Post, April 26, 1937.
“Fleet Begins Trip Through Panama Canal,” Washington Post, April 22, 1934.
“Fleet in Manoeuvres on the Way North,” New York Times, February 27, 1924.
“Fleet Holds Drill on Way to Hawaii,” New York Times, April 18, 1925.
“Fleet in Manoeuvres on Way to Australia,” New York Times, July 4, 1925.
“Fleet in Pacific Bars Personnel Transfer,” New York Times, May 10, 1940.
“Fleet in War Array Reaches Honolulu,” New York Times, April 29, 1928.
“Fleet on Dash Through Canal, New York Times, April 24, 1934.
“Fleet Is Acclaimed in New Zealand,” New York Times, August 12, 1925.
“Fleet Is ‘Fighting’ Its Way to Hawaii, New York Times, April 18, 1937.
“Fleet Is Dividing for New ‘Battle,’” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, May 4,
1934.
“Fleet Is Prepared for Secret Exercise,” New York Times, May 14, 1936.
“Fleet Leaves Balboa Today for Exercises, New York Times, May 16, 1936.
“Fleet Leaves Port for Navy War Game,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
April 30, 1935.
“Fleet Maneuvers Begin In 2 Oceans in February,”New York Times, January 22, 1947.
“Fleet Maneuvers in the Pacific Assailed as ‘Tactless’ Move,” Washington Post, December 20, 1924.
“Fleet Manoeuvres of Great Benefit,” New York Times, March 8, 1931.
“Fleet of 122 Warships Gathers at New York,” Washington Post, April 20, 1927.
“Fleet Operations During Early 1929 Have Been Mapped,” Washington Post, August
5, 1928.
“Fleet Prepares for ‘War,’” New York Times, September 30, 1935.
“Fleet Problem 12,” Time, Mar. 2, 1931.
“Fleet Problem No. 14,” Time, Feb. 13, 1933.
“Fleet Quits Hawaii, Off to Australia,” New York Times, July 2, 1925.
“Fleet Sails Away as City Bids Adieu,” New York Times, June 19, 1934.
“Fleet Shells Forts in Day of Mimic War,” New York Times, May 19, 1927.
“Fleet to Quit New York Tomorrow for War Game,” Washington Post, May 15, 1927.
“Fleet to Stage 1936 Maneuvers in Waters West of Canal Zone,” Washington Post,
August 22, 1935.
“Fleet Transfer East Held Slap at Dictators,” by Barry Smith, Washington Post, May
27, 1938.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

361

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

362

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

“Fleet Transit Canal in 2 Day,” New York Times, April 26, 1934.
“Fleet Units Return from Big War Game,” New York Times, July 18, 1925.
“Fleet Units Return from War Demonstration,” Washington Post, April 21, 1929.
“Fleet Visit Ending; War Game Due,” New York Times, May 13, 1927.
“Fleet War Game Next Year Is Scheduled as Defense of Alaska against Invaders,”
New York Times, Sep. 20, 1934.
“Fleet Will Rush Through Canal,” New York Times, April 23, 1934.
“Fleet Will Stay Near Hawaii Indefinitely,” New York Times, May 8, 1940.
“Fleet, Lights Out, Speeding in Effort to Seize Hawaii,” Washington Post, April 16,
1925.
“Fleet’s Maneuvers Extended 15 Days,” Washington Post, May 14, 1932.
“Fleet’s Vanguard Arrives at Balboa,” New York Times, May 8, 1936.
“Fleets Assemble for Biggest Battle,” New York Times, March 2, 1930.
“Fleets, Far at Sea, Play Hide-and-Seek,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
March 13, 1932.
“Fliers of Navy Give War Demonstration,” Washington Post, April 21, 1929.
“Floating Forts Move on Hawaii,” New York Times, April 21, 1937.
“Flotilla of Navy Sails for Arctic,” New York Times, November 2, 1948.
“Food Termed Vital in Hawaii Defense,” New York Times, August 31, 1937.
“Forts Test Defense of Long Island Sound,” New York Times, June 11, 1928.
“Franco’s New Pilots Are Accurate Shots,” New York Times, Aug. 15, 1936.
“Gather for ‘Battle’ of Long Island,” New York Times, June 2, 1928.
“Grand Fleet Executes a Forty-Degree Turn,” New York Times, May 10, 1925.
“Grand Joint Exercise No. 4,” Time, February 15, 1932.
“Gray Fleet Seizes Culebra Island,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, May 11,
1934.
“Great Fleet Heads for Canal Attack,” New York Times, April 21, 1934.
“Great Fleet Moves to Pacific Objective,” New York Times, April 3, 1940.
“Greatest Armada Going to Panama,” New York Times, January 2, 1924.
“Guns Score 92 Hits on Aerial Target,” New York Times, June 9, 1928.
“Hawaii Guns Await ‘Foe’ in War Games,” New York Times, January 30, 1933.
“Hawaiian Manoeuvres, The” New York Times, December 9, 1924.
“Hawaiian Maneuvers to be Real War Test,” Washington Post, April 5, 1925.
“Hilo ‘Destroyed’ in Navy War Game,” New York Times, April 24, 1937.
“Holds Battleship is Still Supreme,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, March
23, 1932.
“Honolulu Awaits ‘Attack’ From Sea,” Washington Post, January 30, 1933.
“Honolulu Guarded, Troops Held Ready, Following Murder,” New York Times, January 10, 1932.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Hoover Today to Witness Mimic Battle by U.S. Fleet,” Washington Post, May 20,
1930.
“How ‘Battleship Gertie’ Almost Precipitates a War Between Japan and the United
States,” by Brooks Atkinson, New York Times, January 19, 1935.
“How We Won the War,”by Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, September 6, 2002.
“Invader Battleship Sinks Blue Defenders’ Flagship,” Washington Post, May 19, 1927.
“Iowa ‘Torpedoed’ in Mock Pacific War,” New York Times, March 2, 1947.
“Iran Encounter Grimly Echoes ’02 War Game,” by Thom Shanker, New York Times,
January 27, 2008.
“Japan Calm Over Our Tests,” New York Times, May 17, 1935.
“Japan to Denounce Pact on Saturday,” New York Times, Dec. 26, 1934.
“Japan Sees Aggressive Aim,” New York Times, March 25, 1938.
“Japanese Fleets to Wage Mimic War”, New York Times, October 8, 1930.
“Japanese in Caribbean, Fishing Vessels Sighted There as Fleet Gathers for Manoeuvres,” New York Times, February 15, 1939.
“Japanese Insist Panay Was Sunk by Accident,” New York Times, Dec. 26, 1937.
“Japanese on Hand at Our Manoevers,” New York Times, April 30, 1925.
“Japanese See War Threat By America in Fleet Maneuver,” Washington Post, November 30, 1924.
“Japanese Seizure Forestalled Paris,” by Hugh Byas, New York Times, April 5, 1939.
“John F. Hines,” New York Times, October 21, 1941.
“Joint Exercise Highly Successful,” Washington Post, February 21, 1932.
“Joint Manoeuvres Probable in May,” New York Times, February 2, 1927.
“Joint War Games of Army and Navy Lauded by Wilbur,” Washington Post, April 29,
1925.
“Land Forces Claim War Games Victory,” New York Times, May 20, 1921.
“Landing of Marines Reported Successful,” Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 1935.
“Last Mutinous Ships Surrender in Chile,” New York Times, Sep. 8, 1931.
“Last of War Fleet Leaves the Pacific, New York Times, April 26, 1934.
“Lesson of the War Game,” New York Times, March 30, 1931.
“Lexington Is Delayed,” New York Times, March 2, 1930.
“Limitations of the United States Navy in a Comedy Entitled Sailor, Beware!” by
Brooks Atkinson, New York Times, September 29, 1933.
“Lindbergh Soars from Ship to Canal,” New York Times, Feb. 9, 1929.
“Little Stinker,” Time, April 20, 1942.
“Macon Fails in Fleet Test,” Washington Post, May 10, 1934.
“Major Aircraft Test in Coming War Games,” New York Times, January 11, 1931.
“Maneuvers in Tropics Scheduled for Fleets,” Washington Post, December 6, 1925.
“Maneuvers Reveal U.S. Needs Cruisers,” Washington Post, March 17, 1930.
“Manoeuvres Close with ‘Blue’ Ahead,” New York Times, Feb. 14, 1932.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

363

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

364

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

“Manoeuvres Show that We Need Ships,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
March 22, 1932.
“Marines’ Landing Tests Atomic War,” New York Times, March 10, 1947.
“Massie Grand Jury Indicts for Murder in Second Degree,” New York Times, January
27, 1932.
“Mighty Fleet Here with Parade up Bay,” New York Times, May 8, 1930.
“Military Overkill Defeats Virtual War: And Real-World Soldiers Are the Losers,” by
Michael Schrage, Washington Post, September 22, 2002.
“Mimic War to Start Tonight off Panama,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 15, 1931.
“Ministers Decry War Games,” Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1935.
“Moffett Says Navy Needs 11 Aircraft Carriers Now,” Washington Post, December 11,
1932.
“More Naval Games Enlist Hawaii Fleet,” New York Times, May 14, 1940.
“Movements of Naval Vessels,” New York Times, April 23, 1937, April 29, 1937, May
2, 1937, May 4, 1937, July 29, 1937.
“Nation’s Full Fleet to ‘War’ at Canal,” New York Times, August 24, 1930.
“Naval Air Pioneer Dies, Capt. Frank R. McCrary,” New York Times, June 14, 1952.
“Naval Games Prove New Cruisers’ Value,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 26, 1931.
“Naval Manoeuvres Ordered in Pacific,” New York Times, December 1, 1932.
“Naval War Games Have Lighter Side,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 12, 1933.
“Naval Planes Show Power in War Game,” New York Times, March 29, 1931.
“Navies Turn Again to the Atlantic,” by Hanson W. Baldwin New York Times, December 25, 1938.
“Navy Aim Mystery; Sudden Order for Fleet to Leave,” by Frank L. Kluckhohn, New
York Times, April 16, 1939.
“Navy Cancels Trip to Chile and Peru,” New York Times, November 29, 1925.
“Navy Fights Battle off Oahu at Night in a New War Game,” New York Times, May 8,
1925.
“Navy Fliers Aloft This Week in Test over Caribbean Sea,” Washington Post, March
22, 1931.
“Navy Game Starts in Caribbean Sea,” Washington Post, March 9, 1927.
“Navy Games Show Arctic Garb Fails,” New York Times, November 10, 1948.
“Navy Heads Called To Plan Maneuvers,” Washington Post, April 11, 1935.
“Navy Launches Test of Power in the Pacific,” Washington Post, April 30, 1935.
“Navy Manoeuvres in Pacific February 6,” New York Times, January 17, 1933.
“Navy Men Compare Our Ships to Nelson” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 28, 1931.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Navy Men See Need for More Cruisers,” by John A. Park, New York Times, March
17, 1930.
“Navy Opens Sham War on Our Coast,” by Charles M. Lincoln, New York Times,
May 19, 1927.
“Navy Orders Fleet to Avoid Honolulu,” New York Times, January 10, 1932.
“Navy Orders Secrecy on Games in Pacific,” New York Times, February 24, 1938.
“Navy Repels Mock Air Raid On Puerto Rico,” Washington Post, February 26, 1939.
“Navy Sails Far South in Secret War Games,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York
Times, May 24, 1936.
“Navy Sets Timetable in Pacific Maneuvers,” New York Times, February 28, 1947.
“Navy Strength in Pacific Will be Augmented,” by Harold J. Horan, Washington Post,
February 11, 1933.
“Navy Tender Sets Base at San Juan,” New York Times, January 23, 1939.
“Navy to Launch Air Raid on West Coast,” Washington Post, February 6, 1933.
“Navy to Request Fast Auxiliaries,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, June 9,
1935.
“Navy to ‘Seize’ North Pacific in Mock War,” Washington Post, Dec. 30, 1934.
“Navy to Use 29 Warships in Maneuvers,” Washington Post, April 9, 1946.
“Navy War Game,” New York Times, January 22, 1939.
“Navy ‘War’ Leaves Big Crop of Yarns,”by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, May
28, 1935.
“Navy’s Pacific War Game Is Much Like Real Thing,” Christian Science Monitor,
April 1, 1940.
“Navy’s Plans for 1936,” New York Times, August 22, 1935.
“New Battleship on Way,” New York Times, January 29, 1947.
“New Naval Ships Excel in War Game,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
June 7, 1935.
“New U.S. Subs Get Test in Huge Fleet Maneuvers,” by John Bunker, Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 1948.
“Newport is Host to 1,400 ‘Middies,’” New York Times, June 16, 1928.
“Nippon Navy Tests As Pact Effect,” Washington Post, October 8, 1930.
“No Army Manoeuvres,” New York Times, December 13, 1926.
“Our Fleet is Ready for Far East Call,” New York Times, Jan. 30, 1932.
“Our Fleet Plays a Far-Flung War Game,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 5, 1933.
“Our Fleet Reviewed by Haitian President,” New York Times, March 19, 1927.
“Our Fleet to Avoid Japan,” New York Times, Feb. 7, 1935.
“Our Good Gray Ships,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, April 23, 1939.
“Our Hawaiian Base,” New York Times, May 8, 1925.
“Pacific Fleet Ends Problem 21 Games,” New York Times, April 27, 1940.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

365

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

366

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

“Pacific Fleet Maneuvers Show Need of Trained Men,” by Dean Tyler Jenks, Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1947.
“Pacific ‘War’ Ends as Haleiwa Falls,” New York Times, April 28, 1925.
“Pacific ‘War Game’ to Start in April,” Washington Post, February 16, 1925.
“Pacific War Games Expanded by Navy,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
Dec.11, 1937.
“Panama Sea Game Recalls Great War,” by Lewis Freeman, New York Times, February 3, 1929.
“Passenger Liner ‘Sunk’ Three Times in War Zone,” Washington Post, May 4, 1925.
“Pilots, Man Your Planes,” by Stephen Jurika, Jr., Saturday Evening Post, January 7,
1939.
“Plan Navy Exercises off the Hawaiians,” New York Times, January 6, 1927.
“Plane and Subsea Craft Fail to Save Hawaii from ‘Foe,’” by Arthur Sears Henning,
Washington Post, April 28, 1925.
“Planes Save Panama from ‘Enemy’ Attack in Naval War Games,” by Hanson W.
Baldwin, New York Times, February 21, 1931.
“Planes Tuned for Big Mass Hop,” New York Times, May 9, 1935.
“Plot Story Causes Heavy Guard,” New York Times, April 26, 1934.
“Poverty Bars Army from Manoeuvres,” New York Times, December 11, 1926.
“Pratt Approves Fleet Operations,” Washington Post, December 11, 1932.
“President, Aids to View Huge Fleet May 31,” Washington Post, May 20, 1934.
“President Plans Vacation Viewing ‘Attack’ on Canal,” Christian Science Monitor,
February 11, 1939.
“President Praises Admiral and Fleet,” New York Times, May 21, 1930.
“President Returns, Explains War Game,” by Felix Belair, Jr., New York Times, March
4, 1939.
“President To See Navy War Games,” by Edward T. Folliard, Washington Post, April
19, 1946.
“Pride of Navy Here,” New York Times, April 30, 1939.
“Radio Ship Will Go Under Fire Thrice,” Washington Post, March 13, 1923.
“‘Raid’ Hurled Back by Defense Fleet,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, February 17, 1933.
“Reassures Japanese,” New York Times, April 25, 1925.
“Record Armada to Visit New York,” New York Times, March 20, 1927.
“Rely on Our Forces in Shanghai Crisis,” New York Times, March 20, 1927.
“Reorganized Fleet to Hold Big Tests,” New York Times, December 26, 1922.
“Rival Fleets Near Air and Sea ‘War,’” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, February 5, 1933.
“Roosevelt and Leahy Admit They Were ‘Sunk’ Before They Knew They Were Under
‘Fire’”, New York Times, March 8, 1939.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Roosevelt as ‘Foe’ Sees Navy ‘Fight,’” New York Times, October 3, 1935.
“Roosevelt Enters Zone of War Game,” by Felix Belair, Jr., New York Times, February
21, 1939.
“Roosevelt Leads War Game Survey,” by Felix Belair, Jr., New York Times, February
28, 1939.
“Roosevelt Sails to War Games Next Week,” Washington Post, February 5, 1939.
“Roosevelt to See Air War Simulated,” New York Times, May 3, 1934.
“Roosevelt Will Review Whole Fleet Here in June When Ships Mass from Two
Coasts,” New York Times, January 11, 1934.
“Roosevelt’s Crossing of Equator Recalls Mass Polliwog Initiation at Fleet Maneuvers,” by Windsor Booth, Washington Post, November 29, 1936.
“Round-Up of Spies Hinted in Capital,” New York Times, July 16, 1936.
“Sailors Swarm into Cristobal,” New York Times, April 25, 1934.
“Sailor Throngs Win Colon Praise,” New York Times, April 27, 1934.
“Saratoga’s Raid Left Fleet Behind,” by Lewis Freeman, New York Times, February
18, 1929.
“Says Navy Can Bar Any Single Enemy,” New York Times, May 29, 1939.
“Says Navy Must Get Small Plane Carriers,” New York Times, March 28, 1931.
“Scores Navy War Games,” New York Times, Apr 1, 1935.
“Scout Fleet Plan Will Be Revised,” Washington Post, August 17, 1930.
“Scout Ships Clash in a Mimic Battle,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, February 6, 1931.
“Scouting Fleet Likely to Stay on West Coast Another Year,” New York Times, February 10, 1933.
“Scouting Fleet off to Enter War Game,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 5, 1931.
“Scouting Ships to Stay in Pacific,” New York Times, October 1, 1932.
“Seek Coordination in Pacific War Play,” New York Times, April 5, 1925.
“Seek More Troops, Planes and Guns to Defend Hawaii,” by Hal Smith, New York
Times, May 10, 1925.
“Ships at Canal Rush to Nicaragua’s Aid,” New York Times, April 1, 1931.
“Spy Sentenced,” Time, March 8, 1937.
“Staffs ‘Wiped Out’ in Naval ‘Battle,’” New York Times, April 14, 1934.
“Starts for Hawaii in War Game Move,” New York Times, April 23, 1935.
“Strong Naval Force Will Attack Panama,” New York Times, Oct. 23, 1934.
“Students and Union to Boycott Japan,” New York Times, Nov. 18, 1937.
“Submarines Aid in Fleet ‘Battle,’” New York Times, April 12, 1934.
“Submarines Give Test,” New York Times, April 20, 1934.
“Submarines off to Arctic,” New York Times, October 31, 1948.
“Swanson Retorts to Tokyo on Navy,” New York Times, May 16, 1935.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

367

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

368

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

“Three More Cruisers Reach Balboa,” New York Times, February 2, 1927.
“Throngs Flock to Fleet as City Welcomes Navy,” New York Times, June 2, 1934.
“Throngs See Fleet as Farewell Nears, New York Times, May 18, 1930.
“To Fight Mimic War with 100 Airplanes,” New York Times, March 7, 1927.
“Tokio Papers Call War Game a Menace,” New York Times, May 3, 1925.
“Tokyo Rejects Protest, Turns Down French Complaint,” April 7, 1939.
“Tokyo to Maneuver Fleet ‘South of Japan,’” Christian Science Monitor, May 16,
1933.
“Tonsillitis Fells 500 on U.S.S. Lexington,” Washington Post, March 30, 1938.
“Truman Schedules Cruise with Fleet,” by Felix Belair, Jr., New York Times, January
30, 1947.
“Truman, on Carrier, Views Navy with ‘Green’ Crews, Play at War,” by Felix Belair,
Jr., New York Times, April 23, 1946.
“Twelve Hurt in Riot in Canal Zone,” New York Times, May 8, 1928.
“Two Fleets Anchor Here Next Week,” New York Times, April 27, 1930.
“U.S. Battle Fleet Moves on Hawaii,” Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 1937.
“U.S. Battle Fleet to Sail for Hawaii,” Washington Post, January 31, 1932.
“U.S. Decides on War Show By Fleet off Pacific Coast,” by Elliot Smith, Washington
Post, September 20, 1934.
“U.S. Fleet Displeases Japan,” Washington Post, February 13, 1927.
“U.S. Fleet Headed Home,” New York Times, May 24, 1937.
“U.S. Fleet Invokes Strictest Secrecy,” Washington Post, March 14, 1938.
“U.S. Fleet Sails Today for Big War Maneuvers in Pacific,” Washington Post, April 1,
1940.
“U.S. Fleet Racing for Canal Transit Mark,” New York Times, Oct. 24, 1934.
“U.S. Missionaries Regret War Game,” New York Times, Apr. 21, 1935.
“U.S. War Games To Be Carried Out in Secret,”Washington Post, February 24, 1938.
“Value of Battleship Proved, Pratt Says,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
February 27, 1931.
“Value of Dirigibles Proved in War Game,” New York Times, February 22, 1931.
“Victory for ‘Blues,’” by Charles M. Austin, New York Times, February 14, 1932.
“Wait Beside Guns to Repel Invaders, New York Times, May 16, 1927.
“War Conditions Simulated,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1934.
“‘War’ Is On! U.S. Throws 130 Warships and 110,000 Men into Greatest Maneuver,”
by John G. Norris, Washington Post, April 14, 1940.
“War Game Begins,” New York Times, March 2, 1927.
“War Game to Pivot on Isthmian Canals, New York Times, January 5, 1931.
“War Game Secrecy Tightened by Navy,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times,
March 13, 1938.
“War Game Umpires in Secret Session,” New York Times, May 22, 1927.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

“War Game Umpires Urge Greater Hawaii Defenses,”Washington Post, May 7, 1925.
“War Game Victory Due to Battleships,” New York Times, April 1, 1931.
“War Game Was Fixed to Ensure American Victory, Claims General,” by Julian
Borger, Guardian, August 21, 2002.
“War Games Found to Be of Great Use,” by Lewis R. Friedman, New York Times, February 14, 1929.
“War Games in the Pacific,” New York Times, December 30, 1924.
“War Game Opens on Florida Coast,” New York Times, October 5, 1948.
“War games rigged? General says Millennium Challenge ’02 ‘was almost entirely
scripted,’” by Sean D. Naylor, Army Times, August 16, 2002.
“War Games Showed Fleet Deficiencies,” New York Times, April 30, 1924.
“War Games to Test New York Defenses,” New York Times, June 1, 1928.
“‘War’ Is Declared at Fort Wright,” New York Times, June 13, 1928.
“Warships Mass in Pacific,” New York Times, April 21, 1934.
“Warships Prepare at Balboa for War,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, February 9, 1931.
“Washington Takes a Graver View as Panay Survivors Tell Stories,” New York Times,
December 16, 1937.
“White Fleet Sails for Great Battle,” by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, May
17, 1935.
“Whole U.S. Fleet Will Sail Under Sealed Orders Today,” Washington Post, April 29,
1935.
“Winter Season Puerto Rico’s Gayest,” Washington Post, January 15, 1939.
Books, Articles, and Online Resources
Abbazia, Patrick, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet,
1939–1942 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975).
Adams, Henry H., Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985).
Allen, Keith, “Notes on U.S. Fleet Organization and Disposition, 1898–1941,” The
World War I Document Archive (University of Kansas), www.ku.edu/~kansite/
ww_one/naval/fdus0001.htm.
Althoff, William F., U.S.S. Los Angeles: The Navy’s Venerable Airship and Aviation
Technology (Dulles: Brassey’s, 2004).
Ancell, E. Manning, and Christine M. Miller, Biographical Dictionary of World War
II Generals and Flag Officers (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1996).
Andrews, Lewis M., Tempest, Fire, and Foe (Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2004).
Arpee, Edward, From Frigate to Flattop: The Story of the Life and Achievements of
Rear Admiral William Adger Moffet, U.S.N., “The Father of Naval Aviation” (Lake
Forest, Ill.: Privately published, 1953).

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

369

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

370

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Asada, Sadeo, “The Revolt Against the Washington Treaty: The Japanese Imperial
Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921–1927,” Naval War College Review, Summer
1993, pp. 82–97.
Beach, Samuel Wheeler, The Great Cruise of 1925 (San Francisco: International,
1925).
Beesly, Patrick, A Very Special Intelligence: The Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence
Centre, 1939–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006).
Belote, James H. and William M. Belote, Titans of the Seas: The Development and
Operations of Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces during World War II
(New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
Braisted, William R., “On the American Red-Orange War Plans, 1919–1939,” in Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900–1945: Essays in Honour of Arthur
Marder, ed. Gerald Jordan (New York: Crane Russak, 1977), pp 167–85.
———, “On the General Board of the Navy, Admiral Hilary Jones, and Naval Arms
Limitation, 1921–1931,” Dwight D. Eisenhower Lecture in War and Peace No. 5,
1991, Kansas State University.
Brice, Martin H., The Royal Navy and the Sino-Japanese Incident, 1937–1941 (London: Ian Allan, 1973).
Brodhurst, Robin, Churchill’s Anchor: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
(Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Leo Cooper, 2000).
Bruer, William B., Undercover Tales of World War II (New York: John Wiley, 2000).
Buell, Thomas B., Master of Seapower: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).
———, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1974).
Cockburn, Alexander, and Jeffrey St. Clair, White Out: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press
(New York: Verso, 1998).
Chesneau, Roger, ed., Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946 (New York:
Mayflower, 1980).
Clark, J. J., with Clark G. Reynolds, Carrier Admiral (New York: McKay, 1967).
Coffman, Edward M., The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).
Coger, William B., Dictionary of Admirals of the U.S. Navy, Vol. II, 1901–18
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).
Cohen, David E., “The Mk. XIV Torpedo: Lessons for Today”, Naval History, Vol. 6,
No.4, Winter 1992, pp. 34–36.
Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch, “Failure to Learn: American Antisubmarine Warfare in 1942,” The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990),
pp. 59–94.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cole, Bernard D., Gunboats and Marines: The U.S. Navy in China, 1925–1928
(Wilmington, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 1982).
Coletta, Paolo E., “Dirigibles in the U.S. Navy,” in New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Tenth Naval History Symposium, ed. Jack Sweetman
et al. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 213–29.
———, Patrick N. L. Bellinger and U.S. Naval Aviation (Lanham, Md.: University
Press of America, 1987).
Conn, Stetson, and Fairchild, Byron, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, The
United States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of Military History,
1989).
Corey, Herbert, “Across the Equator with the American Navy,” National Geographic,
June 1921, pp. 571–624.
Cortada, James W., Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939
(Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 276.
Cressman, Robert J., U.S.S. Ranger (Washington: Brassey’s, 2003).
Daugherty, Leo. J., III, “Away All Boats: The Army-Navy Maneuvers of 1925,” Joint
Forces Quarterly, Autumn–Winter, 1998–99, pp. 107–13.
Davis, Henry Blaine, Jr., Generals in Khaki (Raleigh, N.C.: Pentland Press, 1998).
Denlinger, Sutherland, and Charles B. Gary, War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies,
Peoples, and Battle Problems (New York: Robert M. McBride, 1936).
Dingman, Roger, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation,
1914–1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
Dunnigan, James F. and Albert A. Nofi, The Pacific War Encyclopedia (New York:
Facts On File, 1998).
Dyer, George Carroll, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).
Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the
Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
Ewing, Steve, Thach Weave: The Life of Jimmie Thach (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2004).
Felker, Craig C., Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises,
1923–1940 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007).
Fleming, Thomas, “February 7, 1932—A Date that Would Live in Amnesia,” Kazine
No. 27, keepingapace.org/htm/bodyarchive/kazine/kz27/remembrance.htm.
Francillon, René J., Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War (London: Putnam and Co.,
1979).
Franks, William C., Jr., “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939,”
Naval War College Review, January–February 1984, pp. 24–55.
“French Frigate Shoals Aviation and Space History,” www.letarc.net/ffsavion/.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:50 AM

371

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

372

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Friedman, Norman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1983).
———, U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: Naval Institute,
1985).
———, U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: Naval Institute,
1984).
———, U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1982).
———, U.S. Submarines through 1945: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis:
Naval Institute, 1995).
———, “U.S. Survives Blackest Tuesday,” Proceedings, October 2001, p. 10
Fry, John, U.S.S. Saratoga, CV-3: An Illustrated History of the Legendary Aircraft Carrier, 1927–1946 (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1996).
Garzke, William H., Jr., and Robert O. Dulin, Jr., Allied Battleships in World War II
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980).
———, Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1985).
———, United States Battleships in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1976).
Genda, Minoru, “Evolution of Aircraft Carrier Tactics in the Imperial Japanese
Navy,” in Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy, edited by Paul
Stillwell (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981).
Gladwell, Malcolm, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking (New York: Little, Brown, 2005).
Goldstein, Donald M., and Katherine V. Dillon, eds., The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside
the Japanese Plans (Washington: Brassey’s, 1993).
Gole, Henry G., The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2003).
Guerlac, Henry E., Radar in World War II, Vol. VIII of The History of Modern Physics,
1800–1950 (n.p.: Tomash/American Institute of Physics, 1987).
Guttridge, Leonard F., Mutiny: A History of Naval Insurrection (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. 189.
Hammond, James W., Jr., The Treaty Navy: The Story of the U.S. Naval Service Between the Wars (Victoria, BC: Wesley Press, 2001).
Hattendorf, John B., B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and
Scholars: The Centennial History of the United States Naval War College (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1984).
Hayes, John D., “Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, U.S.N. (1872–1948),” Part 1, Naval
War College Review, November 1970, pp. 48–57, and Part II, Naval War College
Review, January 1972, pp. 50–64.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps,
1775–1962 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1962), p. 259.
Holzimmer, Kevin C., General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War (Lawrence, Ks.: University Press of Kansas, 2007).
Hone, Thomas C., “The Effectiveness of the ‘Washington Treaty’ Navy,” Naval War
College Review, November–December 1979, pp. 35–59.
———, “The Evolution of the U.S. Fleet, 1933–1941,” in F.D.R. and the U.S. Navy,
ed. Edward Marolda (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), pp. 65–114.
Hone, Thomas C., Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles, American and British
Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1999).
Hone, Thomas C., and Trent Hone, Battleline: The United States Navy, 1919–1939
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006).
Hone, Thomas C. and Mark D. Mandeles, “Interwar Innovation in Three Navies:
U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, Imperial Japanese Navy,” Naval War College Review,
Spring 1987, pp. 63–83.
———, “Managerial Style in the Interwar Navy: A Reappraisal,” Naval War College
Review, September–October 1980, pp. 88–101.
Hone, Trent, “Building a Doctrine: U.S.N. Tactics and Battle Plans in the Interwar Period,” International Journal of Naval History, October 2002,
www.ijnhonline.org/volume1_number2_Oct02/articles/article_hone1_doctrine
.doc.htm (June 3, 2004).
———, “The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922–1941,”
Journal of Military History, No. 67 (October 2003), pp. 1107–48.
Horn, Steve, The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K and Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005).
Hough, Frank O., Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to
Guadalcanal, Volume I of History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War
II (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, 1958).
Howeth, Linwood S., History of Communications-Electronics in the United States
Navy (Washington: Bureau of Ships and The Office of Naval History, 1963).
Howland, Vernon W., “The Loss of H.M.S. Glorious: An Analysis of the Action,”
Warship International, 1994, No.1, pp. 47–62.
Howman-Meek, R. S. S., Harold Johnson, K. D. McBride, and Christopher C.
Wright, “Target Ships,” Warship International, 2002, No. 1, pp. 24–36.
Humphreys, Robert A., Latin American and the Second World War, two volumes
(London: Athlone, 1981–82).
Internet Movie Database, www.imdb.com/.
Jones, Lloyd S, U.S. Bombers, 1920–1980 (Fallbrook, Ca.: Aero, 1980).

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

373

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

374

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Kachilla, M. A., Doctrine Development: A Look at History (Quantico: Marine Corps
Command and Staff College, 1993), www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
report/1993/KMA.htm.
Kasai, Jiuji G., The United States and Japan in the Pacific: American Naval Maneuvers
and Japan’s Pacific Policy (Tokyo: Kobusai, 1935/New York, Arno Press, 1970).
Kaufman, J. E., and H. W. Kaufman, The Sleeping Giant: American Armed Forces between the Wars (Westport, Ct.: Praeger, 1996).
Koda, Yoji, “A Commander’s Dilemma: Admiral Yamamoto and the ‘Gradual Attrition’ Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 1993, pp. 63–74.
Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr., “Military Experimentation: Time to Get Serious,” Naval
War College Review, Winter 2001, pp. 76–89.
Kuehn, John T., Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet
That Defeated Japan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008).
LeMay, Curtis E, with McKinley Kantor, Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965).
Lentz, Jerry M., French Frigate Shoals, www.radiojerry.com/frigate/.
Leonard, Thomas M., and John F. Bratzel, eds., Latin America during World War II
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).
Leutze, James, A Different Kind of Victory: A Biography of Adm. Thomas C. Hart
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981).
“Lexington, CV 2, March 29, 1938, Hawaiian Flu Felled 450 Sailors,” Carrier Capsules, No. 151, March 31, 2000, www.carriersg.org/151.htm.
Lippman, David H., “World War II Plus 55 Chronology, August 25–August 28th,
1942,” www.usswashington.com/dl25au42.htm.
Love, Robert William, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980).
Lundstrom, John B., Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea,
Midway, and Guadalcanal (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006).
MacDonald, Scot, “Last of the Fleet Problems,” www.history.navy.mil/download/
car-6.pdf.
McFarland, Stephen L., America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910–1945 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995).
Major, John, “The Navy Plans for War, 1938–1941,” in In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775–1978, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, Ct.:
Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 237–62.
Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).
Millet, Richard, “The State Department’s Navy: A History of the Special Service
Squadron, 1920–1940,” The American Neptune, April 1975, pp. 118–38.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Millett, Allan R., “Assault from the Sea,” Chapter 2 of Williamson Murray and Allan
R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
Mitchell, Donald William, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power (New York:
Macmillan, 1974).
Morison, Elting E., Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942).
Morison, Samuel Eliot, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1951).
———, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939–May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown,
1947).
———, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949).
———, Leyte (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958).
———, Rising Sun in the Pacific (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), pp. 16–18.
———, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943 (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1960).
———, The Two-Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).
———, Victory in the Pacific, 1945 (Boston: Little Brown, 1960).
Morton, Louis, “Interservice Co-operation and Political Military Collaboration,” in
Total War and Cold War: Problems of Civilian Control of the Military, ed. Harry L.
Coles (n.p.: Ohio University Press, 1962), pp. 131–60.
Mourer, John H., “Fuel and the Battle Fleet: Coal, Oil, and American Naval Strategy,
1898–1925,” Naval War College Review, November–December 1981 pp. 60–73.
Naval Historical Center, “Aircraft on Hand,” www.history.navy.mil/avh-1910/
APPO4.pdf.
Naval History Net, “Navies of World War I: Turkish,” www.navalhistory.net/
WW1NavyTurkish.htm#key.
Navy Lakehurst Historical Society, “U.S.S. Akron: Fleet Operations,”
www.nlhs.com/fleet.htm.
Nimitz, Chester W., “The Little-known Tale of the U.S.S. Maumee and Her Role in
the Development of the Navy’s Secret Weapon,” Petroleum Today, v. 2, no. 3
(Spring 1961), pp. 9–12.
Nofi, Albert A., “WW I: Planes vs. Ships,” Strategy & Tactics, No. 96 (Mar–April
1984), p. 9.
O’Hara, Vincent P., The U.S. Navy Against the Axis: Surface Combat, 1941–1945
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007).
Oi, Atsui, “The Japanese Navy in 1941,” in The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II, ed. Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (Washington: Potomac Books, 2004), pp. 4–31.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

375

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

376

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Parker, Frederick D., Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924–1941 (Washington: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1994).
Parker, William D., A Concise History of the United States Marine Corps, 1775–1969
(Washington: Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1970).
Paz, Maria Emilia, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World
War II (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
Peattie, Mark R., Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Aviation (Annapolis: Naval
Institute, 2001).
Phister, Jeff, Battleship Oklahoma (BB 37) (Norman, Ok.: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2008).
Polmar, Norman, “Bombing Pearl Harbor,” Naval History, XVI, 3 (June 2002), p. 14,
16.
———, Historic Naval Aircraft: From the Pages of Naval History Magazine (Washington: Potomac Books, 2004).
Potter, E. B., Admiral Arleigh Burke (New York: Random House, 1990).
———, Bull Halsey (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985).
———, Nimitz (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976).
Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, Miracle at Midway (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982.
“Professional Notes,” The Marine Corps Gazette, September 1928, pp. 206–208.
Radford, Arthur W., “Aircraft Battle Force,” in Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections
of a Day of Infamy, ed. Paul Stillwell (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp.
18–22.
Reagan, Stephen D., In Bitter Tempest: The Biography of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1994).
Resture, Jane, “French Frigate Shoals,” www.janeresture.com/french_frigate_shoal/.
Reynolds, Clark G., Famous American Admirals (New York: Van Nostrand,
1978/Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002).
———, John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).
———, On the Warpath in the Pacific: Admiral Jocko Clark and the Fast Carriers
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005).
Rhys-Jones, Graham, The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2000).
Robison, Samuel S., and Mary L. Robison, A History of Naval Tactics from
1530–1930: The Evolution of Tactical Maxims (Annapolis: United States Naval
Institute, 1942).

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rock, David, “War and Postwar Intersections: Latin America and the United States,”
in David Rock, ed., Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
Rolt, Kenneth D., “The Fessenden Oscillator: History, Electroacoustic Model, and
Performance Estimate,” Papers of the Acoustical Society of America 127th Meeting,
June 6–10, 1994, www.auditory.org/asamtgs/asa94mit/2aEA/2aEA3.html.
Roskill, Stephen, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. I, The Period of Anglo-American
Antagonism, 1919–1929 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968).
———, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. II, The Period of Reluctant Rearmament,
1930–1939 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976).
Rosen, Philip T., “The Treaty Navy, 1919–1937,” in In Peace and War: Interpretations
of American Naval History, 1775–1978, ed. by Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, Ct.:
Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 220–36.
Ross, Steven T., American War Plans, 1890–1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
Saville, Allison, “Claude Augustus Swanson,” in American Secretaries of the Navy,
Vol. II, 1913–1972, ed. Paolo E. Coletta (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980),
pp. 654–67.
Scarborough, William E., “The Neutrality Patrol: To Keep Us out of World War II?”
Naval Historical Center, www.history.navy.mil/download/ww2-4.pdf and
www.history.navy.mil/download/ww2-5.pdf.
Siegel, Adam B., “The Tip of the Spear: The U.S. Navy and the Spanish Civil War,”
The American Neptune, Spring 2001, pp. 185–205.
Sprout, Harold and Margaret, Toward a New Order of Sea Power; American Naval
Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1943).
Stannard, David E., Honor Killing: How the Infamous “Massie Affair” Transformed
Hawai’i (New York: Viking, 2005).
Stillwell, Paul, Battleship Arizona: An Illustrated History (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1991).
Sullivan, Brian R., “Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War,”
Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 4, 1995, pp. 697–724.
Svonavec, Stephen, “United States Navy, 1890–1945: The United States Navy, July 1,
1923,” www.geocities.com/scs028a/1923intro.html.
Swanborough, Gordon, and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft since 1911
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990).
Thompson, Frederick, “Did We Learn Anything From That Exercise? Could We?”
Naval War College Review, July–August 1982, pp. 25–37.
Thompson, Roger, Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy’s Status Quo Culture
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007).
“To Lay Up Nine Ships,” Army-Navy Journal, March 30, 1929, pp. 205, 222.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

377

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

378

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Tolley, Kemp, Yangtze Patrol (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1971).
Trimble, William F., Admiral William A. Moffet, Architect of Naval Aviation (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999).
Underwood, Jeffrey S., The Wings of Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the
Roosevelt Administration, 1933–1941 (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1991).
United States Marine Corps Historical Division, Who’s Who in Marine Corps History, www.hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/HD/Historical/Whos_Who/.
“United States Naval Guns,” www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Main.htm.
“U.S.S. Houston (CA 30),” www.wiretap.area.com/Gopher/Gov/US-History/
Naval/bb07.txt.
“U.S.S. Perch (SS 176),” www.subvets.org/Requiem/176.htm.
“U.S.S. S-28 (SS 133),” www.subnet.com/fleet/ss133.htm.
“U.S.S. Sellers (DD G-11),” www.navysite.de/dd/ddg11.htm.
“U.S. Destroyers Sunk as Targets,” Warship International, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2003).
“U.S. Submarines Sunk as Targets,” Warship International, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2003).
Updegraph, Charles L., U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of World War II (Washington: Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1972).
Urwin, Gregory J. W., Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island (Lincoln, Neb.:
University of Nebraska Press, 2002).
Van Riper, Paul K., “Preparing for War Takes Study and Open Debate,” Proceedings,
November 2002, p. 2.
Vlahos, Michael, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission,
1919–1941 (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1980).
Wainwright, Richard, “The General Board,” Proceedings, February 1922, pp.
189–201.
Watson, Mark Skinner, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950).
Wheeler, Gerald E., Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor’s Life (Washington: Naval History Division, 1974).
———, Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet: A Biography of Adm. Thomas Kincaid, U.S.
Navy (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1995).
———, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921–1931
(Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1968).
———, “William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review, May 1969, pp.
36–61.
Wildenberg, Thomas, All the Factors of Victory: Adm. Joseph Mason Reeves and the
Origins of Carrier Air Power (Dulles: Brassey’s, 2003).
———, “Chester Nimitz and the Development of Fueling at Sea,” Naval War College
Review, Autumn 1993, pp. 52–62.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

———, Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier
Airpower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998).
———, Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S.
Navy, 1912–1995 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996).
———, “Preparing for War: Admiral William H. Standley and the Struggle to Build
Auxiliaries for the Navy,” in New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers
from the Eleventh Naval History Symposium, ed. Robert W. Love, Jr. (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 250–66.
Williams, Dion, “Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force: Joint Army and Navy Exercises, 1925,” Marine Corps Gazette, X, 4 (September, 1925), pp. 76–88.
———, “The Winter Maneuvers of 1924, Problem No. 4,” Marine Corps Gazette, IX,
1 (March 1924), pp. 1–27.
Wilson, Eugene E., “The Navy’s First Carrier Task Force,” Proceedings, February
1950, pp. 163–66.
“World Battleships Lists,” www.hazegray.org/navhist/battleships/.
Wukovits, John F., Devotion to Duty: A Biography of Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995).
Yerxa, Donald A., “The Special Service Squadron and the Caribbean Region,
1920–1940: A Case Study in Naval Diplomacy,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 1986, pp. 60–72.
Young, Jack, “The Real Architect of Pearl Harbor,” Wings of Gold, Vol. 30, No. 1
(Spring 2005), pp. 54–56.
Zogbaum, Rufus Fairchild, “From Port To Port With The White Squadron,”
Scribner’s Magazine, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October, 1890), pp. 453–72.

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

379

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Albert A. Nofi is an American military historian. He holds a BA (1965) and an MA
(1967) from Fordham University and a PhD in military history from the City University of New York (1991). From 1965 through 1995 Dr. Nofi was a teacher and
later administrator in alternative programs in the New York City public schools, retiring as an assistant principal. During this period he also built a parallel career as an
independent historian, defense analyst, and war-game designer, working primarily
at Simulations Publications (SPI). Dr. Nofi has lectured at the University of Paris–
Sorbonne, the Smithsonian Institution, the Library and Archives Canada, the National Museum of the Pacific War, the Air War College, the Command and Staff
College of the Marine Corps University, several other colleges and universities, and
numerous Civil War Round Tables and local historical societies. In 1999 Dr. Nofi
became a research analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria,
Virginia, and was for several years assigned as the CNA field representative to the
Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group, in Newport, Rhode Island,
from 2001 through 2005, before returning to CNA until 2006. A former Associate
Fellow of the U.S. Civil War Center, he has been a director of the New York Military
Affairs Symposium since its formation, and is a member of the Society for Military
History as well as of other military and historical societies, and is also a founding
member of the American Italian Historical Association. In addition to work for SPI,
Dr. Nofi has authored, coauthored, or edited over thirty books on a wide variety of
topics. Recent titles include The Spanish-American War (1996) and Victory and Deceit: Deception and Trickery at War (2001). He spends his time in Austin and New
York.

HM18_Nofi_frontmatterApril.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\HM18_Nofi_frontmatterApril.vp
Friday, June 25, 2010 3:53:46 PM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

382

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

INDEX
Note to the Reader: Certain words and phrases (e.g., “aircraft carrier,” “fleet problem,” “tactics,” “maneuvers,”
etc.) occur so frequently in this work that they have not been indexed. Personal names, designations of individual
fleet problems and other major maneuvers (e.g., “Fleet Problem XII”), and those of ships and other commands
have not always been indexed where they are repeated frequently in particular chapters or sections.
Aaron Ward (DD 773), USS, 36
Abbazia, Patrick, xiii
Acapulco, Mexico, 209
Adak, Aleutian Is., 199
advanced base operations. See amphibious
operations/advanced base operations
Akron (ZRS 4), USS, 4, 159–60, 162, 343
Alabama (BB 8), USS, 31
Alaska, 3, 59, 196–98, 201, 203, 267
Aleutian Is., 3, 195–96, 198–99, 201, 203, 219, 229,
235, 257, 280
Almirante Latorre, Chilean battleship, 32, 45
Amami–Oshima, Japan, 65
amphibious operations/advanced base operations, 3,
59, 62, 66, 74, 77, 79, 94, 219, 231, 240, 250, 257,
272, 278
Anchorage, Alaska, 219
Andrews, Adolphus, 236, 241–42, 246–47, 257, 331,
339
Antigua, 130
Arctic, 20
Argonaut (SS 166), USS, 182
Arizona (BB 39), USS, 67, 169, 240, 342–43
Ark Royal, British aircraft carrier, 304
Arkansas (BB 33), USS, 16, 23, 69, 105, 140, 142–43,
146, 253
Army, United States, 2, 6, 30–31, 49, 68, 74, 85, 94,
109–10, 114, 116, 135, 152, 154, 165, 168, 173,
182, 190, 211, 220, 245, 256–57, 272, 282, 308
Army Air Corps/Air Forces, 5, 31, 53, 62, 77, 79, 91,
93–94, 104, 110, 113, 115, 176, 182, 196, 200, 220,
283, 312
Army War College, 332, 334, 336–38
Aroostook (CM 3), USS, 24, 44, 62–63, 74, 92, 100,
109–10, 113–15, 121, 124, 308
Asiatic Fleet, 5, 10, 16, 60, 100, 349

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

ASW (anti-submarine warfare), 14, 179, 198, 221,
240, 245, 253, 290–91
Atlantic, 100, 105, 109, 122, 151, 178, 182, 190, 207,
239–41, 248, 265, 279–80, 291, 304
Atlantic Fleet, 1, 9, 62, 253, 280, 313
Atlantic Squadron, 9, 241, 247–48, 280, 313
Augusta (CA 31), USS, 168
Austin, Charles M., 4, 162, 331
Australia, 5, 77, 80–81
Aux Cayes, Haiti, 65–66, 132
auxiliaries, 52, 76, 93, 103, 203, 292
Axis, 239, 249
Azores Is., 1, 61, 240–41
B-17 Boeing bomber, 34–35, 46, 213
Bahia Honda, Panama, 111–12, 141, 143–44
Baker, Wilder D., 14, 332
Balboa, Panama, 53, 62, 85–86, 91, 210, 213, 257, 310
Baldwin, Hanson W., 162, 207
Balkan Wars, 5
Barbados, 129–31
Battle Fleet/Battle Force, 9, 51–52, 59–60, 62, 67, 74,
80, 85, 93, 95, 100, 110, 121, 135, 141, 154, 160,
178, 207, 231, 236, 283–84, 295–96, 312
Battle Force. See Battle Fleet/Battle Force
Beaver (AS 5), USS, 170
Bellinger, Patrick, 213, 332
Bismarck, German battleship, 29, 45, 304
Blackie Affair, 67
Bloch, Claude C., 19, 218, 221–25, 227–28, 230,
232–33, 240, 247, 309–10, 317, 329, 331–32
Block I., R.I., 105
Bostwick, Lucius Allyn, 121–22, 129, 332
Bougainville I., 313, 333
Brazil, 239–40
Brazos (AO 4), USS, 160, 214
Breck (DD 283), USS, 113

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

INDEX

Britain, United Kingdom of Great, xvii, 23, 29–30,
43–44, 61, 109, 129, 187, 247, 249, 265, 304
Brooklyn (CL 40), USS, 12, 253, 282
Brown, John H., Jr., 15
Brown, Preston, 94, 332
Brown, Wilson, 14, 303, 313, 332, 336
Brumby, Frank H., 184, 333
Bryan, Hamilton, 63–64, 294, 333
budget, 3, 5, 174, 177, 279, 281–82, 297, 325
Bureau of Aeronautics, 33, 37, 309, 343, 348
Bureau of Navigation, 236, 296, 312
California, 51, 60, 73–74, 109, 117, 156, 160, 171, 190,
197, 208, 220, 229, 272, 279
California (BB 44), USS, 6, 33, 63, 75, 92, 104, 115,
124, 134, 179–80, 194, 235, 286, 299, 332, 339
Callao, Peru, 59
Campbell, Mark Allen, xii, xix, 39, 289, 306
Canary Is., 240
Cape Cherchel, Battle of, 317
Cape Esperance, Battle of, 317
Cape Mala, Panama, 61
Cape Matapan, Battle of, 317
Cape Palos, Battle of, 317
Caribbean, xv, xxvi, xxviii, 1–4, 19, 23, 37, 43, 58–59,
62–65, 67, 73, 87, 91–92, 109, 113, 121–22, 126,
129–31, 139, 145, 165, 177, 182–84, 188–89,
239–42, 246–47, 266, 272, 277, 279–80, 297
Catalina Is., 266
censorship, 192, 207, 219, 229, 240, 285, 298
Center for Naval Analyses, xi
Central America, 50–51, 59, 73, 85–86, 129, 139, 141,
179, 207, 254, 266, 279
Chagres, Panama, 62–63, 87
Channel Is., Calif., 157
cheating, 38, 69, 113, 174, 294–96
Chesapeake Bay, 61, 146
Chester (CA 27), USS, 180, 201, 343
Chicago (CA 29), USS, 200
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 9, 14, 20–23, 28,
54, 67, 85, 117, 140, 145, 159, 177, 214, 239, 245,
247, 265, 267, 283–84, 287, 292, 310, 321, 344
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 23, 77, 110, 267, 283,
334–35
Chile, xvii, 1, 32, 59–60, 88, 239
China, 31, 65, 79, 81, 94, 160, 178, 229, 250, 265, 314
China Incident, xvii, 31, 298, 314
China Seas, 58, 65
Chinese Navy, 31
Chiriqui Lagoon, Panama, 61–62, 69, 216
Christmas I., 73–74, 265
Cimarron (AO 22), USS, 300
Clark, Frank H., 165, 167–68, 173, 333
Clark, J. J. “Jocko,” 152, 170, 333
Clemson (DD 186), USS, 35, 168
Cluverius, Watt Tyler, 197, 221, 333
CNO Strategic Studies Group, xi
coast defense, 87, 92, 94–95, 99, 105, 283
Coco Solo, Panama, 51, 63, 111

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:51 AM

codes and ciphers, xiv, 22, 75–76, 113, 116–17, 125,
131, 134, 236, 255, 284, 293
Cold War, xiv, 2, 273, 275, 321
Cole, Cyrus W., 141, 144, 166, 197–98, 333
Cole, Eli K., 63, 68, 333
Cole, William C., 121–22, 129, 134–35, 334
Colombia, 52, 129
Colorado (BB 45), USS, 11
combat loading, 66, 70
Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force (COMAIRONS),
14, 24, 95, 102, 111, 141, 143, 150, 221
Commander, Battle Fleet/Force (COMBATFLT/
COMBATFOR), 14, 24–25, 33, 52, 62, 74, 77, 85,
91, 93, 100, 110, 121, 129, 132, 151, 155, 160, 167,
178, 199, 208, 221, 230, 241, 254, 311
Commander, Scouting Fleet/Force (COMSCOFLT/
COMSCOFOR), 14, 25, 62, 74, 85, 91, 93, 110,
121, 129, 140, 155, 165, 184, 196, 208, 221, 230,
241, 312–13
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS),
xiv, xxvi, 3, 9, 14, 19–21, 23, 25–26, 33, 37–42, 51,
53–55, 76, 85, 102, 115, 121, 125, 129, 153, 159,
167–68, 172–73, 177, 181, 188–90, 196, 203, 212,
214, 225, 230, 232–33, 240, 247, 256, 260, 262,
265–67, 283, 285–86, 292, 307–12, 315, 317, 329,
339–40, 344–46, 349
communications, 22, 38, 40, 54–56, 67, 75–76, 93,
103, 113, 116–18, 126, 134–35, 139, 179, 192, 202,
207, 225, 229, 253, 255–56, 261–62, 284, 286,
292–93, 321
Concord (CL 10), USS, 38, 133–34
Congress, 53, 55, 117, 281, 292
Conner, Fox, 102, 104, 334
constructive forces, 25–27, 37, 52–53, 60, 62, 65–67,
69, 74, 95, 100, 121, 140, 155, 161, 166–67, 169,
184, 188, 197, 208, 259, 287, 289, 307–308, 327
Contocook (AT 36), USS, 123
Control Force, 10, 16, 22, 51, 61–62, 65–66, 74, 85, 93,
110, 140, 165
Coolidge, Calvin, 281, 331–32
Coontz, Robert E., 3, 14, 20, 54, 61, 67, 76, 78–80,
292, 310, 329, 334
Coral Sea, Battle of the, 278, 305, 312, 317, 336
Costa Rica, 52, 139, 266
Craig, Malin, 110, 151, 283, 334
Cristobal, Panama, 184
critique, 27, 40, 54, 64, 68, 79, 86, 92, 102, 115, 125,
153, 173, 203, 247, 260, 284, 293, 309–10, 315
cruising formation, 52, 56, 74, 86–87, 179, 183, 185,
208, 212, 232, 263, 311, 342, 344
Cuba, xvii, 5, 92–93, 122, 129, 131, 240, 249
Culebra, P.R., 65–67, 183–86, 189, 243–45, 272, 286
Culebra Cut, Panama, 63
Cuyama (AO 3), USS, 61, 214
Day, George C., 100–101, 103, 334
de Steiguer, Louis R., 100–102, 104, 335
Denby, Edwin C., 53, 335
Denmark Strait, Battle of, 29
Depression/Crash of 1929, 11–13, 160, 281, 292, 314

383

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

384

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

DeRuyter, Dutch light cruiser, 35
Detroit (CL 8), USS, 86, 88, 113, 131, 294–95, 349
Dinger, Henry C., 69, 335
Dobbin (AD 3), USS, 198
Dominican Republic, xvii, 23, 92–93, 129, 239, 244,
249
Doyle, Austin K., 32, 119, 335
Drayton (DD 366), USS, 243
Drum, Hugh A., 220–21, 335
Dunnigan, James F., 320
Dutch Harbor, Aleutian Is., 199, 220, 258
Dyer, Thomas, 116, 335, 345
East Asia, 2, 240
East Coast, xv, 1, 51, 59, 67, 74, 80, 86, 109, 121, 127,
129, 207, 246, 265, 284
Eastern Pacific, xxviii, 279
Eberle, Edward W., 20, 52, 335
effectiveness of air attack, 30, 33–34, 36, 309
El Salvador, 60
Eltinge, LeRoy, 78, 336
Empress of France, Canadian ocean liner, 78
Eniwetok I., Mandates, 59
Enterprise (CV 6), USS, 12, 38, 162, 173, 241–44, 249,
282, 289, 305, 313
espionage, 76, 226, 249
Essex (CV 9), USS, 12
European Squadron, 16
Europe/European, 2, 19, 25, 41, 61, 121, 139, 177,
183, 265, 277, 285
experiments, 2, 27, 66, 135, 160, 188, 286, 292, 294,
311, 313, 321
F2A “Buffalo” Brewster fighter, 304
F2B Boeing fighter, 113
F3B Boeing fighter, 113–14, 116
F3F3 Grumman fighter, 304
F4B/P-12 Boeing fighter, 152, 304
F4F “Wildcat” Grumman fighter, 162, 304
Far East, 41, 77, 160, 265, 267
Farallon Is., 167
Fascism/Fascist, xiv, 2, 239, 249
Felker, Craig C., xii
Fessenden Oscillator, 56
5th Marine Regiment, 62, 245
1st Marine Provisional Brigade, 77–78
Fisher’s I., N.Y., 105
Fitch, Aubrey W., 312, 336
Fleet Landing Exercise (FLEX) No. 5 (1939), 245, 284
Fleet Landing Exercise (FLEX) No. 7 (1941), 266
Fleet Marine Force, 10, 178, 199
Fleet Problem I (1923), 3, 26, 47, 51, 55, 285, 292,
295, 307, 310–11, 322
Fleet Problem II (1924), 3, 5, 20, 22, 59, 64, 67, 94,
292, 299, 314
Fleet Problem III (1924), 3, 20, 22, 26, 40, 42, 59, 61,
64, 67–68, 283, 291, 294, 299, 310
Fleet Problem IV (1924), 3, 20, 22, 25, 27, 59, 64,
66–68, 307, 310
Fleet Problem V (1925), xvii, 3, 73, 76, 78, 280, 283,
291

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:52 AM

Fleet Problem VI (1926), 38, 85, 94, 277, 294, 311
Fleet Problem VII (1927), 4–5, 20, 38, 91–92, 95, 277,
283, 294–95, 314
Fleet Problem VIII (1928), 20–22, 25, 98–100,
104–105, 159, 277, 296, 309–10
Fleet Problem IX (1929), 6, 24, 26, 40, 109, 116–17,
122, 125, 247, 283, 286, 290, 293–96, 303, 307,
310, 322
Fleet Problem X (1930), xxvi, 25, 27–28, 37, 121, 125,
135, 152, 280, 287, 293, 303
Fleet Problem XI (1930), 27, 37–38, 129, 141, 144,
280, 287, 293–95
Fleet Problem XII (1931), 22, 25, 28, 139, 287, 289,
291, 303
Fleet Problem XIII (1932), xv, xvii, 4, 33, 37–38, 40,
151, 154–55, 160–61, 280, 283, 289–90, 292
Fleet Problem XIV (1933), 2, 4, 8, 21–22, 25, 33–34,
39–40, 161, 165, 167, 172, 177, 190, 235, 272,
289–90, 295, 300, 303
Fleet Problem XV (1934), 4, 26, 34, 39, 177, 187, 190,
277–78, 282–83, 285–86, 290, 295–96, 298, 303,
310
Fleet Problem XVI (1935), xxiv, 3, 26, 37, 195, 203,
214, 286, 289, 291, 308, 314
Fleet Problem XVII (1936), 6, 26, 37, 207, 280, 285,
287
Fleet Problem XVIII (1937), 3, 219, 283, 285, 293,
303, 308–309
Fleet Problem XIX (1938), 3, 6, 19, 26, 40, 42, 228–29,
280, 293, 295, 309
Fleet Problem XX (1939), xiii–xiv, xvii, 6, 19, 23,
37–38, 81, 162, 239, 277, 280, 282–85, 292–94,
298–99, 308–309, 311, 313
Fleet Problem XXI (1940), 6, 23, 32, 37–39, 253, 265,
271, 278, 280, 285, 293, 298–99, 308–10, 314
Fleet Problem XXII (1941), 265
Fletcher, Frank J., 14, 258–59, 305, 312–13, 336
Florida (BB 30), USS, 16, 26, 105, 148, 333, 348
Flusser (DD 368), USS, 243, 299
Formosa, 65, 93
France, 30, 250, 265, 341
Frankfurt, German cruiser, 30–31
Frederiksted, V.I., 130
French Frigate Shoals, 3, 6, 198, 203, 219, 221–24,
231, 237, 257–60, 299
Friedman, Norman, xii, 16, 137
Fuso, Japanese battleship, 37
Galapagos Is., Ecuador, 3, 24, 52, 110–13, 141–43, 266
Gannet (AVP 8), USS, 74, 100, 170–71
garbage grinders, 193, 298
Gatun Locks/Gatun Dam, Panama, 62–63, 87, 92,
110, 113, 294
Genda, Minoru, 137, 249, 298
General Board of the Navy, 10, 16, 21, 38, 55, 156,
173, 332–33, 336, 338–39, 343
geographic transposition, 20, 58, 99, 109, 237
Germany, 1, 31–32, 187, 239, 265–66, 290–91
Glorious, British aircraft carrier, 304
Gneisenau, German battleship, 304

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

INDEX

Gonaives, Haiti, 93, 95, 189
Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise (GJE), 2, 49
Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise (GJE) No. 2 (1924),
59, 61–62, 64, 280, 283, 291, 294, 299
Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise (GJE) No. 3 (1925),
73, 76–77, 79, 283
Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise (GJE) No. 4 (1932),
150–51, 160–61, 166, 250, 283, 298
Great Mesle Bay, Haiti, 122, 185
Great White Fleet, 5, 340, 342, 348
Greenslade, John W., 178–80, 182, 188, 230, 336
Grenada, 130
Griffin, Robert M., 248, 336
Grimes, James M., xi, 125, 190, 236, 288
Guadalcanal, First and Second Naval Battles of, 29,
35, 187, 317
Guadalupe I., Mexico, 73–75, 78, 230
Guam, Mariana Is., 99–100, 104, 219, 254, 257
Guantanamo, Cuba, 92–94, 126, 130–34, 141, 178,
240–41, 266
Guiana, 240
Gulf of Chiriqui, Panama, 69, 142, 213, 216
Gulf of Fonseca, Panama, 59, 209
Gulf of Gonave, Haiti, 93–94
Gulf of Panama, 24, 53, 59–60, 86–87, 92, 109,
113–14, 141, 143, 208–209, 280
Gully, B. W., 247, 337
Haiti, xvii, xxvi, 5, 23, 44, 65, 79, 92–94, 122, 129,
131–32, 178, 242, 249, 314
Halsey, William F., 14, 213, 235, 261, 303, 312–13,
336–37, 347
Hampton Roads, Va., 51, 110, 135, 140, 146
Harding, Warren G., 331, 335
Hart, Thomas C., 196, 198–201, 210–11, 214, 287,
303, 337
Hawaii, xv, 3, 21, 59, 72–73, 76–79, 85, 98–100,
103–104, 151–52, 154–57, 160, 165–68, 195,
197–200, 202, 208, 219–22, 229–31, 233–35,
254–55, 257–58, 261, 265–67, 278–80, 283
Hawaiian Department/Division, 77, 102, 104, 151,
165–66, 196, 199, 220, 231, 283
Hederman, Thomas H., 47, 63–64, 70, 294, 337
Heintzelman, Stuart, 77–78, 337
Henderson (AP 1), USS, 53, 65–66
Hepburn, Arthur J., 34, 196–97, 199, 208–11, 329, 337
Hermes, British aircraft carrier, 45
Hewitt, H. Kent, 100, 338
Hiei, Japanese battleship, 35
Hilo, Hawaii, 152, 220
Hines, John F., 54, 338
Hines, John L., 77, 79, 338
Hirama, Yoichi, xvii
Hiryu, Japanese aircraft carrier, 305
Holmes, R. S., 194, 338
Hone, Thomas C., xii
Honolulu, Hawaii, 80, 102
Hood, HMS, 29, 45, 299
Hoover, Herbert, 135, 137, 332
Hopkins (DD 249), USS, 243

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:52 AM

Horne, Frederick J., 178, 218, 221, 224–25, 309–10,
331, 338
Hornet (CV 8), USS, 12, 305, 312, 343
Hornet (CV 12), USS, 32, 119
Hosho, Japanese aircraft carrier, 45
Houston (CA 30), USS, 35–36, 180, 240, 245, 250
Hughes, Charles F., 28, 85–87, 92, 95, 117, 308, 329,
339, 344
Hyatoma Maru, Japanese tanker, 76
Idaho (BB 42), USS, 33, 202, 349
Imperial Navy, Japanese, xiv, xvi–xvii, xxvi, 77,
116–17, 188, 195, 198, 203, 285, 297, 304, 314
Indian Ocean, 273
Indiana (BB 1), USS, 31
Indianapolis (CA 35), USS, 189, 199, 338
Indo-China, 265
Iowa (BB 4), USS, 31, 53
Iowa (BB 61), USS, 261, 288
Irwin, Noble E., 339
Italy, 31–32, 239, 265
Jackson, Edward S., 14, 38, 156, 339
Jackson, Richard H., 91, 93–94, 339
Jadhigar-i-Millet, Turkish destroyer, 30
Jaime I, Spanish battleship, 32, 46
Jamaica, 65, 129, 133
Japan, xvi, xxvi, 25, 29–30, 32, 37, 51, 59, 61, 65, 73,
76–77, 80–81, 85, 92, 99, 109, 155, 160, 165, 183,
187, 195–96, 207, 209, 211, 219, 229–31, 235,
239–40, 250, 253–54, 257, 261, 265–67, 271, 277,
287, 293, 305–306, 313, 319
Java Sea, 35
Johnston I., 219, 257–60, 272, 279
joint, xiv, 2, 73, 79, 94, 104–105, 135, 166, 220, 245,
282–83, 285
Joint Army-Navy Board, 23, 44
Jones, Hilary P., 26, 53–54, 307, 329
Jutland, Battle of, xxvi, 45, 53, 187, 271, 317
Kalbfus, Edward C., 32, 230–31, 235, 241–44, 246,
307, 331, 339
kamikaze, 36, 64
Kate, Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bomber, 304
Keith, Francis Lovell, xiii, 290
Keith, Robert Taylor Scott, 40, 339
Kempff, Clarence S., 211–12, 340
Key West, Fla., 51
Kidder (DD 319), USS, 38, 294–95, 332
Kimmel, Husband, 227, 237, 308–309, 312, 317,
329–31, 340, 344
King (DD 242), USS, 123
King, Ernest J., 14, 16, 51, 141, 143, 145–46, 155,
158–59, 222, 224, 230–31, 235–37, 241–44, 249,
295, 303, 312, 329–30, 340, 347, 349
Kingston, Jamaica, 130
Kirishima, Japanese battleship, 29–30
Kiska, Aleutian Is., 199
Kongo, Japanese battleship, 27, 37, 100, 287, 299, 305
Krueger, Walter, 78, 340
Kure, Japan, 65

385

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

386

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Kure Atoll, 3, 203
Kurile Is., 195, 203, 229
Kurita, Takeo, 306
Lae, Papua, 313
Laffey (DD 724), USS, 36
Lahaina Roads, Hawaii, 3, 80, 100, 104, 153–54,
156–58, 221, 224, 231, 256–57, 260
Langley (CV 1/AV 3), USS, xxvi, 12, 14, 26, 38, 52, 62,
64–66, 74–77, 85–87, 91–95, 98, 100, 102–104,
109–10, 114–15, 121, 123–24, 129–30, 133–34,
140, 143–44, 146, 155–57, 159, 167, 171–73,
178–79, 181, 184, 195, 197–99, 208–209, 211, 214,
221–23, 231, 244, 289, 308, 311, 339
Laning, Harris, 4, 28, 38, 107, 154–55, 160, 194,
199–202, 308, 331, 341, 346
Lapwing (AVP 1), USS, 243
Latin America, xiv, 23, 51, 239
Lea (DD 118), USS, 286
Leahy, William D., 208–12, 214, 239, 245, 247, 250,
341
Leigh, Richard H., 21, 151–52, 155, 160, 167, 329, 341
Lesser Antilles, 65, 122, 129–30, 239–40, 266
Lewis, Edward M., 77, 342
Lexington (CV 2), USS, xxi, xxiv–xxvi, 8, 12, 26–27,
36, 38, 67, 76–77, 84, 87, 90, 99, 104–105, 107,
109–13, 115–16, 121–22, 124, 128–34, 140–46,
151–53, 155–56, 158–59, 162, 165, 168–69, 172,
178–79, 181, 184, 188, 195–96, 198–99, 201, 203,
206, 208, 211–12, 214, 221–24, 230–33, 235,
237–38, 241–44, 250, 254–55, 257–59, 261, 264,
289, 304, 308, 312–13, 318, 333, 336
Lindbergh, Charles A., 110, 283
logistics, 60, 145, 203, 214, 216, 284, 292
Long Beach, Calif., 2, 4
Long I., N.Y., 99, 105, 135
Los Angeles (ZR 3), USS, 23, 138–44, 147, 155, 159,
162
Louisville (CA 28), USS, 158, 169, 181, 200
MacArthur, Arthur, III, 53, 342
MacFall, Roscoe C., 56, 342
Macon (ZRS 5), USS, 4, 159, 162, 184–86, 191
Magdalena Bay, Mexico, 52, 109–10, 155–57, 159, 266
Manchuria, 31, 160
Mandates, xvii, 61, 155, 219, 257, 265
Manila, Philippines, 60, 65, 85, 93, 99, 219, 277
Manzanillo Bay, Panama, 87
Marblehead (CL 12), USS, 35–36, 158
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, 167, 197, 207, 235–36
Marine Corps, 2, 66, 68, 77–80, 94, 178, 184, 186, 196,
198, 222, 241, 245–47, 267, 272–73, 282, 314, 333,
335
Marshall, George C., 267
Martin, Charles H., 87, 92, 343
Martinique, 65
Maryland (BB 46), USS, 26, 28, 37, 62, 121, 346
Massachusetts (BB 2), USS, 31
Massie Affair, 154, 161
Maui, Hawaii, 3, 100, 153, 256
Mayaguez, P.R., 130

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:52 AM

McCrary, Frank R., 108, 155, 158, 342
McCully, Newton A., 46, 62–65, 67, 291, 310, 342
McDonald, John D., 51, 53, 77, 342
McKean, Josiah S., 74, 85–86, 88, 343
McNamee, Luke, 33–34, 167, 172, 343
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 292
Metcalf, Martin K., 180, 343
metrics, xi, 28–30
Midway, Battle of, xxvi, 34, 116, 124, 279, 300, 305,
312–13, 317, 336
Midway Atoll, 3, 73, 166, 195–96, 198–203, 219,
221–22, 257–58, 265, 279–80
Milwaukee (CL 5), USS, 88, 131, 170–71
Miraflores Locks, Panama Canal, 53, 63, 92, 110, 113
Mississippi (BB 41), USS, xxi, 31, 53, 134, 185, 188,
202, 343, 347
Mitscher, Marc, 14, 244, 272, 343
Moffett, William A., 14, 33–34, 162, 309, 343
Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, 94
Molokai, Hawaii, 78, 166, 234
Moon Sound, Battle of, 317
Mutsu, Japanese battleship, 29
Mutsuki, Japanese destroyer, 34–35
Nagato, Japanese battleship, 47, 299
Narragansett Bay, R.I., 94–95
Narwhal (SS 167), USS, 182
National Guard and Reserves, 5, 77–78, 94, 105, 220,
245
National Industrial Recovery Act, 192, 281, 326
Nautilus (SS 168), USS, 182
Naval Academy, 10, 13–14, 63, 105, 162, 319
naval arms limitation treaties, 9, 11, 16, 117, 121, 129,
135, 174, 195, 280, 282, 297, 299, 344
naval district, 22, 297
Naval District, 11th, 167
Naval District, 13th, 167
Naval District, 14th, 77, 100, 151, 166, 168, 220, 231,
317
Naval District, 15th, 52, 60–62, 91, 110–11
naval force, xii, xvi, xxvi, 2, 246, 271, 275, 303
Naval War College (NWC), ix, xix, 2, 6, 10, 20–22,
27–29, 32–33, 37–38, 41, 95, 154–55, 160, 286,
307, 320–21, 339, 341
Navassa Island, xxvi, 122, 125, 127, 131–33
Navassa Island, Battle of, 123–24
Navy, Department of the, 4, 9, 23, 44, 53, 77, 165,
177–78, 281, 284
Navy Warfare Development Command, 320
Nell, Mitsubishi G3M Type 96 bomber, 35
Nelson, British battleship, 140
Neptunus Rex, 112, 212
Netherlands, xvii, 35, 129, 249, 265
Neutrality Patrol, 9, 41, 253, 263, 265, 280, 313, 338
Nevada (BB 36), USS, 233, 334, 340, 343
Nevis, 130
New England, 94
New Jersey (BB 16), USS, 31
New London, Conn., 105
New Mexico (BB 40), USS, 37, 124, 202, 220, 332–33

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

INDEX

New York (BB 34), USS, 14, 16, 38, 46, 52, 63, 70, 88,
171, 199, 245–46, 248, 253, 336, 339–40, 344
New York City, xv, 4, 67, 94, 105, 135, 189, 246
New York Times, 4, 207, 267
New Zealand, 5, 77, 80–81, 265
Newport, R.I., 95, 189
Nicaragua, 5, 79, 94, 139–40, 178, 266, 314
Nimitz, Chester W., 15, 52, 69, 74, 240, 279, 312, 330,
344
Norfolk, Va., 91
North Africa, 2
North America, 59
North Carolina (BB 55), USS, 14, 261, 288, 332
North Pacific Triangle, 195, 214, 219, 229, 267, 279
Northampton (CA 26), USS, 142, 144, 180–81, 190
Nulton, Louis M., 70, 121, 129, 132–33, 137, 344
O2U “Corsair” Vought scout & observation airplane,
113
O3U Vought observation floatplane, 200
Oahu, Hawaii, 59–60, 78, 102, 104, 152–54, 166, 200–
201, 208, 219–21, 231, 233–34, 237, 255, 257, 286
Okinawa, Japan, 65
Oklahoma (BB 37), USS, 47, 52–54, 169, 199
OL-8 Loeing amphibian radio relay & observation
airplane, 113, 116
Omaha (CL 4), USS, 11–12, 29, 61, 67, 91–92, 100,
110–13, 254
Ortolan (AM 45), USS, 170
Ostfriesland, German battleship, 30–31
P2D1 Douglas patrol bomber, 213
P2Y Consolidated patrol bomber, 185, 191, 213–14
Pacific, xxvi, 2–3, 9, 19, 25, 37, 59, 62, 64–65, 72–73,
77, 80, 85, 91, 93, 99, 109, 115, 121–22, 139, 141,
154–55, 168, 177, 179, 183, 195, 198, 200, 207,
214, 219, 230, 240, 246, 248, 253, 265, 272–73,
277, 290, 297, 308, 312, 319
Pacific Fleet, 1
Palau I., Mandates, 59, 155
Panama, xv, 1, 23, 40, 50, 52–53, 60–61, 63, 65, 73,
85–86, 91–93, 109, 112, 122, 139, 141–42, 167,
176, 179, 181–82, 190, 207, 209–10, 212, 235, 266,
279, 283
Panama Canal, 22, 24–25, 51, 53–54, 59, 62, 64, 67,
74–75, 80, 86–87, 91, 109, 111, 113–15, 117, 121,
125, 129, 140–41, 182–83, 190, 209–10, 213, 240,
266, 284–86, 297, 307–308, 310
Panama Department/Division, 52, 62, 87, 91, 110–11,
165, 310
Panay (PR 5), USS, 32, 229
Patoka (AO 9), USS, 138, 140
Patrol Force, 9
Patrol Wing Two (PATWING 2), 232
PBY Consolidated Aviation patrol bomber, 42, 191,
214, 225, 230–31, 240–41, 243–44, 247–48, 253,
256, 261, 309, 317
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 6, 79, 98–99, 101–102, 104,
152, 155, 165–66, 170, 196, 198–200, 202–203,
221, 224, 231, 234, 236, 260, 266, 271, 286, 292,
298, 309, 312, 331

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:52 AM

Pelican (AVP 6), USS, 222
Pennsylvania (BB 38), USS, 54, 155, 158, 170–71, 176,
189, 219, 240, 245, 252, 334, 336, 338, 341, 344
Pensacola (CA 24), USS, 142–43, 181, 235, 295
Perdicaris Affair, 5
Peru, xvii, 1, 59–60, 88
Pescadores Is., China, 65, 93
Petropavlovsk, USSR, 267
Philippines, 59–60, 65, 85, 93, 99, 219, 267
PM and PM-2 Martin seaplane, 213
Ponce, P.R., 130, 178, 183
Portland (CA 33), USS, 181, 200–201
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, 130–31, 247
Pratt, William V., 21, 24, 28, 40, 67, 108, 110, 114,
116–17, 121, 125, 129, 135–36, 145, 159, 247,
286–87, 310, 329, 344
Procyon (AG 11), USS, 100–101
protests, 77, 81, 92, 195–96, 204, 229, 239
publicity/press, 3–4, 95, 117, 189, 203, 240, 245, 263,
285, 322
Puerto Culebra, Costa Rica, 52, 54, 141–43
Puerto Rico, xv, xvii, 65–66, 92, 122, 129–31, 186,
188, 240–46, 341
Puget Sound, Wash., 155–57, 159, 167–68, 196–97,
207, 220
Putnam (DD 287), USS, 33
Pye, William S., 252, 254, 344
radar, 35, 248, 261, 294, 308, 317, 321
Ramillies, British battleship, 29
Ranger (CV 4), USS, 12, 26–27, 36, 119, 173, 178, 184,
195, 199–201, 208, 211, 213–14, 221–23, 230–36,
241–42, 244, 246, 248, 253, 314
Reeves, Joseph M., 14, 24, 33, 91–92, 94–95, 102,
104–105, 108, 111–12, 114, 117, 141, 143, 145–46,
167, 169, 173, 178–82, 184, 189–90, 193, 196–98,
203, 205, 210–12, 214, 216, 267, 286, 290, 310–11,
329, 331, 344, 346, 349
refueling, 20, 61, 69, 74, 85–86, 139, 160, 169, 203,
208, 214, 240, 253, 287, 292, 311, 335
Repulse, British battlecruiser, 299
Rhode Island Sound, 20, 94, 105
Richardson, James O., xxvi, 13, 19, 38, 40, 42, 219,
225, 227, 250, 252, 260–62, 266–67, 285, 303,
308–309, 313–14, 317, 329, 331, 345
Richmond (CL 9), USS, 131, 171, 173
Robison, Samuel S., 62, 74, 77, 329, 345
Rochefort, Joseph J., 116, 345–46
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 189, 240, 245–46, 250, 253,
262, 279, 281, 292, 332–33, 340–41, 345
Royal Naval Air Service, 30
Royal Navy, British, xiv, xvi, 31, 80, 117, 140, 299, 304
rules, 27–29, 32–34, 36, 39, 182, 307
S-11 (SS 116), USS, 75, 332
S-12 (SS 117), USS, 123
S-42 (SS 153), USS, 152
S-44 (SS 155), USS, 198
Safford, Laurence F., 116, 293, 346
Salamaua, Papua, 313
Salt Lake City (CA 25), USS, 135, 158, 180, 242

387

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

388

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

Samana Bay, Dominican Republic, 93, 130, 132, 244
Samar, Battle off, 306
Samoa, 73, 80, 257
San Clemente I., 240
San Diego, Calif., 22, 51, 59–60, 73, 76, 80, 85, 91,
108, 110, 157, 167–68, 177–78, 196–97, 207, 213,
230, 254, 265–66, 280
San Francisco (CA 38), USS, 29
San Francisco, Calif., xv, 4, 76, 78, 99–101, 103,
155–57, 159, 167–69, 171–72, 196–97, 219, 230,
254–55
San Juan, P.R., 130, 178, 183–84, 243–44
San Pedro, Calif., 59–60, 74, 76, 85, 99–100, 157,
167–68, 171, 177–78, 196–97, 207, 213, 230, 235,
240, 266, 296
Sandpiper (AVP 9), USS, 129–32, 243
Santa Barbara Channel, 170
Santa Cruz Channel, 170
Santa Cruz Is., Battle of, 317, 336
Saratoga (CV 3), USS, xxi, xxiv, xxvi, 12, 24, 26–27,
38, 67, 76, 87, 99, 104, 109–17, 121–25, 129–34,
140–43, 145–46, 150–53, 155–59, 162, 165, 168,
170–72, 174, 178–81, 184–85, 188, 195, 199,
208–14, 216, 221–23, 230–33, 235, 237, 240–41,
250, 254–55, 257–60, 283, 286, 289, 294–95, 304,
307–308, 310, 312, 339, 342, 348–49
Sasebo, Japan, 65
Saturday Evening Post, 231
Savo I., Battle of, 317
SBD “Dauntless” Douglas dive bomber, 134, 162
Scharnhorst, German battleship, 304
Schofield, Frank H., 21, 140–42, 144, 153, 155, 159,
283, 329, 346
Scouting Fleet/Scouting Force, 9, 16, 51–52, 59,
61–62, 66–67, 74, 77, 80, 82, 85–86, 93–94,
99–100, 105, 109–10, 127, 135, 140–41, 145–46,
148, 154–55, 160, 178, 207–208, 230–31, 236,
295–96, 312
Scouting Force. See Scouting Fleet/Scouting Force
Seattle (CA 11), USS, 78
Secretary of the Navy, 144, 195, 203
Sellers, David Foote, 177–78, 181–82, 188–90, 298,
310–11, 329, 346
Senn, Thomas J., 111–12, 167, 172, 346
Shawmut (CM 4), USS, 74
Shenandoah (ZR 1), USS, 74, 342
Sicard (DD 346), USS, 286
Sims, William, 14, 339, 341, 344, 346
Sino-Japanese War, 31, 240, 298, 314
Slava, Russian battleship, 45
Snyder, Charles P., 252, 254–55, 257, 346
sonar attack, 39, 233, 291
South Dakota (BB 57), USS, 261, 288
Soviet Union, 239, 273
Spaatz, Carl T., 347
Spain, 32
Spanish Civil War, 31, 239, 298, 317
special operations, 63–64, 70, 87, 91, 246, 293–94
Special Service Squadron, 10, 16, 22, 60–61, 65, 165
Spruance, Raymond, 14, 305–306, 313, 347

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:52 AM

St. Kitts, 130
St. Thomas, V.I., 130, 189, 243
St. Vincent, 130
Standley, William H., 78, 168–69, 172, 177, 216, 347
Stark, Harold R., 267, 317
State, Department of, xiv, 23, 44, 77, 129, 160, 249,
284
surrogates. See constructive forces
Swanson, Claude A., xxvi, 195, 303, 347
Swartz, Peter M., 2, 5
T4M Martin bomber, 113–14
Taboga I., Panama, 91
Takagi, Takeo, 305
Tangier Crisis, 5
Tarawa–Makin Operation, 300
Tarrant, William T., 221–22, 230, 347
Task Force Seven, 240
Tassafaronga, Battle of, 317
Taylor, Montgomery Meigs, 110–11, 116, 125, 347
TBF “Avenger” Grumman dive bomber, 162
Teal (AVP 5), USS, 129–31
Tennessee (BB 43), USS, 37, 75, 114, 133
Texas (BB 35), USS, 16, 31, 169, 245–46, 248, 253
Thach, John “Jimmy,” xv
Theobald, Robert A., 233, 348
Time magazine, 145, 239
Towers, John H., 38, 152, 231, 348
Training Squadron, 10, 93, 100, 110
Trenton (CL 11), USS, 123, 131, 158
Trinidad, 65, 129, 131, 239–41
Tromp, Dutch light cruiser, 35
Trujillo, Rafael, 239
Truk I., Mandates, 59–60, 73
Tsushima, Battle of, 317
Tsushima Straits, Japan, 64, 237
Turner, Richmond K., 348
Uhlig, Frank, Jr., 193
umpire, 25, 27, 38–40, 77–78, 112, 118, 124, 155–56,
158, 160, 167, 172, 178, 183, 185, 196–97, 223,
255–56, 283, 286, 290
United States Fleet, 1, 9, 65, 196, 234, 265, 287, 319
Utah (BB 31/AG 16), USS, 5, 16, 18, 33–34, 40, 88,
105, 148, 196, 198, 241, 309
Val, Aichi D3A Type 99 dive bomber, 304
Vargas, Gaetulio, 239
Venezuela, xvii, 129, 240
Victorious, British aircraft carrier, 162, 304
Vieques, P.R., 65–66, 245
Virginia, 51, 272
Virginia (BB 13), USS, 31
Wadle, Ryan David, xiii
War Plan Orange, 4, 19, 61, 85, 257, 277–78, 292
War Plans Division, 21, 23
wargames, 2, 6, 20, 28, 45, 95, 321
Washington (BB 47), USS, 30–31
Washington (BB 56), USS, 29–30
Wasp (CV 7), USS, 12, 173

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

INDEX

Watch Hill, R.I., 95
Wells, Briant Harris, 151, 166, 348
West Coast, 67, 99, 121, 145–46, 151–52, 165, 167,
170, 178, 195, 202, 224, 229, 235, 240, 257, 266,
272, 284
West Virginia (BB 48), USS, 124, 133, 169, 299, 333,
346
White, Richard Drace, 113, 295, 348
Wildenberg, Thomas, xii
Wiley, Henry A., 77, 102–103, 115–17, 309–10, 329,
349
Willard, Arthur L., 140–41, 143–44, 155, 158, 349
Wilson, Eugene E., 117, 349
Windward Passage, 122, 131
World War I, 1–2, 11, 30, 32, 281, 290, 307
World War II, xiii–xiv, 6, 14, 16, 29–30, 34, 45, 68,
78–79, 81, 135, 187, 190–91, 233, 247, 253, 265,

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:52 AM

271–72, 275, 278, 285, 287, 290–91, 293, 303–304,
307, 309, 313, 317, 319, 321
World’s Fair, N.Y., 246
Wright (AV 1), USS, 66, 105, 121–22, 125, 129–33,
141–43, 167, 222, 244, 349
Wyoming (BB 32/AG 17), USS, 16, 26, 66, 69, 74–75,
78, 88, 114–15, 123, 148, 245–46, 349
XPS-2 Sikorsky S-38 amphibian aircraft, 113, 119
Yamamoto, Isoroku, 298
Yarnell, Harry, 111, 150, 152, 154–55, 159, 168, 172,
349
Yorktown (CV 5), USS, 12, 36, 38, 173, 241–43, 249,
254–61, 282, 289, 305, 312–14, 333, 336
Zeke/Zero, Mitsubishi A6M Type 00 fighter, 304
Zogbaum, Rufus F., 137, 170, 349

389

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Working_Nofi_2010_April.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\Working_Nofi_2010_April.vp
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 9:19:52 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH SERIES
1. The Writings of Stephen B. Luce, edited by John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf
(1975).
3. Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession,
Ronald Spector (1977).
4. The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941, Michael
Vlahos (1980).
5. On His Majesty’s Service: Observations of the British Home Fleet from the Diary, Reports,
and Letters of Joseph H. Wellings, Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché, London, 1940–1941, edited by John B. Hattendorf (1983).
7. A Bibliography of the Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, compiled by John B. Hattendorf
and Lynn C. Hattendorf (1986).
8. The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform: Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy, and Allied
Naval Cooperation, Joel J. Sokolsky (1991).
9. The Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, edited by John B. Hattendorf (1991).
10. Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett
and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, edited by James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf
(1993).
11. Ubi Sumus? The State of Naval and Maritime History, edited by John B. Hattendorf
(1994).
12. The Queenstown Patrol, 1917: The Diary of Commander Joseph Knefler Taussig, U.S.
Navy, edited by William N. Still, Jr. (1996).
13. Doing Naval History: Essays toward Improvement, edited by John B. Hattendorf (1995).
14. An Admiral’s Yarn, edited by Mark R. Shulman (1999).
15. The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, edited by Evelyn M. Cherpak (2004).

HM18_Nofi_frontmatterApril.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\HM18_Nofi_frontmatterApril.vp
Friday, June 25, 2010 3:53:46 PM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

392

TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR

16. Three Splendid Little Wars: The Diary of Joseph K. Taussig, 1898–1901, edited by Evelyn
M. Cherpak (2009).
17. Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War College, the Lessons of World War Two, and Future
Naval Warfare, 1945–1947, Hal M. Friedman (2010).

HM18_Nofi_p392series.ps
C:\_WIP\_HM18-Nofi\HM18_Nofi_frontmatterApril.vp
Tuesday, June 29, 2010 11:46:15 AM

NAVAL
WAR
COLLEGE
PRES
S

Al
be
r
tA.
Nof
i

TheU.
S
.
Na
v
yFl
e
e
tPr
obl
e
ms
,
1
9
2
3
–1
9
4
0

